mirror of
https://github.com/tiennm99/DocsGPT.git
synced 2026-10-04 12:13:05 +00:00
arc53-machine
25c82003d7
Correctness - /api/remote never recorded source.created, so URL, GitHub and connector sources had a source.deleted with no matching creation. All three creation paths now go through one _audit_source_created helper. - The prompt-cache rate divided cached tokens by a whole bucket's prompt tokens. A bucket is a day and mixes calls whose provider reports a cache breakdown with calls whose provider does not, so filtering buckets in the client could not separate them and the rate was understated by however much traffic ran on a non-reporting provider. The denominator is now computed in SQL over the reporting rows. - The outcome pill matched values nothing writes. Guardrails emit triggered / not_evaluated and the device feed emits dispatched; the map had blocked / denied / allowed, so a guardrail that fired rendered neutral grey -- the one signal the merged feed exists to surface. Fixtures were seeding the fictional values, so the tests passed on it too. - Stream duration_ms timed the consumer. stream_token_usage is a generator, so start-to-exhaustion includes the agent loop's tool handling and the SSE client's pace; a slow browser recorded ~30s for a sub-second call. It now accumulates only the time spent inside next(). Safety - Activity filters failed open: an unknown facet or unparseable timestamp was dropped, and no filter means every row, so a typo widened an audit view and on the export streamed the full history. Both are now a 400. - The search term was interpolated into an ILIKE pattern, so "100%" matched everything and "q1_report" matched more than it should. Escaped. - 0034 set actor_id NOT NULL with no default. A previous-release process inserting mid-rollout would raise, and in admin/routes.py that insert shares the request transaction, so a role grant beside it would roll back too. Noise and dead code - The per-user panel is a security panel: data-plane events file under the actor, so an active account's routine deletes pushed a denied login out of the 20-row window. It now excludes them; the Activity tab shows everything. - device_audit_log had no created_at-leading index, so the merged feed sequentially scanned that branch every page (migration 0036). - conversation.deleted_all no longer records when nothing was deleted, and agent.updated no longer records an empty field list. - Dropped by_model from /admin/usage (no consumer; an extra aggregate per page load), the duplicate filter surface on AuthEventsRepository that nothing called, and the unreachable FLOW_LABELS.schedule entry. - Type hints on record_event's conn and the remaining unannotated helpers.
75 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
75 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
"""Shared audit-trail helper for recording data-plane and identity events.
|
|
|
|
Identity and access events (login, role grants, provisioning) have been
|
|
audited since ``auth_events`` was introduced. Data-plane actions — creating and
|
|
deleting sources, agents, agent keys and conversations — were not, which left
|
|
the trail unable to answer "who deleted that source". :func:`record_event` is
|
|
the one-line hook those routes use.
|
|
|
|
Two properties matter and are enforced here rather than at every call site:
|
|
|
|
1. **An audit write can never fail the action it records.** The insert runs in
|
|
a SAVEPOINT so a rejected row rolls back alone, and any exception is
|
|
swallowed with a log line.
|
|
2. **Request context is optional.** Celery tasks (ingestion finishing, a
|
|
scheduled run) have no Flask request; the row simply records without an IP
|
|
or user agent instead of raising.
|
|
|
|
The event → category taxonomy the admin activity feed filters on lives in
|
|
``docsgpt/audit_events.py``, which the storage layer needs too.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import logging
|
|
from typing import Any, Optional
|
|
|
|
from flask import has_request_context, request
|
|
from sqlalchemy import Connection
|
|
|
|
from docsgpt.storage.db.repositories.auth_events import AuthEventsRepository
|
|
|
|
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def record_event(
|
|
conn: Connection,
|
|
event: str,
|
|
*,
|
|
actor: Optional[str],
|
|
target: Optional[str] = None,
|
|
**metadata: Any,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""Append one audit event, best-effort, inside the caller's transaction.
|
|
|
|
Args:
|
|
conn: Open SQLAlchemy ``Connection`` -- not a Session -- inside the
|
|
action's transaction, so the audit row commits atomically with the
|
|
change it describes and ``begin_nested`` gives it a real SAVEPOINT.
|
|
event: Dotted event name (``source.deleted``, ``agent.created``).
|
|
actor: Who performed the action; ``"unknown"`` when unauthenticated.
|
|
target: The user acted upon, when the event is about a user. Data-plane
|
|
events act on a resource, not an account, so they leave this None.
|
|
**metadata: Free-form detail for the audit drill-down. ``None`` values
|
|
are dropped so the stored object only carries what was known.
|
|
"""
|
|
detail = {key: value for key, value in metadata.items() if value is not None}
|
|
ip = request.remote_addr if has_request_context() else None
|
|
user_agent = request.headers.get("User-Agent") if has_request_context() else None
|
|
resolved_actor = actor or "unknown"
|
|
try:
|
|
with conn.begin_nested():
|
|
AuthEventsRepository(conn).insert(
|
|
# ``user_id`` is the per-user feed key: the target when the
|
|
# event is about someone, else the actor's own trail.
|
|
user_id=target or resolved_actor,
|
|
event=event,
|
|
ip=ip,
|
|
user_agent=user_agent,
|
|
metadata=detail,
|
|
actor_id=resolved_actor,
|
|
target_id=target,
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
logger.warning("audit insert failed for event=%s", event, exc_info=True)
|