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DocsGPT/tests/api/user/sources
Alex 41b3afed14 fix: stop leaking connector OAuth session tokens to other origins
The connector OAuth popup posted the session token to window.opener with
a '*' target origin, so any page that opened the popup received it. An
attacker with an account on a multi-user deployment could start a flow for
their own pending session, get a victim to finish the provider consent, and
receive a token backed by the victim's Drive/SharePoint/Confluence tokens.

- Post popup results only to allowed frontend origins: the callback origin,
  OIDC_FRONTEND_URL, the new CONNECTOR_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, and localhost:5173
  when the callback runs on a loopback host.
- Render the success page from the callback itself so the token never
  appears in a URL; callback-status ignores session_token/user_email params.
- ConnectorAuth accepts messages only from the popup it opened, on the
  callback origin reported by /api/connectors/auth.
- /api/connectors/disconnect requires auth and only deletes the caller's
  session.
- /api/connectors/sync and /api/remote reject session tokens the caller
  does not own.

Fixes #2766
2026-09-14 21:46:09 +01:00
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