Alex 95c19f0fe7 Document sandboxed code execution in the threat model ...

Add code execution as an attack surface and an isolation threat: untrusted
LLM-authored code runs in the sandbox, and the self-hosted Jupyter runner is a
single trust domain (shared container/uid). Record the mitigations (approval
gating, state passed as data not code, scrubbed kernel secrets, 0700 workspaces,
network-layer egress) and that per-tenant isolation means the Daytona
per-session-VM backend or running the runner under gVisor.

2026-06-25 09:47:14 +01:00

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ISSUE_TEMPLATE

Update bug_report.yml

2023-10-03 15:14:44 +01:00

styles

feat: pg migration, more tables

2026-04-12 12:15:59 +01:00

workflows

Frontend component cleanup (#2495)

2026-05-25 14:54:15 +01:00

dependabot.yml

chore(dependabot): add react-widget npm dependency updates (#2146)

2025-11-07 17:17:46 +02:00

FUNDING.yml

Create FUNDING.yml

2025-01-09 18:16:25 +00:00

holopin.yml

Update holopin.yml

2024-10-21 16:23:46 +01:00

INCIDENT_RESPONSE.md

Fix secret references in INCIDENT_RESPONSE.md to match actual DocsGPT config

2026-04-14 10:51:22 +00:00

labeler.yml

Update labeler.yml

2024-11-03 21:22:34 +00:00

PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md

ci(root): add pull request markdown template

2023-10-03 13:04:32 +01:00

THREAT_MODEL.md

Document sandboxed code execution in the threat model

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