fix(security): harden API endpoints and resolve PR #674 review findings

- Fix X-Forwarded-For header spoofing in requireSensitiveLocalAccess (use socket-level address only)
- Add model ID length validation (max 256 chars) in PUT /models/:provider
- Add provider name validation (alphanumeric, max 64 chars) to prevent path traversal
- Add stale entry eviction for unbounded quotaRateLimits Map (>1000 entries)
- Fix concurrent refresh race in usage aggregator (wait for in-flight before forced refresh)
- Sanitize internal URLs/paths from OAuth failure diagnostics
- Add ValidationError class for denylist violations (distinct from system errors)
- Make CLIProxy sync interval configurable via CCS_CLIPROXY_SYNC_INTERVAL env var
- Improve legacy continuity config error logging (unconditional warn)
- Add CACHE_VERSION history comments

src/auth/profile-continuity-inheritance.ts

@@ -52,13 +52,11 @@ function loadLegacyContinuityInheritanceMap(): Record<string, string> {
 
     return normalized;
   } catch (error) {
-    if (process.env.CCS_DEBUG) {
+    console.error(
-      console.error(
+      warn(
-        warn(
+        `Failed to parse legacy continuity mapping at "${configJsonPath}": ${(error as Error).message}`
-          `Failed to parse legacy continuity mapping at "${configJsonPath}": ${(error as Error).message}`
+      )
-        )
+    );
-      );
-    }
     return {};
   }
 }

src/cliproxy/auth/oauth-process.ts

@@ -304,8 +304,12 @@ async function handleTokenNotFound(
   console.log('');
 
   if (failureReason) {
+    // Sanitize internal URLs/paths from failure reason to avoid leaking infrastructure details
+    const sanitizedReason = failureReason
+      .replace(/https?:\/\/(?:localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|0\.0\.0\.0)[^\s]*/gi, '[internal-url]')
+      .replace(/\/(?:root|home|opt|tmp|var)\/[^\s]*/g, '[path]');
     console.log(fail('Authentication completed but token was not persisted'));
-    console.log(`    ${failureReason}`);
+    console.log(`    ${sanitizedReason}`);
     console.log('');
     console.log('This usually means provider-side authorization was accepted,');
     console.log('but CLIProxy failed a post-auth verification or token save step.');

src/errors/error-types.ts

@@ -155,6 +155,20 @@ export class UserAbortError extends CCSError {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Input validation errors (model denylist, invalid format, length limits)
+ * Distinguishes user-input validation failures from system errors
+ */
+export class ValidationError extends CCSError {
+  constructor(
+    message: string,
+    public readonly field?: string
+  ) {
+    super(message, ExitCode.GENERAL_ERROR, false);
+    this.name = 'ValidationError';
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Type guard to check if an error is a CCSError
  */

src/web-server/routes/cliproxy-stats-routes.ts

@@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ function buildQuotaRateLimitKey(req: Request, provider: string): string {
 function isQuotaRouteRateLimited(req: Request, provider: string): boolean {
   const key = buildQuotaRateLimitKey(req, provider);
   const now = Date.now();
+
+  // Evict stale entries to prevent unbounded memory growth
+  if (quotaRateLimits.size > 1000) {
+    for (const [k, v] of quotaRateLimits) {
+      if (now - v.windowStart >= QUOTA_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS * 2) {
+        quotaRateLimits.delete(k);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
   const current = quotaRateLimits.get(key);
 
   if (!current || now - current.windowStart >= QUOTA_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS) {
@@ -584,6 +594,13 @@ router.get('/auth-files/download', async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<
 router.put('/models/:provider', async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
   try {
     const { provider } = req.params;
+
+    // Validate provider name to prevent path traversal via crafted provider param
+    if (!provider || provider.length > 64 || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(provider)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid provider name' });
+      return;
+    }
+
     const { model } = req.body;
 
     if (!model || typeof model !== 'string') {
@@ -591,6 +608,11 @@ router.put('/models/:provider', async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<voi
       return;
     }
 
+    if (model.length > 256) {
+      res.status(400).json({ error: 'Model ID exceeds maximum length (256 characters)' });
+      return;
+    }
+
     const deniedReason = getDeniedModelIdReasonForProvider(model, provider);
     if (deniedReason) {
       res.status(400).json({ error: deniedReason });

src/web-server/routes/route-helpers.ts

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {
 } from '../../cliproxy/model-id-normalizer';
 import type { CLIProxyProvider } from '../../cliproxy/types';
 import type { Config, Settings } from '../../types/config';
+import { ValidationError } from '../../errors/error-types';
 
 /** Model mapping for API profiles */
 export interface ModelMapping {
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ export function createSettingsFile(
     canonicalHaikuModel,
   ]);
   if (deniedReason) {
-    throw new Error(deniedReason);
+    throw new ValidationError(deniedReason, 'model');
   }
   const droidProvider = resolveDroidProvider({
     provider,
@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ export function updateSettingsFile(
       : settings.env?.ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL,
   ]);
   if (deniedReason) {
-    throw new Error(deniedReason);
+    throw new ValidationError(deniedReason, 'model');
   }
 
   if (updates.baseUrl) {

src/web-server/routes/settings-routes.ts

@@ -78,10 +78,10 @@ function requireSensitiveLocalAccess(req: Request, res: Response): boolean {
     return true;
   }
 
-  const forwarded = req.headers['x-forwarded-for'];
+  // Use only socket-level address for security decisions.
-  const firstForwarded =
+  // X-Forwarded-For is trivially spoofable and must NOT be trusted
-    typeof forwarded === 'string' ? forwarded.split(',')[0]?.trim() : undefined;
+  // without an explicit trust proxy configuration.
-  const candidateAddress = firstForwarded || req.socket.remoteAddress || req.ip;
+  const candidateAddress = req.socket.remoteAddress;
 
   if (isLoopbackAddress(candidateAddress)) {
     return true;

src/web-server/usage/aggregator.ts

@@ -378,8 +378,17 @@ async function refreshFromSourceCoalesced(force = false): Promise<{
   monthly: MonthlyUsage[];
   session: SessionUsage[];
 }> {
+  // Wait for any in-flight refresh to finish before starting a forced one
+  // to prevent concurrent refreshes competing for the same resources
+  if (force && pendingFullRefresh) {
+    await pendingFullRefresh.catch(() => {});
+  }
+
   if (force) {
-    return refreshFromSource();
+    pendingFullRefresh = refreshFromSource().finally(() => {
+      pendingFullRefresh = null;
+    });
+    return pendingFullRefresh;
   }
 
   if (pendingFullRefresh) {

src/web-server/usage/cliproxy-usage-syncer.ts

@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ interface CliproxyUsageSnapshot {
 
 const SNAPSHOT_VERSION = 1;
 
+/** Sync interval in ms, configurable via CCS_CLIPROXY_SYNC_INTERVAL env var (default: 5 min) */
+const SYNC_INTERVAL_MS = Math.max(
+  30_000,
+  parseInt(process.env.CCS_CLIPROXY_SYNC_INTERVAL ?? '300000', 10) || 300_000
+);
+
 // Module-level interval ID
 let syncIntervalId: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null;
 
@@ -149,17 +155,15 @@ export function startCliproxySync(): void {
     return;
   }
 
-  console.log(info('Starting CLIProxy usage sync (interval: 5 min)'));
+  const intervalMin = Math.round(SYNC_INTERVAL_MS / 60_000);
+  console.log(info(`Starting CLIProxy usage sync (interval: ${intervalMin} min)`));
 
   // Fire-and-forget initial sync
   void syncCliproxyUsage();
 
-  syncIntervalId = setInterval(
+  syncIntervalId = setInterval(() => {
-    () => {
+    void syncCliproxyUsage();
-      void syncCliproxyUsage();
+  }, SYNC_INTERVAL_MS);
-    },
-    5 * 60 * 1000
-  );
 }
 
 /**

src/web-server/usage/disk-cache.ts

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ export interface UsageDiskCache {
 }
 
 // Current cache version - increment to invalidate old caches
+// v1: Initial cache format (daily, monthly, session)
+// v2: Added multi-instance aggregation
 // v3: Added hourly data to cache
 // v4: Pricing fix for Claude 4.6 models (invalidate stale costs)
 const CACHE_VERSION = 4;