* fix(sandbox): avoid shell in FsBridge writes
Replace sh -c with interpolated path by shell-free 'tee -- <path>' argv form,
piping content via stdin. Prevents command injection through filenames
containing shell metacharacters inside the sandbox container.
Co-authored-by: evgyur <evgyur@gmail.com>
* fix(security): fail-closed on pairing DB errors across channels
On IsPaired lookup error, deny instead of granting access. Covers the shared
CheckDMPolicy/CheckGroupPolicy helpers (Slack/Discord/Feishu/WhatsApp/Zalo) and
the four inline Telegram pairing checks.
Co-authored-by: Srini <srinis.k@gmail.com>
* fix(security): harden provider URL validation against SSRF
Enforce scheme check for all provider types; restrict local types (ollama,
claude_cli, acp) to an explicit localhost allowlist instead of skipping checks;
resolve remote hostnames and reject any IP in a private/reserved range via the
shared security.IsBlocked CIDR list (covers loopback, link-local, metadata,
multicast, and unspecified 0.0.0.0/::). Closes the wildcard-DNS bypass and the
local-type escape hatch. Operator opt-in via GOCLAW_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS.
Exports security.IsBlocked as the single source of truth for blocked ranges.
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
* feat(pipeline): add fail-closed tool call authorization gate
Gate tool execution against the server-side AllowedTools allowlist built from the
RBAC/tenant-aware filtered tool set. Resolve the tool-call prefix before the
allowlist lookup so prefixed agents are not wrongly blocked, re-check deny on lazy
MCP activation, and expand IsDenied to cover aliased tool names.
Co-authored-by: Huy Doan <tui@pm.me>
* fix(security): expand file-serve deny-list defense-in-depth
Add absolute-path deny prefixes (/home, /Users, /srv, /var/lib, /var/www, /opt)
and an explicit fail-closed log when no file-serving boundary is configured.
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
* fix(providers): allow claude cli executable paths
Refs: #1185
---------
Co-authored-by: evgyur <evgyur@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Srini <srinis.k@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
Co-authored-by: Huy Doan <tui@pm.me>
Phase 2 (a587231b) advertised SSRF hardening for the http hook handler
but the supporting `internal/security` package was never created, so the
production HTTPHandler fell back to a bare http.Client and admin-config
webhooks could probe loopback / link-local / RFC1918 / cloud-metadata.
- internal/security/ssrf.go: Validate(rawURL) parses + resolves once,
rejects loopback/link-local/private/multicast/unspecified + 169.254.169.254;
NewSafeClient(timeout) returns an http.Client whose DialContext pins the
resolved IP from context (defense-in-depth re-checks the dialed IP) and
refuses redirects (CheckRedirect = ErrUseLastResponse)
- internal/hooks/handlers/http_handler.go: call Validate before each request,
attach pinned IP via security.WithPinnedIP(ctx, ip)
- cmd/gateway_managed.go: construct HTTPHandler with
Client: security.NewSafeClient(10*time.Second)
- tests: 13 new ssrf_test.go cases (every block category + redirect refused
+ dial pinned); existing http_test.go retrofitted with
security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest helper for httptest.NewServer
- plan: phase-02 Step 2a marked done with reference to this commit
Refs: GitHub Issue #875
