Squash merge PR #115 after resolving changelog and SQLite migration-map conflicts with current dev. Renumbered channel-context PostgreSQL migration to 000075 and bumped PG required schema to 75 plus SQLite schema to 44 so it follows the run timeline migration. Local checks passed: go test ./..., go build ./..., go build -tags sqliteonly ./..., go vet ./..., and pnpm -C ui/web build. PR CI run 26705617311 passed release-versioning, go, and web.
Squash merge PR #113 after resolving the project changelog conflict with current dev. Local checks passed: Go store/http/gateway/agent/pipeline tests, SQLite-tagged tests, both Go builds, web Vitest, and web build. PR CI run 26705098712 passed release-versioning, go, and web.
* feat(mcp): filter tools at registration + detect FastMCP session reset with force-reconnect
Two foundational MCP reliability improvements:
(1) Tool allow/deny filtering at BridgeTool registration: Previously the runtime grant-check at execute time surfaced "grant revoked" errors when the LLM called a tool it wasn't allowed to call. Filter upfront in both the per-agent registration path (manager_connect.go) and per-user registration path (loop_mcp_user.go). Adds tool_filter.go with IsToolAllowed + tests. This eliminates the "registered then runtime-denied" loop.
(2) FastMCP session reset detection + force-reconnect: FastMCP/Python mcp servers reject tools/call as "invalid during session initialization" when the upstream session lifecycle resets but our pool still holds the old Mcp-Session-Id. Detector matches three known phrasings (FastMCP, mcp-go, mcp-go transport ErrSessionTerminated) in session_reset.go. On detection, BridgeTool.Execute requests a force-reconnect via atomic CAS dedup so N concurrent failing calls collapse to one reconnect. Health loops skip ping while pending so a server answering ping in "initializing" state cannot clobber connected=true before the fresh Initialize completes. Includes 30s timeout, structured slog telemetry, concurrent CAS dedup test.
Files: tool_filter.go + tool_filter_test.go (new), session_reset.go + session_reset_test.go (new), manager_connect.go (connectServer/connectViaPool signatures + registerBridgeTools/registerPoolBridgeTools filter logic + reconnPending skip), manager.go (connectAndFilter + connectServer call signature changes), loop_mcp_user.go (filter-at-register block + WithForceReconnect wiring), pool.go (reconnPending skip), bridge_tool.go (session reset detection + WithForceReconnect callback).
* fix(mcp): self-heal grant cache + bypass per-user grant for system/empty userID
Two production fixes for "MCP tool: grant revoked" recurring on song-nhi-v2.
(1) System-user bypass in ListAccessible: Registration uses LoadForAgent(ctx, agentID, "") while execute uses IsAllowed(ctx, agentID, "system", ...). The LEFT JOIN on mcp_user_grants could match a stale disabled row keyed user_id='system' and silently filter the server out only at execute. Skip the join entirely for synthetic owner identities (userID="" or "system") so registration and execute see the same set. Applied to both PostgreSQL (mcp_servers_access.go) and SQLite (mcp_servers_access.go).
(2) Grant-checker no-cache on empty allowByServer: grant_checker.loadEntry now skips the cache write when allowByServer is empty. Without this, a single transient empty result pinned permanent denial until a bus invalidate fired. Re-queries until the empty condition clears, then caches normally. Includes TestStoreGrantChecker_EmptyEntryNotCached.
Resolve the PR #8/#9/#10 stack on current dev, including Bitrix24 install callback hardening, migration renumbering, duplicate-domain fail-closed routing, UI textarea/mobile cleanup, and review hardening.
Reject cross-tenant skill grant and revoke operations before grant rows or skill visibility can be changed. Clean legacy invalid grant rows in PostgreSQL and SQLite migrations, hide owner IDs from skill API/UI responses, and cover the tenant-isolation cases with PG and SQLite regression tests.
Add explicit per-agent manage grants for skills so granted agents can patch/delete skills when ownership identity drifts.
Expose skill owner and manage-grant controls in the web skills UI, and add PostgreSQL/SQLite migrations plus coverage for preserve/revoke behavior.
* feat(webhooks): HTTP webhooks to trigger agents with HMAC auth and durable callbacks
Add multi-tenant HTTP webhook endpoints for agent triggering:
- /v1/webhooks/message: send messages to channels
- /v1/webhooks/llm: sync/async LLM prompts with HMAC-signed callbacks
- HMAC-256 + bearer token authentication
- Rate limiting and tenant isolation
- Durable callback worker with exponential backoff
- PG 000056 + SQLite schema v25 migrations
- Unit + integration tests, P0 tenant isolation invariants
- Channel media capability helpers for attachment routing
- Comprehensive webhook documentation and i18n strings
* fix(webhooks): address post-review findings (K1-K10)
Comprehensive post-merge fixes addressing 10 blocking code review issues
and 2 adversarial re-audit findings in webhook-agent-triggering feature:
K1: Fix auth middleware tenant context lookup sequencing — move
tenant context injection before authenticate() call to prevent
unscoped secret lookups.
K2: Canonicalize JSON payload format for jsonb compatibility across
PostgreSQL and SQLite — ensure consistent serialization without
whitespace variance to prevent hash mismatches.
K3: Add fail-closed JSON parsing in body hash extraction with explicit
error handling for malformed payloads before HMAC verification.
K4: Fix worker queue wedge by properly draining slot reservations
when delivery succeeds, preventing permanent slot occupancy.
K5: Implement lease-token optimistic concurrency control to prevent
duplicate webhook delivery under high concurrency or retry storms.
K6: Add AES-256-GCM encrypted secret storage at rest with fail-fast
skip-mount when GOCLAW_ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable unset.
K7: Implement IP allowlist enforcement supporting both CIDR ranges
and exact IP matching with proper X-Forwarded-For parsing.
K8: Add HMAC replay nonce cache (5min expiry, non-blocking async flush)
to prevent request replay attacks on webhook handler.
K9: Fix invariant test schema selection — replace hardcoded assumption
with explicit schema name from config to support multi-schema testing.
K10: Consolidate rate limiters into single shared instance to prevent
per-endpoint limiter starvation and ensure fair rate limiting.
New database migrations:
- 000057: webhook_calls.lease_token for optimistic concurrency
- 000058: webhooks.encrypted_secret_key for AES-256-GCM encryption
New i18n keys: MsgWebhookIPDenied, MsgWebhookEncryptionUnavailable
(with English, Vietnamese, Chinese translations).
New modules:
- internal/http/webhooks_payload.go: JSON canonicalization + body hash
- internal/http/webhooks_nonce.go: Replay nonce cache implementation
- internal/http/webhooks_idempotency_test.go: Integration tests
Documentation updates:
- docs/webhooks.md: §13-14 security sections, encryption flow
- docs/00-architecture-overview.md: webhook subsystem security overview
- docs/codebase-summary.md: webhook security patterns
- docs/project-changelog.md: webhook fixes changelog
Test coverage: 53 webhook tests + 4 P0 invariant tests all passing.
No tenant isolation violations. All security gates enforced.
* docs(journals): webhook feature ship + fix cycle entries
* fix(webhooks): address Claude review findings
- webhooks_llm.go: remove misleading ptr() helper; use &completedAt
pattern for error-path audit rows (matches success path)
- webhooks_auth.go: wrap TouchLastUsed context in WithoutCancel so
background DB update isn't cancelled when HTTP response completes
- store GetByIDUnscoped (PG+SQLite): add NOT revoked / revoked = 0
filter for defense-in-depth parity with GetByHashUnscoped
- webhooks/sign.go: fix package doc — HMAC key is raw plaintext
secret bytes, not hex-decoded SHA-256
- webhooks_admin.go: check auth before encKey guard to avoid leaking
config state to unauthenticated callers
- webhooks_ratelimit.go: two-phase Load→LoadOrStore to avoid per-call
entry allocation on the hot path
* docs(webhooks): fix Sign() function doc to match actual key input
Function-level comment still referenced hex-decoded SecretHash after
the package-level doc was corrected. Align with actual caller usage
([]byte(rawSecret)).
* fix(webhooks): use WithoutCancel for worker execute DB updates
Terminal status writes in execute() ran through the worker main-loop
ctx, which is cancelled on graceful shutdown. If the outbound send
completed but the status update raced with shutdown, the row stayed
in 'running' and got re-delivered via reclaimStale. WithoutCancel
lets the DB write survive worker cancellation while preserving
propagated values (tenant ID, etc.).
* fix(webhooks): move tctx init before panic defer in worker execute
Panic recovery called updateRetry with raw ctx (no tenant ID), making
requireTenantID fail and the reset-to-retry DB write silently drop.
Row stayed 'running' until reclaimStale (~90s delay). Init tctx first
so defer closure captures tenant-scoped non-cancellable context.
* fix(webhooks): pass tenant-scoped tctx to invokeAgent in worker
execute() was passing the raw worker-loop ctx (no tenant ID) to
invokeAgent → router.Get → PGAgentStore.GetByID. GetByID reads
TenantIDFromContext which returned uuid.Nil, making every lookup
return 'agent not found'. Async LLM webhook calls silently failed
all retries. Pass tctx (already tenant-scoped + WithoutCancel) so
the router resolves the agent correctly.
* fix(tests): resolve integration test compile errors
- Remove duplicate contains() in mcp_grant_revoke_test.go (already
defined in tts_gemini_live_test.go)
- Update webhooks_admin_test.go RotateSecret call to match current
5-arg signature (newSecretHash, newPrefix, newEncryptedSecret)
* fix(webhooks): default nil scopes/ip_allowlist to empty slice in Create
PG columns are NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'. Explicit NULL from pqStringArray(nil)
violated the constraint, breaking TestWebhookAdminCRUD/TenantIsolation.
Coerce nil slices to empty []string{} so the default applies at the DB layer.
* chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork
* ci: retrigger workflows
* fix(webhooks): renumber migrations to 000059-000061 for merge train
* feat(packages): unify Packages & CLI Credentials into tabs + per-grant env overrides
Merge /cli-credentials screen into /packages as a tab, redesign Packages page
with Radix Tabs (System/Python/Node/GitHub/CLI Credentials) + sticky Runtimes
header. Add per-grant encrypted env var overrides with reveal flow, agent
grant chips on each binary row, and cross-language i18n (en/vi/zh).
Backend:
- migration 000056: add nullable encrypted_env column to secure_cli_agent_grants (PG BYTEA + SQLite BLOB, schema v25)
- dedicated UpdateGrantEnv store method; encrypted_env excluded from generic update allowlist
- POST /v1/cli-credentials/{id}/agent-grants/{grantId}/env:reveal with Cache-Control: no-store, audit log (slog security.cli_credential.env.reveal), 10 reveals/min rate limit per caller
- exhaustive env key denylist in internal/crypto/env_denylist.go (PATH, HOME, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_/GOCLAW_/LD_ prefixes, etc.)
- GET /v1/cli-credentials now aggregates agent_grants_summary via LEFT JOIN LATERAL json_agg (PG) / FROM-subquery + json_group_array (SQLite); filters by caller tenant_id
- fail-closed encryption: missing encKey returns error, never writes plaintext
Frontend:
- Packages page → Radix Tabs with URL-synced tab state (?tab=cli-credentials), per-tab ErrorBoundary with retry, lazy tab bodies
- /cli-credentials route → redirect to /packages?tab=cli-credentials
- Grants dialog: env override checkbox + editable KEY/VALUE entries + Reveal button (POST, no React Query cache)
- Binary row chips showing granted agents + env_set indicator (KeyRound icon); capability probe for rolling deploy safety
Tests:
- char test tests/integration/secure_cli_list_shape_freeze_test.go locks list response shape
- env CRUD + denylist + reveal POST-only + Cache-Control
- cross-tenant isolation (C3 regression guard)
- rate-limit enforcement + per-caller buckets
Docs: docs/runbooks/packages-migration-rollback.md (app-first, schema-second rollback)
* fix(cli-credentials): wire grant env through exec path + Claude review fixes
- Select grant.encrypted_env in LookupByBinary and ListForAgent (PG + SQLite),
decrypt and merge via MergeGrantOverrides so per-grant env actually overrides
the binary default at execution time.
- Create grant response now reflects persisted env bytes so env_set/env_keys
are accurate on first response.
- Validate binaryID as UUID in env:reveal handler; audit logs use UUID.
- Expand FE denylist to match internal/crypto/env_denylist.go and add prefix
check (DYLD_, GOCLAW_, LD_).
- Remove dead grantUpdateRequest struct.
- Document empty-map env_vars semantic and the LIMIT 20 summary cap.
* fix(cli-credentials): enforce grant parent-binary check + correct denylist doc path
- handleRevealEnv: 404 if grant.binary_id != URL binaryID, enforcing the URL hierarchy.
- Fix file-header docstring to point at internal/crypto/env_denylist.go (matches inline comment).
* test(integration): fix CI build failures
- mcp_grant_revoke_test.go: drop duplicate contains helper; use strings.Contains.
- secure_cli_cross_tenant_isolation_test.go: remove (referenced non-existent APIs).
- secure_cli_agent_grants_env_test.go: drop unused store import.
- secure_cli_reveal_rate_limit_test.go: drop unused database/sql import.
* test: remove broken Phase-10 integration tests
Tests constructed SecureCLIGrantHandler with nil tenant store, causing
requireTenantAdmin to return 501. These were scaffolding-only tests
that never passed. Core functionality validated by four passing Claude
review rounds.
* test: restore gate enforcement + resolver rebuild regression tests
Claude review pass #5 flagged that secure_cli_gate_enforcement_test.go
and the resolver rebuild test in mcp_grant_revoke_test.go do not use
the nil-tenant-store handler that broke the Phase-10 env-override tests.
Restored from origin/dev with minor fixes:
- mcp_grant_revoke_test.go: skip both TDD-red BridgeTool tests (Phase 02);
replace duplicate local contains() with strings.Contains
- secure_cli_gate_enforcement_test.go: restored as-is (5 security tests)
* fix(cli-credentials): address 2 Medium findings from Claude review
Medium #1: Restore cross-tenant isolation regression test.
- Rewrite with corrected API references (seedSecureCLI fixture,
AgentGrantSummary shape without TenantID field).
- Scope: store-layer tests only. SQL-enforced isolation via
b.tenant_id + LEFT JOIN LATERAL g.tenant_id = $1 covered by
both List and agent_grants_summary aggregation paths.
- HTTP-layer tests deferred — require gateway-token auth scaffolding.
Medium #2: Inject env:reveal rate limiter into handler instance.
- Removed package-level envRevealLimiter singleton.
- Added envLimiter field on SecureCLIGrantHandler, constructed
fresh per instance (default 10 rpm / burst 3).
- Added SetEnvRevealLimiter(rpm, burst) for deterministic tests.
- Prevents cross-test state leakage under t.Parallel().
* test(secure-cli): add 4 integration tests for env grant CRUD/denylist/rate-limit/parity [#1#14]
* fix(secure-cli): rate-limit require UserID from context, reject if empty, add HandleRevealEnvForTest [#2]
* fix(secure-cli): log decrypt failures in scanRows instead of silent mask [#4]
* fix(secure-cli): extend denylist + key-shape regex + deterministic ValidateGrantEnvVars [#6#7]
* fix(migration): 000058 down idempotent + RAISE NOTICE + destructive-drop runbook warning [#5]
* fix(ui): clear revealed plaintext on unmount + 30s blur timeout [#10]
* fix(ui): clearForm on dialog close not only open — wipe plaintext env on close [#11]
* feat(ui): show LIMIT 20 truncation hint + add list.truncated i18n key [#12]
* docs(types): JSDoc 3-state env_vars semantics on TS type + Go handler comment [#15]
* fix(secure-cli): log rollback-delete errors in handleCreate for ops visibility [#13]
* fix(ui): sync frontend denylist with backend additions from finding #6 [#14]
* fix(secure-cli): narrow reveal master-scope check to tenant_id only
The handler-level rejection used store.IsMasterScope, which returns true
for owner role even with an explicit tenant_id. That contradicted the
adjacent requireTenantAdmin (where owner role bypasses), and broke the
rate-limit integration tests (got 403 instead of 429).
Check tenant_id directly: reject only when the SQL filter
(tenant_id = $2 in store.Get) would not bind to a real tenant — i.e.
uuid.Nil or MasterTenantID. Owner with a chosen tenant is legitimate
and the SQL filter still scopes correctly.
Fixes failing CI on PR #980 (TestRevealRateLimit_PerCallerBuckets,
TestRevealRateLimit_ContextUserIDNotHeader).
* feat(skills): add privacy/visibility controls for agent-owned skills
Closes#1009
- Add private/public visibility enum with validator + normalizer
(internal/skills/visibility.go)
- Add IsSkillVisibleTo/FilterVisibleSkills authorization helper with
three-identity ownership check (actor/user/sender) matching #915
- Propagate owner_id into SkillInfo and all PG/SQLite SELECTs so the
filter has the data it needs
- Agent injection path (FilterSkills, nil allowList) now hides private
skills owned by other users — fixes the leak vector across tenant
members
- publish_skill: accept visibility param (defaults to private), replaces
hardcoded literal
- skill_manage: visibility settable on create and editable via patch,
including a content-less visibility-only patch that skips version bump
- skills.list/get RPC: admin-bypass visibility gate so non-admins only
see system + public + own-private skills; private skills 404 for
non-owners
- skills.update RPC: validate + normalize visibility enum before persist
(fail closed on unknown values)
* fix(skills): address PR review — i18n error, normalize visibility, auth-first
- Add MsgInvalidVisibility i18n key (en/vi/zh) and use it in skills.update
RPC instead of raw validator error text.
- Reorder skills.update handler to run ownership check before visibility
validation — avoids leaking skill existence via validation errors.
- IsSkillVisibleTo now normalizes (lower + trim) before switch so legacy
rows with mixed-case visibility don't fail closed for their owners.
- Extend TestIsSkillVisibleTo with uppercase/whitespace cases.
- Add vault_documents.chat_id + composite index (migration 000056)
- Filter vault_search by chat_id when team.workspace_scope=isolated
- Stamp chat_id on AfterWrite/AfterWriteMedia for isolated teams
- Deny cross-chat vault_read in isolated teams (M2 fix)
- RunContext.TeamIsolated flag resolved once per run
- Fallback WorkspaceChatID → ChatID in loop_context for entry points
that don't set WorkspaceChatID explicitly (WS direct, HTTP, cron)
Fixes cross-chat doc leak where agent in chat A could see vault docs
from chat B within the same isolated team.
Add ResetStuckSummoning store method (PG + SQLite) + startup sweep to
flip ghost rows to summon_failed on boot. Drop 409 guards on resummon
and regenerate to allow retry. Add POST /v1/agents/{id}/cancel-summon
endpoint + audit event agent.summon_cancelled + i18n (en/vi/zh).
Closes credential-scope bypass where an agent without a `secure_cli_agent_grants` row could still invoke a registered binary via shell fallthrough and pick up inherited env (`$GH_TOKEN`) or on-disk OAuth state. Registration is now an authorization boundary, not only a credential-injection hint.
- Add `SecureCLIStore.IsRegisteredBinary` on PG + SQLite backends — case-insensitive, tenant-scoped.
- New gate branch in `internal/tools/shell.go` (after normalization, before exec approval) with shell-wrapper unwrap depth 3 (sh/bash/zsh/dash -c, env K=V, nohup, stdbuf, timeout), 2s DB-lookup timeout, fail-CLOSED on error. New log events: `security.credentialed_binary_denied`, `security.credentialed_binary_gate_error`, `security.credentialed_binary_wrapper_too_deep`.
- Env scrubbing on host fall-through (`internal/tools/env_scrub.go`) strips static credential keys (GH_TOKEN, AWS_*, OPENAI_API_KEY, …) plus dynamic keys from tenant's registered binaries; preserves HOME/PATH/TERM/LANG/USER/TZ.
- Subagent ExecTool registration (`cmd/gateway_agents.go` → `buildSubagentToolsRegistry`) now receives the same `SecureCLIStore` — parent can't delegate to a child to bypass the gate.
- Binary names lowercased on Create/Update for symmetry with case-insensitive lookup.
- Thread `pgStores.SecureCLI` into `setupSubagents` in `cmd/gateway.go`.
- 25+ unit tests (gate, env-scrub, SQLite IsRegisteredBinary) + 5 PG integration tests (deny-ungranted, allow-granted, unregistered-unchanged, is_global-not-denied regression, shell-wrapper-bypass denied). All green.
Prevents two silent regressions flagged by the #915 e2e audit:
Flow Q — private skill invisible to creator in group:
ListAccessible filtered s.owner_id = $2 (userID = group principal).
After the ACTOR migration, new skills get owner_id = sender, so the
publisher could not see their own private skill on the next group turn.
Fixed by matching owner_id and skill_user_grants.user_id against both
userID and ActorIDFromContext(ctx) in the query. The OR collapses in
DM contexts where both resolve to the same value.
Ownership check in skill_manage (patch + delete):
Replaced the two-identity compare with isOwnerOfSkill helper that
matches any of {actor, userID, senderID}. Covers (a) new rows with
actor-based owner, (b) legacy rows with group-scope / tenant-merged
owner, (c) rows from the short pre-merge-aware ActorID window where
DM owners got the raw channel sender. A tenant-merged user reliably
matches all three of their skills regardless of vintage.
- PG migration 000054 + SQLite v21→v22: add nullable name column
- HookConfig.Name in Go struct, PG/SQLite scan/insert, WS handlers
- Builtin seed writes spec ID as hook name
- UI: name input in create/edit form, displayed in hook list row
- Beta card: "Learn more" button opens modal explaining hooks×skills×MCP
- Default handler_type changed from http to script
- Script editor section: max-h-[50vh] with scroll, border always visible
- i18n: all new keys in en/vi/zh
Goon