5 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Goon	75c570e951	feat(security): credentialed exec + HTTP RBAC + API key cache (#197) ... - Secure CLI credential injection via AES-256-GCM encrypted env vars - API key management with fine-grained RBAC scopes - resolveAuth/requireAuth middleware across all 25+ HTTP handlers - In-memory API key cache with TTL, negative caching, pubsub invalidation - Sandbox-first execution (fails if unavailable, no silent fallback) - Credential scrubbing, constant-time token comparison, Admin-only CLI creds - SQL migration 000020: secure_cli_binaries + api_keys tables - 14 unit tests for cache and RBAC with race detector Closes #197	2026-03-15 20:13:18 +07:00
viettranx	ae89239dd5	feat: Refine tool policies with updated groups and aliases, and enhance credential scrubbing by dynamically detecting and redacting server IPs.	2026-03-02 20:34:25 +07:00
viettranx	74d85c8dd5	feat(security): enforce group file writer restrictions + harden exec against env/config leaks ... Group writer enforcement (managed mode): - GroupWriterCache with 5min TTL wrapping AgentStore.ListGroupFileWriters - Tool-level blocking: write_file, edit, read_file (SOUL.md/AGENTS.md), cron mutations - System prompt injection: non-writers get refusal instructions + filtered context files - Cache invalidation via bus events on add/remove writer - Wired through resolver, loop, gateway_managed, gateway_callbacks Exec security hardening: - Block /proc/PID/environ and /proc/self/environ reads (env var exfiltration) - Block strings on /proc files (binary env dump) - DenyPaths() on ExecTool: block data dir, .goclaw/, config file from exec commands - Scrub VIRTUAL_* env vars from tool output Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-03-02 19:22:21 +07:00
Viet Tran	2991283901	Add environment variable dumping protections and expand credential scrubbing patterns ... Remove env/printenv from safe bins list and add deny patterns for bare env/printenv/set/export commands that dump all environment variables including secrets. Expand credential scrubbing to detect connection strings (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MongoDB, Redis, AMQP), generic KEY=/SECRET=/CREDENTIAL= environment variables, DSN/DATABASE_URL patterns, and long hex strings (64+ chars) that may be encryption keys or hashes.	2026-02-22 22:00:35 +07:00
Viet Tran	f3f4c67b36	Initial commit: GoClaw AI agent gateway ... Multi-agent AI gateway with WebSocket RPC, HTTP API, and messaging channel integrations. Go port of OpenClaw with multi-tenant PostgreSQL, per-user isolation, security hardening, and production observability. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-02-22 14:58:07 +07:00