//go:build integration

package integration

import (
	"context"
	"database/sql"
	"strings"
	"testing"

	"github.com/google/uuid"

	"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
	"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store/pg"
	"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/tools"
)

// gateTestBinaryName is deliberately NOT a real binary on PATH so the
// "allowed" path can never accidentally exec something real.
const gateTestBinaryName = "goclaw_test_cli"

// gateFixture holds the common seeds for gate enforcement tests.
type gateFixture struct {
	db       *sql.DB
	tool     *tools.ExecTool
	tenantID uuid.UUID
	agentA   uuid.UUID
	agentB   uuid.UUID
	binaryID uuid.UUID
}

// setupGateTest seeds: tenant, two agents under that SAME tenant (Red Team F10),
// a non-global registered binary, and a grant only for agentA. Returns a wired
// ExecTool + the IDs. All rows are cleaned up via t.Cleanup.
func setupGateTest(t *testing.T) *gateFixture {
	t.Helper()

	db := testDB(t)
	tenantID, agentA := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
	agentB := seedSecondAgent(t, db, tenantID)
	binaryID := seedGateBinary(t, db, tenantID, gateTestBinaryName, false)
	seedGrant(t, db, tenantID, binaryID, agentA)

	secStore := pg.NewPGSecureCLIStore(db, testEncryptionKey)
	tool := tools.NewExecTool(t.TempDir(), false)
	tool.SetSecureCLIStore(secStore)

	return &gateFixture{
		db:       db,
		tool:     tool,
		tenantID: tenantID,
		agentA:   agentA,
		agentB:   agentB,
		binaryID: binaryID,
	}
}

// seedSecondAgent inserts an additional agent under an existing tenant. Used
// to satisfy Red Team F10: both test agents must share the same tenant to
// prove the gate (not tenant isolation) is what denies ungranted exec.
func seedSecondAgent(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, tenantID uuid.UUID) uuid.UUID {
	t.Helper()

	agentID := uuid.New()
	agentKey := "test-" + agentID.String()[:8]

	_, err := db.Exec(
		`INSERT INTO agents (id, tenant_id, agent_key, agent_type, status, provider, model, owner_id)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'predefined', 'active', 'test', 'test-model', 'test-owner')`,
		agentID, tenantID, agentKey)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("seed second agent: %v", err)
	}

	t.Cleanup(func() {
		db.Exec("DELETE FROM agents WHERE id = $1", agentID)
	})

	return agentID
}

// seedGateBinary inserts a secure_cli_binaries row with a caller-specified
// binary_name and is_global flag. Matches shape used by seedSecureCLI.
func seedGateBinary(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, tenantID uuid.UUID, name string, isGlobal bool) uuid.UUID {
	t.Helper()

	binaryID := uuid.New()
	_, err := db.Exec(
		`INSERT INTO secure_cli_binaries (id, tenant_id, binary_name, encrypted_env, description, enabled, is_global)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'gate test CLI', true, $5)`,
		binaryID, tenantID, name, []byte(`{}`), isGlobal)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("seed gate binary: %v", err)
	}

	t.Cleanup(func() {
		db.Exec("DELETE FROM secure_cli_agent_grants WHERE binary_id = $1", binaryID)
		db.Exec("DELETE FROM secure_cli_user_credentials WHERE binary_id = $1", binaryID)
		db.Exec("DELETE FROM secure_cli_binaries WHERE id = $1", binaryID)
	})

	return binaryID
}

// seedGrant inserts a secure_cli_agent_grants row tying an agent to a binary.
func seedGrant(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, tenantID, binaryID, agentID uuid.UUID) {
	t.Helper()

	_, err := db.Exec(
		`INSERT INTO secure_cli_agent_grants (binary_id, agent_id, tenant_id, enabled)
		 VALUES ($1, $2, $3, true)`,
		binaryID, agentID, tenantID)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("seed grant: %v", err)
	}
}

// gateCtx builds a ctx with tenant + agent set for gate enforcement.
func gateCtx(tenantID, agentID uuid.UUID) context.Context {
	ctx := store.WithTenantID(context.Background(), tenantID)
	return store.WithAgentID(ctx, agentID)
}

// TestSecureCLIGate_DeniesUngranted proves the gate denies ungranted agents
// for a registered, non-global binary (FR2 — the primary fix).
func TestSecureCLIGate_DeniesUngranted(t *testing.T) {
	t.Parallel()

	f := setupGateTest(t)
	ctx := gateCtx(f.tenantID, f.agentB)

	result := f.tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
		"command": gateTestBinaryName + " --help",
	})

	if !result.IsError {
		t.Fatalf("expected IsError=true for ungranted exec, got: %+v", result)
	}
	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "requires a secure CLI grant") {
		t.Fatalf("expected deny message, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
	}
}

// TestSecureCLIGate_AllowsGrantedAgent proves the gate permits a granted
// agent past the deny branch (FR3). The downstream credentialed exec may
// still fail because the binary is not on PATH — we assert only that the
// deny message is NOT returned.
func TestSecureCLIGate_AllowsGrantedAgent(t *testing.T) {
	t.Parallel()

	f := setupGateTest(t)
	ctx := gateCtx(f.tenantID, f.agentA)

	result := f.tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
		"command": gateTestBinaryName + " --help",
	})

	if strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "requires a secure CLI grant") {
		t.Fatalf("granted agent unexpectedly denied: %s", result.ForLLM)
	}
}

// TestSecureCLIGate_UnregisteredBinaryUnchanged proves the gate is a no-op
// for binaries not in the registry (FR4). `echo` must run normally.
func TestSecureCLIGate_UnregisteredBinaryUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
	t.Parallel()

	db := testDB(t)
	tenantID, agentID := seedTenantAgent(t, db)

	secStore := pg.NewPGSecureCLIStore(db, testEncryptionKey)
	tool := tools.NewExecTool(t.TempDir(), false)
	tool.SetSecureCLIStore(secStore)

	ctx := gateCtx(tenantID, agentID)
	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
		"command": "echo hello",
	})

	if result.IsError {
		t.Fatalf("expected no error for unregistered binary, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
	}
	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "hello") {
		t.Fatalf("expected output to contain 'hello', got: %s", result.ForLLM)
	}
}

// TestSecureCLIGate_IsGlobalBinaryNotDenied is Red Team F2 regression guard.
// A global binary (is_global=true) needs no grant; the gate must NOT deny.
func TestSecureCLIGate_IsGlobalBinaryNotDenied(t *testing.T) {
	t.Parallel()

	db := testDB(t)
	tenantID, agentID := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
	seedGateBinary(t, db, tenantID, "goclaw_global_test", true)

	secStore := pg.NewPGSecureCLIStore(db, testEncryptionKey)
	tool := tools.NewExecTool(t.TempDir(), false)
	tool.SetSecureCLIStore(secStore)

	ctx := gateCtx(tenantID, agentID)
	result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
		"command": "goclaw_global_test --help",
	})

	if strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "requires a secure CLI grant") {
		t.Fatalf("global binary unexpectedly denied by gate: %s", result.ForLLM)
	}
}

// TestSecureCLIGate_ShellWrapperBypassDenied is Red Team F1 integration guard.
// Wrapping the registered binary in `sh -c '...'` must still hit the deny path.
func TestSecureCLIGate_ShellWrapperBypassDenied(t *testing.T) {
	t.Parallel()

	f := setupGateTest(t)
	ctx := gateCtx(f.tenantID, f.agentB)

	result := f.tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{
		"command": "sh -c '" + gateTestBinaryName + " --help'",
	})

	if !result.IsError {
		t.Fatalf("expected IsError=true for wrapped exec, got: %+v", result)
	}
	if !strings.Contains(result.ForLLM, "requires a secure CLI grant") {
		t.Fatalf("expected deny message for sh -c wrap, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
	}
}