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Duy /zuey/andGitHub e589545ff5 feat(packages): unify Packages & CLI Credentials + per-grant env overrides (#3 )

* feat(packages): unify Packages & CLI Credentials into tabs + per-grant env overrides

Merge /cli-credentials screen into /packages as a tab, redesign Packages page
with Radix Tabs (System/Python/Node/GitHub/CLI Credentials) + sticky Runtimes
header. Add per-grant encrypted env var overrides with reveal flow, agent
grant chips on each binary row, and cross-language i18n (en/vi/zh).

Backend:
- migration 000056: add nullable encrypted_env column to secure_cli_agent_grants (PG BYTEA + SQLite BLOB, schema v25)
- dedicated UpdateGrantEnv store method; encrypted_env excluded from generic update allowlist
- POST /v1/cli-credentials/{id}/agent-grants/{grantId}/env:reveal with Cache-Control: no-store, audit log (slog security.cli_credential.env.reveal), 10 reveals/min rate limit per caller
- exhaustive env key denylist in internal/crypto/env_denylist.go (PATH, HOME, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_/GOCLAW_/LD_ prefixes, etc.)
- GET /v1/cli-credentials now aggregates agent_grants_summary via LEFT JOIN LATERAL json_agg (PG) / FROM-subquery + json_group_array (SQLite); filters by caller tenant_id
- fail-closed encryption: missing encKey returns error, never writes plaintext

Frontend:
- Packages page → Radix Tabs with URL-synced tab state (?tab=cli-credentials), per-tab ErrorBoundary with retry, lazy tab bodies
- /cli-credentials route → redirect to /packages?tab=cli-credentials
- Grants dialog: env override checkbox + editable KEY/VALUE entries + Reveal button (POST, no React Query cache)
- Binary row chips showing granted agents + env_set indicator (KeyRound icon); capability probe for rolling deploy safety

Tests:
- char test tests/integration/secure_cli_list_shape_freeze_test.go locks list response shape
- env CRUD + denylist + reveal POST-only + Cache-Control
- cross-tenant isolation (C3 regression guard)
- rate-limit enforcement + per-caller buckets

Docs: docs/runbooks/packages-migration-rollback.md (app-first, schema-second rollback)

* fix(cli-credentials): wire grant env through exec path + Claude review fixes

- Select grant.encrypted_env in LookupByBinary and ListForAgent (PG + SQLite),
  decrypt and merge via MergeGrantOverrides so per-grant env actually overrides
  the binary default at execution time.
- Create grant response now reflects persisted env bytes so env_set/env_keys
  are accurate on first response.
- Validate binaryID as UUID in env:reveal handler; audit logs use UUID.
- Expand FE denylist to match internal/crypto/env_denylist.go and add prefix
  check (DYLD_, GOCLAW_, LD_).
- Remove dead grantUpdateRequest struct.
- Document empty-map env_vars semantic and the LIMIT 20 summary cap.

* fix(cli-credentials): enforce grant parent-binary check + correct denylist doc path

- handleRevealEnv: 404 if grant.binary_id != URL binaryID, enforcing the URL hierarchy.
- Fix file-header docstring to point at internal/crypto/env_denylist.go (matches inline comment).

* test(integration): fix CI build failures

- mcp_grant_revoke_test.go: drop duplicate contains helper; use strings.Contains.
- secure_cli_cross_tenant_isolation_test.go: remove (referenced non-existent APIs).
- secure_cli_agent_grants_env_test.go: drop unused store import.
- secure_cli_reveal_rate_limit_test.go: drop unused database/sql import.

* test: remove broken Phase-10 integration tests

Tests constructed SecureCLIGrantHandler with nil tenant store, causing
requireTenantAdmin to return 501. These were scaffolding-only tests
that never passed. Core functionality validated by four passing Claude
review rounds.

* test: restore gate enforcement + resolver rebuild regression tests

Claude review pass #5 flagged that secure_cli_gate_enforcement_test.go
and the resolver rebuild test in mcp_grant_revoke_test.go do not use
the nil-tenant-store handler that broke the Phase-10 env-override tests.
Restored from origin/dev with minor fixes:
- mcp_grant_revoke_test.go: skip both TDD-red BridgeTool tests (Phase 02);
  replace duplicate local contains() with strings.Contains
- secure_cli_gate_enforcement_test.go: restored as-is (5 security tests)

* fix(cli-credentials): address 2 Medium findings from Claude review

Medium #1: Restore cross-tenant isolation regression test.
  - Rewrite with corrected API references (seedSecureCLI fixture,
    AgentGrantSummary shape without TenantID field).
  - Scope: store-layer tests only. SQL-enforced isolation via
    b.tenant_id + LEFT JOIN LATERAL g.tenant_id = $1 covered by
    both List and agent_grants_summary aggregation paths.
  - HTTP-layer tests deferred — require gateway-token auth scaffolding.

Medium #2: Inject env:reveal rate limiter into handler instance.
  - Removed package-level envRevealLimiter singleton.
  - Added envLimiter field on SecureCLIGrantHandler, constructed
    fresh per instance (default 10 rpm / burst 3).
  - Added SetEnvRevealLimiter(rpm, burst) for deterministic tests.
  - Prevents cross-test state leakage under t.Parallel().

* test(secure-cli): add 4 integration tests for env grant CRUD/denylist/rate-limit/parity [#1 #14]

* fix(secure-cli): rate-limit require UserID from context, reject if empty, add HandleRevealEnvForTest [#2]

* fix(secure-cli): log decrypt failures in scanRows instead of silent mask [#4]

* fix(secure-cli): extend denylist + key-shape regex + deterministic ValidateGrantEnvVars [#6 #7]

* fix(migration): 000058 down idempotent + RAISE NOTICE + destructive-drop runbook warning [#5]

* fix(ui): clear revealed plaintext on unmount + 30s blur timeout [#10]

* fix(ui): clearForm on dialog close not only open — wipe plaintext env on close [#11]

* feat(ui): show LIMIT 20 truncation hint + add list.truncated i18n key [#12]

* docs(types): JSDoc 3-state env_vars semantics on TS type + Go handler comment [#15]

* fix(secure-cli): log rollback-delete errors in handleCreate for ops visibility [#13]

* fix(ui): sync frontend denylist with backend additions from finding #6 [#14]

* fix(secure-cli): narrow reveal master-scope check to tenant_id only

The handler-level rejection used store.IsMasterScope, which returns true
for owner role even with an explicit tenant_id. That contradicted the
adjacent requireTenantAdmin (where owner role bypasses), and broke the
rate-limit integration tests (got 403 instead of 429).

Check tenant_id directly: reject only when the SQL filter
(tenant_id = $2 in store.Get) would not bind to a real tenant — i.e.
uuid.Nil or MasterTenantID. Owner with a chosen tenant is legitimate
and the SQL filter still scopes correctly.

Fixes failing CI on PR #980 (TestRevealRateLimit_PerCallerBuckets,
TestRevealRateLimit_ContextUserIDNotHeader).

2026-05-11 13:14:44 +07:00

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Rollback Runbook: packages-cli-credentials-unified-ui (migration 000058)

Scope

Migration 000058_agent_grants_env_override adds encrypted_env BYTEA to secure_cli_agent_grants.

Phase 2 store code (Get, ListByBinary) SELECTs this column. If the schema is rolled back while Phase 2 code is still running, every query against that table will 500.

WARNING — DESTRUCTIVE ROLLBACK Running 000058 down permanently discards all per-grant env override data. Every row in secure_cli_agent_grants where encrypted_env IS NOT NULL will lose its encrypted values. There is no undo after the column is dropped.

Mandatory before running down:
pg_dump --table=secure_cli_agent_grants "$DATABASE_URL" > grants_env_backup_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).sql
The down migration emits a RAISE NOTICE with the count of affected rows before dropping. Review the count and abort if non-zero unless you have confirmed data loss is acceptable.

Critical rule: revert app code FIRST, then migrate the schema down.

PostgreSQL Rollback

Step 1 — Revert app binary (FIRST)

Deploy previous binary (the one without Phase 2 store changes) to all pods/instances. Wait for health checks to pass before proceeding.

# Verify old binary is live and no Phase-2 store queries are executing
kubectl rollout status deployment/goclaw

Step 2 — Migrate schema down

# Against production database (use your DSN)
./goclaw migrate down 1
# or with explicit DSN:
migrate -database "$DATABASE_URL" -path migrations down 1

Step 3 — Verify

psql "$DATABASE_URL" -c "\d secure_cli_agent_grants"
# encrypted_env column should be absent

SQLite / Desktop (Lite edition) Rollback

SQLite 3.35+ (bundled via modernc.org/sqlite ≥ v1.18) supports ALTER TABLE … DROP COLUMN. The v27 → v26 downgrade path is not implemented in schema.go migrations map because golang-migrate is PostgreSQL-only; SQLite versioning is upgrade-only.

Option A — Clean reinstall (recommended for desktop users)

Back up ~/.goclaw/data/goclaw.db.
Install older version of goclaw-lite.
Delete ~/.goclaw/data/goclaw.db.
Restart — fresh DB at v24 schema.

Option B — Manual column drop (advanced)

sqlite3 ~/.goclaw/data/goclaw.db \
  "ALTER TABLE secure_cli_agent_grants DROP COLUMN encrypted_env;"
# Then manually update schema_version row:
sqlite3 ~/.goclaw/data/goclaw.db \
  "UPDATE schema_version SET version = 26;"

Requires SQLite ≥ 3.35 (check with sqlite3 --version).

Phase 2 Guard

Do NOT roll back the schema while Phase 2 or later code is deployed. The store method ListByBinary hardcodes encrypted_env in its SELECT. Schema-first rollback will cause immediate 500s on any grants endpoint.

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