Files
goclaw/internal/http/webhooks_ratelimit.go
Duy /zuey/andGitHub ddf8e1099f feat(webhooks): HTTP webhooks to trigger agents with HMAC auth + durable callbacks (#2)
* feat(webhooks): HTTP webhooks to trigger agents with HMAC auth and durable callbacks

Add multi-tenant HTTP webhook endpoints for agent triggering:
- /v1/webhooks/message: send messages to channels
- /v1/webhooks/llm: sync/async LLM prompts with HMAC-signed callbacks
- HMAC-256 + bearer token authentication
- Rate limiting and tenant isolation
- Durable callback worker with exponential backoff
- PG 000056 + SQLite schema v25 migrations
- Unit + integration tests, P0 tenant isolation invariants
- Channel media capability helpers for attachment routing
- Comprehensive webhook documentation and i18n strings

* fix(webhooks): address post-review findings (K1-K10)

Comprehensive post-merge fixes addressing 10 blocking code review issues
and 2 adversarial re-audit findings in webhook-agent-triggering feature:

K1: Fix auth middleware tenant context lookup sequencing — move
    tenant context injection before authenticate() call to prevent
    unscoped secret lookups.

K2: Canonicalize JSON payload format for jsonb compatibility across
    PostgreSQL and SQLite — ensure consistent serialization without
    whitespace variance to prevent hash mismatches.

K3: Add fail-closed JSON parsing in body hash extraction with explicit
    error handling for malformed payloads before HMAC verification.

K4: Fix worker queue wedge by properly draining slot reservations
    when delivery succeeds, preventing permanent slot occupancy.

K5: Implement lease-token optimistic concurrency control to prevent
    duplicate webhook delivery under high concurrency or retry storms.

K6: Add AES-256-GCM encrypted secret storage at rest with fail-fast
    skip-mount when GOCLAW_ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable unset.

K7: Implement IP allowlist enforcement supporting both CIDR ranges
    and exact IP matching with proper X-Forwarded-For parsing.

K8: Add HMAC replay nonce cache (5min expiry, non-blocking async flush)
    to prevent request replay attacks on webhook handler.

K9: Fix invariant test schema selection — replace hardcoded assumption
    with explicit schema name from config to support multi-schema testing.

K10: Consolidate rate limiters into single shared instance to prevent
     per-endpoint limiter starvation and ensure fair rate limiting.

New database migrations:
- 000057: webhook_calls.lease_token for optimistic concurrency
- 000058: webhooks.encrypted_secret_key for AES-256-GCM encryption

New i18n keys: MsgWebhookIPDenied, MsgWebhookEncryptionUnavailable
(with English, Vietnamese, Chinese translations).

New modules:
- internal/http/webhooks_payload.go: JSON canonicalization + body hash
- internal/http/webhooks_nonce.go: Replay nonce cache implementation
- internal/http/webhooks_idempotency_test.go: Integration tests

Documentation updates:
- docs/webhooks.md: §13-14 security sections, encryption flow
- docs/00-architecture-overview.md: webhook subsystem security overview
- docs/codebase-summary.md: webhook security patterns
- docs/project-changelog.md: webhook fixes changelog

Test coverage: 53 webhook tests + 4 P0 invariant tests all passing.
No tenant isolation violations. All security gates enforced.

* docs(journals): webhook feature ship + fix cycle entries

* fix(webhooks): address Claude review findings

- webhooks_llm.go: remove misleading ptr() helper; use &completedAt
  pattern for error-path audit rows (matches success path)
- webhooks_auth.go: wrap TouchLastUsed context in WithoutCancel so
  background DB update isn't cancelled when HTTP response completes
- store GetByIDUnscoped (PG+SQLite): add NOT revoked / revoked = 0
  filter for defense-in-depth parity with GetByHashUnscoped
- webhooks/sign.go: fix package doc — HMAC key is raw plaintext
  secret bytes, not hex-decoded SHA-256
- webhooks_admin.go: check auth before encKey guard to avoid leaking
  config state to unauthenticated callers
- webhooks_ratelimit.go: two-phase Load→LoadOrStore to avoid per-call
  entry allocation on the hot path

* docs(webhooks): fix Sign() function doc to match actual key input

Function-level comment still referenced hex-decoded SecretHash after
the package-level doc was corrected. Align with actual caller usage
([]byte(rawSecret)).

* fix(webhooks): use WithoutCancel for worker execute DB updates

Terminal status writes in execute() ran through the worker main-loop
ctx, which is cancelled on graceful shutdown. If the outbound send
completed but the status update raced with shutdown, the row stayed
in 'running' and got re-delivered via reclaimStale. WithoutCancel
lets the DB write survive worker cancellation while preserving
propagated values (tenant ID, etc.).

* fix(webhooks): move tctx init before panic defer in worker execute

Panic recovery called updateRetry with raw ctx (no tenant ID), making
requireTenantID fail and the reset-to-retry DB write silently drop.
Row stayed 'running' until reclaimStale (~90s delay). Init tctx first
so defer closure captures tenant-scoped non-cancellable context.

* fix(webhooks): pass tenant-scoped tctx to invokeAgent in worker

execute() was passing the raw worker-loop ctx (no tenant ID) to
invokeAgent → router.Get → PGAgentStore.GetByID. GetByID reads
TenantIDFromContext which returned uuid.Nil, making every lookup
return 'agent not found'. Async LLM webhook calls silently failed
all retries. Pass tctx (already tenant-scoped + WithoutCancel) so
the router resolves the agent correctly.

* fix(tests): resolve integration test compile errors

- Remove duplicate contains() in mcp_grant_revoke_test.go (already
  defined in tts_gemini_live_test.go)
- Update webhooks_admin_test.go RotateSecret call to match current
  5-arg signature (newSecretHash, newPrefix, newEncryptedSecret)

* fix(webhooks): default nil scopes/ip_allowlist to empty slice in Create

PG columns are NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'. Explicit NULL from pqStringArray(nil)
violated the constraint, breaking TestWebhookAdminCRUD/TenantIsolation.
Coerce nil slices to empty []string{} so the default applies at the DB layer.

* chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork

* ci: retrigger workflows

* fix(webhooks): renumber migrations to 000059-000061 for merge train
2026-05-11 13:29:24 +07:00

112 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package http
import (
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"golang.org/x/time/rate"
)
// webhookLimiter is a two-tier token-bucket rate limiter for webhook endpoints.
//
// Tier 1 — per-webhook: keyed by webhook UUID. Rate sourced from
// WebhookData.RateLimitPerMin (0 = unlimited).
//
// Tier 2 — per-tenant: keyed by tenant UUID. Rate sourced from
// WebhookTenantRatePerMin config (default 600).
//
// Both tiers must allow for a request to proceed. Per-webhook is checked first
// so a misconfigured individual webhook can't starve the tenant bucket.
//
// Ownership: single *webhookLimiter per gateway process, held by middleware
// closure. Never attach to request context — stale buckets would never evict.
type webhookLimiter struct {
tenantRPM int // global per-tenant rate (req/min); 0 = unlimited
buckets sync.Map // string key → *webhookLimiterEntry
callCounter atomic.Int64
}
type webhookLimiterEntry struct {
limiter *rate.Limiter
lastSeen atomic.Int64 // unix nanoseconds
}
const (
// webhookLimiterSweepEvery — sweep stale entries every N accepted calls.
webhookLimiterSweepEvery = 512
// webhookLimiterStaleAfter — evict buckets idle for this long.
webhookLimiterStaleAfter = 30 * time.Minute
)
// newWebhookLimiter creates a limiter with the given tenant-level RPM cap.
// rpm <= 0 disables the tenant tier (unlimited).
func newWebhookLimiter(tenantRPM int) *webhookLimiter {
return &webhookLimiter{tenantRPM: tenantRPM}
}
// NewWebhookLimiter creates a process-lifetime limiter with the default tenant RPM cap.
// Use this when wiring the message/LLM handlers outside the http package.
func NewWebhookLimiter() *webhookLimiter {
return newWebhookLimiter(defaultWebhookTenantRPM)
}
// AllowWebhook checks the per-webhook bucket. webhookID must be the UUID string;
// rpm is WebhookData.RateLimitPerMin (0 = unlimited).
func (wl *webhookLimiter) AllowWebhook(webhookID string, rpm int) bool {
return wl.allow("webhook:"+webhookID, rpm)
}
// AllowTenant checks the per-tenant bucket using the configured tenant RPM.
func (wl *webhookLimiter) AllowTenant(tenantID string) bool {
return wl.allow("tenant:"+tenantID, wl.tenantRPM)
}
// allow is the shared implementation for both keyspaces.
// rpm == 0 → unlimited (always returns true, no bucket created).
func (wl *webhookLimiter) allow(key string, rpm int) bool {
if rpm <= 0 {
return true
}
limit := rate.Limit(float64(rpm) / 60.0)
burst := rpm // burst = full rpm per spec (Success Criteria §3)
nowNs := time.Now().UnixNano()
// Fast path: Load avoids allocating a new entry on hits (the common case).
var entry *webhookLimiterEntry
if v, ok := wl.buckets.Load(key); ok {
entry = v.(*webhookLimiterEntry)
} else {
fresh := &webhookLimiterEntry{limiter: rate.NewLimiter(limit, burst)}
fresh.lastSeen.Store(nowNs)
v, _ := wl.buckets.LoadOrStore(key, fresh)
entry = v.(*webhookLimiterEntry)
}
if !entry.limiter.Allow() {
return false
}
entry.lastSeen.Store(nowNs)
if wl.callCounter.Add(1)%webhookLimiterSweepEvery == 0 {
wl.sweepStale()
}
return true
}
// sweepStale evicts entries that have been idle longer than webhookLimiterStaleAfter.
// Safe for concurrent calls — sync.Map.Range + atomic lastSeen are data-race free.
func (wl *webhookLimiter) sweepStale() {
cutoffNs := time.Now().Add(-webhookLimiterStaleAfter).UnixNano()
wl.buckets.Range(func(k, v any) bool {
if v.(*webhookLimiterEntry).lastSeen.Load() < cutoffNs {
wl.buckets.Delete(k)
}
return true
})
}
// defaultWebhookTenantRPM is the fallback tenant rate when config omits the field.
const defaultWebhookTenantRPM = 600