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* feat(packages): add update flow for GitHub binaries (#900) Closes #900. Proactive update-check + atomic swap for GitHub-installed binaries on the Runtime & Packages page. Interfaces prepared for pip/npm/apk extension in Phase 2. - UpdateCache + UpdateRegistry + PackageLocker (ctx-aware keyed mutex) - GitHubUpdateChecker: ETag-aware, distinct /latest vs /list ETag keys, semver-correct ordering via golang.org/x/mod/semver, non-semver fallback that refuses to downgrade, pre-release + stable candidate fusion for the v1.0.0-rc.1 -> v1.0.0 transition - GitHubUpdateExecutor: two-phase .bak swap with hadBackup-aware rollback, manifest save retry (3x, 100ms/500ms/1s backoff), nil-safe meta access, explicit ScratchDir, 0755 set pre-rename - HTTP: GET /v1/packages/updates (SWR), POST /v1/packages/updates/refresh, POST /v1/packages/update, POST /v1/packages/updates/apply-all (always 200, failed[] is error source). Master-scope gated. - WS events package.update.{checked,started,succeeded,failed} forwarded to owner clients via event_filter.go - Frontend: useUpdates hook + 3 components (summary bar, update-all modal, row button), master-scope-gated disabled state - i18n: 8 backend keys + 17 frontend keys x en/vi/zh - Config: packages.github_token (reserved), updates_check_ttl, scratch_dir - 45+ new tests, race-clean, BenchmarkCheckAll10Packages ~1.1ms/op warm * docs(packages): document update flow + Phase 1 completion - packages-github.md: "Updating Installed Packages" section with UI + API contract, troubleshooting runbook (corrupt cache, rate-limit, scratch dir, mid-swap recovery) - 17-changelog.md + CHANGELOG.md: Phase 1 entry - 14-skills-runtime.md: cross-ref to update flow - journal entry capturing CRIT fixes (double-write, lock-key mismatch, rollback false-alarm) + design wins (keyed locks, red-team pre-flight) * feat(workstation): remote workstation runtime — SSH exec + security + audit Adds generic Remote Workstation Runtime enabling agents to execute commands on user-owned SSH workstations. Includes registry (DB + API + UI), SSH backend with connection pool and circuit breaker, workstation.exec + claude_remote tools, NFKC + binary-name allowlist security, and audit logging. Standard edition only. Closes #941. * fix(workstation): address 3 critical + 5 important code review findings - C1: Add json:"-" to Metadata/DefaultEnv fields; use SanitizedView() in all API responses to prevent SSH private key leakage - C2: Wire CheckEnv into PermCheckFn; LD_PRELOAD/PATH injection now blocked - C3: SSH Setenv fallback — prepend `export K=V;` when server rejects Setenv - I1: BackendCache sync.RWMutex → sync.Mutex (fix data race on lastUsed) - I2: Validate metadata shape in handleUpdate before store write - I3: Include command in exec-done event; activity sink uses actual cmd hash - I4: Wrap pool release in sync.Once (idempotent double-call safety) - I5: Verify workstation tenant ownership before adding permissions * fix(packages): bypass HTTPS+IP validation in update executor tests Test httptest servers bind to http://127.0.0.1 which fails both the HTTPS scheme check and literal-IP SSRF guard. Add testSkipDownloadValidation flag (same pattern as existing withTestDownloadHosts) to skip full URL validation in test context. * fix(workstation): address Claude review findings — tenant isolation + pool leak + dead code - Activity list: add workstation ownership check before listing (prevents cross-tenant activity enumeration via known UUID) - SSH pool: clean up p.sem + p.circuits maps in CloseWorkstation, prune, and Close to prevent unbounded map growth - RPC handlers: return ErrInvalidRequest on JSON unmarshal failure instead of silently using zero-value params - Remove unused containsControlChars function in normalize.go - HTTP tests: add 10s context timeout to prevent CI package timeout * fix(workstation): DefaultEnv JSON parse, backend cache leak, perm ownership check - DefaultEnv: replace KEY=VALUE text parse with json.Unmarshal (stored as JSON by HTTP handler, was silently ignored) - BackendCache: close losing backend on concurrent cache miss to prevent pruneLoop goroutine leak - Backend interface: add Close() error method; SSHBackend delegates to pool.Close() - handlePermList: add wsStore.GetByID ownership check (prevents cross-tenant UUID enumeration returning empty array vs 404) - scanRows: log scan errors instead of silently skipping * fix(workstation): wire activity sink shutdown + remove misleading comment - WireActivitySink: capture cleanup func, register in gateway shutdown (was discarded → retention goroutine leaked + buffered rows lost) - Add Stop() to WorkstationActivityStore interface (PG+SQLite already had it) - wireWorkstationTools returns cleanup func; gateway.go defers it - Remove misleading "re-validate env" comment in allowlist.go Check() * ci: bump unit test timeout from 90s to 120s hooks/handlers package (goja script tests) consumes ~85s on cold CI runners, leaving insufficient headroom for HTTP retry tests with 1s backoff. 120s provides adequate breathing room without masking real deadlocks. * fix: compile errors in integration tests + allowlist docstring - packages_update_test: add missing lockKey arg to registry.Apply - mcp_grant_revoke_test: remove unused fakeMCPClient struct - allowlist.go: fix Check() docstring to match actual 3-step pipeline * fix(test): relax mcp grant revoke assertion for pre-Phase02 state Execute-time grant checking not yet wired — test correctly gets an error but the message is "no active client" (nil clientPtr) rather than "grant revoked". Accept any error as valid regression guard. * chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork * ci: retrigger workflows * fix(permissions): classify workstation methods in RBAC policy
133 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
133 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
package skills
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"strings"
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)
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// Sentinel errors for the downloader.
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var (
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ErrNotHTTPS = errors.New("github.download: non-HTTPS URL rejected")
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ErrHostNotAllowed = errors.New("github.download: host not in allowlist")
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ErrAssetTooLarge = errors.New("github.download: asset exceeds max size")
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ErrTooManyRedirect = errors.New("github.download: too many redirects")
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)
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// testSkipDownloadValidation skips HTTPS + host + IP checks in tests.
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// Set via withTestInsecureHTTP(t) in test files only.
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var testSkipDownloadValidation bool
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// allowedDownloadHosts is the SSRF allowlist for asset downloads.
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var allowedDownloadHosts = map[string]bool{
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"github.com": true,
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"api.github.com": true,
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"objects.githubusercontent.com": true,
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"release-assets.githubusercontent.com": true,
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"codeload.github.com": true,
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}
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// validateDownloadURL ensures the URL is HTTPS and the host is allowlisted.
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// Also blocks private/loopback IPs when the host is an IP literal.
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func validateDownloadURL(rawURL string) error {
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if testSkipDownloadValidation {
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return nil
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}
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u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("github.download: parse url: %w", err)
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}
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if u.Scheme != "https" {
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return ErrNotHTTPS
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}
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host := strings.ToLower(u.Hostname())
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if !allowedDownloadHosts[host] {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrHostNotAllowed, host)
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}
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// Block literal IPs as hostname (prevents raw-IP SSRF via rebinding tricks).
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if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: literal IP %s", ErrHostNotAllowed, host)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DownloadAsset streams an asset over HTTPS to a temp file, validating the URL,
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// enforcing a max byte cap, and computing SHA256 as it writes.
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// Caller must remove the temp file.
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func (c *GitHubClient) DownloadAsset(ctx context.Context, assetURL string, maxBytes int64) (string, string, error) {
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if err := validateDownloadURL(assetURL); err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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if maxBytes <= 0 {
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maxBytes = 200 * 1024 * 1024
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}
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// Build a client that validates every redirect hop.
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// No Timeout here — it caps the whole request including body read, which
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// would abort large (hundreds of MB) downloads on modest connections.
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// The caller's context carries the correct deadline (install timeout).
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client := &http.Client{
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CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
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if len(via) >= 5 {
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return ErrTooManyRedirect
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}
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return validateDownloadURL(req.URL.String())
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},
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, assetURL, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/octet-stream")
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if c.Token != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.Token)
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}
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("github.download: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1024))
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("github.download: status %d: %s",
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resp.StatusCode, strings.TrimSpace(string(body)))
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}
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tmp, err := os.CreateTemp("", "goclaw-gh-asset-*.bin")
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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tmpName := tmp.Name()
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_ = tmp.Chmod(0o600)
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h := sha256.New()
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// Read up to maxBytes+1 so we can detect overflow.
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limited := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBytes+1)
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n, err := io.Copy(io.MultiWriter(tmp, h), limited)
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cerr := tmp.Close()
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if err != nil {
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os.Remove(tmpName)
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("github.download: copy: %w", err)
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}
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if cerr != nil {
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os.Remove(tmpName)
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return "", "", cerr
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}
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if n > maxBytes {
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os.Remove(tmpName)
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return "", "", ErrAssetTooLarge
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}
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return tmpName, hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)), nil
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}
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