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* feat(secure-cli): Phase 1 schema + storage delta (issue #82) Adds `adapter_name` column to secure_cli_binaries and `credential_type` + `host_scope` columns to secure_cli_user_credentials. LookupByBinary LEFT JOIN now projects AdapterName, UserCredentialType, and UserHostScope. Extends SecureCLIStore with SetUserCredentialsTyped(ctx, binaryID, userID, env, credType, hostScope); legacy SetUserCredentials delegates to typed variant with nil/nil for backward compat. PG migration 73 + RequiredSchemaVersion bumped to 73. SQLite incremental migrations (versions 39–41) + SchemaVersion 42. 7 SQLite + 6 PG integration tests covering schema, round-trip, NULL legacy, LookupByBinary projection. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): Phase 2 CredentialAdapter framework + passthrough (issue #82) Adds CredentialAdapter interface + Injection{ArgvPrefix,Env,Cleanup,ScrubValues} struct. Registry resolves by name; falls back to passthrough for empty/unknown. passthroughAdapter is default no-op — all existing presets (gh/aws/gcloud/kubectl/terraform/gws) behave bit-for-bit identically. Per-request WithScrubBag(ctx) + AddScrubValuesCtx + ScrubCredentialsCtx for multi-tenant secret isolation (replaces package-global slice). Hook in executeCredentialed between env merge and exec: resolve adapter by bin.AdapterName, reject non-passthrough in sandbox, call Prepare, splice ArgvPrefix, merge Env, defer Cleanup, register ScrubValues. Audit log security.system_env_injection records adapter name + env key names + argv_prefix_len + sha256(host_scope) — NEVER values. CLIPreset.AdapterName field added; empty default for legacy presets. 12 unit tests covering passthrough no-op, registry fallback + nil safety, Injection shape, hashHostScope determinism, sortedKeys, scrub bag per-request isolation + concurrent + short-value guard. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): Phase 2b extensibility helpers + psql stub adapter (issue #82) Proves CredentialAdapter framework generalizes beyond git. Adds materializeEphemeral(ctx, content, prefix) shared helper — 0600 tmpfile + idempotent atomic.Bool cleanup latch; memfd intentionally rejected (resolves "self" against child process). Adds psqlAdapter consuming framework end-to-end via PGPASSFILE pattern; libpq-spec .pgpass escaping for `:` and `\`. Registers psql preset with AdapterName: "psql" (production UI for typed creds lands in v2). Interface validation gate passes: Injection shape unchanged, hook is psql-agnostic, no special branch needed. Tests: ephemeral write/cleanup/concurrent/zero-content; psql routing/content/escaping/error paths/registration. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): git adapter PAT + SSH implementation (issue #82) Phase 3 — PAT path - gitAdapter PAT branch via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/KEY_0/VALUE_0 env (git 2.31+) so the token never lands on argv, .git/config, or remote URL - Host-scope enforcement with IDN normalization (golang.org/x/net/idna) and embedded-userinfo rejection in URL parsing - CVE-2018-17456 mitigation: resolve remote URLs via `git config --get` not `git remote get-url` to dodge ext::sh protocol handler injection - Case-insensitive DenyArgs blocking `-c http.`, `-c credential.`, `-c core.sshcommand`, `config --global/--system`, `credential-helper`, bare `daemon` - New WithExecCwd / ExecCwdFromContext context helpers — fixes a latent design gap where the adapter's pre-flight `git config --get` ran in goclaw's daemon CWD instead of the agent's repo - 14 unit tests covering subcommand routing, host normalization, scp-form parsing, userinfo rejection, CRLF token rejection, CVE-2018-17456 regression, DenyArgs preset coverage - 3 integration tests against a local TLS git-http-backend server proving end-to-end clone + fetch + host-mismatch rejection with zero token leakage into the cloned .git/config Phase 4 — SSH path - gitAdapter ssh_key branch materializes per-call 0600 tmpfile via the Phase 2b materializeEphemeral helper, injects GIT_SSH_COMMAND with -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new, idempotent cleanup - ValidateSSHKey using golang.org/x/crypto/ssh rejects passphrase-protected keys via ErrSSHKeyPassphraseUnsupported sentinel - 8 unit tests covering passphrase rejection, env shape, cleanup lifecycle, host-mismatch reuse, malformed-blob rejection - 3 integration tests proving tmpfile 0600 lifecycle, env propagation to child process, cleanup-on-exec-failure, no-orphan-on-rejection - 2 new i18n keys (en/vi/zh) for SSH-passphrase and SSH-key-invalid Verification: go vet clean, go build ./... clean, go build -tags sqliteonly ./... clean, go test -race ./internal/tools/ pass, go test -tags integration ./tests/integration/ -run TestGitAdapter pass. Refs #82 * feat(secure-cli): UI presets + typed credential HTTP path + i18n (issue #82) Phase 5. Typed PUT envelope with {error:{code,message}, error_key} for field-level errors. CliCredentialGitFields React component (PAT/SSH picker, host_scope input, CRLF→LF normalization, masked-edit). 17 i18n keys × 3 locales (backend + frontend). i18n parity test. * feat(secure-cli): audit log schema + adapter framework docs (issue #82) Phase 6. emitSystemEnvInjectionAudit helper centralizes security.system_env_injection slog with host_scope_hash (SHA-256 8 hex, plaintext hostname omitted for PII safety). Audit shape pinned by TestEmitSystemEnvInjectionAudit_*. New docs: git-credential-adapter.md (user guide), credential-adapter-playbook.md (R1 implementer guide w/ kubectl/docker/npm/aws/psql worked mappings). 09-security.md § 14 trust-boundary diagram + SSH TOFU + SIGKILL caveats. 03-tools-system.md § 8a. Changelog entry. * docs(journal): issue #82 CLI credential adapters shipped Retrospective covering 6 commits across phases 1-6: framework, git PAT/SSH, psql stub, UI/i18n, audit log schema, docs. Notes memfd-drop rationale, TOFU/SIGKILL caveats, sentinel-length lesson from audit-shape tests. * fix(secure-cli): honor per-request scrub bag on success+failure paths (#82) Sandbox and host exec paths called the non-Ctx ScrubCredentials, so adapter ScrubValues registered into the per-request bag during Prepare (e.g. GitLab glpat-, Bitbucket app-passwords, Azure DevOps PATs, Gitea tokens, SSH key tmpfile paths) were ignored on stdout/stderr returned to the agent. Only the package-global regex pass ran — covering ghp_ but nothing else. Switch all four exec/sandbox call sites to ScrubCredentialsCtx so the bag is consulted. Also scrub the slog adapter_cleanup_failed line — os.Remove errors embed the full tmpfile path. Add 5 regression tests that pin success path, failure path, negative control (proves the bag is what catches the sentinel), classic-PAT sanity, and timeout path no-leak. Locks AC6 against non-GitHub PAT providers. * fix(secure-cli): address review-pr #89 findings - ui/web: SSH key Textarea was 'text-xs' on all viewports, triggering iOS Safari auto-zoom on focus. Switch to 'text-base md:text-xs' so mobile renders 16px (no zoom) while desktop keeps compact mono font. - psql adapter: add on-disk pgpass tmpfile path to ScrubValues. psql echoes 'could not open password file "<path>"' on IO errors, so the path needs scrubbing alongside the password. Mirrors the git SSH adapter pattern. Update test assertion accordingly. - psql adapter: replace literal 'nil' context with 'context.TODO()' to silence staticcheck SA1012.
172 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
172 lines
5.1 KiB
Go
//go:build sqlite || sqliteonly
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package sqlitestore
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import (
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"context"
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/crypto"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
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)
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// userCredSelectCols projects every column callers read off SecureCLIUserCredential.
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// Keep in lockstep with the struct in internal/store/secure_cli_store.go.
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const userCredSelectCols = `id, binary_id, user_id, encrypted_env, COALESCE(metadata, '{}'),
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credential_type, host_scope, created_at, updated_at`
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// GetUserCredentials returns per-user credential overrides for a CLI binary.
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// Returns (nil, nil) if no per-user credentials exist.
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func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) GetUserCredentials(ctx context.Context, binaryID uuid.UUID, userID string) (*store.SecureCLIUserCredential, error) {
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tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
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if tid == uuid.Nil {
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tid = store.MasterTenantID
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}
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var uc store.SecureCLIUserCredential
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var env []byte
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var metaBytes []byte
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var createdAt, updatedAt string
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err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
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`SELECT `+userCredSelectCols+`
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FROM secure_cli_user_credentials
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WHERE binary_id = ? AND user_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?`,
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binaryID, userID, tid,
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).Scan(&uc.ID, &uc.BinaryID, &uc.UserID, &env, &metaBytes,
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&uc.CredentialType, &uc.HostScope, &createdAt, &updatedAt)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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uc.CreatedAt = createdAt
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uc.UpdatedAt = updatedAt
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if len(metaBytes) > 0 {
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uc.Metadata = metaBytes
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}
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// Decrypt env
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if len(env) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
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if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(env), s.encKey); err == nil {
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uc.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
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}
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} else {
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uc.EncryptedEnv = env
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}
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return &uc, nil
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}
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// SetUserCredentials writes a legacy env-vars credential (credential_type / host_scope NULL).
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// Preserves all pre-existing callers.
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func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) SetUserCredentials(ctx context.Context, binaryID uuid.UUID, userID string, encryptedEnv []byte) error {
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return s.SetUserCredentialsTyped(ctx, binaryID, userID, encryptedEnv, nil, nil)
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}
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// SetUserCredentialsTyped is the typed-credential entry point.
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// credentialType / hostScope are NULL for legacy env-only credentials.
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func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) SetUserCredentialsTyped(ctx context.Context, binaryID uuid.UUID, userID string, encryptedEnv []byte, credentialType, hostScope *string) error {
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tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
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if tid == uuid.Nil {
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tid = store.MasterTenantID
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}
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var envBytes []byte
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if len(encryptedEnv) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
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encrypted, err := crypto.Encrypt(string(encryptedEnv), s.encKey)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("encrypt env: %w", err)
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}
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envBytes = []byte(encrypted)
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} else {
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envBytes = encryptedEnv
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}
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now := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
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id := store.GenNewID()
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_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`INSERT INTO secure_cli_user_credentials
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(id, binary_id, user_id, encrypted_env, metadata, tenant_id,
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credential_type, host_scope, created_at, updated_at)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, '{}', ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
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ON CONFLICT (binary_id, user_id, tenant_id) DO UPDATE SET
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encrypted_env = excluded.encrypted_env,
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credential_type = excluded.credential_type,
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host_scope = excluded.host_scope,
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updated_at = excluded.updated_at`,
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id, binaryID, userID, envBytes, tid, credentialType, hostScope, now, now,
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)
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return err
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}
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// DeleteUserCredentials removes per-user credentials for a binary.
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func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) DeleteUserCredentials(ctx context.Context, binaryID uuid.UUID, userID string) error {
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tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
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if tid == uuid.Nil {
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tid = store.MasterTenantID
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}
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_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`DELETE FROM secure_cli_user_credentials WHERE binary_id = ? AND user_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?`,
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binaryID, userID, tid,
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)
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return err
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}
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// ListUserCredentials returns all per-user credentials for a binary (tenant-scoped).
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func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) ListUserCredentials(ctx context.Context, binaryID uuid.UUID) ([]store.SecureCLIUserCredential, error) {
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tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
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if tid == uuid.Nil {
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tid = store.MasterTenantID
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}
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rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx,
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`SELECT `+userCredSelectCols+`
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FROM secure_cli_user_credentials
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WHERE binary_id = ? AND tenant_id = ?
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ORDER BY created_at`, binaryID, tid)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var result []store.SecureCLIUserCredential
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for rows.Next() {
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var uc store.SecureCLIUserCredential
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var env []byte
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var metaBytes []byte
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var createdAt, updatedAt string
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if err := rows.Scan(&uc.ID, &uc.BinaryID, &uc.UserID, &env, &metaBytes,
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&uc.CredentialType, &uc.HostScope, &createdAt, &updatedAt); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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uc.CreatedAt = createdAt
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uc.UpdatedAt = updatedAt
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if len(metaBytes) > 0 {
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uc.Metadata = metaBytes
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}
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if len(env) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
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if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(env), s.encKey); err == nil {
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uc.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
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}
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} else {
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uc.EncryptedEnv = env
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}
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result = append(result, uc)
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}
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return result, rows.Err()
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}
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