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* feat(secure-cli): Phase 1 schema + storage delta (issue #82) Adds `adapter_name` column to secure_cli_binaries and `credential_type` + `host_scope` columns to secure_cli_user_credentials. LookupByBinary LEFT JOIN now projects AdapterName, UserCredentialType, and UserHostScope. Extends SecureCLIStore with SetUserCredentialsTyped(ctx, binaryID, userID, env, credType, hostScope); legacy SetUserCredentials delegates to typed variant with nil/nil for backward compat. PG migration 73 + RequiredSchemaVersion bumped to 73. SQLite incremental migrations (versions 39–41) + SchemaVersion 42. 7 SQLite + 6 PG integration tests covering schema, round-trip, NULL legacy, LookupByBinary projection. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): Phase 2 CredentialAdapter framework + passthrough (issue #82) Adds CredentialAdapter interface + Injection{ArgvPrefix,Env,Cleanup,ScrubValues} struct. Registry resolves by name; falls back to passthrough for empty/unknown. passthroughAdapter is default no-op — all existing presets (gh/aws/gcloud/kubectl/terraform/gws) behave bit-for-bit identically. Per-request WithScrubBag(ctx) + AddScrubValuesCtx + ScrubCredentialsCtx for multi-tenant secret isolation (replaces package-global slice). Hook in executeCredentialed between env merge and exec: resolve adapter by bin.AdapterName, reject non-passthrough in sandbox, call Prepare, splice ArgvPrefix, merge Env, defer Cleanup, register ScrubValues. Audit log security.system_env_injection records adapter name + env key names + argv_prefix_len + sha256(host_scope) — NEVER values. CLIPreset.AdapterName field added; empty default for legacy presets. 12 unit tests covering passthrough no-op, registry fallback + nil safety, Injection shape, hashHostScope determinism, sortedKeys, scrub bag per-request isolation + concurrent + short-value guard. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): Phase 2b extensibility helpers + psql stub adapter (issue #82) Proves CredentialAdapter framework generalizes beyond git. Adds materializeEphemeral(ctx, content, prefix) shared helper — 0600 tmpfile + idempotent atomic.Bool cleanup latch; memfd intentionally rejected (resolves "self" against child process). Adds psqlAdapter consuming framework end-to-end via PGPASSFILE pattern; libpq-spec .pgpass escaping for `:` and `\`. Registers psql preset with AdapterName: "psql" (production UI for typed creds lands in v2). Interface validation gate passes: Injection shape unchanged, hook is psql-agnostic, no special branch needed. Tests: ephemeral write/cleanup/concurrent/zero-content; psql routing/content/escaping/error paths/registration. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): git adapter PAT + SSH implementation (issue #82) Phase 3 — PAT path - gitAdapter PAT branch via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/KEY_0/VALUE_0 env (git 2.31+) so the token never lands on argv, .git/config, or remote URL - Host-scope enforcement with IDN normalization (golang.org/x/net/idna) and embedded-userinfo rejection in URL parsing - CVE-2018-17456 mitigation: resolve remote URLs via `git config --get` not `git remote get-url` to dodge ext::sh protocol handler injection - Case-insensitive DenyArgs blocking `-c http.`, `-c credential.`, `-c core.sshcommand`, `config --global/--system`, `credential-helper`, bare `daemon` - New WithExecCwd / ExecCwdFromContext context helpers — fixes a latent design gap where the adapter's pre-flight `git config --get` ran in goclaw's daemon CWD instead of the agent's repo - 14 unit tests covering subcommand routing, host normalization, scp-form parsing, userinfo rejection, CRLF token rejection, CVE-2018-17456 regression, DenyArgs preset coverage - 3 integration tests against a local TLS git-http-backend server proving end-to-end clone + fetch + host-mismatch rejection with zero token leakage into the cloned .git/config Phase 4 — SSH path - gitAdapter ssh_key branch materializes per-call 0600 tmpfile via the Phase 2b materializeEphemeral helper, injects GIT_SSH_COMMAND with -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new, idempotent cleanup - ValidateSSHKey using golang.org/x/crypto/ssh rejects passphrase-protected keys via ErrSSHKeyPassphraseUnsupported sentinel - 8 unit tests covering passphrase rejection, env shape, cleanup lifecycle, host-mismatch reuse, malformed-blob rejection - 3 integration tests proving tmpfile 0600 lifecycle, env propagation to child process, cleanup-on-exec-failure, no-orphan-on-rejection - 2 new i18n keys (en/vi/zh) for SSH-passphrase and SSH-key-invalid Verification: go vet clean, go build ./... clean, go build -tags sqliteonly ./... clean, go test -race ./internal/tools/ pass, go test -tags integration ./tests/integration/ -run TestGitAdapter pass. Refs #82 * feat(secure-cli): UI presets + typed credential HTTP path + i18n (issue #82) Phase 5. Typed PUT envelope with {error:{code,message}, error_key} for field-level errors. CliCredentialGitFields React component (PAT/SSH picker, host_scope input, CRLF→LF normalization, masked-edit). 17 i18n keys × 3 locales (backend + frontend). i18n parity test. * feat(secure-cli): audit log schema + adapter framework docs (issue #82) Phase 6. emitSystemEnvInjectionAudit helper centralizes security.system_env_injection slog with host_scope_hash (SHA-256 8 hex, plaintext hostname omitted for PII safety). Audit shape pinned by TestEmitSystemEnvInjectionAudit_*. New docs: git-credential-adapter.md (user guide), credential-adapter-playbook.md (R1 implementer guide w/ kubectl/docker/npm/aws/psql worked mappings). 09-security.md § 14 trust-boundary diagram + SSH TOFU + SIGKILL caveats. 03-tools-system.md § 8a. Changelog entry. * docs(journal): issue #82 CLI credential adapters shipped Retrospective covering 6 commits across phases 1-6: framework, git PAT/SSH, psql stub, UI/i18n, audit log schema, docs. Notes memfd-drop rationale, TOFU/SIGKILL caveats, sentinel-length lesson from audit-shape tests. * fix(secure-cli): honor per-request scrub bag on success+failure paths (#82) Sandbox and host exec paths called the non-Ctx ScrubCredentials, so adapter ScrubValues registered into the per-request bag during Prepare (e.g. GitLab glpat-, Bitbucket app-passwords, Azure DevOps PATs, Gitea tokens, SSH key tmpfile paths) were ignored on stdout/stderr returned to the agent. Only the package-global regex pass ran — covering ghp_ but nothing else. Switch all four exec/sandbox call sites to ScrubCredentialsCtx so the bag is consulted. Also scrub the slog adapter_cleanup_failed line — os.Remove errors embed the full tmpfile path. Add 5 regression tests that pin success path, failure path, negative control (proves the bag is what catches the sentinel), classic-PAT sanity, and timeout path no-leak. Locks AC6 against non-GitHub PAT providers. * fix(secure-cli): address review-pr #89 findings - ui/web: SSH key Textarea was 'text-xs' on all viewports, triggering iOS Safari auto-zoom on focus. Switch to 'text-base md:text-xs' so mobile renders 16px (no zoom) while desktop keeps compact mono font. - psql adapter: add on-disk pgpass tmpfile path to ScrubValues. psql echoes 'could not open password file "<path>"' on IO errors, so the path needs scrubbing alongside the password. Mirrors the git SSH adapter pattern. Update test assertion accordingly. - psql adapter: replace literal 'nil' context with 'context.TODO()' to silence staticcheck SA1012.
189 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
189 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
package tools
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"io/fs"
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"os"
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"runtime"
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"testing"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
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)
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func psqlAdapterInstance(t *testing.T) CredentialAdapter {
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t.Helper()
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a := AdapterFor("psql")
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if a.Name() != "psql" {
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t.Fatalf("psql adapter not registered; AdapterFor(psql)=%q", a.Name())
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}
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return a
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}
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func TestPsqlAdapter_RegisteredAndShouldInject(t *testing.T) {
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a := psqlAdapterInstance(t)
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if !a.ShouldInject(nil) || !a.ShouldInject([]string{"-c", "select 1"}) {
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t.Fatalf("psql ShouldInject must always return true")
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}
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}
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func TestPsqlAdapter_LegacyEnvPassthrough(t *testing.T) {
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a := psqlAdapterInstance(t)
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// No credential → passthrough Injection, no error.
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inj, err := a.Prepare(context.Background(), &store.SecureCLIBinary{}, nil, nil)
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if err != nil || inj == nil || len(inj.Env) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("nil cred should be no-op: inj=%+v err=%v", inj, err)
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}
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// Cred with credential_type=NULL (legacy env-vars) → passthrough.
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inj, err = a.Prepare(context.Background(), &store.SecureCLIBinary{}, &store.SecureCLIUserCredential{
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EncryptedEnv: []byte(`{"PGPASSWORD":"x"}`),
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}, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("legacy env cred raised err: %v", err)
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}
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if inj == nil || len(inj.Env) != 0 || inj.Cleanup != nil {
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t.Fatalf("legacy env cred must produce empty Injection, got %+v", inj)
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}
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}
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func TestPsqlAdapter_PreparePgPasswordFile(t *testing.T) {
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a := psqlAdapterInstance(t)
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credType := "pg_password_file"
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blob, _ := json.Marshal(pgPasswordFile{
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Host: "db.internal",
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Port: "5432",
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Database: "prod",
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User: "app",
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Password: "s3cret!",
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})
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inj, err := a.Prepare(context.Background(), &store.SecureCLIBinary{}, &store.SecureCLIUserCredential{
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CredentialType: &credType,
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EncryptedEnv: blob,
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}, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Prepare: %v", err)
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}
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if inj == nil {
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t.Fatalf("Prepare returned nil Injection")
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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if inj.Cleanup != nil {
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_ = inj.Cleanup()
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}
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})
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path, ok := inj.Env["PGPASSFILE"]
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if !ok || path == "" {
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t.Fatalf("PGPASSFILE missing from Injection.Env: %v", inj.Env)
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}
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got, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ReadFile %s: %v", path, err)
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}
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want := "db.internal:5432:prod:app:s3cret!\n"
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if string(got) != want {
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t.Fatalf(".pgpass line=%q, want %q", got, want)
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}
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if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
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info, _ := os.Stat(path)
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if perm := info.Mode().Perm(); perm != 0o600 {
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t.Fatalf("file mode=%o, want 0600", perm)
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}
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}
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// ScrubValues must include both the password AND the on-disk tmpfile path
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// (psql echoes `could not open password file "<path>"` on IO errors).
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if len(inj.ScrubValues) != 2 || inj.ScrubValues[0] != "s3cret!" || inj.ScrubValues[1] != path {
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t.Fatalf("ScrubValues=%v, want [s3cret! %s]", inj.ScrubValues, path)
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}
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if inj.Cleanup == nil {
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t.Fatalf("Cleanup missing")
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}
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if err := inj.Cleanup(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Cleanup: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := os.Stat(path); !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
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t.Fatalf("file still exists after cleanup")
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}
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// argv prefix must be empty — psql uses env only.
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if len(inj.ArgvPrefix) != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("psql adapter must not set ArgvPrefix, got %v", inj.ArgvPrefix)
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}
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}
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func TestPsqlAdapter_EscapesColonsAndBackslashes(t *testing.T) {
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a := psqlAdapterInstance(t)
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credType := "pg_password_file"
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// Adversarial password: contains both : and \.
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// .pgpass spec: escape backslash first, then colon.
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// p: ab:cd → ab\:cd
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// p: x\y → x\\y
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// combined: x\:y → x\\\:y
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blob, _ := json.Marshal(pgPasswordFile{
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Host: "h",
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Port: "5432",
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Database: "d",
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User: "u",
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Password: `x\:y`,
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})
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inj, err := a.Prepare(context.Background(), &store.SecureCLIBinary{}, &store.SecureCLIUserCredential{
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CredentialType: &credType,
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EncryptedEnv: blob,
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}, nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Prepare: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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if inj.Cleanup != nil {
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_ = inj.Cleanup()
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}
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})
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got, err := os.ReadFile(inj.Env["PGPASSFILE"])
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ReadFile: %v", err)
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}
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want := `h:5432:d:u:x\\\:y` + "\n"
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if string(got) != want {
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t.Fatalf("escaped line=%q, want %q", got, want)
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}
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}
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func TestPsqlAdapter_RejectsEmptyPassword(t *testing.T) {
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a := psqlAdapterInstance(t)
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credType := "pg_password_file"
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blob, _ := json.Marshal(pgPasswordFile{Host: "h", Port: "5432", Database: "d", User: "u"})
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if _, err := a.Prepare(context.Background(), &store.SecureCLIBinary{}, &store.SecureCLIUserCredential{
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CredentialType: &credType,
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EncryptedEnv: blob,
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}, nil); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error for empty password")
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}
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}
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func TestPsqlAdapter_RejectsInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
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a := psqlAdapterInstance(t)
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credType := "pg_password_file"
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if _, err := a.Prepare(context.Background(), &store.SecureCLIBinary{}, &store.SecureCLIUserCredential{
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CredentialType: &credType,
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EncryptedEnv: []byte(`not json`),
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}, nil); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error for invalid JSON")
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}
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}
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// Interface validation gate (Phase 2b §"Interface validation gate"):
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// Confirms psql consumed the Phase 2 Injection shape without modification.
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// If this test fails to compile after a Phase 2 interface change, the change
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// likely needs to be re-evaluated for non-git generality.
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func TestPsqlAdapter_InterfaceValidationGate(t *testing.T) {
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var _ CredentialAdapter = psqlAdapter{}
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// All four Injection fields are exercised by Prepare:
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// Env → PGPASSFILE
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// Cleanup → tmpfile removal
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// ScrubValues → password redaction
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// ArgvPrefix → intentionally empty (not all adapters need argv mutation)
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}
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