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* feat(secure-cli): Phase 1 schema + storage delta (issue #82) Adds `adapter_name` column to secure_cli_binaries and `credential_type` + `host_scope` columns to secure_cli_user_credentials. LookupByBinary LEFT JOIN now projects AdapterName, UserCredentialType, and UserHostScope. Extends SecureCLIStore with SetUserCredentialsTyped(ctx, binaryID, userID, env, credType, hostScope); legacy SetUserCredentials delegates to typed variant with nil/nil for backward compat. PG migration 73 + RequiredSchemaVersion bumped to 73. SQLite incremental migrations (versions 39–41) + SchemaVersion 42. 7 SQLite + 6 PG integration tests covering schema, round-trip, NULL legacy, LookupByBinary projection. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): Phase 2 CredentialAdapter framework + passthrough (issue #82) Adds CredentialAdapter interface + Injection{ArgvPrefix,Env,Cleanup,ScrubValues} struct. Registry resolves by name; falls back to passthrough for empty/unknown. passthroughAdapter is default no-op — all existing presets (gh/aws/gcloud/kubectl/terraform/gws) behave bit-for-bit identically. Per-request WithScrubBag(ctx) + AddScrubValuesCtx + ScrubCredentialsCtx for multi-tenant secret isolation (replaces package-global slice). Hook in executeCredentialed between env merge and exec: resolve adapter by bin.AdapterName, reject non-passthrough in sandbox, call Prepare, splice ArgvPrefix, merge Env, defer Cleanup, register ScrubValues. Audit log security.system_env_injection records adapter name + env key names + argv_prefix_len + sha256(host_scope) — NEVER values. CLIPreset.AdapterName field added; empty default for legacy presets. 12 unit tests covering passthrough no-op, registry fallback + nil safety, Injection shape, hashHostScope determinism, sortedKeys, scrub bag per-request isolation + concurrent + short-value guard. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): Phase 2b extensibility helpers + psql stub adapter (issue #82) Proves CredentialAdapter framework generalizes beyond git. Adds materializeEphemeral(ctx, content, prefix) shared helper — 0600 tmpfile + idempotent atomic.Bool cleanup latch; memfd intentionally rejected (resolves "self" against child process). Adds psqlAdapter consuming framework end-to-end via PGPASSFILE pattern; libpq-spec .pgpass escaping for `:` and `\`. Registers psql preset with AdapterName: "psql" (production UI for typed creds lands in v2). Interface validation gate passes: Injection shape unchanged, hook is psql-agnostic, no special branch needed. Tests: ephemeral write/cleanup/concurrent/zero-content; psql routing/content/escaping/error paths/registration. Fixes #82 * feat(secure-cli): git adapter PAT + SSH implementation (issue #82) Phase 3 — PAT path - gitAdapter PAT branch via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/KEY_0/VALUE_0 env (git 2.31+) so the token never lands on argv, .git/config, or remote URL - Host-scope enforcement with IDN normalization (golang.org/x/net/idna) and embedded-userinfo rejection in URL parsing - CVE-2018-17456 mitigation: resolve remote URLs via `git config --get` not `git remote get-url` to dodge ext::sh protocol handler injection - Case-insensitive DenyArgs blocking `-c http.`, `-c credential.`, `-c core.sshcommand`, `config --global/--system`, `credential-helper`, bare `daemon` - New WithExecCwd / ExecCwdFromContext context helpers — fixes a latent design gap where the adapter's pre-flight `git config --get` ran in goclaw's daemon CWD instead of the agent's repo - 14 unit tests covering subcommand routing, host normalization, scp-form parsing, userinfo rejection, CRLF token rejection, CVE-2018-17456 regression, DenyArgs preset coverage - 3 integration tests against a local TLS git-http-backend server proving end-to-end clone + fetch + host-mismatch rejection with zero token leakage into the cloned .git/config Phase 4 — SSH path - gitAdapter ssh_key branch materializes per-call 0600 tmpfile via the Phase 2b materializeEphemeral helper, injects GIT_SSH_COMMAND with -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o BatchMode=yes -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new, idempotent cleanup - ValidateSSHKey using golang.org/x/crypto/ssh rejects passphrase-protected keys via ErrSSHKeyPassphraseUnsupported sentinel - 8 unit tests covering passphrase rejection, env shape, cleanup lifecycle, host-mismatch reuse, malformed-blob rejection - 3 integration tests proving tmpfile 0600 lifecycle, env propagation to child process, cleanup-on-exec-failure, no-orphan-on-rejection - 2 new i18n keys (en/vi/zh) for SSH-passphrase and SSH-key-invalid Verification: go vet clean, go build ./... clean, go build -tags sqliteonly ./... clean, go test -race ./internal/tools/ pass, go test -tags integration ./tests/integration/ -run TestGitAdapter pass. Refs #82 * feat(secure-cli): UI presets + typed credential HTTP path + i18n (issue #82) Phase 5. Typed PUT envelope with {error:{code,message}, error_key} for field-level errors. CliCredentialGitFields React component (PAT/SSH picker, host_scope input, CRLF→LF normalization, masked-edit). 17 i18n keys × 3 locales (backend + frontend). i18n parity test. * feat(secure-cli): audit log schema + adapter framework docs (issue #82) Phase 6. emitSystemEnvInjectionAudit helper centralizes security.system_env_injection slog with host_scope_hash (SHA-256 8 hex, plaintext hostname omitted for PII safety). Audit shape pinned by TestEmitSystemEnvInjectionAudit_*. New docs: git-credential-adapter.md (user guide), credential-adapter-playbook.md (R1 implementer guide w/ kubectl/docker/npm/aws/psql worked mappings). 09-security.md § 14 trust-boundary diagram + SSH TOFU + SIGKILL caveats. 03-tools-system.md § 8a. Changelog entry. * docs(journal): issue #82 CLI credential adapters shipped Retrospective covering 6 commits across phases 1-6: framework, git PAT/SSH, psql stub, UI/i18n, audit log schema, docs. Notes memfd-drop rationale, TOFU/SIGKILL caveats, sentinel-length lesson from audit-shape tests. * fix(secure-cli): honor per-request scrub bag on success+failure paths (#82) Sandbox and host exec paths called the non-Ctx ScrubCredentials, so adapter ScrubValues registered into the per-request bag during Prepare (e.g. GitLab glpat-, Bitbucket app-passwords, Azure DevOps PATs, Gitea tokens, SSH key tmpfile paths) were ignored on stdout/stderr returned to the agent. Only the package-global regex pass ran — covering ghp_ but nothing else. Switch all four exec/sandbox call sites to ScrubCredentialsCtx so the bag is consulted. Also scrub the slog adapter_cleanup_failed line — os.Remove errors embed the full tmpfile path. Add 5 regression tests that pin success path, failure path, negative control (proves the bag is what catches the sentinel), classic-PAT sanity, and timeout path no-leak. Locks AC6 against non-GitHub PAT providers. * fix(secure-cli): address review-pr #89 findings - ui/web: SSH key Textarea was 'text-xs' on all viewports, triggering iOS Safari auto-zoom on focus. Switch to 'text-base md:text-xs' so mobile renders 16px (no zoom) while desktop keeps compact mono font. - psql adapter: add on-disk pgpass tmpfile path to ScrubValues. psql echoes 'could not open password file "<path>"' on IO errors, so the path needs scrubbing alongside the password. Mirrors the git SSH adapter pattern. Update test assertion accordingly. - psql adapter: replace literal 'nil' context with 'context.TODO()' to silence staticcheck SA1012.
81 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
81 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
package tools
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
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)
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// TestGenerateCredentialContext_BlockedSectionScopedToMarker pins the wording
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// that scopes the "blocked command" guidance to credentialed-CLI errors only.
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// The LLM must see: (a) a header that says "credentialed CLI command",
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// (b) the literal `[CREDENTIALED EXEC]` marker, and (c) the qualifier
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// "credentialed CLI operation" — not the bare phrase from previous wording.
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func TestGenerateCredentialContext_BlockedSectionScopedToMarker(t *testing.T) {
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creds := []store.SecureCLIBinary{{
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BinaryName: "gh",
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Description: "GitHub CLI",
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}}
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out := GenerateCredentialContext(creds)
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wantContains := []string{
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"### When a credentialed CLI command is blocked:",
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"[CREDENTIALED EXEC]",
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"credentialed CLI operation",
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}
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for _, s := range wantContains {
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if !strings.Contains(out, s) {
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t.Errorf("expected output to contain %q, but it did not.\nOutput:\n%s", s, out)
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}
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}
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// Old unqualified wording must not survive — that wording over-generalized
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// to plain shell exec failures and caused unjustified pre-refusals.
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dontWant := "Tell the user: \"This operation requires admin approval"
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if strings.Contains(out, dontWant) {
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t.Errorf("output still contains unqualified wording %q.\nOutput:\n%s", dontWant, out)
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}
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}
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// 14. Phase 5: when the git adapter is enabled on at least one preset, the
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// generated TOOLS.md supplement includes the git-adapter usage block so the
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// LLM knows which subcommands auto-authenticate and which run un-credentialed.
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func TestGenerateCredentialContext_IncludesGit(t *testing.T) {
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git := "git"
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creds := []store.SecureCLIBinary{{
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BinaryName: "git",
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Description: "git VCS",
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AdapterName: &git,
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}}
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out := GenerateCredentialContext(creds)
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wantContains := []string{
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"### git (adapter-managed):",
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"Auto-authenticated subcommands",
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"`clone`, `fetch`, `pull`, `push`, `submodule`",
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"host-scoped",
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"git config --global",
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}
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for _, s := range wantContains {
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if !strings.Contains(out, s) {
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t.Errorf("expected output to contain %q, but it did not.\nOutput:\n%s", s, out)
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}
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}
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}
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// When NO preset has adapter_name=="git", the git block must NOT appear —
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// keeps TOOLS.md context minimal when only passthrough binaries are wired.
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func TestGenerateCredentialContext_OmitsGitWhenAbsent(t *testing.T) {
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creds := []store.SecureCLIBinary{{
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BinaryName: "gh",
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Description: "GitHub CLI",
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}}
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out := GenerateCredentialContext(creds)
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if strings.Contains(out, "### git (adapter-managed):") {
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t.Errorf("git block leaked into non-git context.\nOutput:\n%s", out)
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}
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}
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