Files
goclaw/internal/tools/credentialed_exec_scrub_test.go
Duy /zuey/andGitHub a591473546 feat(secure-cli): CLI credential adapters framework + git adapter (#82) (#89)
* feat(secure-cli): Phase 1 schema + storage delta (issue #82)

Adds `adapter_name` column to secure_cli_binaries and `credential_type` + `host_scope` columns to secure_cli_user_credentials. LookupByBinary LEFT JOIN now projects AdapterName, UserCredentialType, and UserHostScope. Extends SecureCLIStore with SetUserCredentialsTyped(ctx, binaryID, userID, env, credType, hostScope); legacy SetUserCredentials delegates to typed variant with nil/nil for backward compat.

PG migration 73 + RequiredSchemaVersion bumped to 73. SQLite incremental migrations (versions 39–41) + SchemaVersion 42. 7 SQLite + 6 PG integration tests covering schema, round-trip, NULL legacy, LookupByBinary projection.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): Phase 2 CredentialAdapter framework + passthrough (issue #82)

Adds CredentialAdapter interface + Injection{ArgvPrefix,Env,Cleanup,ScrubValues} struct. Registry resolves by name; falls back to passthrough for empty/unknown. passthroughAdapter is default no-op — all existing presets (gh/aws/gcloud/kubectl/terraform/gws) behave bit-for-bit identically.

Per-request WithScrubBag(ctx) + AddScrubValuesCtx + ScrubCredentialsCtx for multi-tenant secret isolation (replaces package-global slice). Hook in executeCredentialed between env merge and exec: resolve adapter by bin.AdapterName, reject non-passthrough in sandbox, call Prepare, splice ArgvPrefix, merge Env, defer Cleanup, register ScrubValues.

Audit log security.system_env_injection records adapter name + env key names + argv_prefix_len + sha256(host_scope) — NEVER values. CLIPreset.AdapterName field added; empty default for legacy presets.

12 unit tests covering passthrough no-op, registry fallback + nil safety, Injection shape, hashHostScope determinism, sortedKeys, scrub bag per-request isolation + concurrent + short-value guard.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): Phase 2b extensibility helpers + psql stub adapter (issue #82)

Proves CredentialAdapter framework generalizes beyond git. Adds materializeEphemeral(ctx, content, prefix) shared helper — 0600 tmpfile + idempotent atomic.Bool cleanup latch; memfd intentionally rejected (resolves "self" against child process).

Adds psqlAdapter consuming framework end-to-end via PGPASSFILE pattern; libpq-spec .pgpass escaping for `:` and `\`. Registers psql preset with AdapterName: "psql" (production UI for typed creds lands in v2).

Interface validation gate passes: Injection shape unchanged, hook is psql-agnostic, no special branch needed.

Tests: ephemeral write/cleanup/concurrent/zero-content; psql routing/content/escaping/error paths/registration.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): git adapter PAT + SSH implementation (issue #82)

Phase 3 — PAT path
- gitAdapter PAT branch via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/KEY_0/VALUE_0 env (git 2.31+)
  so the token never lands on argv, .git/config, or remote URL
- Host-scope enforcement with IDN normalization (golang.org/x/net/idna)
  and embedded-userinfo rejection in URL parsing
- CVE-2018-17456 mitigation: resolve remote URLs via `git config --get`
  not `git remote get-url` to dodge ext::sh protocol handler injection
- Case-insensitive DenyArgs blocking `-c http.`, `-c credential.`,
  `-c core.sshcommand`, `config --global/--system`, `credential-helper`,
  bare `daemon`
- New WithExecCwd / ExecCwdFromContext context helpers — fixes a latent
  design gap where the adapter's pre-flight `git config --get` ran in
  goclaw's daemon CWD instead of the agent's repo
- 14 unit tests covering subcommand routing, host normalization,
  scp-form parsing, userinfo rejection, CRLF token rejection,
  CVE-2018-17456 regression, DenyArgs preset coverage
- 3 integration tests against a local TLS git-http-backend server
  proving end-to-end clone + fetch + host-mismatch rejection with
  zero token leakage into the cloned .git/config

Phase 4 — SSH path
- gitAdapter ssh_key branch materializes per-call 0600 tmpfile via
  the Phase 2b materializeEphemeral helper, injects GIT_SSH_COMMAND
  with -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o BatchMode=yes
  -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new, idempotent cleanup
- ValidateSSHKey using golang.org/x/crypto/ssh rejects
  passphrase-protected keys via ErrSSHKeyPassphraseUnsupported sentinel
- 8 unit tests covering passphrase rejection, env shape, cleanup
  lifecycle, host-mismatch reuse, malformed-blob rejection
- 3 integration tests proving tmpfile 0600 lifecycle, env propagation
  to child process, cleanup-on-exec-failure, no-orphan-on-rejection
- 2 new i18n keys (en/vi/zh) for SSH-passphrase and SSH-key-invalid

Verification: go vet clean, go build ./... clean,
go build -tags sqliteonly ./... clean, go test -race
./internal/tools/ pass, go test -tags integration
./tests/integration/ -run TestGitAdapter pass.

Refs #82

* feat(secure-cli): UI presets + typed credential HTTP path + i18n (issue #82)

Phase 5. Typed PUT envelope with {error:{code,message}, error_key} for
field-level errors. CliCredentialGitFields React component (PAT/SSH picker,
host_scope input, CRLF→LF normalization, masked-edit). 17 i18n keys × 3
locales (backend + frontend). i18n parity test.

* feat(secure-cli): audit log schema + adapter framework docs (issue #82)

Phase 6. emitSystemEnvInjectionAudit helper centralizes
security.system_env_injection slog with host_scope_hash (SHA-256 8 hex,
plaintext hostname omitted for PII safety). Audit shape pinned by
TestEmitSystemEnvInjectionAudit_*. New docs: git-credential-adapter.md
(user guide), credential-adapter-playbook.md (R1 implementer guide w/
kubectl/docker/npm/aws/psql worked mappings). 09-security.md § 14
trust-boundary diagram + SSH TOFU + SIGKILL caveats. 03-tools-system.md
§ 8a. Changelog entry.

* docs(journal): issue #82 CLI credential adapters shipped

Retrospective covering 6 commits across phases 1-6: framework, git PAT/SSH, psql stub, UI/i18n, audit log schema, docs. Notes memfd-drop rationale, TOFU/SIGKILL caveats, sentinel-length lesson from audit-shape tests.

* fix(secure-cli): honor per-request scrub bag on success+failure paths (#82)

Sandbox and host exec paths called the non-Ctx ScrubCredentials, so
adapter ScrubValues registered into the per-request bag during Prepare
(e.g. GitLab glpat-, Bitbucket app-passwords, Azure DevOps PATs, Gitea
tokens, SSH key tmpfile paths) were ignored on stdout/stderr returned
to the agent. Only the package-global regex pass ran — covering ghp_
but nothing else.

Switch all four exec/sandbox call sites to ScrubCredentialsCtx so the
bag is consulted. Also scrub the slog adapter_cleanup_failed line —
os.Remove errors embed the full tmpfile path.

Add 5 regression tests that pin success path, failure path, negative
control (proves the bag is what catches the sentinel), classic-PAT
sanity, and timeout path no-leak.

Locks AC6 against non-GitHub PAT providers.

* fix(secure-cli): address review-pr #89 findings

- ui/web: SSH key Textarea was 'text-xs' on all viewports, triggering
  iOS Safari auto-zoom on focus. Switch to 'text-base md:text-xs' so
  mobile renders 16px (no zoom) while desktop keeps compact mono font.
- psql adapter: add on-disk pgpass tmpfile path to ScrubValues. psql
  echoes 'could not open password file "<path>"' on IO errors, so
  the path needs scrubbing alongside the password. Mirrors the git SSH
  adapter pattern. Update test assertion accordingly.
- psql adapter: replace literal 'nil' context with 'context.TODO()'
  to silence staticcheck SA1012.
2026-05-28 18:17:49 +07:00

127 lines
5.5 KiB
Go

// Regression tests pinning the success/failure-path output scrubber to the
// per-request bag (AddScrubValuesCtx), not the package-global slice.
//
// Why: adapter ScrubValues are registered into the per-request bag during
// Prepare. If formatCredentialedResult / executeCredentialedSandbox call the
// non-Ctx ScrubCredentials, the bag is ignored — so non-GitHub PATs (GitLab
// `glpat-…`, Bitbucket app passwords, Gitea tokens, Azure DevOps PATs) and
// SSH key tmpfile paths would leak into stdout/stderr returned to the agent.
// Locks AC6 against future regressions.
package tools
import (
"context"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// 1. Success path: adapter ScrubValues registered via bag are stripped from
// stdout in the final *Result.ForLLM. Uses a sentinel that does NOT match
// any built-in credentialPatterns regex (no `ghp_`, no `aws_`, no
// `://user:pass@`) so the bag is the only thing that could redact it.
func TestFormatCredentialedResult_HonorsScrubBag_Success(t *testing.T) {
ctx := WithScrubBag(context.Background())
secret := "glpat-NONSENSE_GITLAB_PAT_VALUE_XYZ123" // not matched by global regex
AddScrubValuesCtx(ctx, secret)
// Avoid any keyword-style prefix (`token=`, `password:`, `authorization=`, …)
// so the global credentialPatterns regex doesn't redact this — only the
// per-request bag can. That's the whole point of this regression test.
stdout := "cloning into 'repo'…\nremote: rejected by " + secret + " for user\ndone.\n"
res := formatCredentialedResult("/usr/bin/git", []string{"clone", "x"}, stdout, "", nil, ctx, time.Minute)
if res == nil {
t.Fatal("nil result")
}
if strings.Contains(res.ForLLM, secret) {
t.Fatalf("non-GitHub PAT leaked into ForLLM: %q", res.ForLLM)
}
if !strings.Contains(res.ForLLM, "[REDACTED]") {
t.Fatalf("expected [REDACTED] placeholder in scrubbed output, got %q", res.ForLLM)
}
}
// 2. Failure path: same guarantee on the error branch (exit != 0). This is
// the more dangerous case in practice — error messages often quote the
// failing URL/header that contains the token.
func TestFormatCredentialedResult_HonorsScrubBag_Failure(t *testing.T) {
ctx := WithScrubBag(context.Background())
keyPath := "/tmp/goclaw-gitkey-SENTINEL_PATH_VALUE_xyz789"
AddScrubValuesCtx(ctx, keyPath)
stderr := "Load key \"" + keyPath + "\": Permission denied\nfatal: Could not read from remote\n"
// Synthesize a real *exec.ExitError so the type-assertion branch fires.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", "exit 128")
_ = cmd.Run()
exitErr := &exec.ExitError{ProcessState: cmd.ProcessState}
res := formatCredentialedResult("/usr/bin/git", []string{"clone", "x"}, "", stderr, exitErr, ctx, time.Minute)
if res == nil {
t.Fatal("nil result")
}
if strings.Contains(res.ForLLM, keyPath) {
t.Fatalf("SSH key tmpfile path leaked into ForLLM error: %q", res.ForLLM)
}
if strings.Contains(res.ForUser, keyPath) {
t.Fatalf("SSH key tmpfile path leaked into ForUser error: %q", res.ForUser)
}
}
// 3. Negative control: without a bag in ctx, the same secret leaks (proves
// the test is actually exercising the bag path, not getting silently
// scrubbed by a global match).
func TestFormatCredentialedResult_NoBag_LeaksNonGlobalSecret(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background() // no WithScrubBag
secret := "glpat-NONSENSE_GITLAB_PAT_VALUE_CONTROL"
// Same evasion as test 1 — no keyword-style prefix, so a global regex
// match would have to come from the secret value itself (which it doesn't).
stdout := "remote: rejected by " + secret + " for user\n"
res := formatCredentialedResult("/usr/bin/git", []string{"clone", "x"}, stdout, "", nil, ctx, time.Minute)
if !strings.Contains(res.ForLLM, secret) {
t.Fatalf("control failed — secret was scrubbed without a bag, so test 1's coverage claim is wrong. ForLLM=%q", res.ForLLM)
}
}
// 4. Sanity: empty ctx + empty bag must not panic and must return the regex
// pass intact (well-known ghp_… still gets redacted).
func TestFormatCredentialedResult_EmptyBag_StillRunsGlobalRegex(t *testing.T) {
ctx := WithScrubBag(context.Background())
// classic GitHub PAT shape — matched by the package's regex pass
classicPAT := "ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
stdout := "token=" + classicPAT + "\n"
res := formatCredentialedResult("/usr/bin/git", nil, stdout, "", nil, ctx, time.Minute)
if strings.Contains(res.ForLLM, classicPAT) {
t.Fatalf("classic PAT not redacted by regex pass: %q", res.ForLLM)
}
}
// 5. Defensive: confirm the timeout path doesn't surface stderr at all
// (it returns the timeout marker, not the captured output), so no leak vector.
func TestFormatCredentialedResult_TimeoutPath_NoStderrLeak(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(WithScrubBag(context.Background()), 1*time.Nanosecond)
defer cancel()
time.Sleep(1 * time.Millisecond) // make sure deadline elapsed
stderr := "remote auth token=ghp_AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\n"
res := formatCredentialedResult("/usr/bin/git", nil, "", stderr,
errExitForTimeoutTest{}, ctx, 1*time.Nanosecond)
// On timeout the formatter returns a fixed string mentioning the binary,
// not the captured stderr — so no token in output regardless.
if strings.Contains(res.ForLLM, "ghp_") {
t.Fatalf("timeout path leaked captured stderr: %q", res.ForLLM)
}
}
// errExitForTimeoutTest is a marker error for the timeout-path test. The real
// formatCredentialedResult checks ctx.Err() before unwrapping, so any
// non-ExitError suffices.
type errExitForTimeoutTest struct{}
func (errExitForTimeoutTest) Error() string { return "context deadline exceeded" }