Files
Duy /zuey/andGitHub a591473546 feat(secure-cli): CLI credential adapters framework + git adapter (#82) (#89)
* feat(secure-cli): Phase 1 schema + storage delta (issue #82)

Adds `adapter_name` column to secure_cli_binaries and `credential_type` + `host_scope` columns to secure_cli_user_credentials. LookupByBinary LEFT JOIN now projects AdapterName, UserCredentialType, and UserHostScope. Extends SecureCLIStore with SetUserCredentialsTyped(ctx, binaryID, userID, env, credType, hostScope); legacy SetUserCredentials delegates to typed variant with nil/nil for backward compat.

PG migration 73 + RequiredSchemaVersion bumped to 73. SQLite incremental migrations (versions 39–41) + SchemaVersion 42. 7 SQLite + 6 PG integration tests covering schema, round-trip, NULL legacy, LookupByBinary projection.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): Phase 2 CredentialAdapter framework + passthrough (issue #82)

Adds CredentialAdapter interface + Injection{ArgvPrefix,Env,Cleanup,ScrubValues} struct. Registry resolves by name; falls back to passthrough for empty/unknown. passthroughAdapter is default no-op — all existing presets (gh/aws/gcloud/kubectl/terraform/gws) behave bit-for-bit identically.

Per-request WithScrubBag(ctx) + AddScrubValuesCtx + ScrubCredentialsCtx for multi-tenant secret isolation (replaces package-global slice). Hook in executeCredentialed between env merge and exec: resolve adapter by bin.AdapterName, reject non-passthrough in sandbox, call Prepare, splice ArgvPrefix, merge Env, defer Cleanup, register ScrubValues.

Audit log security.system_env_injection records adapter name + env key names + argv_prefix_len + sha256(host_scope) — NEVER values. CLIPreset.AdapterName field added; empty default for legacy presets.

12 unit tests covering passthrough no-op, registry fallback + nil safety, Injection shape, hashHostScope determinism, sortedKeys, scrub bag per-request isolation + concurrent + short-value guard.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): Phase 2b extensibility helpers + psql stub adapter (issue #82)

Proves CredentialAdapter framework generalizes beyond git. Adds materializeEphemeral(ctx, content, prefix) shared helper — 0600 tmpfile + idempotent atomic.Bool cleanup latch; memfd intentionally rejected (resolves "self" against child process).

Adds psqlAdapter consuming framework end-to-end via PGPASSFILE pattern; libpq-spec .pgpass escaping for `:` and `\`. Registers psql preset with AdapterName: "psql" (production UI for typed creds lands in v2).

Interface validation gate passes: Injection shape unchanged, hook is psql-agnostic, no special branch needed.

Tests: ephemeral write/cleanup/concurrent/zero-content; psql routing/content/escaping/error paths/registration.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): git adapter PAT + SSH implementation (issue #82)

Phase 3 — PAT path
- gitAdapter PAT branch via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/KEY_0/VALUE_0 env (git 2.31+)
  so the token never lands on argv, .git/config, or remote URL
- Host-scope enforcement with IDN normalization (golang.org/x/net/idna)
  and embedded-userinfo rejection in URL parsing
- CVE-2018-17456 mitigation: resolve remote URLs via `git config --get`
  not `git remote get-url` to dodge ext::sh protocol handler injection
- Case-insensitive DenyArgs blocking `-c http.`, `-c credential.`,
  `-c core.sshcommand`, `config --global/--system`, `credential-helper`,
  bare `daemon`
- New WithExecCwd / ExecCwdFromContext context helpers — fixes a latent
  design gap where the adapter's pre-flight `git config --get` ran in
  goclaw's daemon CWD instead of the agent's repo
- 14 unit tests covering subcommand routing, host normalization,
  scp-form parsing, userinfo rejection, CRLF token rejection,
  CVE-2018-17456 regression, DenyArgs preset coverage
- 3 integration tests against a local TLS git-http-backend server
  proving end-to-end clone + fetch + host-mismatch rejection with
  zero token leakage into the cloned .git/config

Phase 4 — SSH path
- gitAdapter ssh_key branch materializes per-call 0600 tmpfile via
  the Phase 2b materializeEphemeral helper, injects GIT_SSH_COMMAND
  with -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o BatchMode=yes
  -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new, idempotent cleanup
- ValidateSSHKey using golang.org/x/crypto/ssh rejects
  passphrase-protected keys via ErrSSHKeyPassphraseUnsupported sentinel
- 8 unit tests covering passphrase rejection, env shape, cleanup
  lifecycle, host-mismatch reuse, malformed-blob rejection
- 3 integration tests proving tmpfile 0600 lifecycle, env propagation
  to child process, cleanup-on-exec-failure, no-orphan-on-rejection
- 2 new i18n keys (en/vi/zh) for SSH-passphrase and SSH-key-invalid

Verification: go vet clean, go build ./... clean,
go build -tags sqliteonly ./... clean, go test -race
./internal/tools/ pass, go test -tags integration
./tests/integration/ -run TestGitAdapter pass.

Refs #82

* feat(secure-cli): UI presets + typed credential HTTP path + i18n (issue #82)

Phase 5. Typed PUT envelope with {error:{code,message}, error_key} for
field-level errors. CliCredentialGitFields React component (PAT/SSH picker,
host_scope input, CRLF→LF normalization, masked-edit). 17 i18n keys × 3
locales (backend + frontend). i18n parity test.

* feat(secure-cli): audit log schema + adapter framework docs (issue #82)

Phase 6. emitSystemEnvInjectionAudit helper centralizes
security.system_env_injection slog with host_scope_hash (SHA-256 8 hex,
plaintext hostname omitted for PII safety). Audit shape pinned by
TestEmitSystemEnvInjectionAudit_*. New docs: git-credential-adapter.md
(user guide), credential-adapter-playbook.md (R1 implementer guide w/
kubectl/docker/npm/aws/psql worked mappings). 09-security.md § 14
trust-boundary diagram + SSH TOFU + SIGKILL caveats. 03-tools-system.md
§ 8a. Changelog entry.

* docs(journal): issue #82 CLI credential adapters shipped

Retrospective covering 6 commits across phases 1-6: framework, git PAT/SSH, psql stub, UI/i18n, audit log schema, docs. Notes memfd-drop rationale, TOFU/SIGKILL caveats, sentinel-length lesson from audit-shape tests.

* fix(secure-cli): honor per-request scrub bag on success+failure paths (#82)

Sandbox and host exec paths called the non-Ctx ScrubCredentials, so
adapter ScrubValues registered into the per-request bag during Prepare
(e.g. GitLab glpat-, Bitbucket app-passwords, Azure DevOps PATs, Gitea
tokens, SSH key tmpfile paths) were ignored on stdout/stderr returned
to the agent. Only the package-global regex pass ran — covering ghp_
but nothing else.

Switch all four exec/sandbox call sites to ScrubCredentialsCtx so the
bag is consulted. Also scrub the slog adapter_cleanup_failed line —
os.Remove errors embed the full tmpfile path.

Add 5 regression tests that pin success path, failure path, negative
control (proves the bag is what catches the sentinel), classic-PAT
sanity, and timeout path no-leak.

Locks AC6 against non-GitHub PAT providers.

* fix(secure-cli): address review-pr #89 findings

- ui/web: SSH key Textarea was 'text-xs' on all viewports, triggering
  iOS Safari auto-zoom on focus. Switch to 'text-base md:text-xs' so
  mobile renders 16px (no zoom) while desktop keeps compact mono font.
- psql adapter: add on-disk pgpass tmpfile path to ScrubValues. psql
  echoes 'could not open password file "<path>"' on IO errors, so
  the path needs scrubbing alongside the password. Mirrors the git SSH
  adapter pattern. Update test assertion accordingly.
- psql adapter: replace literal 'nil' context with 'context.TODO()'
  to silence staticcheck SA1012.
2026-05-28 18:17:49 +07:00

226 lines
7.1 KiB
Go

package tools
import (
"context"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
)
// Credential patterns to scrub from tool output before returning to the LLM.
// Inspired by zeroclaw's credential scrubbing system.
var credentialPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
// OpenAI
regexp.MustCompile(`sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}`),
// Anthropic
regexp.MustCompile(`sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{20,}`),
// GitHub personal access tokens
regexp.MustCompile(`ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}`),
regexp.MustCompile(`gho_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}`),
regexp.MustCompile(`ghu_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}`),
regexp.MustCompile(`ghs_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}`),
regexp.MustCompile(`ghr_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}`),
// AWS
regexp.MustCompile(`AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}`),
// Generic key=value patterns (case-insensitive)
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(api[_-]?key|token|secret|password|bearer|authorization)\s*[:=]\s*["']?\S{8,}["']?`),
// Connection strings (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MongoDB, Redis, AMQP)
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(postgres|postgresql|mysql|mongodb|redis|amqp)://[^\s"']+`),
// Generic KEY=/SECRET=/CREDENTIAL= env-var patterns (skip already-redacted [REDACTED] values)
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)[A-Z_]*(KEY|SECRET|CREDENTIAL|PRIVATE)[A-Z_]*\s*=\s*[^\[\s]{8,}`),
// DSN/DATABASE_URL env vars (skip already-redacted values)
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(DSN|DATABASE_URL|REDIS_URL|MONGO_URI)\s*=\s*[^\[\s]{8,}`),
// VIRTUAL_* env vars (internal runtime config, should not leak)
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)VIRTUAL_[A-Z_]+\s*=\s*[^\[\s]{4,}`),
// Long hex strings (64+ chars) — likely encryption keys, hashes, or secrets
regexp.MustCompile(`[a-fA-F0-9]{64,}`),
}
const redactedPlaceholder = "[REDACTED]"
const serverIPPlaceholder = "[SERVER_IP]"
// dynamicScrubValues holds runtime-discovered values to scrub (e.g., server IPs).
var (
dynamicScrubMu sync.RWMutex
dynamicScrubValues []string
)
// credentialScrubValues holds credential values to scrub (replaced with [REDACTED]).
// Separate from dynamicScrubValues which use [SERVER_IP] placeholder.
var (
credentialScrubMu sync.RWMutex
credentialScrubValues []string
)
// AddDynamicScrubValues adds exact string values to the dynamic scrub list.
// Thread-safe. Deduplicates. Empty strings are ignored.
func AddDynamicScrubValues(values ...string) {
dynamicScrubMu.Lock()
defer dynamicScrubMu.Unlock()
existing := make(map[string]bool, len(dynamicScrubValues))
for _, v := range dynamicScrubValues {
existing[v] = true
}
for _, v := range values {
if v != "" && !existing[v] {
dynamicScrubValues = append(dynamicScrubValues, v)
existing[v] = true
}
}
}
// DynamicScrubCount returns the number of dynamic scrub values registered.
func DynamicScrubCount() int {
dynamicScrubMu.RLock()
defer dynamicScrubMu.RUnlock()
return len(dynamicScrubValues)
}
// ResetDynamicScrubValues clears all dynamic scrub values. For testing only.
func ResetDynamicScrubValues() {
dynamicScrubMu.Lock()
defer dynamicScrubMu.Unlock()
dynamicScrubValues = nil
}
// ResetCredentialScrubValues clears all credential scrub values.
// Called when credentials are updated to prevent stale values from accumulating.
func ResetCredentialScrubValues() {
credentialScrubMu.Lock()
defer credentialScrubMu.Unlock()
credentialScrubValues = nil
}
// AddCredentialScrubValues adds credential values to the scrub list.
// These are replaced with [REDACTED] (not [SERVER_IP]).
// Thread-safe. Deduplicates. Empty/short strings ignored.
func AddCredentialScrubValues(values ...string) {
credentialScrubMu.Lock()
defer credentialScrubMu.Unlock()
existing := make(map[string]bool, len(credentialScrubValues))
for _, v := range credentialScrubValues {
existing[v] = true
}
for _, v := range values {
// Skip short values to avoid false-positive scrubbing
if len(v) >= 6 && !existing[v] {
credentialScrubValues = append(credentialScrubValues, v)
existing[v] = true
}
}
}
// --- Per-request scrub bag (multi-tenant safe) ---
//
// The package-global credentialScrubValues above accumulates across all
// goroutines for the life of the process. For the adapter pipeline (Phase 2+)
// each exec gets its own scrub bag via context so tenant A's credentials never
// reach tenant B's output, even when adapters run concurrently.
type scrubBag struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
values []string
}
type scrubBagKey struct{}
type execCwdKey struct{}
// WithExecCwd returns a context carrying the working directory the
// credentialed exec will use. Adapters consult this so any pre-flight
// sub-exec (e.g. `git config --get remote.origin.url`) runs inside the
// caller's repo, not goclaw's daemon CWD.
func WithExecCwd(ctx context.Context, cwd string) context.Context {
if cwd == "" {
return ctx
}
return context.WithValue(ctx, execCwdKey{}, cwd)
}
// ExecCwdFromContext returns the cwd planted by WithExecCwd, or empty.
func ExecCwdFromContext(ctx context.Context) string {
if s, ok := ctx.Value(execCwdKey{}).(string); ok {
return s
}
return ""
}
// WithScrubBag returns a context carrying a fresh per-request scrub list.
// Call at the top of executeCredentialed; pass the returned ctx downstream.
func WithScrubBag(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, scrubBagKey{}, &scrubBag{})
}
// AddScrubValuesCtx appends adapter-derived secrets to the per-request bag.
// No-op when ctx has no bag (legacy callers). Skips values shorter than 6
// chars to avoid false-positive matches like "x" or "1".
func AddScrubValuesCtx(ctx context.Context, vs ...string) {
bag, ok := ctx.Value(scrubBagKey{}).(*scrubBag)
if !ok {
return
}
bag.mu.Lock()
defer bag.mu.Unlock()
for _, v := range vs {
if len(v) >= 6 {
bag.values = append(bag.values, v)
}
}
}
// ScrubCredentialsCtx runs the same regex pass as ScrubCredentials AND any
// per-request bag values, but does NOT consult the package-global slice.
// Use this in the adapter pipeline so one tenant's secrets cannot leak into
// another tenant's output through the shared global.
func ScrubCredentialsCtx(ctx context.Context, text string) string {
for _, pat := range credentialPatterns {
text = pat.ReplaceAllString(text, redactedPlaceholder)
}
if bag, ok := ctx.Value(scrubBagKey{}).(*scrubBag); ok {
bag.mu.RLock()
vals := append([]string(nil), bag.values...)
bag.mu.RUnlock()
for _, v := range vals {
text = strings.ReplaceAll(text, v, redactedPlaceholder)
}
}
// Dynamic server-IP values still apply — they're infra metadata, not creds.
dynamicScrubMu.RLock()
dyn := dynamicScrubValues
dynamicScrubMu.RUnlock()
for _, v := range dyn {
text = strings.ReplaceAll(text, v, serverIPPlaceholder)
}
return text
}
// ScrubCredentials replaces known credential patterns and dynamic values in text.
func ScrubCredentials(text string) string {
for _, pat := range credentialPatterns {
text = pat.ReplaceAllString(text, redactedPlaceholder)
}
// Credential values (from credentialed exec)
credentialScrubMu.RLock()
credVals := credentialScrubValues
credentialScrubMu.RUnlock()
for _, v := range credVals {
text = strings.ReplaceAll(text, v, redactedPlaceholder)
}
// Dynamic values (server IPs, etc.)
dynamicScrubMu.RLock()
vals := dynamicScrubValues
dynamicScrubMu.RUnlock()
for _, v := range vals {
text = strings.ReplaceAll(text, v, serverIPPlaceholder)
}
return text
}