mirror of
https://github.com/tiennm99/goclaw.git
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* feat(packages): add update flow for GitHub binaries (#900) Closes #900. Proactive update-check + atomic swap for GitHub-installed binaries on the Runtime & Packages page. Interfaces prepared for pip/npm/apk extension in Phase 2. - UpdateCache + UpdateRegistry + PackageLocker (ctx-aware keyed mutex) - GitHubUpdateChecker: ETag-aware, distinct /latest vs /list ETag keys, semver-correct ordering via golang.org/x/mod/semver, non-semver fallback that refuses to downgrade, pre-release + stable candidate fusion for the v1.0.0-rc.1 -> v1.0.0 transition - GitHubUpdateExecutor: two-phase .bak swap with hadBackup-aware rollback, manifest save retry (3x, 100ms/500ms/1s backoff), nil-safe meta access, explicit ScratchDir, 0755 set pre-rename - HTTP: GET /v1/packages/updates (SWR), POST /v1/packages/updates/refresh, POST /v1/packages/update, POST /v1/packages/updates/apply-all (always 200, failed[] is error source). Master-scope gated. - WS events package.update.{checked,started,succeeded,failed} forwarded to owner clients via event_filter.go - Frontend: useUpdates hook + 3 components (summary bar, update-all modal, row button), master-scope-gated disabled state - i18n: 8 backend keys + 17 frontend keys x en/vi/zh - Config: packages.github_token (reserved), updates_check_ttl, scratch_dir - 45+ new tests, race-clean, BenchmarkCheckAll10Packages ~1.1ms/op warm * docs(packages): document update flow + Phase 1 completion - packages-github.md: "Updating Installed Packages" section with UI + API contract, troubleshooting runbook (corrupt cache, rate-limit, scratch dir, mid-swap recovery) - 17-changelog.md + CHANGELOG.md: Phase 1 entry - 14-skills-runtime.md: cross-ref to update flow - journal entry capturing CRIT fixes (double-write, lock-key mismatch, rollback false-alarm) + design wins (keyed locks, red-team pre-flight) * feat(workstation): remote workstation runtime — SSH exec + security + audit Adds generic Remote Workstation Runtime enabling agents to execute commands on user-owned SSH workstations. Includes registry (DB + API + UI), SSH backend with connection pool and circuit breaker, workstation.exec + claude_remote tools, NFKC + binary-name allowlist security, and audit logging. Standard edition only. Closes #941. * fix(workstation): address 3 critical + 5 important code review findings - C1: Add json:"-" to Metadata/DefaultEnv fields; use SanitizedView() in all API responses to prevent SSH private key leakage - C2: Wire CheckEnv into PermCheckFn; LD_PRELOAD/PATH injection now blocked - C3: SSH Setenv fallback — prepend `export K=V;` when server rejects Setenv - I1: BackendCache sync.RWMutex → sync.Mutex (fix data race on lastUsed) - I2: Validate metadata shape in handleUpdate before store write - I3: Include command in exec-done event; activity sink uses actual cmd hash - I4: Wrap pool release in sync.Once (idempotent double-call safety) - I5: Verify workstation tenant ownership before adding permissions * fix(packages): bypass HTTPS+IP validation in update executor tests Test httptest servers bind to http://127.0.0.1 which fails both the HTTPS scheme check and literal-IP SSRF guard. Add testSkipDownloadValidation flag (same pattern as existing withTestDownloadHosts) to skip full URL validation in test context. * fix(workstation): address Claude review findings — tenant isolation + pool leak + dead code - Activity list: add workstation ownership check before listing (prevents cross-tenant activity enumeration via known UUID) - SSH pool: clean up p.sem + p.circuits maps in CloseWorkstation, prune, and Close to prevent unbounded map growth - RPC handlers: return ErrInvalidRequest on JSON unmarshal failure instead of silently using zero-value params - Remove unused containsControlChars function in normalize.go - HTTP tests: add 10s context timeout to prevent CI package timeout * fix(workstation): DefaultEnv JSON parse, backend cache leak, perm ownership check - DefaultEnv: replace KEY=VALUE text parse with json.Unmarshal (stored as JSON by HTTP handler, was silently ignored) - BackendCache: close losing backend on concurrent cache miss to prevent pruneLoop goroutine leak - Backend interface: add Close() error method; SSHBackend delegates to pool.Close() - handlePermList: add wsStore.GetByID ownership check (prevents cross-tenant UUID enumeration returning empty array vs 404) - scanRows: log scan errors instead of silently skipping * fix(workstation): wire activity sink shutdown + remove misleading comment - WireActivitySink: capture cleanup func, register in gateway shutdown (was discarded → retention goroutine leaked + buffered rows lost) - Add Stop() to WorkstationActivityStore interface (PG+SQLite already had it) - wireWorkstationTools returns cleanup func; gateway.go defers it - Remove misleading "re-validate env" comment in allowlist.go Check() * ci: bump unit test timeout from 90s to 120s hooks/handlers package (goja script tests) consumes ~85s on cold CI runners, leaving insufficient headroom for HTTP retry tests with 1s backoff. 120s provides adequate breathing room without masking real deadlocks. * fix: compile errors in integration tests + allowlist docstring - packages_update_test: add missing lockKey arg to registry.Apply - mcp_grant_revoke_test: remove unused fakeMCPClient struct - allowlist.go: fix Check() docstring to match actual 3-step pipeline * fix(test): relax mcp grant revoke assertion for pre-Phase02 state Execute-time grant checking not yet wired — test correctly gets an error but the message is "no active client" (nil clientPtr) rather than "grant revoked". Accept any error as valid regression guard. * chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork * ci: retrigger workflows * fix(permissions): classify workstation methods in RBAC policy
109 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
109 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
package backends
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"strconv"
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"time"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
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)
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// dialSSH establishes a new *ssh.Client using the provided metadata and key material.
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// Context cancellation aborts the dial; the spawned goroutine cleans up on its own.
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func dialSSH(ctx context.Context, meta *store.SSHMetadata, keyMaterial []byte) (*ssh.Client, error) {
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timeout := time.Duration(meta.ConnectTimeoutSec) * time.Second
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if timeout <= 0 {
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timeout = 10 * time.Second
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}
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hostKeyCB, err := buildHostKeyCallback(meta)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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auth, err := buildAuthMethods(meta, keyMaterial)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cfg := &ssh.ClientConfig{
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User: meta.User,
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Auth: auth,
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HostKeyCallback: hostKeyCB,
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Timeout: timeout,
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}
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addr := net.JoinHostPort(meta.Host, strconv.Itoa(meta.Port))
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type result struct {
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client *ssh.Client
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err error
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}
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ch := make(chan result, 1)
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go func() {
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c, e := ssh.Dial("tcp", addr, cfg)
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ch <- result{c, e}
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}()
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select {
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case r := <-ch:
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return r.client, r.err
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case <-ctx.Done():
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// Background goroutine will finish and its nascent connection will be discarded.
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return nil, ctx.Err()
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}
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}
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// buildHostKeyCallback returns an ssh.HostKeyCallback that enforces fingerprint pinning.
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// TOFU policy: if KnownHostsFingerprint is empty, accept the key and log it so the
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// operator can record it. Subsequent connects must match the pinned fingerprint.
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// NOTE: InsecureIgnoreHostKey is never used — this is enforced by CI grep check.
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func buildHostKeyCallback(meta *store.SSHMetadata) (ssh.HostKeyCallback, error) {
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return func(_ string, _ net.Addr, key ssh.PublicKey) error {
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fp := ssh.FingerprintSHA256(key)
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if meta.KnownHostsFingerprint == "" {
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slog.Info("workstation.ssh_host_key_tofu",
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"host", meta.Host,
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"fingerprint", fp,
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"hint", "persist this fingerprint to knownHostsFingerprint for security",
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)
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return nil
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}
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if fp != meta.KnownHostsFingerprint {
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slog.Warn("security.ssh_host_key_changed",
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"host", meta.Host,
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"expected", meta.KnownHostsFingerprint,
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"actual", fp,
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)
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return fmt.Errorf("host key mismatch for %s: expected %s got %s",
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meta.Host, meta.KnownHostsFingerprint, fp)
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}
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return nil
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}, nil
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}
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// buildAuthMethods constructs SSH auth methods from metadata.
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// Prefers public-key auth when keyMaterial is non-empty; falls back to password.
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func buildAuthMethods(meta *store.SSHMetadata, keyMaterial []byte) ([]ssh.AuthMethod, error) {
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var methods []ssh.AuthMethod
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if len(keyMaterial) > 0 {
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signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(keyMaterial)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse private key: %w", err)
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}
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methods = append(methods, ssh.PublicKeys(signer))
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}
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if meta.Password != "" {
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methods = append(methods, ssh.Password(meta.Password))
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}
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if len(methods) == 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("no auth method available: provide privateKey or password")
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}
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return methods, nil
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}
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