Files
goclaw/internal/agent/loop_media_test.go
T
bd5adc61c8 feat(bitrix24): imbot.v2 migration, 2-way media, openline sender-tag echo, and hardening (#1236)
* refactor(bitrix24): rename "Path B" framing to maintainer-specified naming [B24:2794]

Per maintainer hard rule #10 (no generic "Path A/B" framing) from PR #1061
review. The Bitrix24 MCP auto-onboard flow is Bitrix-specific glue
("Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge"), NOT a generic
MCP architecture pattern.

Naming convention applied consistently:
- First mention per file: full "Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing
  mcp_user_credentials bridge" (matches maintainer comment verbatim).
- Subsequent mentions in same file: shortened "mcp_user_credentials bridge".
- Test/log context referencing literal endpoint /api/auto-onboard: keep
  "auto-onboard" reference (it's the actual API endpoint name).

Changes are documentation-only:
- Rename in code comments + test descriptions + plan docs.
- Clarify framing in mcp_client.go + provisioner.go doc comments to
  emphasize Bitrix-specific glue (not generic MCP infra).
- Reuse existing mcp_user_credentials table + MCPServerStore methods
  (no schema / store / abstraction change).

Files:
- cmd/gateway.go (factory registration doc)
- internal/channels/bitrix24/{channel,factory,mcp_client,provisioner}.go
- internal/channels/bitrix24/{mcp_client,provisioner}_test.go
- plan/goclaw-mcp-integration.md (21 occurrences)

Verified: go build + MCP-related tests pass (TestProvision*,
TestInitMCPProvisioner*, TestMCPClient*).

Phase 1 of Path C execution per
plans/reports/decision-log-260519-1555-bitrix24-pr-fork-decision.md.

* fix: confine outbound media paths to agent workspace [B24:2794]

Tool MEDIA:<path> output reached channel file-upload sinks (Bitrix
imbot.v2.File.upload, Telegram sendDocument, etc.) verbatim via
parseMediaResult, with no workspace-boundary check. A malicious or buggy
tool emitting MEDIA:/etc/passwd could exfiltrate arbitrary files to chat.

Extract the EvalSymlinks+Rel containment from extractMediaFromContent into
a shared confineToWorkspace helper and apply it at the parseMediaResult
sink in processToolResult. Fixing at the source/egress boundary protects
every channel at once rather than per-channel. Paths that escape the
workspace are dropped and logged (security.media_path_rejected).

Add TestConfineToWorkspace (boundary unit) and
TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace (sink regression for H2).

* feat(bitrix24): support inbound + outbound media via imbot.v2 File API [B24:2794]

Bitrix24 channel was text-only; attachments were parsed but dropped.
- Inbound: download chat files via imbot.v2.File.download (one-time URL),
  forward to the agent with MIME preserved (internal/channels/bitrix24/download.go).
- Outbound: upload agent media to the chat via imbot.v2.File.upload
  (internal/channels/bitrix24/send_media.go).
- Add BaseChannel.HandleMessageMedia to preserve MIME/filename through the bus.
- Per-channel media_max_mb cap (default 20) applies to both directions.

Tests: 92 pass (internal/channels/bitrix24 + internal/channels), go vet clean (PG + sqliteonly).

* refactor(bitrix24): migrate messaging/bot-list/unregister to imbot v2 API [B24:2794]

Move outbound REST calls to the imbot v2 family (keeps register on v1):
- imbot.message.add -> imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send (fields.message shape, live-verified)
- imbot.bot.list (+ legacy imbot.list fallback) -> imbot.v2.Bot.list; add botListRows
  to normalize the v2 {bots:[...]} envelope, legacy array, and id-keyed map forms
- imbot.unregister -> imbot.v2.Bot.unregister

Bot registration stays on v1 imbot.register: v2 imbot.v2.Bot.register changes the
event-delivery model (per-event handler URLs -> eventMode), which would require
rewriting the inbound event parser. No user-facing behavior change.

Tests: bitrix24 package green; go vet ./... clean.

* feat(bitrix24): route whisper via v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR + add v2 replyId [B24:2794]

Bot was leaking HiddenMessage (whisper) replies to the external Zalo
connector because every outbound call went through imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send,
which has no equivalent of the v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR flag. Branch the outbound
path on inbound visibility:

  whisper → imbot.message.add + SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y  (v1, send_v1.go)
  public  → imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send + fields.replyId  (v2, send_v2.go)

Pipeline:
  events.go        parse data[PARAMS][PARAMS][COMPONENT_ID]=HiddenMessage
                   into EventParams.IsHiddenMessage (form + JSON variants)
  handle.go        set bitrix_visibility on InboundMessage.Metadata
  consumer         forward visibility + message_id into OutboundMessage
  send.go          resolveSendOptions + sendChunk dispatcher +
                   shared callWithRateLimitRetry helper
  metadata_keys.go single source of truth for the keys + values

Defaults preserve pre-refactor behaviour: callers that don't populate
bitrix_visibility still go through v2 public, and replyId is omitted
unless a numeric bitrix_message_id arrives in metadata.

Tests:
  TestParseEvent_FormURLEncoded_IsHiddenMessage  (3 cases)
  TestParseEvent_JSON_IsHiddenMessage             (3 cases)
  TestResolveSendOptions                          (8 cases)
  TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility                   (4 cases)

* feat(bitrix24): openline sender-tag echo on replies [B24:2794]

Openline sender-tag echo (this change):
- Capture the connector sender tag ("[name #id]:" or "[name] #id:") from
  inbound openline group messages, strip it from the body the agent sees,
  and re-prepend the canonical "[name] #id:" form to the reply so the Open
  Channel connector routes the answer back to the right external user.
- New sender_prefix.go helper (+ test) accepts both inbound layouts and
  emits one canonical form; scoped to messages carrying the tag, so plain
  chats are unaffected.
- metadata_keys.go: MetaKeySenderPrefix; handle.go capture/strip/stash;
  gateway_consumer_normal.go forwards the key; send.go prepends it on the
  first chunk before chunking.

Bundled bitrix24 channel-core work already on this branch:
- handle.go: @mention is the sole trigger for both staff and connector
  customers; unmentioned traffic is dropped (was: drop all connector msgs).
- isGroupMessageType: treat SONET_GROUP "B" as a group.
- handle_test.go, mcp_client_test.go: cover the above.

* feat(bitrix24): accept colon-less openline sender tag, echo [name] #id [B24:2794]

The Open Channel connector dropped the trailing colon from its sender tag:
inbound now arrives as "[Name] #id <msg>" (was "[Name] #id: <msg>"). The
id-bearing patterns required the colon, so the tag fell through to the
name-only branch and the reply echoed "[Name]" — dropping the #id the
connector needs to route the answer back.

- sender_prefix.go: make the trailing ":" optional on both id layouts
  ([name #id] / [name] #id, with or without colon) and echo the canonical
  "[name] #id" (no colon) to match the connector's current format. Bare
  "[name]" (no id) still echoes "[name]" for Open Channel only.
- handle.go: gate the bare name-only layout to Open Channel (isOpenChannel)
  so ordinary group chats starting with "[x] ..." are left untouched.
- sender_prefix_test.go: cover colon/no-colon x id-inside/id-outside, the
  name-only openline case, and the non-openline no-op.

* fix: security and robustness fixes from the bitrix24 channel review [B24:2794]

- download.go: block redirect-based SSRF on inbound media. CheckRedirect
  re-validates each hop (http(s) only, reject private/loopback/link-local
  hosts, cap hops); the initial portal-domain pin is no longer bypassable
  via a 3xx to an internal service. Public-host redirects still allowed.
- handle.go: extract/echo the openline sender tag only for Open Channel
  sessions (was: any group chat), removing bogus prefixes in CRM group
  chats and narrowing the forged-tag misroute surface.
- loop_tools.go + loop_media.go: confine result.Media to the agent / team /
  tenant-allowed roots (new confineToAnyRoot) before a channel uploads it,
  so a prompt-injected out-of-workspace path (e.g. /etc/passwd) cannot
  exfiltrate, while legitimate cross-workspace media (team files, delegatee
  output) still flows.
- send_media.go: bounded outbound read via io.LimitReader replaces the
  os.Stat + os.ReadFile pair, closing the TOCTOU size-cap bypass; cap a
  single message's outbound attachments at 10 (mirrors inbound).
- register.go: paginate imbot.v2.Bot.list (limit/offset + hasNextPage,
  capped at 40 pages) so verify/lookup see bots past the first 50.
- mcp_client.go: redact access_token / refresh_token / client_secret from an
  echoed MCP error body before it is logged or returned (+ test).

* fix(security): validate resolved dial IP on Bitrix media redirects [B24:2794]

The inbound media download redirect guard only string-checked the redirect
hostname (isPrivateOrLoopback on req.URL.Hostname()), so a redirect to a public
hostname that resolves to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 / an RFC1918 address — or a
DNS-rebinding swap between check and dial — still passed the guard and the client
would connect. Reported in PR review.

Add security.NewRedirectFollowingSafeClient: it follows redirects but validates
the RESOLVED destination IP of every hop at dial time via net.Dialer.Control,
reusing the existing blocked-CIDR list. The IP it checks is the IP actually
dialed, so both redirect-to-internal and DNS rebinding are refused, while
legitimate public CDN redirects still succeed. download.go now uses it instead of
the hostname-string guard.

Tests: deterministic dial-control table (loopback / link-local / private /
multicast / unspecified / public, v4 + v6), malformed/non-IP addr, test bypass,
loopback-dial-blocked client wiring, and redirect cap + scheme checks.

* feat(bitrix24): per-participant Zalo openline identity from 3-token sender tag [B24:2794]

Parse the connector's "[Name] #uid #msgId" sender tag so each external
customer in a shared Open Channel group gets its own contact + USER.md
instead of collapsing onto the connector proxy id. Identity minting is
gated on IS_CONNECTOR=Y to reject operator forged tags. Echo back the
msgId only ("#msgId") on replies; keep the legacy single-number and
name-only layouts unchanged. Zero DB migration.

- sender_prefix.go: parseOpenlineSenderTag() classifies 3-token / legacy / name-only
- handle.go: synthetic senderID "openlines:{instance}:{chat}:{uid}" + participant_user_id metadata, gated on FromIsConnector
- gateway_consumer_normal.go: deriveGroupUserID() routes participant -> per-person scope, group fallback otherwise
- send.go: buildAddressMention numeric-id guard so synthetic ids don't emit invalid [USER=...] BBCode
- MetaKeyMessageID kept as Bitrix MESSAGE_ID (drives v2 fields.replyId); connector msgId surfaced only via echo prefix

---------

Co-authored-by: DangTinh311 <dangtinh31193@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chinh Dang <chinhdang@192.168.68.104>
2026-06-22 14:23:34 +07:00

259 lines
8.0 KiB
Go

package agent
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// writeTempFile drops a zero-byte file at workspace/relPath, creating dirs.
func writeTempFile(t *testing.T, workspace, relPath string) string {
t.Helper()
full := filepath.Join(workspace, relPath)
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(full), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(full, nil, 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
return full
}
func TestExtractMediaFromContent(t *testing.T) {
wsRaw := t.TempDir()
// Resolve workspace symlinks up front (macOS has /var → /private/var) so
// expected paths match what the extractor returns after EvalSymlinks.
ws, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(wsRaw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
reportPath := writeTempFile(t, ws, "deliver/report.pdf")
audioA := writeTempFile(t, ws, "a.mp3")
audioB := writeTempFile(t, ws, "b.mp3")
chartPath := writeTempFile(t, ws, "charts/q4.png")
// Outside-workspace file: should be rejected by containment check.
outsideDir := t.TempDir()
outsidePath := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "leak.pdf")
if err := os.WriteFile(outsidePath, nil, 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Symlink inside workspace pointing to outside: must be rejected by
// EvalSymlinks-then-Rel containment. Covers the P0 ancestor-symlink
// escape the lexical-only Rel check would have allowed.
symlinkFile := filepath.Join(ws, "shortcut-to-leak.pdf")
if err := os.Symlink(outsidePath, symlinkFile); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink not supported: %v", err)
}
// Ancestor symlink case: dir symlink inside ws pointing outside.
symDirParent := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(symDirParent, "victim.pdf"), nil, 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ancestorSym := filepath.Join(ws, "shared")
if err := os.Symlink(symDirParent, ancestorSym); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink not supported: %v", err)
}
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
workspace string
wantPaths []string
}{
{
name: "empty content",
content: "",
},
{
name: "no media prefix",
content: "Just a regular response with no attachments.",
},
{
name: "relative path resolved + exists",
content: "MEDIA:deliver/report.pdf",
workspace: ws,
wantPaths: []string{reportPath},
},
{
name: "multiple tokens deduped",
content: "First: MEDIA:a.mp3\nSecond: MEDIA:b.mp3\nAgain: MEDIA:a.mp3",
workspace: ws,
wantPaths: []string{audioA, audioB},
},
{
name: "markdown wrapped and punctuation stripped",
content: `![chart](MEDIA:charts/q4.png). See "MEDIA:deliver/report.pdf".`,
workspace: ws,
wantPaths: []string{chartPath, reportPath},
},
{
name: "hallucinated path dropped (file missing)",
content: "MEDIA:not-real.pdf",
workspace: ws,
},
{
name: "path traversal escape blocked",
content: "MEDIA:../leak.pdf",
workspace: ws,
},
{
name: "absolute path outside workspace blocked",
content: "MEDIA:" + outsidePath,
workspace: ws,
},
{
name: "absolute path with no workspace dropped",
content: "MEDIA:" + reportPath,
},
{
name: "symlink leaf rejected by Lstat",
content: "MEDIA:shortcut-to-leak.pdf",
workspace: ws,
},
{
name: "ancestor symlink escape blocked (P0)",
content: "MEDIA:shared/victim.pdf",
workspace: ws,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := extractMediaFromContent(tt.content, tt.workspace)
if len(got) != len(tt.wantPaths) {
t.Fatalf("count = %d, want %d; got=%+v", len(got), len(tt.wantPaths), got)
}
for i, want := range tt.wantPaths {
if got[i].Path != want {
t.Errorf("path[%d] = %q, want %q", i, got[i].Path, want)
}
}
})
}
}
// TestConfineToWorkspace exercises the shared media path-containment boundary
// directly. It is the single guard that both feeders of MediaResult.Path rely
// on, so a regression here would reopen the outbound-exfiltration hole (H2).
func TestConfineToWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
wsRaw := t.TempDir()
ws, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(wsRaw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
insidePath := writeTempFile(t, ws, "deliver/report.pdf")
// File outside the workspace (stands in for /etc/passwd).
outsideDir := t.TempDir()
outsidePath := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(outsidePath, nil, 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Leaf symlink inside ws pointing outside: must be rejected by Lstat.
leafSymlink := filepath.Join(ws, "shortcut.txt")
symlinkSupported := os.Symlink(outsidePath, leafSymlink) == nil
// Ancestor dir symlink inside ws pointing outside.
symDirParent := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(symDirParent, "victim.txt"), nil, 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ancestorSym := filepath.Join(ws, "shared")
if symlinkSupported {
if err := os.Symlink(symDirParent, ancestorSym); err != nil {
symlinkSupported = false
}
}
tests := []struct {
name string
path string
workspace string
wantOK bool
wantPath string
symlink bool // requires symlink support
}{
{name: "relative inside workspace", path: "deliver/report.pdf", workspace: ws, wantOK: true, wantPath: insidePath},
{name: "absolute inside workspace", path: insidePath, workspace: ws, wantOK: true, wantPath: insidePath},
{name: "absolute outside workspace rejected", path: outsidePath, workspace: ws, wantOK: false},
{name: "traversal escape rejected", path: "../secret.txt", workspace: ws, wantOK: false},
{name: "missing file rejected", path: "nope.pdf", workspace: ws, wantOK: false},
{name: "empty workspace rejected", path: insidePath, workspace: "", wantOK: false},
{name: "empty path rejected", path: "", workspace: ws, wantOK: false},
{name: "leaf symlink rejected", path: "shortcut.txt", workspace: ws, wantOK: false, symlink: true},
{name: "ancestor symlink escape rejected", path: "shared/victim.txt", workspace: ws, wantOK: false, symlink: true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if tt.symlink && !symlinkSupported {
t.Skip("symlinks not supported on this platform")
}
got, ok := confineToWorkspace(tt.path, tt.workspace)
if ok != tt.wantOK {
t.Fatalf("ok = %v, want %v (got path %q)", ok, tt.wantOK, got)
}
if tt.wantOK && got != tt.wantPath {
t.Errorf("path = %q, want %q", got, tt.wantPath)
}
})
}
}
// TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace reproduces the processToolResult sink
// (parseMediaResult → confineToWorkspace) and asserts that a tool emitting a
// MEDIA: path outside the agent workspace is dropped, not shipped to a channel.
// This is the regression guard for H2: MEDIA:/etc/passwd must never become an
// outbound MediaResult.
func TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
wsRaw := t.TempDir()
ws, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(wsRaw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
insidePath := writeTempFile(t, ws, "chart.png")
outsideDir := t.TempDir()
outsidePath := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "passwd")
if err := os.WriteFile(outsidePath, nil, 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// confineSink mirrors the loop_tools.go branch: parse, then confine.
confineSink := func(toolOutput string) (MediaResult, bool) {
mr := parseMediaResult(toolOutput)
if mr == nil {
return MediaResult{}, false
}
cleaned, ok := confineToWorkspace(mr.Path, ws)
if !ok {
return MediaResult{}, false
}
mr.Path = cleaned
return *mr, true
}
t.Run("inside workspace shipped", func(t *testing.T) {
got, ok := confineSink("MEDIA:" + insidePath)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected in-workspace media to be shipped")
}
if got.Path != insidePath {
t.Errorf("path = %q, want %q", got.Path, insidePath)
}
})
t.Run("outside workspace dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
if _, ok := confineSink("MEDIA:" + outsidePath); ok {
t.Fatal("expected out-of-workspace media to be dropped")
}
})
t.Run("traversal dropped", func(t *testing.T) {
if _, ok := confineSink("MEDIA:../passwd"); ok {
t.Fatal("expected traversal media to be dropped")
}
})
}