Files
goclaw/internal/http/secure_cli_user_credentials.go
T
Duy /zuey/andGitHub a591473546 feat(secure-cli): CLI credential adapters framework + git adapter (#82) (#89)
* feat(secure-cli): Phase 1 schema + storage delta (issue #82)

Adds `adapter_name` column to secure_cli_binaries and `credential_type` + `host_scope` columns to secure_cli_user_credentials. LookupByBinary LEFT JOIN now projects AdapterName, UserCredentialType, and UserHostScope. Extends SecureCLIStore with SetUserCredentialsTyped(ctx, binaryID, userID, env, credType, hostScope); legacy SetUserCredentials delegates to typed variant with nil/nil for backward compat.

PG migration 73 + RequiredSchemaVersion bumped to 73. SQLite incremental migrations (versions 39–41) + SchemaVersion 42. 7 SQLite + 6 PG integration tests covering schema, round-trip, NULL legacy, LookupByBinary projection.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): Phase 2 CredentialAdapter framework + passthrough (issue #82)

Adds CredentialAdapter interface + Injection{ArgvPrefix,Env,Cleanup,ScrubValues} struct. Registry resolves by name; falls back to passthrough for empty/unknown. passthroughAdapter is default no-op — all existing presets (gh/aws/gcloud/kubectl/terraform/gws) behave bit-for-bit identically.

Per-request WithScrubBag(ctx) + AddScrubValuesCtx + ScrubCredentialsCtx for multi-tenant secret isolation (replaces package-global slice). Hook in executeCredentialed between env merge and exec: resolve adapter by bin.AdapterName, reject non-passthrough in sandbox, call Prepare, splice ArgvPrefix, merge Env, defer Cleanup, register ScrubValues.

Audit log security.system_env_injection records adapter name + env key names + argv_prefix_len + sha256(host_scope) — NEVER values. CLIPreset.AdapterName field added; empty default for legacy presets.

12 unit tests covering passthrough no-op, registry fallback + nil safety, Injection shape, hashHostScope determinism, sortedKeys, scrub bag per-request isolation + concurrent + short-value guard.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): Phase 2b extensibility helpers + psql stub adapter (issue #82)

Proves CredentialAdapter framework generalizes beyond git. Adds materializeEphemeral(ctx, content, prefix) shared helper — 0600 tmpfile + idempotent atomic.Bool cleanup latch; memfd intentionally rejected (resolves "self" against child process).

Adds psqlAdapter consuming framework end-to-end via PGPASSFILE pattern; libpq-spec .pgpass escaping for `:` and `\`. Registers psql preset with AdapterName: "psql" (production UI for typed creds lands in v2).

Interface validation gate passes: Injection shape unchanged, hook is psql-agnostic, no special branch needed.

Tests: ephemeral write/cleanup/concurrent/zero-content; psql routing/content/escaping/error paths/registration.

Fixes #82

* feat(secure-cli): git adapter PAT + SSH implementation (issue #82)

Phase 3 — PAT path
- gitAdapter PAT branch via GIT_CONFIG_COUNT/KEY_0/VALUE_0 env (git 2.31+)
  so the token never lands on argv, .git/config, or remote URL
- Host-scope enforcement with IDN normalization (golang.org/x/net/idna)
  and embedded-userinfo rejection in URL parsing
- CVE-2018-17456 mitigation: resolve remote URLs via `git config --get`
  not `git remote get-url` to dodge ext::sh protocol handler injection
- Case-insensitive DenyArgs blocking `-c http.`, `-c credential.`,
  `-c core.sshcommand`, `config --global/--system`, `credential-helper`,
  bare `daemon`
- New WithExecCwd / ExecCwdFromContext context helpers — fixes a latent
  design gap where the adapter's pre-flight `git config --get` ran in
  goclaw's daemon CWD instead of the agent's repo
- 14 unit tests covering subcommand routing, host normalization,
  scp-form parsing, userinfo rejection, CRLF token rejection,
  CVE-2018-17456 regression, DenyArgs preset coverage
- 3 integration tests against a local TLS git-http-backend server
  proving end-to-end clone + fetch + host-mismatch rejection with
  zero token leakage into the cloned .git/config

Phase 4 — SSH path
- gitAdapter ssh_key branch materializes per-call 0600 tmpfile via
  the Phase 2b materializeEphemeral helper, injects GIT_SSH_COMMAND
  with -o IdentitiesOnly=yes -o BatchMode=yes
  -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new, idempotent cleanup
- ValidateSSHKey using golang.org/x/crypto/ssh rejects
  passphrase-protected keys via ErrSSHKeyPassphraseUnsupported sentinel
- 8 unit tests covering passphrase rejection, env shape, cleanup
  lifecycle, host-mismatch reuse, malformed-blob rejection
- 3 integration tests proving tmpfile 0600 lifecycle, env propagation
  to child process, cleanup-on-exec-failure, no-orphan-on-rejection
- 2 new i18n keys (en/vi/zh) for SSH-passphrase and SSH-key-invalid

Verification: go vet clean, go build ./... clean,
go build -tags sqliteonly ./... clean, go test -race
./internal/tools/ pass, go test -tags integration
./tests/integration/ -run TestGitAdapter pass.

Refs #82

* feat(secure-cli): UI presets + typed credential HTTP path + i18n (issue #82)

Phase 5. Typed PUT envelope with {error:{code,message}, error_key} for
field-level errors. CliCredentialGitFields React component (PAT/SSH picker,
host_scope input, CRLF→LF normalization, masked-edit). 17 i18n keys × 3
locales (backend + frontend). i18n parity test.

* feat(secure-cli): audit log schema + adapter framework docs (issue #82)

Phase 6. emitSystemEnvInjectionAudit helper centralizes
security.system_env_injection slog with host_scope_hash (SHA-256 8 hex,
plaintext hostname omitted for PII safety). Audit shape pinned by
TestEmitSystemEnvInjectionAudit_*. New docs: git-credential-adapter.md
(user guide), credential-adapter-playbook.md (R1 implementer guide w/
kubectl/docker/npm/aws/psql worked mappings). 09-security.md § 14
trust-boundary diagram + SSH TOFU + SIGKILL caveats. 03-tools-system.md
§ 8a. Changelog entry.

* docs(journal): issue #82 CLI credential adapters shipped

Retrospective covering 6 commits across phases 1-6: framework, git PAT/SSH, psql stub, UI/i18n, audit log schema, docs. Notes memfd-drop rationale, TOFU/SIGKILL caveats, sentinel-length lesson from audit-shape tests.

* fix(secure-cli): honor per-request scrub bag on success+failure paths (#82)

Sandbox and host exec paths called the non-Ctx ScrubCredentials, so
adapter ScrubValues registered into the per-request bag during Prepare
(e.g. GitLab glpat-, Bitbucket app-passwords, Azure DevOps PATs, Gitea
tokens, SSH key tmpfile paths) were ignored on stdout/stderr returned
to the agent. Only the package-global regex pass ran — covering ghp_
but nothing else.

Switch all four exec/sandbox call sites to ScrubCredentialsCtx so the
bag is consulted. Also scrub the slog adapter_cleanup_failed line —
os.Remove errors embed the full tmpfile path.

Add 5 regression tests that pin success path, failure path, negative
control (proves the bag is what catches the sentinel), classic-PAT
sanity, and timeout path no-leak.

Locks AC6 against non-GitHub PAT providers.

* fix(secure-cli): address review-pr #89 findings

- ui/web: SSH key Textarea was 'text-xs' on all viewports, triggering
  iOS Safari auto-zoom on focus. Switch to 'text-base md:text-xs' so
  mobile renders 16px (no zoom) while desktop keeps compact mono font.
- psql adapter: add on-disk pgpass tmpfile path to ScrubValues. psql
  echoes 'could not open password file "<path>"' on IO errors, so
  the path needs scrubbing alongside the password. Mirrors the git SSH
  adapter pattern. Update test assertion accordingly.
- psql adapter: replace literal 'nil' context with 'context.TODO()'
  to silence staticcheck SA1012.
2026-05-28 18:17:49 +07:00

200 lines
7.6 KiB
Go

package http
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/i18n"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
)
func (h *SecureCLIHandler) handleListUserCredentials(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
binaryID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
locale := store.LocaleFromContext(r.Context())
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInvalidID)})
return
}
creds, err := h.store.ListUserCredentials(r.Context(), binaryID)
if err != nil {
locale := store.LocaleFromContext(r.Context())
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInternalError, err.Error())})
return
}
// Return without env values for listing (names only + timestamps).
// credential_type + host_scope surface so the table can show a Type badge
// (PAT / SSH / Env) without a second round-trip per row.
type entry struct {
ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
BinaryID uuid.UUID `json:"binary_id"`
UserID string `json:"user_id"`
HasEnv bool `json:"has_env"`
EnvKeys []string `json:"env_keys,omitempty"`
Env map[string]store.SecureCLIEnvResponseEntry `json:"env,omitempty"`
CredentialType *string `json:"credential_type,omitempty"`
HostScope *string `json:"host_scope,omitempty"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
}
entries := make([]entry, 0, len(creds))
for _, c := range creds {
envKeys := envKeysFromDecryptedJSON(c.EncryptedEnv)
// Typed credentials (pat / ssh_key) hold a single secret in the blob.
// Suppress env / env_keys for them — those keys would leak the wire
// shape (`token` / `key`) to the listing endpoint.
isTyped := c.CredentialType != nil && *c.CredentialType != "" && *c.CredentialType != "env"
e := entry{
ID: c.ID,
BinaryID: c.BinaryID,
UserID: c.UserID,
HasEnv: len(c.EncryptedEnv) > 0,
CredentialType: c.CredentialType,
HostScope: c.HostScope,
CreatedAt: c.CreatedAt,
UpdatedAt: c.UpdatedAt,
}
if !isTyped {
e.EnvKeys = envKeys
e.Env = store.SanitizeSecureCLIEnvJSON(c.EncryptedEnv)
}
entries = append(entries, e)
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"user_credentials": entries})
}
func (h *SecureCLIHandler) handleGetUserCredentials(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
binaryID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
locale := store.LocaleFromContext(r.Context())
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInvalidID)})
return
}
userID := r.PathValue("userId")
if userID == "" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "user_id required"})
return
}
cred, err := h.store.GetUserCredentials(r.Context(), binaryID, userID)
if err != nil {
locale := store.LocaleFromContext(r.Context())
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInternalError, err.Error())})
return
}
if cred == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"})
return
}
// Typed creds suppress env to avoid leaking the blob shape (`token`/`key`).
isTyped := cred.CredentialType != nil && *cred.CredentialType != "" && *cred.CredentialType != "env"
resp := map[string]any{
"user_id": cred.UserID,
"credential_type": cred.CredentialType,
"host_scope": cred.HostScope,
"has_secret": len(cred.EncryptedEnv) > 0,
}
if !isTyped {
resp["env"] = store.SanitizeSecureCLIEnvJSON(cred.EncryptedEnv)
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
func (h *SecureCLIHandler) handleSetUserCredentials(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
locale := store.LocaleFromContext(r.Context())
binaryID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInvalidID)})
return
}
userID := r.PathValue("userId")
if userID == "" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "user_id required"})
return
}
var body struct {
Env json.RawMessage `json:"env"`
typedCredentialBody
}
if !bindJSON(w, r, locale, &body) {
return
}
// Typed branch (pat / ssh_key): validate + encrypt blob, store with
// credential_type + host_scope. Audit emits credential_type only — never
// the secret or host (host is operator-visible config but still scoped to
// the audit channel).
envBytes, credType, hostScope, terr := prepareTypedCredentialEnv(locale, body.typedCredentialBody)
if terr != nil {
writeTypedCredentialError(w, terr)
return
}
if envBytes != nil {
if err := h.store.SetUserCredentialsTyped(r.Context(), binaryID, userID, envBytes, credType, hostScope); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInternalError, err.Error())})
return
}
emitAudit(h.msgBus, r, "secure_cli.user_credentials.updated", "secure_cli_user_credentials", binaryID.String()+"/"+userID+"#"+*credType)
h.emitCacheInvalidate("")
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
return
}
// Legacy env-paste branch (no credential_type or credential_type="env").
if len(body.Env) == 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "env is required"})
return
}
existing, err := h.store.GetUserCredentials(r.Context(), binaryID, userID)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInternalError, err.Error())})
return
}
var existingEnv []byte
if existing != nil {
existingEnv = existing.EncryptedEnv
}
envJSON, err := store.MergeSecureCLIEnv(existingEnv, body.Env)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgGrantEnvValueInvalid, err.Error())})
return
}
if err := h.store.SetUserCredentials(r.Context(), binaryID, userID, envJSON); err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInternalError, err.Error())})
return
}
emitAudit(h.msgBus, r, "secure_cli.user_credentials.updated", "secure_cli_user_credentials", binaryID.String()+"/"+userID)
h.emitCacheInvalidate("")
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
}
func (h *SecureCLIHandler) handleDeleteUserCredentials(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
binaryID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
locale := store.LocaleFromContext(r.Context())
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInvalidID)})
return
}
userID := r.PathValue("userId")
if userID == "" {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{"error": "user_id required"})
return
}
if err := h.store.DeleteUserCredentials(r.Context(), binaryID, userID); err != nil {
locale := store.LocaleFromContext(r.Context())
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": i18n.T(locale, i18n.MsgInternalError, err.Error())})
return
}
emitAudit(h.msgBus, r, "secure_cli.user_credentials.deleted", "secure_cli_user_credentials", binaryID.String()+"/"+userID)
h.emitCacheInvalidate("")
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
}