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viettranx
73b46c3634
Port 8 fixes from upstream TypeScript OpenClaw (4 CRITICAL + 4 HIGH): CRITICAL: 1. Tool call name trimming — add strings.TrimSpace() to all provider response parsers (Anthropic 2 locations, OpenAI 3 locations) to prevent registry lookup failures from LLM whitespace-padded names 2. Shell env injection deny patterns — block GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF, GIT_DIFF_OPTS, BASH_ENV, and ENV=.*sh to prevent code execution via environment variable injection during git/shell operations 3. Broken symlink escape — recursive target resolution via resolveThroughExistingAncestors() to catch chained symlinks that escape workspace (e.g. link1→link2→/etc/passwd) 4. Mutable parent-symlink TOCTOU check — hasMutableSymlinkParent() detects symlinks in writable parent dirs that could be rebound between path validation and file operation HIGH: 5. Model fallback thinking preservation — add ThinkingCapable interface to providers/types.go, implement on Anthropic/OpenAI/DashScope, check before injecting thinking_level in agent loop, warn on fallback when thinking is configured 6. Cron session-key double-prefix guard — prevent agent:X:cron:agent:X duplication in BuildCronSessionKey() 7. Webhook rate limiter — bounded WebhookRateLimiter (4096 keys max, 60s window, 30 hits/window) to prevent memory exhaustion DoS 8. DM policy allowlist validation — warn at startup when dmPolicy=allowlist with empty allowFrom (silent message drop) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
71 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
71 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
package channels
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import (
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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const (
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// maxTrackedKeys caps the number of tracked rate-limit keys to prevent
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// memory exhaustion from attackers rotating source IPs/keys.
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maxTrackedKeys = 4096
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// rateLimitWindow is the sliding window duration for rate counting.
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rateLimitWindow = 60 * time.Second
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// rateLimitMaxHits is the max requests per key within a window.
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rateLimitMaxHits = 30
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)
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type rateLimitEntry struct {
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windowStart time.Time
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count int
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}
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// WebhookRateLimiter bounds the number of tracked rate-limit keys
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// to prevent memory exhaustion from rotating source keys (DoS).
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// Safe for concurrent use.
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type WebhookRateLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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entries map[string]*rateLimitEntry
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}
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// NewWebhookRateLimiter creates a bounded webhook rate limiter.
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func NewWebhookRateLimiter() *WebhookRateLimiter {
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return &WebhookRateLimiter{entries: make(map[string]*rateLimitEntry)}
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}
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// Allow returns true if the key is within rate limits.
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// Automatically prunes stale entries and enforces a hard cap on tracked keys.
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func (r *WebhookRateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
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r.mu.Lock()
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defer r.mu.Unlock()
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now := time.Now()
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// Prune stale entries when approaching the cap
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if len(r.entries) >= maxTrackedKeys {
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for k, e := range r.entries {
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if now.Sub(e.windowStart) >= rateLimitWindow {
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delete(r.entries, k)
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}
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}
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// Hard eviction if still at cap (FIFO-ish via map iteration)
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for len(r.entries) >= maxTrackedKeys {
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for k := range r.entries {
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delete(r.entries, k)
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break
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}
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}
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}
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e, ok := r.entries[key]
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if !ok || now.Sub(e.windowStart) >= rateLimitWindow {
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r.entries[key] = &rateLimitEntry{windowStart: now, count: 1}
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return true
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}
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e.count++
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return e.count <= rateLimitMaxHits
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}
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