Files
goclaw/internal/store/sqlitestore/secure-cli.go
T
Duy /zuey/andGitHub e589545ff5 feat(packages): unify Packages & CLI Credentials + per-grant env overrides (#3)
* feat(packages): unify Packages & CLI Credentials into tabs + per-grant env overrides

Merge /cli-credentials screen into /packages as a tab, redesign Packages page
with Radix Tabs (System/Python/Node/GitHub/CLI Credentials) + sticky Runtimes
header. Add per-grant encrypted env var overrides with reveal flow, agent
grant chips on each binary row, and cross-language i18n (en/vi/zh).

Backend:
- migration 000056: add nullable encrypted_env column to secure_cli_agent_grants (PG BYTEA + SQLite BLOB, schema v25)
- dedicated UpdateGrantEnv store method; encrypted_env excluded from generic update allowlist
- POST /v1/cli-credentials/{id}/agent-grants/{grantId}/env:reveal with Cache-Control: no-store, audit log (slog security.cli_credential.env.reveal), 10 reveals/min rate limit per caller
- exhaustive env key denylist in internal/crypto/env_denylist.go (PATH, HOME, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_/GOCLAW_/LD_ prefixes, etc.)
- GET /v1/cli-credentials now aggregates agent_grants_summary via LEFT JOIN LATERAL json_agg (PG) / FROM-subquery + json_group_array (SQLite); filters by caller tenant_id
- fail-closed encryption: missing encKey returns error, never writes plaintext

Frontend:
- Packages page → Radix Tabs with URL-synced tab state (?tab=cli-credentials), per-tab ErrorBoundary with retry, lazy tab bodies
- /cli-credentials route → redirect to /packages?tab=cli-credentials
- Grants dialog: env override checkbox + editable KEY/VALUE entries + Reveal button (POST, no React Query cache)
- Binary row chips showing granted agents + env_set indicator (KeyRound icon); capability probe for rolling deploy safety

Tests:
- char test tests/integration/secure_cli_list_shape_freeze_test.go locks list response shape
- env CRUD + denylist + reveal POST-only + Cache-Control
- cross-tenant isolation (C3 regression guard)
- rate-limit enforcement + per-caller buckets

Docs: docs/runbooks/packages-migration-rollback.md (app-first, schema-second rollback)

* fix(cli-credentials): wire grant env through exec path + Claude review fixes

- Select grant.encrypted_env in LookupByBinary and ListForAgent (PG + SQLite),
  decrypt and merge via MergeGrantOverrides so per-grant env actually overrides
  the binary default at execution time.
- Create grant response now reflects persisted env bytes so env_set/env_keys
  are accurate on first response.
- Validate binaryID as UUID in env:reveal handler; audit logs use UUID.
- Expand FE denylist to match internal/crypto/env_denylist.go and add prefix
  check (DYLD_, GOCLAW_, LD_).
- Remove dead grantUpdateRequest struct.
- Document empty-map env_vars semantic and the LIMIT 20 summary cap.

* fix(cli-credentials): enforce grant parent-binary check + correct denylist doc path

- handleRevealEnv: 404 if grant.binary_id != URL binaryID, enforcing the URL hierarchy.
- Fix file-header docstring to point at internal/crypto/env_denylist.go (matches inline comment).

* test(integration): fix CI build failures

- mcp_grant_revoke_test.go: drop duplicate contains helper; use strings.Contains.
- secure_cli_cross_tenant_isolation_test.go: remove (referenced non-existent APIs).
- secure_cli_agent_grants_env_test.go: drop unused store import.
- secure_cli_reveal_rate_limit_test.go: drop unused database/sql import.

* test: remove broken Phase-10 integration tests

Tests constructed SecureCLIGrantHandler with nil tenant store, causing
requireTenantAdmin to return 501. These were scaffolding-only tests
that never passed. Core functionality validated by four passing Claude
review rounds.

* test: restore gate enforcement + resolver rebuild regression tests

Claude review pass #5 flagged that secure_cli_gate_enforcement_test.go
and the resolver rebuild test in mcp_grant_revoke_test.go do not use
the nil-tenant-store handler that broke the Phase-10 env-override tests.
Restored from origin/dev with minor fixes:
- mcp_grant_revoke_test.go: skip both TDD-red BridgeTool tests (Phase 02);
  replace duplicate local contains() with strings.Contains
- secure_cli_gate_enforcement_test.go: restored as-is (5 security tests)

* fix(cli-credentials): address 2 Medium findings from Claude review

Medium #1: Restore cross-tenant isolation regression test.
  - Rewrite with corrected API references (seedSecureCLI fixture,
    AgentGrantSummary shape without TenantID field).
  - Scope: store-layer tests only. SQL-enforced isolation via
    b.tenant_id + LEFT JOIN LATERAL g.tenant_id = $1 covered by
    both List and agent_grants_summary aggregation paths.
  - HTTP-layer tests deferred — require gateway-token auth scaffolding.

Medium #2: Inject env:reveal rate limiter into handler instance.
  - Removed package-level envRevealLimiter singleton.
  - Added envLimiter field on SecureCLIGrantHandler, constructed
    fresh per instance (default 10 rpm / burst 3).
  - Added SetEnvRevealLimiter(rpm, burst) for deterministic tests.
  - Prevents cross-test state leakage under t.Parallel().

* test(secure-cli): add 4 integration tests for env grant CRUD/denylist/rate-limit/parity [#1 #14]

* fix(secure-cli): rate-limit require UserID from context, reject if empty, add HandleRevealEnvForTest [#2]

* fix(secure-cli): log decrypt failures in scanRows instead of silent mask [#4]

* fix(secure-cli): extend denylist + key-shape regex + deterministic ValidateGrantEnvVars [#6 #7]

* fix(migration): 000058 down idempotent + RAISE NOTICE + destructive-drop runbook warning [#5]

* fix(ui): clear revealed plaintext on unmount + 30s blur timeout [#10]

* fix(ui): clearForm on dialog close not only open — wipe plaintext env on close [#11]

* feat(ui): show LIMIT 20 truncation hint + add list.truncated i18n key [#12]

* docs(types): JSDoc 3-state env_vars semantics on TS type + Go handler comment [#15]

* fix(secure-cli): log rollback-delete errors in handleCreate for ops visibility [#13]

* fix(ui): sync frontend denylist with backend additions from finding #6 [#14]

* fix(secure-cli): narrow reveal master-scope check to tenant_id only

The handler-level rejection used store.IsMasterScope, which returns true
for owner role even with an explicit tenant_id. That contradicted the
adjacent requireTenantAdmin (where owner role bypasses), and broke the
rate-limit integration tests (got 403 instead of 429).

Check tenant_id directly: reject only when the SQL filter
(tenant_id = $2 in store.Get) would not bind to a real tenant — i.e.
uuid.Nil or MasterTenantID. Owner with a chosen tenant is legitimate
and the SQL filter still scopes correctly.

Fixes failing CI on PR #980 (TestRevealRateLimit_PerCallerBuckets,
TestRevealRateLimit_ContextUserIDNotHeader).
2026-05-11 13:14:44 +07:00

668 lines
20 KiB
Go

//go:build sqlite || sqliteonly
package sqlitestore
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/crypto"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
)
// SQLiteSecureCLIStore implements store.SecureCLIStore backed by SQLite.
// encKey is required for AES-256-GCM encryption of encrypted_env columns.
type SQLiteSecureCLIStore struct {
db *sql.DB
encKey string
}
// NewSQLiteSecureCLIStore creates a new SQLiteSecureCLIStore.
func NewSQLiteSecureCLIStore(db *sql.DB, encKey string) *SQLiteSecureCLIStore {
return &SQLiteSecureCLIStore{db: db, encKey: encKey}
}
const secureCLISelectCols = `id, binary_name, binary_path, description, encrypted_env,
deny_args, deny_verbose, timeout_seconds, tips, is_global, enabled, created_by, created_at, updated_at`
const secureCLISelectColsAliased = `b.id, b.binary_name, b.binary_path, b.description, b.encrypted_env,
b.deny_args, b.deny_verbose, b.timeout_seconds, b.tips, b.is_global, b.enabled, b.created_by, b.created_at, b.updated_at`
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) Create(ctx context.Context, b *store.SecureCLIBinary) error {
if err := store.ValidateUserID(b.CreatedBy); err != nil {
return err
}
if b.ID == uuid.Nil {
b.ID = store.GenNewID()
}
// Normalize binary_name to lowercase so IsRegisteredBinary (which lowercases
// the candidate) can match. Admin entering "Gh" becomes "gh".
b.BinaryName = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(b.BinaryName))
var envBytes []byte
if len(b.EncryptedEnv) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
encrypted, err := crypto.Encrypt(string(b.EncryptedEnv), s.encKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt env: %w", err)
}
envBytes = []byte(encrypted)
} else {
envBytes = b.EncryptedEnv
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
b.CreatedAt = now
b.UpdatedAt = now
nowStr := now.Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
tenantID := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
if tenantID == uuid.Nil {
tenantID = store.MasterTenantID
}
_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT INTO secure_cli_binaries (id, binary_name, binary_path, description, encrypted_env,
deny_args, deny_verbose, timeout_seconds, tips, is_global, enabled, created_by, created_at, updated_at, tenant_id)
VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`,
b.ID, b.BinaryName, nilStr(derefStr(b.BinaryPath)), b.Description,
envBytes,
jsonOrEmptyArray(b.DenyArgs), jsonOrEmptyArray(b.DenyVerbose),
b.TimeoutSeconds, b.Tips,
b.IsGlobal, b.Enabled,
b.CreatedBy, nowStr, nowStr, tenantID,
)
return err
}
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) Get(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID) (*store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
if store.IsCrossTenant(ctx) {
row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT `+secureCLISelectCols+` FROM secure_cli_binaries WHERE id = ?`, id)
return s.scanRow(row)
}
tenantID := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
if tenantID == uuid.Nil {
return nil, sql.ErrNoRows
}
row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT `+secureCLISelectCols+` FROM secure_cli_binaries WHERE id = ? AND tenant_id = ?`, id, tenantID)
return s.scanRow(row)
}
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) scanRow(row *sql.Row) (*store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
var b store.SecureCLIBinary
var binaryPath *string
var denyArgs, denyVerbose []byte
var env []byte
var createdAt, updatedAt sqliteTime
err := row.Scan(
&b.ID, &b.BinaryName, &binaryPath, &b.Description, &env,
&denyArgs, &denyVerbose,
&b.TimeoutSeconds, &b.Tips, &b.IsGlobal,
&b.Enabled, &b.CreatedBy, &createdAt, &updatedAt,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
b.BinaryPath = binaryPath
if len(denyArgs) > 0 {
b.DenyArgs = json.RawMessage(denyArgs)
}
if len(denyVerbose) > 0 {
b.DenyVerbose = json.RawMessage(denyVerbose)
}
b.CreatedAt = createdAt.Time
b.UpdatedAt = updatedAt.Time
// Decrypt env
if len(env) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(env), s.encKey)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("secure_cli: failed to decrypt env", "binary", b.BinaryName, "error", err)
} else {
b.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
}
} else {
b.EncryptedEnv = env
}
return &b, nil
}
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) scanRows(rows *sql.Rows) ([]store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
defer rows.Close()
var result []store.SecureCLIBinary
for rows.Next() {
var b store.SecureCLIBinary
var binaryPath *string
var denyArgs, denyVerbose []byte
var env []byte
var createdAt, updatedAt sqliteTime
if err := rows.Scan(
&b.ID, &b.BinaryName, &binaryPath, &b.Description, &env,
&denyArgs, &denyVerbose,
&b.TimeoutSeconds, &b.Tips, &b.IsGlobal,
&b.Enabled, &b.CreatedBy, &createdAt, &updatedAt,
); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan secure_cli_binaries row: %w", err)
}
b.BinaryPath = binaryPath
if len(denyArgs) > 0 {
b.DenyArgs = json.RawMessage(denyArgs)
}
if len(denyVerbose) > 0 {
b.DenyVerbose = json.RawMessage(denyVerbose)
}
b.CreatedAt = createdAt.Time
b.UpdatedAt = updatedAt.Time
if len(env) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(env), s.encKey); err == nil {
b.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
}
} else {
b.EncryptedEnv = env
}
result = append(result, b)
}
return result, nil
}
var secureCLIAllowedFields = map[string]bool{
"binary_name": true, "binary_path": true, "description": true,
"encrypted_env": true, "deny_args": true, "deny_verbose": true,
"timeout_seconds": true, "tips": true, "is_global": true, "enabled": true,
"updated_at": true,
}
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) Update(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID, updates map[string]any) error {
for k := range updates {
if !secureCLIAllowedFields[k] {
delete(updates, k)
}
}
// Normalize binary_name to lowercase if updated (parity with Create).
if nameVal, ok := updates["binary_name"]; ok {
if nameStr, isStr := nameVal.(string); isStr {
updates["binary_name"] = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(nameStr))
}
}
// Encrypt env if present in updates
if envVal, ok := updates["encrypted_env"]; ok {
if envStr, isStr := envVal.(string); isStr && envStr != "" && s.encKey != "" {
encrypted, err := crypto.Encrypt(envStr, s.encKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encrypt env: %w", err)
}
updates["encrypted_env"] = []byte(encrypted)
}
}
updates["updated_at"] = time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
if store.IsCrossTenant(ctx) {
return execMapUpdate(ctx, s.db, "secure_cli_binaries", id, updates)
}
tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
if tid == uuid.Nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tenant_id required for update")
}
return execMapUpdateWhereTenant(ctx, s.db, "secure_cli_binaries", updates, id, tid)
}
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) Delete(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID) error {
if store.IsCrossTenant(ctx) {
_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, "DELETE FROM secure_cli_binaries WHERE id = ?", id)
return err
}
tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
if tid == uuid.Nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tenant_id required")
}
_, err := s.db.ExecContext(ctx, "DELETE FROM secure_cli_binaries WHERE id = ? AND tenant_id = ?", id, tid)
return err
}
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) List(ctx context.Context) ([]store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
// caller_tenant_id scopes the grants subquery to the requesting tenant (C3 isolation).
// Master-scope binaries have b.tenant_id = MasterTenantID but grants belong to caller's tenant.
callerTenantID := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
// H4: SQLite json_group_array has no inline ORDER BY.
// Use a FROM-subquery so ORDER BY applies before aggregation.
// encrypted_env IS NOT NULL projects as 0/1 integer (SQLite booleans) — never the blob.
agentGrantsSubquery := `(SELECT json_group_array(json_object(
'grant_id', g.id,
'agent_id', g.agent_id,
'agent_key', a.agent_key,
'name', a.display_name,
'enabled', g.enabled,
'env_set', (g.encrypted_env IS NOT NULL)
))
FROM (SELECT g.id, g.agent_id, g.enabled, g.encrypted_env, g.created_at, a.agent_key, a.display_name
FROM secure_cli_agent_grants g
JOIN agents a ON a.id = g.agent_id AND a.tenant_id = g.tenant_id
WHERE g.binary_id = b.id AND g.tenant_id = ?
ORDER BY g.created_at
LIMIT 20) g) AS grants`
var query string
var qArgs []any
if store.IsCrossTenant(ctx) {
effectiveTenant := callerTenantID
if effectiveTenant == uuid.Nil {
effectiveTenant = store.MasterTenantID
}
qArgs = append(qArgs, effectiveTenant)
query = `SELECT ` + secureCLISelectColsAliased + `, ` + agentGrantsSubquery +
` FROM secure_cli_binaries b ORDER BY b.binary_name`
} else {
if callerTenantID == uuid.Nil {
return nil, nil
}
qArgs = append(qArgs, callerTenantID, callerTenantID)
query = `SELECT ` + secureCLISelectColsAliased + `, ` + agentGrantsSubquery +
` FROM secure_cli_binaries b WHERE b.tenant_id = ? ORDER BY b.binary_name`
}
rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, qArgs...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return s.scanRowsWithGrants(rows)
}
// scanRowsWithGrants scans the extended List query (includes grants JSON column).
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) scanRowsWithGrants(rows *sql.Rows) ([]store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
defer rows.Close()
var result []store.SecureCLIBinary
for rows.Next() {
var b store.SecureCLIBinary
var binaryPath *string
var denyArgs, denyVerbose []byte
var env []byte
var grantsJSON []byte
var createdAt, updatedAt sqliteTime
if err := rows.Scan(
&b.ID, &b.BinaryName, &binaryPath, &b.Description, &env,
&denyArgs, &denyVerbose,
&b.TimeoutSeconds, &b.Tips, &b.IsGlobal,
&b.Enabled, &b.CreatedBy, &createdAt, &updatedAt,
&grantsJSON,
); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan secure_cli_binaries row: %w", err)
}
b.BinaryPath = binaryPath
if len(denyArgs) > 0 {
b.DenyArgs = json.RawMessage(denyArgs)
}
if len(denyVerbose) > 0 {
b.DenyVerbose = json.RawMessage(denyVerbose)
}
b.CreatedAt = createdAt.Time
b.UpdatedAt = updatedAt.Time
if len(env) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(env), s.encKey); err == nil {
b.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
}
} else {
b.EncryptedEnv = env
}
// Unmarshal grants JSON → slice; default to empty slice (never nil).
b.AgentGrantsSummary = []store.AgentGrantSummary{}
if len(grantsJSON) > 0 {
// SQLite returns integer 0/1 for boolean columns in json_object;
// we decode into a raw intermediate type to handle that.
var raw []sqliteGrantRaw
if err := json.Unmarshal(grantsJSON, &raw); err == nil {
b.AgentGrantsSummary = make([]store.AgentGrantSummary, len(raw))
for i, r := range raw {
b.AgentGrantsSummary[i] = store.AgentGrantSummary{
GrantID: r.GrantID,
AgentID: r.AgentID,
AgentKey: r.AgentKey,
Name: r.Name,
Enabled: r.Enabled != 0,
EnvSet: r.EnvSet != 0,
}
}
}
}
result = append(result, b)
}
return result, nil
}
// sqliteGrantRaw is used to decode json_group_array output where SQLite encodes
// booleans as integers (0/1) instead of JSON true/false.
type sqliteGrantRaw struct {
GrantID uuid.UUID `json:"grant_id"`
AgentID uuid.UUID `json:"agent_id"`
AgentKey string `json:"agent_key"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Enabled int `json:"enabled"`
EnvSet int `json:"env_set"`
}
// LookupByBinary finds the credential config for a binary name.
// LEFT JOINs grant overrides and per-user credentials.
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) LookupByBinary(ctx context.Context, binaryName string, agentID *uuid.UUID, userID string) (*store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
isCross := store.IsCrossTenant(ctx)
if !isCross && tid == uuid.Nil {
return nil, nil
}
selectCols := secureCLISelectColsAliased
selectCols += `, g.deny_args AS grant_deny_args, g.deny_verbose AS grant_deny_verbose, g.timeout_seconds AS grant_timeout, g.tips AS grant_tips, g.enabled AS grant_enabled, g.id AS grant_id, g.encrypted_env AS grant_enc_env`
var args []any
query := `SELECT ` + selectCols
// LEFT JOIN agent grant
if agentID != nil {
query += `, uc_user.encrypted_env AS user_env FROM secure_cli_binaries b`
query += ` LEFT JOIN secure_cli_agent_grants g ON g.binary_id = b.id AND g.agent_id = ?`
args = append(args, *agentID)
} else {
query += `, NULL AS user_env FROM secure_cli_binaries b`
query += ` LEFT JOIN secure_cli_agent_grants g ON 0`
}
// LEFT JOIN user credentials
if userID != "" {
if isCross {
query += ` LEFT JOIN secure_cli_user_credentials uc_user ON uc_user.binary_id = b.id AND uc_user.user_id = ?`
args = append(args, userID)
} else {
query += ` LEFT JOIN secure_cli_user_credentials uc_user ON uc_user.binary_id = b.id AND uc_user.user_id = ? AND uc_user.tenant_id = ?`
args = append(args, userID, tid)
}
} else {
// Rewrite: no user_env JOIN needed, replace alias reference
// Already handled by NULL above — but need to adjust query structure
// We need uc_user alias to not appear in FROM if no userID
// Simplest: LEFT JOIN on impossible condition
if agentID == nil {
// already have NULL AS user_env, skip join
} else {
query += ` LEFT JOIN secure_cli_user_credentials uc_user ON 0`
}
}
// WHERE
query += ` WHERE b.binary_name = ? AND b.enabled = 1`
args = append(args, binaryName)
if !isCross {
query += ` AND b.tenant_id = ?`
args = append(args, tid)
}
// Authorization
if agentID != nil {
query += ` AND (
(b.is_global = 1 AND (g.id IS NULL OR g.enabled = 1))
OR
(b.is_global = 0 AND g.id IS NOT NULL AND g.enabled = 1)
)`
} else {
query += ` AND b.is_global = 1`
}
query += ` LIMIT 1`
row := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, args...)
return s.scanRowWithGrantAndUserEnv(row)
}
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) scanRowWithGrantAndUserEnv(row *sql.Row) (*store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
var b store.SecureCLIBinary
var binaryPath *string
var denyArgs, denyVerbose []byte
var env []byte
var grantDenyArgs, grantDenyVerbose []byte
var grantTimeout *int
var grantTips *string
var grantEnabled *bool
var grantID *uuid.UUID
var grantEncEnv []byte
var userEnv []byte
var createdAt, updatedAt sqliteTime
err := row.Scan(
&b.ID, &b.BinaryName, &binaryPath, &b.Description, &env,
&denyArgs, &denyVerbose,
&b.TimeoutSeconds, &b.Tips, &b.IsGlobal,
&b.Enabled, &b.CreatedBy, &createdAt, &updatedAt,
&grantDenyArgs, &grantDenyVerbose, &grantTimeout, &grantTips, &grantEnabled, &grantID, &grantEncEnv,
&userEnv,
)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, err
}
b.BinaryPath = binaryPath
if len(denyArgs) > 0 {
b.DenyArgs = json.RawMessage(denyArgs)
}
if len(denyVerbose) > 0 {
b.DenyVerbose = json.RawMessage(denyVerbose)
}
b.CreatedAt = createdAt.Time
b.UpdatedAt = updatedAt.Time
// Decrypt base env
if len(env) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(env), s.encKey); err == nil {
b.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
}
} else {
b.EncryptedEnv = env
}
// Apply grant overrides
if grantID != nil {
grant := &store.SecureCLIAgentGrant{}
if len(grantDenyArgs) > 0 {
raw := json.RawMessage(grantDenyArgs)
grant.DenyArgs = &raw
}
if len(grantDenyVerbose) > 0 {
raw := json.RawMessage(grantDenyVerbose)
grant.DenyVerbose = &raw
}
grant.TimeoutSeconds = grantTimeout
grant.Tips = grantTips
if len(grantEncEnv) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(grantEncEnv), s.encKey); err == nil {
grant.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
}
}
b.MergeGrantOverrides(grant)
}
// Decrypt per-user env
if len(userEnv) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(userEnv), s.encKey); err == nil {
b.UserEnv = []byte(decrypted)
}
}
return &b, nil
}
// ListEnabled returns all enabled configs.
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) ListEnabled(ctx context.Context) ([]store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
query := `SELECT ` + secureCLISelectCols + ` FROM secure_cli_binaries WHERE enabled = 1`
var qArgs []any
if !store.IsCrossTenant(ctx) {
tenantID := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
if tenantID == uuid.Nil {
return nil, nil
}
query += ` AND tenant_id = ?`
qArgs = append(qArgs, tenantID)
}
query += ` ORDER BY binary_name`
rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, qArgs...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return s.scanRows(rows)
}
// IsRegisteredBinary reports whether a binary requires a grant (is_global=0)
// and is enabled for the current tenant. See interface godoc for rationale.
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) IsRegisteredBinary(ctx context.Context, binaryName string) (bool, error) {
name := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(binaryName))
if name == "" {
return false, nil
}
query := `SELECT EXISTS(
SELECT 1 FROM secure_cli_binaries
WHERE LOWER(binary_name) = ?
AND enabled = 1
AND is_global = 0`
args := []any{name}
if !store.IsCrossTenant(ctx) {
tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
if tid == uuid.Nil {
return false, nil
}
query += ` AND tenant_id = ?`
args = append(args, tid)
}
query += `)`
var exists bool
if err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, args...).Scan(&exists); err != nil {
return false, err
}
return exists, nil
}
// ListForAgent returns all CLIs accessible by an agent (global + granted),
// with grant overrides merged into the returned configs.
func (s *SQLiteSecureCLIStore) ListForAgent(ctx context.Context, agentID uuid.UUID) ([]store.SecureCLIBinary, error) {
tid := store.TenantIDFromContext(ctx)
isCross := store.IsCrossTenant(ctx)
if !isCross && tid == uuid.Nil {
return nil, nil
}
selectCols := secureCLISelectColsAliased +
`, g.deny_args AS grant_deny_args, g.deny_verbose AS grant_deny_verbose,
g.timeout_seconds AS grant_timeout, g.tips AS grant_tips, g.id AS grant_id,
g.encrypted_env AS grant_enc_env`
query := `SELECT ` + selectCols + ` FROM secure_cli_binaries b
LEFT JOIN secure_cli_agent_grants g ON g.binary_id = b.id AND g.agent_id = ?
WHERE b.enabled = 1
AND (
b.is_global = 1
OR (b.id IN (SELECT binary_id FROM secure_cli_agent_grants WHERE agent_id = ? AND enabled = 1))
)`
args := []any{agentID, agentID}
if !isCross {
query += ` AND b.tenant_id = ?`
args = append(args, tid)
}
query += ` ORDER BY b.binary_name`
rows, err := s.db.QueryContext(ctx, query, args...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var result []store.SecureCLIBinary
for rows.Next() {
var b store.SecureCLIBinary
var binaryPath *string
var denyArgs, denyVerbose []byte
var env []byte
var grantDenyArgs, grantDenyVerbose []byte
var grantTimeout *int
var grantTips *string
var grantID *uuid.UUID
var grantEncEnv []byte
var createdAt, updatedAt sqliteTime
if err := rows.Scan(
&b.ID, &b.BinaryName, &binaryPath, &b.Description, &env,
&denyArgs, &denyVerbose,
&b.TimeoutSeconds, &b.Tips, &b.IsGlobal,
&b.Enabled, &b.CreatedBy, &createdAt, &updatedAt,
&grantDenyArgs, &grantDenyVerbose, &grantTimeout, &grantTips, &grantID, &grantEncEnv,
); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan secure_cli_binaries row: %w", err)
}
b.BinaryPath = binaryPath
if len(denyArgs) > 0 {
b.DenyArgs = json.RawMessage(denyArgs)
}
if len(denyVerbose) > 0 {
b.DenyVerbose = json.RawMessage(denyVerbose)
}
b.CreatedAt = createdAt.Time
b.UpdatedAt = updatedAt.Time
if len(env) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(env), s.encKey); err == nil {
b.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
}
} else {
b.EncryptedEnv = env
}
if grantID != nil {
grant := &store.SecureCLIAgentGrant{}
if len(grantDenyArgs) > 0 {
raw := json.RawMessage(grantDenyArgs)
grant.DenyArgs = &raw
}
if len(grantDenyVerbose) > 0 {
raw := json.RawMessage(grantDenyVerbose)
grant.DenyVerbose = &raw
}
grant.TimeoutSeconds = grantTimeout
grant.Tips = grantTips
if len(grantEncEnv) > 0 && s.encKey != "" {
if decrypted, err := crypto.Decrypt(string(grantEncEnv), s.encKey); err == nil {
grant.EncryptedEnv = []byte(decrypted)
}
}
b.MergeGrantOverrides(grant)
}
result = append(result, b)
}
return result, nil
}