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[Security] Fix: Ensure .info() logs are not used for request/responses + Add code QA check for possible violations (#14386)
* test: info log * fixes for debug * add info_log_check * fix: debug level * fix: debug level * fix: use .debug * fix info statements * fix info log check * fix: fix emit_standard_logging_payload * fix RequestBody * Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 3339: Clear-text logging of sensitive information Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix check * fix code qa check --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ishaan Jaff
co-authored by
Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
parent
fd70ccfd5b
commit
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@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
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import ast
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import os
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import re
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from typing import List, Dict, Any
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class SensitiveLogDetector(ast.NodeVisitor):
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"""
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Detects logger.info() statements that might log sensitive request/response data.
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"""
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def __init__(self):
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self.violations = []
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self.current_file = None
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def set_file(self, file_path: str):
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"""Set the current file being analyzed"""
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self.current_file = file_path
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def visit_Call(self, node):
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"""Visit function calls to detect logger.info() with sensitive data"""
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if self._is_logger_info_call(node):
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# Check all arguments to the logger.info() call
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for arg in node.args:
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if self._contains_sensitive_data(arg):
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violation = {
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"file": self.current_file,
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"line": node.lineno,
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"call": self._get_call_string(node),
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"reason": self._get_violation_reason(arg),
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"arg": self._get_arg_string(arg)
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}
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self.violations.append(violation)
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self.generic_visit(node)
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def _is_logger_info_call(self, node) -> bool:
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"""Check if this is a logger.info() call"""
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if not isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute):
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return False
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# Check for various logger patterns:
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# logger.info(), verbose_logger.info(), verbose_proxy_logger.info(), etc.
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if node.func.attr == "info":
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if isinstance(node.func.value, ast.Name):
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logger_name = node.func.value.id
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return any(pattern in logger_name.lower() for pattern in ["logger", "log"])
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return False
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def _contains_sensitive_data(self, arg) -> bool:
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"""Check if the argument might contain sensitive data"""
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# Convert argument to string for analysis
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arg_str = self._get_arg_string(arg).lower()
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# Skip obvious non-sensitive patterns
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non_sensitive_patterns = [
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r'^["\'][\w\s\-_:.,!?]*["\']$', # Simple static strings
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r'^["\'][^{%]*["\']$', # Strings without format placeholders
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]
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# Skip common safe phrases that contain sensitive keywords
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safe_phrases = [
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r'request\s+(completed|finished|started|processing)',
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r'response\s+(sent|received|processed)',
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r'data\s+(inserted|updated|deleted|saved)\s+into',
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r'(successfully|failed)\s+(request|response)',
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r'(starting|ending|completed)\s+(request|response)',
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r'no\s+(usage\s+)?data\s+found',
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r'found\s+\d+.*records',
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r'exported\s+\d+.*records',
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]
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for pattern in non_sensitive_patterns:
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if re.search(pattern, arg_str):
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# Check if it's a safe phrase first
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for safe_pattern in safe_phrases:
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if re.search(safe_pattern, arg_str, re.IGNORECASE):
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return False
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# Then check if the static string mentions sensitive keywords
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if not any(keyword in arg_str for keyword in
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['request', 'response', 'data', 'body', 'payload', 'token', 'auth', 'credential']):
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return False
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# Direct variable/attribute patterns that are likely sensitive
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sensitive_patterns = [
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r'\brequest\b(?!\s*(id|status|method))', # request but not request_id, request_status, request_method
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r'\bresponse\b(?!\s*(status|code|time))', # response but not response_status, response_code
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r'\bdata\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)', # data followed by . [ space or end
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r'\bbody\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bpayload\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bmessages?\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bcontent\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\binput\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\boutput\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bargs\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bkwargs\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bparams\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bheaders\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bapi_key\b',
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r'\btoken\b(?!\s*(name|id))', # token but not token_name, token_id
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r'\bauth\b(?=[\.\[\s]|$)',
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r'\bcredentials?\b'
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]
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# Check for direct variable references with context
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for pattern in sensitive_patterns:
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if re.search(pattern, arg_str):
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return True
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# Check for format strings that might interpolate sensitive data
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if self._is_format_string_with_sensitive_data(arg):
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return True
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# Check for JSON dumps or string formatting of objects
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if self._is_object_serialization(arg):
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return True
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return False
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def _is_format_string_with_sensitive_data(self, arg) -> bool:
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"""Check if this is a format string that might contain sensitive data"""
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# Check for f-strings
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if isinstance(arg, ast.JoinedStr):
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for value in arg.values:
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if isinstance(value, ast.FormattedValue):
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value_str = self._get_arg_string(value.value).lower()
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if any(pattern in value_str for pattern in
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['request', 'response', 'data', 'body', 'content', 'messages']):
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return True
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# Check for .format() calls
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if isinstance(arg, ast.Call) and isinstance(arg.func, ast.Attribute):
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if arg.func.attr == "format":
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# Check the base string for suspicious patterns
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base_str = self._get_arg_string(arg.func.value).lower()
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if "{}" in base_str or "{" in base_str:
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# Check format arguments for sensitive data
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for format_arg in arg.args:
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format_str = self._get_arg_string(format_arg).lower()
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if any(pattern in format_str for pattern in
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['request', 'response', 'data', 'body', 'content']):
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return True
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return False
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def _is_object_serialization(self, arg) -> bool:
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"""Check if this is serializing an object that might contain sensitive data"""
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arg_str = self._get_arg_string(arg)
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# Check for json.dumps() calls
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if isinstance(arg, ast.Call):
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if (isinstance(arg.func, ast.Attribute) and
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arg.func.attr == "dumps" and
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isinstance(arg.func.value, ast.Name) and
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arg.func.value.id == "json"):
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return True
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# Check for str() calls on potentially sensitive objects
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if (isinstance(arg.func, ast.Name) and arg.func.id == "str" and
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len(arg.args) > 0):
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obj_str = self._get_arg_string(arg.args[0]).lower()
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if any(pattern in obj_str for pattern in
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['request', 'response', 'data', 'body']):
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return True
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return False
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def _get_violation_reason(self, arg) -> str:
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"""Get a human-readable reason for the violation"""
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arg_str = self._get_arg_string(arg).lower()
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if 'request' in arg_str:
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return "Potentially logging request data"
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elif 'response' in arg_str:
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return "Potentially logging response data"
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elif any(pattern in arg_str for pattern in ['data', 'body', 'payload', 'content']):
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return "Potentially logging sensitive data/body/content"
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elif any(pattern in arg_str for pattern in ['messages', 'input', 'output']):
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return "Potentially logging message/input/output data"
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elif any(pattern in arg_str for pattern in ['api_key', 'token', 'auth', 'credentials']):
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return "Potentially logging authentication data"
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else:
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return "Potentially logging sensitive data"
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def _get_call_string(self, node) -> str:
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"""Get string representation of the function call"""
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try:
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if hasattr(ast, 'unparse'):
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return ast.unparse(node)
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else:
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# Fallback for older Python versions
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return f"{self._get_arg_string(node.func)}(...)"
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except:
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return "logger.info(...)"
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def _get_arg_string(self, arg) -> str:
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"""Get string representation of an argument"""
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try:
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if hasattr(ast, 'unparse'):
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return ast.unparse(arg)
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else:
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# Fallback for older Python versions
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if isinstance(arg, ast.Name):
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return arg.id
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elif isinstance(arg, ast.Attribute):
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return f"{self._get_arg_string(arg.value)}.{arg.attr}"
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elif isinstance(arg, ast.Str):
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return repr(arg.s)
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elif isinstance(arg, ast.Constant):
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return repr(arg.value)
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else:
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return str(type(arg).__name__)
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except:
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return "unknown"
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def check_sensitive_logging(base_dir: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
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"""
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Check for logger.info() statements that might log sensitive data.
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Args:
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base_dir: Base directory to scan (typically the litellm root)
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Returns:
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List of violations found
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"""
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detector = SensitiveLogDetector()
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all_violations = []
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# Directories to scan - only main litellm codebase
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scan_dirs = [
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"litellm",
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"enterprise" # Include enterprise directory if it exists
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]
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# Directories to exclude (third-party code, venvs, etc.)
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exclude_dirs = {
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"venv", "venv313", ".venv", "env", ".env",
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"node_modules", "__pycache__", ".git",
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"build", "dist", ".tox", "clean_env",
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"litellm_env", "myenv", "py313_env",
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"venv_sip_bypass", "mypyc_env"
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}
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for scan_dir in scan_dirs:
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dir_path = os.path.join(base_dir, scan_dir)
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if not os.path.exists(dir_path):
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print(f"Warning: Directory {dir_path} does not exist, skipping.")
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continue
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print(f"Scanning directory: {dir_path}")
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for root, dirs, files in os.walk(dir_path):
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# Skip excluded directories
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dirs[:] = [d for d in dirs if d not in exclude_dirs]
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# Skip if we're in a virtual environment or third-party directory
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relative_root = os.path.relpath(root, base_dir)
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if any(excluded in relative_root.split(os.sep) for excluded in exclude_dirs):
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continue
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for file in files:
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if file.endswith(".py"):
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file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
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relative_path = os.path.relpath(file_path, base_dir)
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# Skip files that are clearly third-party or generated
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if any(excluded in relative_path for excluded in exclude_dirs):
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continue
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try:
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with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
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content = f.read()
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tree = ast.parse(content)
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detector.set_file(relative_path)
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detector.visit(tree)
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except SyntaxError as e:
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print(f"Warning: Syntax error in file {relative_path}: {e}")
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continue
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except UnicodeDecodeError as e:
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print(f"Warning: Unicode decode error in file {relative_path}: {e}")
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continue
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except Exception as e:
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print(f"Warning: Error processing file {relative_path}: {e}")
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continue
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return detector.violations
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def main():
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"""Main function to run the sensitive logging check"""
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# Get the base directory (assume we're running from tests/code_coverage_tests/)
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###################
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# Running locally
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###################
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# current_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
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# base_dir = os.path.join(current_dir, "..", "..")
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# base_dir = os.path.abspath(base_dir)
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###################
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# Running in CI/CD
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###################
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base_dir = "./litellm" # Adjust this path as needed
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print(f"Checking for sensitive logging in: {base_dir}")
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violations = check_sensitive_logging(base_dir)
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if violations:
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print(f"\n❌ Found {len(violations)} potential violations:")
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print("=" * 80)
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for i, violation in enumerate(violations, 1):
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print(f"\n{i}. {violation['file']}:{violation['line']}")
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print(f" Reason: {violation['reason']}")
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print(f" Call: {violation['call']}")
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print(f" Argument: {violation['arg']}")
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print("\n" + "=" * 80)
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print("⚠️ SECURITY WARNING:")
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print("These logger.info() statements may log sensitive request/response data.")
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print("Consider changing them to logger.debug() or removing sensitive data.")
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print("This is critical for PII compliance and security.")
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print("Please contact @ishaan-jaff for more details about this check. DO NOT VIOLATE THIS CHECK.")
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return 1 # Exit with error code
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else:
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print("\n✅ No sensitive logging violations found!")
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return 0
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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exit(main())
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