name: "CodeQL"

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]
  schedule:
    # Run daily at 04:00 UTC
    - cron: "0 4 * * *"

concurrency:
  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}

jobs:
  analyze:
    if: github.event_name != 'schedule' || github.repository == 'BerriAI/litellm'
    name: Analyze (${{ matrix.language }})
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    timeout-minutes: 30
    permissions:
      security-events: write
      packages: read
      actions: read
      contents: read

    strategy:
      fail-fast: false
      matrix:
        include:
          - language: actions
            build-mode: none
          - language: javascript-typescript
            build-mode: none
          - language: python
            build-mode: none

    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@08eba0b27e820071cde6df949e0beb9ba4906955 # v4.3.0
        with:
          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Initialize CodeQL
        uses: github/codeql-action/init@ebcb5b36ded6beda4ceefea6a8bc4cc885255bb3 # v3
        with:
          languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
          build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }}
          config-file: ./.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml

      - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
        uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@ebcb5b36ded6beda4ceefea6a8bc4cc885255bb3 # v3
        with:
          category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}"
          output: sarif-results
          upload: failure-only

      # py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing (CWE-328) fires on the OCI signing call at
      # litellm/llms/oci/common_utils.py, which hashes the HTTP request body to
      # produce the x-content-sha256 header required by the OCI HTTP signing spec —
      # a content-integrity hash, not a password or secret hash. SHA-256 is mandated
      # by Oracle for this header; see
      # https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/API/Concepts/signingrequests.htm
      # The `usedforsecurity=False` flag on the hashlib.sha256 call already declares
      # non-security intent, but CodeQL's taint flow still re-fires when callers
      # further up the stack are modified. The suppression is scoped to this one
      # file/rule pair via SARIF post-filtering so every other callsite of
      # py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing in the repository continues to be analyzed.
      - name: Filter SARIF (OCI sha256)
        if: matrix.language == 'python'
        uses: advanced-security/filter-sarif@2da736ff05ef065cb2894ac6892e47b5eac2c3c0 # v1.1
        with:
          patterns: |
            -litellm/llms/oci/common_utils.py:py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing
          input: sarif-results/python.sarif
          output: sarif-results/python.sarif

      - name: Upload SARIF
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@ebcb5b36ded6beda4ceefea6a8bc4cc885255bb3 # v3
        with:
          sarif_file: sarif-results
          category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}"