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f62ae93e13
* test(proxy): add create_scratch_actor harness helper
Adds create_scratch_actor() to the management behavior-suite conftest and
extends create_scratch_team() with team_member_permissions / models kwargs,
needed by the PR3 team-key-permission and team-model matrices. The new
helper mints a scratch-prefixed user + verification token (+ org
memberships), all reclaimed by the existing scratch-prefix teardown.
* test(proxy): pin /key block, unblock, health, aliases behavior
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/block, POST /key/unblock,
POST /key/health, and GET /key/aliases. Pins that the management-route gate
401s ORG_ADMIN-role callers before _check_key_admin_access runs, the
block/unblock round-trip on the blocked column, missing-key 404, and the
_apply_non_admin_alias_scope visibility rules for /key/aliases.
* test(proxy): pin /key/bulk_update + /team/key/bulk_update behavior
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/bulk_update (PROXY_ADMIN-only;
ORG_ADMIN stopped 401 at the route gate, INTERNAL_USER-role 403 at the
handler) and POST /team/key/bulk_update (team-member-permission gate keyed
on KEY_UPDATE). Pins batch semantics: empty/over-cap 400, per-key failure
isolation into failed_updates, all_keys_in_team broadcast, and no-keys 404.
Adds an optional key_alias arg to create_scratch_key for multi-key scenarios.
* test(proxy): pin /key SA-generate, v2-info, reset-spend behavior
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/service-account/generate
(team-membership + team-member-permission gating; SA keys carry no user_id),
POST /v2/key/info (per-key _can_user_query_key_info silently drops invisible
keys), and POST /key/{key}/reset_spend (PROXY_ADMIN or team admin only;
missing key 404, reset-value 400). Pins that ORG_ADMIN-role callers are
stopped 401 at the management-route gate on the two non-info routes.
* test(proxy): close PR1/PR2 key-side deferred coverage gaps
Closes the four key-side gaps deferred from PR1/PR2:
- 404 on missing key for /key/update and /key/delete (not 401/403)
- denied /key/update leaves max_budget/tpm_limit/rpm_limit untouched
- /key/regenerate enforces litellm.upperbound_key_generate_params (#26340)
- /key/list key_alias substring vs exact (admin-only) + team_id filter,
and a non-admin filtering a foreign team is 403
* test(proxy): pin /team block, unblock, available, filter/ui, members/me
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/block + /team/unblock
(management-route gate fronts _verify_team_access; reachable only by
PROXY_ADMIN and an org admin of the team's own org), GET /team/available
(default empty path), GET /team/filter/ui (route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only
despite the handler having no gate), and GET /team/{team_id}/members/me
(caller resolves its own membership; non-member 404, no-user_id key 400).
* test(proxy): pin /team model add/delete + permissions endpoints
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/model/add + /team/model/delete
(route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only; missing team 404), GET /team/permissions_list +
POST /team/permissions_update (self-managed; proxy/team/org admin pass), and
POST /team/permissions_bulk_update (PROXY_ADMIN-only). Pins the deliberate
divergence that the available-team self-join grants read access via
permissions_list but never write access via permissions_update.
* test(proxy): pin /team delete, bulk_member_add, v2/list, daily/activity
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/delete (per-team
_verify_team_access; batch aborts whole on a missing id), POST
/team/bulk_member_add (route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only; empty/over-cap 400),
GET /v2/team/list (_enforce_list_team_v2_access — bare query 401s regular
users, org-scoped for org admins) and GET /team/daily/activity (non-member
team_ids filter 404, the VERIA-43 fix).
* test(proxy): add route-coverage gate + close team org-relocation gap
Adds test_route_coverage.py (PR3.M1): parses every @router route literal
from the two management-endpoint source files and asserts each is exercised
by >=1 behavior-suite scenario — a permanent regression guard for future
routes. Closes the last PR1/PR2 deferred gap: the /team/update org-relocation
allowed branch, exercised by a dual-org-admin minted via create_scratch_actor.
test_team_model uses literal route URLs so the coverage parser resolves them.
* test(proxy): bound plain route params to one path segment in coverage gate
Plain path params ({team_id}) now compile to [^/?]+ instead of [^?]+, so a
parameter cannot span '/'. Starlette ':path' params still match across '/'.
Keeps the route-coverage guard from falsely reporting a future multi-segment
route as covered. All 37 routes remain covered.
114 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
114 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
import uuid
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import pytest
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from litellm.proxy.utils import hash_token
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from .actors import TEAM_ALPHA, TEAM_BETA, Actor
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from .conftest import create_scratch_key
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio(loop_scope="session")
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# Same-team peers can READ each other's keys (see test_key_info) but cannot
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# DELETE them — delete is stricter than read.
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_SCENARIOS = [
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("self/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "self", 200),
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("self/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "self", 401),
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("self/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "self", 200),
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("self/internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, "self", 200),
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("self/owner", Actor.OWNER, "self", 200),
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("self/unrelated_same_org", Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, "self", 200),
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("self/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "self", 200),
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("self/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "self", 200),
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("owner_target/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "owner", 200),
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("owner_target/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "owner", 401),
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("owner_target/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "owner", 200),
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("owner_target/internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, "owner", 403),
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("owner_target/unrelated_same_org", Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, "owner", 403),
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("owner_target/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "owner", 403),
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("owner_target/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "owner", 403),
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("cross_org_target/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "cross_org", 200),
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("cross_org_target/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "cross_org", 401),
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("cross_org_target/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "cross_org", 403),
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("cross_org_target/owner", Actor.OWNER, "cross_org", 403),
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("cross_org_target/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "cross_org", 200),
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("cross_org_target/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "cross_org", 403),
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]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"actor,target_shape,expected_status",
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[(a, t, s) for (_id, a, t, s) in _SCENARIOS],
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ids=[s[0] for s in _SCENARIOS],
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)
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async def test_key_delete_authz_matrix(
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actor: Actor,
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target_shape: str,
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expected_status: int,
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proxy_client,
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prisma,
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scratch,
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world,
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):
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caller = world.keys[actor]
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seeder = world.keys[Actor.PROXY_ADMIN].cleartext
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if target_shape == "self":
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target_cleartext = await create_scratch_key(
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proxy_client, seeder, scratch.prefix, user_id=caller.user_id
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)
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elif target_shape == "owner":
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target_cleartext = await create_scratch_key(
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proxy_client,
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seeder,
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scratch.prefix,
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user_id=world.keys[Actor.OWNER].user_id,
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team_id=TEAM_ALPHA,
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)
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elif target_shape == "cross_org":
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target_cleartext = await create_scratch_key(
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proxy_client,
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seeder,
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scratch.prefix,
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user_id=world.keys[Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER].user_id,
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team_id=TEAM_BETA,
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)
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else:
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pytest.fail(f"unknown target_shape={target_shape}")
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target_hashed = hash_token(target_cleartext)
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resp = await proxy_client.post(
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"/key/delete",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {caller.cleartext}"},
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json={"keys": [target_cleartext]},
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)
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assert (
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resp.status_code == expected_status
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), f"{actor.value} {target_shape}: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}"
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row = await prisma.db.litellm_verificationtoken.find_unique(
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where={"token": target_hashed}
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)
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auth_check = await proxy_client.get(
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"/key/info", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {target_cleartext}"}
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)
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if expected_status == 200:
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# Hard- or soft-delete both produce a 401 on subsequent auth.
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assert auth_check.status_code == 401
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else:
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assert row is not None, f"{actor.value}: denied but row vanished"
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assert auth_check.status_code == 200
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async def test_key_delete_missing_key_is_404(proxy_client, world):
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"""Deleting a key absent from the DB is a 404 — not 401/403."""
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resp = await proxy_client.post(
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"/key/delete",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {world.keys[Actor.PROXY_ADMIN].cleartext}"},
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json={"keys": ["sk-" + uuid.uuid4().hex]},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
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