mirror of
https://github.com/tiennm99/litellm.git
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dedaf74a5e
* chore(auth): validate clientside api_base against SSRF guard; clear admin secrets on base override Two related issues with how the proxy handles client-supplied ``api_base`` / ``base_url`` overrides on chat-completion requests: 1. **SSRF gate bypass** — ``check_complete_credentials()`` returned ``True`` for any non-empty ``api_key``, allowing the ``is_request_body_safe`` ``banned_params`` loop to admit ``api_base`` / ``base_url`` values that point at private (RFC 1918), loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata addresses. Now: when the gate sees a client-supplied ``api_base`` / ``base_url``, it runs the URL through ``litellm_core_utils.url_utils.validate_url`` (DNS-resolves, blocks internal/IMDS/LL networks, defends against rebinding). Rejection raises with a clear message. 2. **Admin-config leak on base override** — ``get_dynamic_litellm_params`` only carried the three clientside keys (``api_key``, ``api_base``, ``base_url``) from request to upstream call. Other admin-configured fields on ``litellm_params`` — ``organization``, ``extra_body``, ``extra_headers``, ``api_version``, ``azure_ad_token``, AWS / Vertex creds, etc. — flowed through unchanged. With base redirected to a client-controlled server, those admin secrets were sent to the attacker. Now: when ``api_base`` / ``base_url`` is in ``request_kwargs``, drop those admin-config fields from ``litellm_params`` unless the caller re-supplied them. Tests cover the SSRF-target rejection per URL field, the admin-secret clearing on base override, the don't-clear case when only ``api_key`` is overridden (BYOK pattern), and the don't-overwrite case when the caller resupplies fields like ``organization`` themselves. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(vertex-batches): wrap api_base GET in safe_get for defense-in-depth The vertex batches status-poll fetches an attacker-influenceable ``api_base`` URL with a raw ``sync_handler.get()``. The proxy auth gate already validates clientside ``api_base`` before reaching this sink, so the proxy flow is covered. This adds the per-sink wrap so SDK callers and any future code path that bypasses the proxy gate pick up the same SSRF defense from ``url_utils.safe_get``. Operators with a legitimate private Vertex base can either allowlist the host via ``litellm.user_url_allowed_hosts`` or disable validation with ``litellm.user_url_validation = False``. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(auth): hoist url_utils import; derive admin-config field list from CredentialLiteLLMParams /simplify pass: - Move ``from litellm.litellm_core_utils.url_utils import SSRFError, validate_url`` to module top in ``proxy/auth/auth_utils.py``. CLAUDE.md prefers module-level imports unless avoiding a circular dependency, and there's no cycle here (``url_utils`` doesn't depend on ``proxy.auth``). - Replace the hardcoded ``_ADMIN_CONFIG_FIELDS_TO_CLEAR_ON_BASE_OVERRIDE`` literal with ``_admin_config_fields_to_clear_on_base_override()`` that derives the typed-field portion from ``CredentialLiteLLMParams.model_fields``. Adds three fields the hardcoded list missed (``aws_bedrock_runtime_endpoint``, ``watsonx_region_name``, ``region_name``) and stays in sync as new provider fields are declared on the model. The kwargs-only set (``organization``, ``extra_body``, ``azure_ad_token``, ``aws_session_token``, ``aws_sts_endpoint``, ``aws_web_identity_token``, ``aws_role_name``, …) remains explicit since those fields aren't on the typed model. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): close field-echo bypass; gate URL check on toggle; cover async batch path Three issues from review: 1. ``get_dynamic_litellm_params`` used ``if field not in request_kwargs: pop`` to clear admin-set provider config when the caller redirected ``api_base``. A caller could *echo* any clear-list field name (with any value, including an empty string) to skip the pop, leaving the admin's value in ``litellm_params`` to be forwarded to the redirected upstream. Fix: always pop, then write the caller's value back if they resupplied the field. 2. ``check_complete_credentials`` called ``validate_url`` directly. That helper doesn't itself consult ``litellm.user_url_validation``; the toggle is honoured by ``safe_get`` / ``async_safe_get``. Mirror that here so admins who explicitly disabled URL validation aren't blocked at the proxy boundary. 3. ``VertexAIBatchesHandler._async_retrieve_batch`` still used a bare ``await client.get(api_base, ...)`` while the sync sibling was wrapped in ``safe_get``. Wrap the async call in ``async_safe_get`` so SDK callers on the async path get the same DNS-rebind / private / cloud-metadata defenses as the sync path. Tests: - ``TestCheckCompleteCredentialsBlocksSSRF`` is now mock-only; an autouse fixture flips the toggle on, ``validate_url`` is patched in the parametrized blocking tests, and the positive path no longer makes a real DNS call to api.openai.com. - ``test_skips_url_validation_when_toggle_is_off`` documents the new toggle-off behaviour and asserts ``validate_url`` is not called. - ``test_caller_resupplied_value_overrides_admin_value_on_base_override`` replaces the prior test that asserted the buggy preserve-admin-value-on-echo behaviour. - ``test_field_echo_does_not_preserve_admin_value`` is a focused regression test for the empty-string echo vector. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): close provider-confusion credential exfil; expand banned-params; cover OCI Three additions on top of the entry-point URL gate so the cluster is fully closed against caller-supplied ``api_base`` redirection: 1. ``get_llm_provider_logic.py`` matched registered openai-compatible endpoints against ``api_base`` with an unanchored substring search (``if endpoint in api_base:``). A caller could pass an api_base like ``https://attacker.com/api.groq.com/openai/v1`` to coerce the proxy into reading ``GROQ_API_KEY`` from the environment and forwarding it as a Bearer credential to the attacker's host. Replaced with parsed- URL semantics (hostname exact-match plus segment-bounded path-prefix) in a new ``_endpoint_matches_api_base`` helper. 2. ``is_request_body_safe`` rejects ``api_base`` / ``base_url`` / ``user_config`` / a handful of AWS / vertex fields, but the list omitted three other endpoint-targeting fields: * ``aws_bedrock_runtime_endpoint`` — Bedrock endpoint redirect * ``langsmith_base_url`` / ``langfuse_host`` — observability callback hostnames; attacker-controlled values exfiltrate the entire request payload (incl. message content) via the logging hook. Added all three to the blocklist. 3. ``_admin_config_fields_to_clear_on_base_override`` derives its typed- field list from ``CredentialLiteLLMParams.model_fields``, which does not declare any of the OCI provider's auth fields. Added ``oci_signer``, ``oci_user``, ``oci_fingerprint``, ``oci_tenancy``, ``oci_key``, and ``oci_key_file`` to the kwargs-only fixed list so they are cleared on caller-redirected ``api_base`` like the AWS / Azure / Vertex equivalents. Tests: - ``TestEndpointMatchesApiBase`` — direct unit tests on the new matcher: legitimate provider URLs (5 shapes) match; attacker smuggling via path injection, suffix label, prefix label, userinfo ``@`` injection, and path-segment lookalikes (7 shapes) do not. - ``TestGetLlmProviderRejectsAttackerSmuggledApiBase`` — end-to-end invariant that ``GROQ_API_KEY`` is never read against an attacker- controlled host while the legitimate ``api.groq.com`` path still resolves the provider correctly. - ``TestIsRequestBodySafeBlocksEndpointTargetingFields`` — parametrized coverage that each of the three new banned-params raises a clear rejection naming the offending field. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): remove implicit api-key bypass + add posthog/braintrust/slack to blocklist The historical ``check_complete_credentials`` clause inside ``is_request_body_safe`` was a third, *implicit*, *caller-controlled* BYOK path: any caller that supplied a non-empty ``api_key`` caused the entire banned-params blocklist to be skipped. That turned every missing entry on the blocklist into an exploitable SSRF / credential-exfil hole and is the root cause of the chain of api_base advisories that have been re-discovered with each new integration: * GHSA-jh89-88fc-qrfp (critical, triage) — env-var exfil via api_base * GHSA-3frq-6r6h-7j64 (high, triage) — admin org / extra_body leak * veria-admin Dv_m860l, b_yRJeQ5, stN90yjP, LBlyOAc8, U2TD78kg — variations on "list X is missing field Y" Two explicit, admin-controlled BYOK paths already exist and remain: ``general_settings.allow_client_side_credentials = true`` (proxy-wide) and ``configurable_clientside_auth_params: [...]`` per deployment. Removing the implicit bypass converts the failure mode of a missing blocklist entry from "live credential leak" to "predictable 400 with a clear remediation message," which is the structural fix. Also adds the three remaining endpoint-targeting fields the dynamic callback layer reads from request body: ``posthog_host``, ``braintrust_host``, ``slack_webhook_url``. ``slack_webhook_url`` in particular was a direct exfil channel (caller-set webhook → proxy mirrors every request to attacker's Slack). Tests: - ``test_api_key_does_not_bypass_blocklist`` — parametrized regression asserting api_key=anything no longer skips the gate for any of the five highest-risk fields. - ``test_admin_opt_in_proxy_wide_still_allows`` — confirms the documented BYOK opt-in still works. - Extends ``test_endpoint_targeting_field_in_request_body_is_rejected`` to cover posthog / braintrust / slack. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): block sagemaker_base_url, s3_endpoint_url, deployment_url Provider-specific endpoint overrides surfaced by a wider audit of ``optional_params`` consumers in ``litellm/llms/``. Same threat as ``api_base``: a caller-supplied value redirects the outbound request to an attacker host. * ``s3_endpoint_url`` — read in ``litellm/llms/bedrock/files/transformation.py`` to build the S3 upload URL for Bedrock files. Caller redirects file uploads to attacker-controlled S3. * ``sagemaker_base_url`` — read in ``litellm/llms/sagemaker/{chat,completion}/*``. Caller redirects SageMaker traffic. This is the primary vector described in veria-admin mNqEBBtG. * ``deployment_url`` — popped in ``litellm/llms/sap/chat/transformation.py``. Caller redirects SAP deployment requests. Tests parametrize ``test_endpoint_targeting_field_in_request_body_is_rejected`` to cover the three new fields. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
967 lines
39 KiB
Python
967 lines
39 KiB
Python
"""
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Unit tests for auth_utils functions related to rate limiting and customer ID extraction.
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"""
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from typing import Optional
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from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
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import pytest
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from litellm.proxy._types import UserAPIKeyAuth
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from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import (
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_get_customer_id_from_standard_headers,
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check_complete_credentials,
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get_end_user_id_from_request_body,
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get_model_from_request,
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get_key_model_rpm_limit,
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get_key_model_tpm_limit,
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get_project_model_rpm_limit,
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get_project_model_tpm_limit,
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is_request_body_safe,
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)
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class TestGetKeyModelRpmLimit:
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"""Tests for get_key_model_rpm_limit function."""
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def test_returns_key_metadata_when_present(self):
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"""Key metadata takes priority over team metadata."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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metadata={"model_rpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 100}},
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team_metadata={"model_rpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 50}},
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)
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result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 100}
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def test_falls_back_to_team_metadata_when_key_has_other_metadata(self):
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"""Should fall back to team metadata when key metadata exists but has no model_rpm_limit."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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metadata={
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"some_other_key": "value"
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}, # Has metadata, but not model_rpm_limit
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team_metadata={"model_rpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 50}},
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)
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result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 50}
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def test_extracts_from_model_max_budget(self):
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"""Should extract rpm_limit from model_max_budget when metadata is empty."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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model_max_budget={
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"gpt-4": {"rpm_limit": 100, "tpm_limit": 1000},
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"gpt-3.5-turbo": {"rpm_limit": 200},
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},
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)
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result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 100, "gpt-3.5-turbo": 200}
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def test_skips_models_without_rpm_limit(self):
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"""Should skip models that don't have rpm_limit in model_max_budget."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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model_max_budget={
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"gpt-4": {"rpm_limit": 100},
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"gpt-3.5-turbo": {"tpm_limit": 1000}, # No rpm_limit
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},
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)
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result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 100}
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def test_returns_none_when_no_limits_configured(self):
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"""Should return None when no rate limits are configured."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
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result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result is None
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def test_team_metadata_empty_rpm_dict_falls_through_to_deployment_default(self):
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"""Explicitly empty team model_rpm_limit ({}) should be returned as-is, not fallen through."""
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# An empty dict is a valid team limit map (no per-model limits configured).
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# It should be returned directly rather than falling through to deployment defaults,
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# so a team with an empty map is treated as unconstrained at the team level.
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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team_metadata={"model_rpm_limit": {}},
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)
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result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {}
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class TestGetKeyModelTpmLimit:
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"""Tests for get_key_model_tpm_limit function."""
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def test_returns_key_metadata_when_present(self):
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"""Key metadata takes priority over team metadata."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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metadata={"model_tpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 10000}},
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team_metadata={"model_tpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 5000}},
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)
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result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 10000}
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def test_falls_back_to_team_metadata_when_key_has_other_metadata(self):
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"""Should fall back to team metadata when key metadata exists but has no model_tpm_limit."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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metadata={
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"some_other_key": "value"
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}, # Has metadata, but not model_tpm_limit
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team_metadata={"model_tpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 5000}},
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)
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result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 5000}
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def test_extracts_from_model_max_budget(self):
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"""Should extract tpm_limit from model_max_budget when metadata is empty."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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model_max_budget={
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"gpt-4": {"tpm_limit": 10000, "rpm_limit": 100},
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"gpt-3.5-turbo": {"tpm_limit": 20000},
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},
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)
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result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 10000, "gpt-3.5-turbo": 20000}
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def test_skips_models_without_tpm_limit(self):
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"""Should skip models that don't have tpm_limit in model_max_budget."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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model_max_budget={
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"gpt-4": {"tpm_limit": 10000},
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"gpt-3.5-turbo": {"rpm_limit": 100}, # No tpm_limit
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},
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)
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result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 10000}
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def test_returns_none_when_no_limits_configured(self):
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"""Should return None when no rate limits are configured."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
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result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result is None
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def test_model_max_budget_priority_over_team(self):
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"""model_max_budget should take priority over team_metadata."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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model_max_budget={"gpt-4": {"tpm_limit": 10000}},
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team_metadata={"model_tpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 5000}},
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)
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result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {"gpt-4": 10000}
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def test_team_metadata_empty_tpm_dict_falls_through_to_deployment_default(self):
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"""Explicitly empty team model_tpm_limit ({}) should be returned as-is, not fallen through."""
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# An empty dict is a valid team limit map (no per-model limits configured).
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# It should be returned directly rather than falling through to deployment defaults,
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# so a team with an empty map is treated as unconstrained at the team level.
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
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api_key="sk-123",
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team_metadata={"model_tpm_limit": {}},
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)
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result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
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assert result == {}
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def test_skips_deployments_with_malformed_limit_value(self):
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"""Deployments with non-integer-parseable limit values are skipped without raising."""
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user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
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mock_router = MagicMock()
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mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
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{
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"model_name": "model1",
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"litellm_params": {"default_api_key_tpm_limit": "not-a-number"},
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},
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_make_deployment_dict("model1", tpm=500),
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]
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with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
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result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
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# The malformed deployment is skipped; the valid one provides 500
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assert result == {"model1": 500}
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class TestGetCustomerIdFromStandardHeaders:
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"""Tests for _get_customer_id_from_standard_headers helper function."""
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def test_should_return_customer_id_from_x_litellm_customer_id_header(self):
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"""Should extract customer ID from x-litellm-customer-id header."""
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headers = {"x-litellm-customer-id": "customer-123"}
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result = _get_customer_id_from_standard_headers(request_headers=headers)
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assert result == "customer-123"
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def test_should_return_customer_id_from_x_litellm_end_user_id_header(self):
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"""Should extract customer ID from x-litellm-end-user-id header."""
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headers = {"x-litellm-end-user-id": "end-user-456"}
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result = _get_customer_id_from_standard_headers(request_headers=headers)
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assert result == "end-user-456"
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def test_should_return_none_when_headers_is_none(self):
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"""Should return None when headers is None."""
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result = _get_customer_id_from_standard_headers(request_headers=None)
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assert result is None
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def test_should_return_none_when_no_standard_headers_present(self):
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"""Should return None when no standard customer ID headers are present."""
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headers = {"x-other-header": "some-value"}
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result = _get_customer_id_from_standard_headers(request_headers=headers)
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assert result is None
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class TestGetEndUserIdFromRequestBodyWithStandardHeaders:
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"""Tests for get_end_user_id_from_request_body with standard customer ID headers."""
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def test_should_prioritize_standard_header_over_body_user(self):
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"""Standard customer ID header should take precedence over body user field."""
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headers = {"x-litellm-customer-id": "header-customer"}
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request_body = {"user": "body-user"}
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with patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {}):
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result = get_end_user_id_from_request_body(
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request_body=request_body, request_headers=headers
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)
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assert result == "header-customer"
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def test_should_fall_back_to_body_when_no_standard_header(self):
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"""Should fall back to body user when no standard headers are present."""
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headers = {"x-other-header": "value"}
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request_body = {"user": "body-user"}
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with patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", {}):
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result = get_end_user_id_from_request_body(
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request_body=request_body, request_headers=headers
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)
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assert result == "body-user"
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def test_get_model_from_request_supports_google_model_names_with_slashes():
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assert (
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get_model_from_request(
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request_data={},
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route="/v1beta/models/bedrock/claude-sonnet-3.7:generateContent",
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)
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== "bedrock/claude-sonnet-3.7"
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)
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assert (
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get_model_from_request(
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request_data={},
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route="/models/hosted_vllm/gpt-oss-20b:generateContent",
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)
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== "hosted_vllm/gpt-oss-20b"
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)
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def test_get_model_from_request_vertex_passthrough_still_works():
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route = "/vertex_ai/v1/projects/p/locations/l/publishers/google/models/gemini-1.5-pro:generateContent"
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assert get_model_from_request(request_data={}, route=route) == "gemini-1.5-pro"
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def test_get_customer_user_header_returns_none_when_no_customer_role():
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from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import get_customer_user_header_from_mapping
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mappings = [
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{"header_name": "X-OpenWebUI-User-Id", "litellm_user_role": "internal_user"}
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]
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result = get_customer_user_header_from_mapping(mappings)
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_customer_user_header_returns_none_for_single_non_customer_mapping():
|
|
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import get_customer_user_header_from_mapping
|
|
|
|
mapping = {"header_name": "X-Only-Internal", "litellm_user_role": "internal_user"}
|
|
result = get_customer_user_header_from_mapping(mapping)
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_customer_user_header_from_mapping_returns_customer_header():
|
|
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import get_customer_user_header_from_mapping
|
|
|
|
mappings = [
|
|
{"header_name": "X-OpenWebUI-User-Id", "litellm_user_role": "internal_user"},
|
|
{"header_name": "X-OpenWebUI-User-Email", "litellm_user_role": "customer"},
|
|
]
|
|
result = get_customer_user_header_from_mapping(mappings)
|
|
assert result == ["x-openwebui-user-email"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_customer_user_header_returns_customers_header_in_config_order_when_multiple_exist():
|
|
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import get_customer_user_header_from_mapping
|
|
|
|
mappings = [
|
|
{"header_name": "X-OpenWebUI-User-Id", "litellm_user_role": "internal_user"},
|
|
{"header_name": "X-OpenWebUI-User-Email", "litellm_user_role": "customer"},
|
|
{"header_name": "X-User-Id", "litellm_user_role": "customer"},
|
|
]
|
|
result = get_customer_user_header_from_mapping(mappings)
|
|
assert result == ["x-openwebui-user-email", "x-user-id"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_end_user_id_returns_id_from_user_header_mappings():
|
|
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import get_end_user_id_from_request_body
|
|
|
|
mappings = [
|
|
{"header_name": "x-openwebui-user-id", "litellm_user_role": "internal_user"},
|
|
{"header_name": "x-openwebui-user-email", "litellm_user_role": "customer"},
|
|
]
|
|
general_settings = {"user_header_mappings": mappings}
|
|
headers = {"x-openwebui-user-email": "1234"}
|
|
|
|
with (
|
|
patch(
|
|
"litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils._get_customer_id_from_standard_headers",
|
|
return_value=None,
|
|
),
|
|
patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", general_settings),
|
|
):
|
|
result = get_end_user_id_from_request_body(
|
|
request_body={}, request_headers=headers
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert result == "1234"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_end_user_id_returns_first_customer_header_when_multiple_mappings_exist():
|
|
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import get_end_user_id_from_request_body
|
|
|
|
mappings = [
|
|
{"header_name": "x-openwebui-user-id", "litellm_user_role": "internal_user"},
|
|
{"header_name": "x-user-id", "litellm_user_role": "customer"},
|
|
{"header_name": "x-openwebui-user-email", "litellm_user_role": "customer"},
|
|
]
|
|
general_settings = {"user_header_mappings": mappings}
|
|
headers = {
|
|
"x-user-id": "user-456",
|
|
"x-openwebui-user-email": "user@example.com",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
with (
|
|
patch(
|
|
"litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils._get_customer_id_from_standard_headers",
|
|
return_value=None,
|
|
),
|
|
patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", general_settings),
|
|
):
|
|
result = get_end_user_id_from_request_body(
|
|
request_body={}, request_headers=headers
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert result == "user-456"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_end_user_id_returns_none_when_no_customer_role_in_mappings():
|
|
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import get_end_user_id_from_request_body
|
|
|
|
mappings = [
|
|
{"header_name": "x-openwebui-user-id", "litellm_user_role": "internal_user"},
|
|
]
|
|
general_settings = {"user_header_mappings": mappings}
|
|
headers = {"x-openwebui-user-id": "user-789"}
|
|
|
|
with (
|
|
patch(
|
|
"litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils._get_customer_id_from_standard_headers",
|
|
return_value=None,
|
|
),
|
|
patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", general_settings),
|
|
):
|
|
result = get_end_user_id_from_request_body(
|
|
request_body={}, request_headers=headers
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_end_user_id_falls_back_to_deprecated_user_header_name():
|
|
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import get_end_user_id_from_request_body
|
|
|
|
general_settings = {"user_header_name": "x-custom-user-id"}
|
|
headers = {"x-custom-user-id": "user-legacy"}
|
|
|
|
with (
|
|
patch(
|
|
"litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils._get_customer_id_from_standard_headers",
|
|
return_value=None,
|
|
),
|
|
patch("litellm.proxy.proxy_server.general_settings", general_settings),
|
|
):
|
|
result = get_end_user_id_from_request_body(
|
|
request_body={}, request_headers=headers
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert result == "user-legacy"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _make_deployment_dict(
|
|
model_name: str, tpm: Optional[int] = None, rpm: Optional[int] = None
|
|
) -> dict:
|
|
"""Helper to build a minimal deployment dict as returned by router.get_model_list."""
|
|
litellm_params: dict = {"model": model_name}
|
|
if tpm is not None:
|
|
litellm_params["default_api_key_tpm_limit"] = tpm
|
|
if rpm is not None:
|
|
litellm_params["default_api_key_rpm_limit"] = rpm
|
|
return {"model_name": model_name, "litellm_params": litellm_params}
|
|
|
|
|
|
_ROUTER_PATCH = "litellm.proxy.proxy_server.llm_router"
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestDeploymentDefaultRpmLimit:
|
|
"""Tests for deployment default_api_key_rpm_limit fallback in get_key_model_rpm_limit."""
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_deployment_default_when_key_has_no_limits(self):
|
|
"""Case 2 from spec: key has no model-specific limits, falls back to deployment default."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", rpm=200)
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 200}
|
|
|
|
def test_key_model_limit_takes_priority_over_deployment_default(self):
|
|
"""Case 1 from spec: key model-specific limit wins over deployment default."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
|
|
api_key="sk-123",
|
|
metadata={"model_rpm_limit": {"model1": 10}},
|
|
)
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", rpm=200)
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 10}
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_when_no_deployment_default_and_no_key_limits(self):
|
|
"""Returns None when neither the key nor the deployment has any rpm limit."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1") # no rpm default
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_without_model_name_even_when_deployment_has_default(self):
|
|
"""No model_name means deployment fallback is skipped."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", rpm=200)
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_when_llm_router_is_none(self):
|
|
"""No router means deployment fallback returns None gracefully."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, None):
|
|
result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_minimum_across_multiple_deployments(self):
|
|
"""When multiple deployments share a model name, the minimum rpm limit is used."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", rpm=200),
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", rpm=50),
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", rpm=150),
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 50}
|
|
|
|
def test_ignores_deployments_without_default_when_others_have_it(self):
|
|
"""Deployments missing the field are skipped; min is taken over those that have it."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1"), # no rpm default
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", rpm=75),
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 75}
|
|
|
|
def test_skips_deployments_with_malformed_limit_value(self):
|
|
"""Deployments with non-integer-parseable limit values are skipped without raising."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
{
|
|
"model_name": "model1",
|
|
"litellm_params": {"default_api_key_rpm_limit": "not-a-number"},
|
|
},
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", rpm=100),
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
# The malformed deployment is skipped; the valid one provides 100
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 100}
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestDeploymentDefaultTpmLimit:
|
|
"""Tests for deployment default_api_key_tpm_limit fallback in get_key_model_tpm_limit."""
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_deployment_default_when_key_has_no_limits(self):
|
|
"""Case 2 from spec: key has no model-specific limits, falls back to deployment default."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", tpm=100)
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 100}
|
|
|
|
def test_key_model_limit_takes_priority_over_deployment_default(self):
|
|
"""Case 1 from spec: key model-specific limit wins over deployment default."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
|
|
api_key="sk-123",
|
|
metadata={"model_tpm_limit": {"model1": 20}},
|
|
)
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", tpm=100)
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 20}
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_when_no_deployment_default_and_no_key_limits(self):
|
|
"""Returns None when neither the key nor the deployment has any tpm limit."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1") # no tpm default
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_without_model_name_even_when_deployment_has_default(self):
|
|
"""No model_name means deployment fallback is skipped."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", tpm=100)
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_when_llm_router_is_none(self):
|
|
"""No router means deployment fallback returns None gracefully."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, None):
|
|
result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_minimum_across_multiple_deployments(self):
|
|
"""When multiple deployments share a model name, the minimum tpm limit is used."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", tpm=1000),
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", tpm=300),
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", tpm=700),
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 300}
|
|
|
|
def test_ignores_deployments_without_default_when_others_have_it(self):
|
|
"""Deployments missing the field are skipped; min is taken over those that have it."""
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
mock_router = MagicMock()
|
|
mock_router.get_model_list.return_value = [
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1"), # no tpm default
|
|
_make_deployment_dict("model1", tpm=400),
|
|
]
|
|
with patch(_ROUTER_PATCH, mock_router):
|
|
result = get_key_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict, model_name="model1")
|
|
assert result == {"model1": 400}
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestGetProjectModelRpmLimit:
|
|
"""Tests for get_project_model_rpm_limit function."""
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_project_metadata_rpm_limit(self):
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
|
|
api_key="sk-123",
|
|
project_metadata={"model_rpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 200}},
|
|
)
|
|
result = get_project_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
|
|
assert result == {"gpt-4": 200}
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_when_no_project_metadata(self):
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
result = get_project_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_when_project_metadata_missing_key(self):
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
|
|
api_key="sk-123",
|
|
project_metadata={"other_key": "value"},
|
|
)
|
|
result = get_project_model_rpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestGetProjectModelTpmLimit:
|
|
"""Tests for get_project_model_tpm_limit function."""
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_project_metadata_tpm_limit(self):
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
|
|
api_key="sk-123",
|
|
project_metadata={"model_tpm_limit": {"gpt-4": 50000}},
|
|
)
|
|
result = get_project_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
|
|
assert result == {"gpt-4": 50000}
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_when_no_project_metadata(self):
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="sk-123")
|
|
result = get_project_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_none_when_project_metadata_missing_key(self):
|
|
user_api_key_dict = UserAPIKeyAuth(
|
|
api_key="sk-123",
|
|
project_metadata={"other_key": "value"},
|
|
)
|
|
result = get_project_model_tpm_limit(user_api_key_dict)
|
|
assert result is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestCheckCompleteCredentials:
|
|
"""Tests for the api_key validation in check_complete_credentials."""
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_false_when_api_key_missing(self):
|
|
result = check_complete_credentials({"model": "gpt-4"})
|
|
assert result is False
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_false_when_api_key_is_none(self):
|
|
result = check_complete_credentials({"model": "gpt-4", "api_key": None})
|
|
assert result is False
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_false_when_api_key_is_empty_string(self):
|
|
result = check_complete_credentials({"model": "gpt-4", "api_key": ""})
|
|
assert result is False
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_false_when_api_key_is_whitespace(self):
|
|
result = check_complete_credentials({"model": "gpt-4", "api_key": " "})
|
|
assert result is False
|
|
|
|
def test_returns_true_when_api_key_is_valid(self):
|
|
result = check_complete_credentials({"model": "gpt-4", "api_key": "sk-valid"})
|
|
assert result is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestCheckCompleteCredentialsBlocksSSRF:
|
|
"""
|
|
Even with credentials supplied, ``api_base`` / ``base_url`` must not
|
|
point at private / internal / cloud-metadata addresses. Without this
|
|
the gate accepts ``api_key=anything`` plus a malicious target and the
|
|
proxy is used as an SSRF pivot.
|
|
|
|
The check only runs when ``litellm.user_url_validation`` is True, so
|
|
every test in this class flips the toggle. Tests stay mock-only — no
|
|
real DNS is performed.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
|
|
def _enable_url_validation(self, monkeypatch):
|
|
import litellm
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "user_url_validation", True, raising=False)
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"url_field",
|
|
["api_base", "base_url"],
|
|
)
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"blocked_url",
|
|
[
|
|
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/",
|
|
"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/",
|
|
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin",
|
|
"http://10.0.0.1/",
|
|
"http://192.168.1.1/",
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_rejects_private_or_metadata_targets(self, url_field, blocked_url):
|
|
from litellm.litellm_core_utils.url_utils import SSRFError
|
|
|
|
with patch(
|
|
"litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils.validate_url",
|
|
side_effect=SSRFError(f"blocked: {blocked_url}"),
|
|
):
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError) as exc_info:
|
|
check_complete_credentials(
|
|
{
|
|
"model": "gpt-4",
|
|
"api_key": "sk-some-clientside-key",
|
|
url_field: blocked_url,
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
assert url_field in str(exc_info.value)
|
|
assert "SSRF" in str(exc_info.value)
|
|
|
|
def test_allows_public_target_when_validate_url_passes(self):
|
|
# ``validate_url`` is mocked so no real DNS is performed.
|
|
with patch(
|
|
"litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils.validate_url",
|
|
return_value=("https://api.openai.com/v1", "api.openai.com"),
|
|
):
|
|
result = check_complete_credentials(
|
|
{
|
|
"model": "gpt-4",
|
|
"api_key": "sk-some-clientside-key",
|
|
"api_base": "https://api.openai.com/v1",
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
assert result is True
|
|
|
|
def test_skips_url_validation_when_toggle_is_off(self, monkeypatch):
|
|
# Admins who disable ``user_url_validation`` (default) should not
|
|
# have requests rejected at the proxy boundary even if the URL
|
|
# would fail the SSRF guard.
|
|
import litellm
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "user_url_validation", False, raising=False)
|
|
with patch(
|
|
"litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils.validate_url",
|
|
) as mocked:
|
|
result = check_complete_credentials(
|
|
{
|
|
"model": "gpt-4",
|
|
"api_key": "sk-some-clientside-key",
|
|
"api_base": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin",
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
assert result is True
|
|
mocked.assert_not_called()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestGetDynamicLitellmParamsClearsAdminConfigOnBaseOverride:
|
|
"""
|
|
When the caller redirects ``api_base`` / ``base_url`` to their own
|
|
server, admin-set fields like ``OpenAI-Organization``, ``extra_body``,
|
|
AWS / Vertex / Azure tokens, and per-deployment ``api_version`` must
|
|
NOT flow through to that destination.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def test_clears_admin_organization_and_extra_body_on_base_override(self):
|
|
from litellm.router_utils.clientside_credential_handler import (
|
|
get_dynamic_litellm_params,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
admin_params = {
|
|
"model": "gpt-4",
|
|
"api_key": "sk-admin-key",
|
|
"api_base": "https://admin.upstream/v1",
|
|
"organization": "org-admin-corp",
|
|
"extra_body": {"x-admin-secret": "super-secret"},
|
|
"api_version": "2026-04-01",
|
|
}
|
|
out = get_dynamic_litellm_params(
|
|
litellm_params=dict(admin_params),
|
|
request_kwargs={
|
|
"api_key": "sk-attacker",
|
|
"api_base": "https://attacker.example",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
assert out["api_base"] == "https://attacker.example"
|
|
assert out["api_key"] == "sk-attacker"
|
|
assert "organization" not in out
|
|
assert "extra_body" not in out
|
|
assert "api_version" not in out
|
|
|
|
def test_clears_aws_and_vertex_secrets_on_base_override(self):
|
|
from litellm.router_utils.clientside_credential_handler import (
|
|
get_dynamic_litellm_params,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
admin_params = {
|
|
"model": "bedrock/claude-3",
|
|
"aws_access_key_id": "AKIA-EXAMPLE",
|
|
"aws_secret_access_key": "secret-example",
|
|
"aws_session_token": "session-example",
|
|
"vertex_credentials": '{"private_key":"-----BEGIN..."}',
|
|
"vertex_project": "admin-gcp-project",
|
|
}
|
|
out = get_dynamic_litellm_params(
|
|
litellm_params=dict(admin_params),
|
|
request_kwargs={"base_url": "https://attacker.example"},
|
|
)
|
|
assert "aws_access_key_id" not in out
|
|
assert "aws_secret_access_key" not in out
|
|
assert "aws_session_token" not in out
|
|
assert "vertex_credentials" not in out
|
|
assert "vertex_project" not in out
|
|
|
|
def test_caller_resupplied_value_overrides_admin_value_on_base_override(self):
|
|
# When the caller redirects ``api_base`` and *also* supplies their
|
|
# own value for one of the admin fields (e.g. ``organization``),
|
|
# the caller's value must win — never the admin's. The naive
|
|
# ``if field not in request_kwargs: pop`` shape lets a caller echo
|
|
# the field name with any value (or empty string) to keep the
|
|
# admin's value forwarded, which is the exfiltration vector this
|
|
# test guards against.
|
|
from litellm.router_utils.clientside_credential_handler import (
|
|
get_dynamic_litellm_params,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
out = get_dynamic_litellm_params(
|
|
litellm_params={
|
|
"api_base": "https://admin.upstream/v1",
|
|
"organization": "org-admin",
|
|
"extra_body": {"admin": "value"},
|
|
},
|
|
request_kwargs={
|
|
"api_base": "https://attacker.example",
|
|
"organization": "org-attacker",
|
|
"extra_body": {"attacker": "value"},
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
assert out["organization"] == "org-attacker"
|
|
assert out["extra_body"] == {"attacker": "value"}
|
|
|
|
def test_field_echo_does_not_preserve_admin_value(self):
|
|
# Regression: a caller that echoes an admin-config field name with
|
|
# an *empty* value (or any value) must not be able to keep the
|
|
# admin's value in ``litellm_params``.
|
|
from litellm.router_utils.clientside_credential_handler import (
|
|
get_dynamic_litellm_params,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
out = get_dynamic_litellm_params(
|
|
litellm_params={
|
|
"api_base": "https://admin.upstream/v1",
|
|
"organization": "org-admin-secret",
|
|
"extra_body": {"x-admin-only": "secret"},
|
|
},
|
|
request_kwargs={
|
|
"api_base": "https://attacker.example",
|
|
"organization": "",
|
|
"extra_body": "",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
assert out["organization"] == ""
|
|
assert out["extra_body"] == ""
|
|
assert "org-admin-secret" not in str(out)
|
|
|
|
def test_no_clearing_when_only_api_key_overridden(self):
|
|
from litellm.router_utils.clientside_credential_handler import (
|
|
get_dynamic_litellm_params,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Caller only overrides api_key (BYOK pattern); admin's organization /
|
|
# extra_body / region still apply because the destination is unchanged.
|
|
out = get_dynamic_litellm_params(
|
|
litellm_params={
|
|
"api_base": "https://admin.upstream/v1",
|
|
"organization": "org-admin",
|
|
"api_version": "2026-04-01",
|
|
},
|
|
request_kwargs={"api_key": "sk-byok"},
|
|
)
|
|
assert out["organization"] == "org-admin"
|
|
assert out["api_version"] == "2026-04-01"
|
|
assert out["api_base"] == "https://admin.upstream/v1"
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestIsRequestBodySafeBlocksEndpointTargetingFields:
|
|
"""
|
|
``is_request_body_safe`` rejects request-body fields that retarget the
|
|
outbound request to a caller-controlled host. Beyond the original
|
|
``api_base`` / ``base_url``, the same protection must apply to:
|
|
|
|
* ``aws_bedrock_runtime_endpoint`` — Bedrock endpoint redirect; an
|
|
attacker-controlled value coerces the proxy to authenticate against
|
|
their host with the admin's AWS creds.
|
|
* ``langsmith_base_url`` — Langsmith callback host; attacker-controlled
|
|
values exfiltrate the entire request payload (incl. message content)
|
|
via the observability hook.
|
|
* ``langfuse_host`` — same exfil vector via the Langfuse hook.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
|
|
def _disable_url_validation(self, monkeypatch):
|
|
# The new banned-params entries should be rejected even when
|
|
# ``user_url_validation`` is off — the gate isn't the URL guard,
|
|
# it's the banned-params list.
|
|
import litellm
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(litellm, "user_url_validation", False, raising=False)
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"field",
|
|
[
|
|
"aws_bedrock_runtime_endpoint",
|
|
"langsmith_base_url",
|
|
"langfuse_host",
|
|
"posthog_host",
|
|
"braintrust_host",
|
|
"slack_webhook_url",
|
|
"s3_endpoint_url",
|
|
"sagemaker_base_url",
|
|
"deployment_url",
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_endpoint_targeting_field_in_request_body_is_rejected(self, field):
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError) as exc:
|
|
is_request_body_safe(
|
|
request_body={"model": "gpt-4", field: "https://attacker.example"},
|
|
general_settings={},
|
|
llm_router=None,
|
|
model="gpt-4",
|
|
)
|
|
# The function lists the offending param name in the error.
|
|
assert field in str(exc.value)
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"field",
|
|
["api_base", "base_url", "user_config", "langfuse_host", "slack_webhook_url"],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_api_key_does_not_bypass_blocklist(self, field):
|
|
# Regression: the historical ``check_complete_credentials`` clause
|
|
# made the entire blocklist a no-op for any caller that supplied
|
|
# a non-empty ``api_key``. That bypass turned every missing entry
|
|
# on the blocklist into an SSRF / credential-exfil hole. Verify
|
|
# that supplying an api_key (alongside the banned param) does NOT
|
|
# bypass the gate — it can only be opened by an admin opt-in.
|
|
with pytest.raises(ValueError) as exc:
|
|
is_request_body_safe(
|
|
request_body={
|
|
"model": "gpt-4",
|
|
"api_key": "sk-anything",
|
|
field: "https://attacker.example",
|
|
},
|
|
general_settings={},
|
|
llm_router=None,
|
|
model="gpt-4",
|
|
)
|
|
assert field in str(exc.value)
|
|
|
|
def test_admin_opt_in_proxy_wide_still_allows(self):
|
|
# ``general_settings.allow_client_side_credentials = True`` remains
|
|
# the documented proxy-wide BYOK opt-in.
|
|
assert (
|
|
is_request_body_safe(
|
|
request_body={"model": "gpt-4", "api_base": "https://my-byok.example"},
|
|
general_settings={"allow_client_side_credentials": True},
|
|
llm_router=None,
|
|
model="gpt-4",
|
|
)
|
|
is True
|
|
)
|