Files
litellm/litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/oauth2_token_cache.py
T
e4c14862fc feat(mcp): add OBO MCP Auth (#27421)
* feat(mcp): add oauth2 token exchange auth

Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): cache token exchange fallback

Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <279349115+oss-agent-shin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-07 15:35:21 -07:00

313 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""
OAuth2 client_credentials token cache for MCP servers.
Automatically fetches and refreshes access tokens for MCP servers configured
with ``client_id``, ``client_secret``, and ``token_url``.
"""
import asyncio
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Dict, Optional, Tuple, Union
import httpx
from litellm._logging import verbose_logger
from litellm.caching.in_memory_cache import InMemoryCache
from litellm.constants import (
MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_CACHE_DEFAULT_TTL,
MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_CACHE_MAX_SIZE,
MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_CACHE_MIN_TTL,
MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS,
MCP_PER_USER_TOKEN_DEFAULT_TTL,
MCP_PER_USER_TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS,
MCP_PER_USER_TOKEN_REDIS_KEY_PREFIX,
)
from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler import get_async_httpx_client
from litellm.proxy.common_utils.encrypt_decrypt_utils import (
decrypt_value_helper,
encrypt_value_helper,
)
from litellm.proxy._experimental.mcp_server.auth import token_exchange
from litellm.types.llms.custom_http import httpxSpecialProvider
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from litellm.types.mcp_server.mcp_server_manager import MCPServer
class MCPOAuth2TokenCache(InMemoryCache):
"""
In-memory cache for OAuth2 client_credentials tokens, keyed by server_id.
Inherits from ``InMemoryCache`` for TTL-based storage and eviction.
Adds per-server ``asyncio.Lock`` to prevent duplicate concurrent fetches.
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
super().__init__(
max_size_in_memory=MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_CACHE_MAX_SIZE,
default_ttl=MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_CACHE_DEFAULT_TTL,
)
self._locks: Dict[str, asyncio.Lock] = {}
def _get_lock(self, server_id: str) -> asyncio.Lock:
return self._locks.setdefault(server_id, asyncio.Lock())
@staticmethod
def _has_client_credentials_config(server: "MCPServer") -> bool:
return bool(server.client_id and server.client_secret and server.token_url)
async def async_get_token(
self,
server: "MCPServer",
*,
require_client_credentials_flow: bool = True,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a valid access token, fetching or refreshing as needed.
Returns ``None`` when the server lacks client credentials config.
"""
if require_client_credentials_flow and not server.has_client_credentials:
return None
if not self._has_client_credentials_config(server):
return None
server_id = server.server_id
# Fast path — cached token is still valid
cached = self.get_cache(server_id)
if cached is not None:
return cached
# Slow path — acquire per-server lock then double-check
async with self._get_lock(server_id):
cached = self.get_cache(server_id)
if cached is not None:
return cached
token, ttl = await self._fetch_token(server)
self.set_cache(server_id, token, ttl=ttl)
return token
async def _fetch_token(self, server: "MCPServer") -> Tuple[str, int]:
"""POST to ``token_url`` with ``grant_type=client_credentials``.
Returns ``(access_token, ttl_seconds)`` where ttl accounts for the
expiry buffer so the cache entry expires before the real token does.
"""
client = get_async_httpx_client(llm_provider=httpxSpecialProvider.MCP)
if not server.client_id or not server.client_secret or not server.token_url:
raise ValueError(
f"MCP server '{server.server_id}' missing required OAuth2 fields: "
f"client_id={bool(server.client_id)}, "
f"client_secret={bool(server.client_secret)}, "
f"token_url={bool(server.token_url)}"
)
data: Dict[str, str] = {
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
"client_id": server.client_id,
"client_secret": server.client_secret,
}
if server.scopes:
data["scope"] = " ".join(server.scopes)
verbose_logger.debug(
"Fetching OAuth2 client_credentials token for MCP server %s",
server.server_id,
)
try:
response = await client.post(server.token_url, data=data)
response.raise_for_status()
except httpx.HTTPStatusError as exc:
raise ValueError(
f"OAuth2 token request for MCP server '{server.server_id}' "
f"failed with status {exc.response.status_code}"
) from exc
body = response.json()
if not isinstance(body, dict):
raise ValueError(
f"OAuth2 token response for MCP server '{server.server_id}' "
f"returned non-object JSON (got {type(body).__name__})"
)
access_token = body.get("access_token")
if not access_token:
raise ValueError(
f"OAuth2 token response for MCP server '{server.server_id}' "
f"missing 'access_token'"
)
# Safely parse expires_in — providers may return null or non-numeric values
raw_expires_in = body.get("expires_in")
try:
expires_in = (
int(raw_expires_in)
if raw_expires_in is not None
else MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_CACHE_DEFAULT_TTL
)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
expires_in = MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_CACHE_DEFAULT_TTL
ttl = max(
expires_in - MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS,
MCP_OAUTH2_TOKEN_CACHE_MIN_TTL,
)
verbose_logger.info(
"Fetched OAuth2 token for MCP server %s (expires in %ds)",
server.server_id,
expires_in,
)
return access_token, ttl
def invalidate(self, server_id: str) -> None:
"""Remove a cached token (e.g. after a 401)."""
self.delete_cache(server_id)
mcp_oauth2_token_cache = MCPOAuth2TokenCache()
def _compute_per_user_token_ttl(server: "MCPServer", expires_in: Optional[int]) -> int:
"""Compute Redis TTL for a per-user token.
Uses server.token_storage_ttl_seconds when configured; otherwise derives
TTL from expires_in minus the expiry buffer; falls back to the default TTL.
"""
if server.token_storage_ttl_seconds is not None:
return max(server.token_storage_ttl_seconds, 1)
if expires_in is not None:
return max(
expires_in - MCP_PER_USER_TOKEN_EXPIRY_BUFFER_SECONDS,
1,
)
return MCP_PER_USER_TOKEN_DEFAULT_TTL
class MCPPerUserTokenCache:
"""Redis-backed cache for per-user OAuth2 access tokens.
Uses LiteLLM's existing ``user_api_key_cache`` (DualCache with optional
Redis backend). Tokens are NaCl-encrypted with ``encrypt_value_helper``
before storage so they are safe at rest in Redis.
Redis key format: ``mcp:per_user_token:{user_id}:{server_id}``
Redis value: ``encrypt_value_helper(access_token)`` — URL-safe base64
"""
def _cache_key(self, user_id: str, server_id: str) -> str:
return f"{MCP_PER_USER_TOKEN_REDIS_KEY_PREFIX}:{user_id}:{server_id}"
async def get(self, user_id: str, server_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the plaintext access_token, or None on miss/error."""
try:
from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import user_api_key_cache # noqa: PLC0415
key = self._cache_key(user_id, server_id)
encrypted = await user_api_key_cache.async_get_cache(key)
if encrypted is None:
return None
plaintext = decrypt_value_helper(
encrypted,
key="mcp_per_user_token",
exception_type="debug",
)
return plaintext or None
except Exception as exc:
verbose_logger.debug(
"MCPPerUserTokenCache.get failed for user=%s server=%s: %s",
user_id,
server_id,
exc,
)
return None
async def set(
self,
user_id: str,
server_id: str,
access_token: str,
ttl: int,
) -> None:
"""Store NaCl-encrypted access_token in Redis with the given TTL."""
try:
from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import user_api_key_cache # noqa: PLC0415
key = self._cache_key(user_id, server_id)
encrypted = encrypt_value_helper(access_token)
await user_api_key_cache.async_set_cache(key, encrypted, ttl=ttl)
verbose_logger.debug(
"MCPPerUserTokenCache.set: cached token for user=%s server=%s ttl=%ds",
user_id,
server_id,
ttl,
)
except Exception as exc:
verbose_logger.debug(
"MCPPerUserTokenCache.set failed for user=%s server=%s: %s",
user_id,
server_id,
exc,
)
async def delete(self, user_id: str, server_id: str) -> None:
"""Invalidate the cached token (removes from both in-memory and Redis layers)."""
try:
from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import user_api_key_cache # noqa: PLC0415
key = self._cache_key(user_id, server_id)
await user_api_key_cache.async_delete_cache(key)
except Exception as exc:
verbose_logger.debug(
"MCPPerUserTokenCache.delete failed for user=%s server=%s: %s",
user_id,
server_id,
exc,
)
mcp_per_user_token_cache = MCPPerUserTokenCache()
async def resolve_mcp_auth(
server: "MCPServer",
mcp_auth_header: Optional[Union[str, Dict[str, str]]] = None,
subject_token: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Optional[Union[str, Dict[str, str]]]:
"""Resolve the auth value for an MCP server.
Priority:
1. ``mcp_auth_header`` — per-request/per-user override
2. OAuth2 Token Exchange (OBO / RFC 8693) — exchange user token for scoped token
3. OAuth2 client_credentials token — auto-fetched and cached
4. ``server.authentication_token`` — static token from config/DB
"""
if mcp_auth_header:
return mcp_auth_header
if server.has_token_exchange_config:
if subject_token:
return await token_exchange.mcp_token_exchange_handler.exchange_token(
subject_token, server
)
# No subject_token — fall back to client_credentials using the same client
# credentials and token_url so M2M scenarios still work.
if server.client_id and server.client_secret and server.token_url:
return await mcp_oauth2_token_cache.async_get_token(
server,
require_client_credentials_flow=False,
)
# OBO configured but no subject_token and missing client credentials — warn
# rather than silently proceeding unauthenticated.
verbose_logger.warning(
"MCP server '%s' is configured for token exchange (OBO) but no subject_token "
"was provided and client credentials (client_id/client_secret/token_url) are "
"incomplete. The request will proceed without authentication.",
server.server_id,
)
if server.has_client_credentials:
return await mcp_oauth2_token_cache.async_get_token(server)
return server.authentication_token