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f62ae93e13
* test(proxy): add create_scratch_actor harness helper
Adds create_scratch_actor() to the management behavior-suite conftest and
extends create_scratch_team() with team_member_permissions / models kwargs,
needed by the PR3 team-key-permission and team-model matrices. The new
helper mints a scratch-prefixed user + verification token (+ org
memberships), all reclaimed by the existing scratch-prefix teardown.
* test(proxy): pin /key block, unblock, health, aliases behavior
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/block, POST /key/unblock,
POST /key/health, and GET /key/aliases. Pins that the management-route gate
401s ORG_ADMIN-role callers before _check_key_admin_access runs, the
block/unblock round-trip on the blocked column, missing-key 404, and the
_apply_non_admin_alias_scope visibility rules for /key/aliases.
* test(proxy): pin /key/bulk_update + /team/key/bulk_update behavior
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/bulk_update (PROXY_ADMIN-only;
ORG_ADMIN stopped 401 at the route gate, INTERNAL_USER-role 403 at the
handler) and POST /team/key/bulk_update (team-member-permission gate keyed
on KEY_UPDATE). Pins batch semantics: empty/over-cap 400, per-key failure
isolation into failed_updates, all_keys_in_team broadcast, and no-keys 404.
Adds an optional key_alias arg to create_scratch_key for multi-key scenarios.
* test(proxy): pin /key SA-generate, v2-info, reset-spend behavior
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/service-account/generate
(team-membership + team-member-permission gating; SA keys carry no user_id),
POST /v2/key/info (per-key _can_user_query_key_info silently drops invisible
keys), and POST /key/{key}/reset_spend (PROXY_ADMIN or team admin only;
missing key 404, reset-value 400). Pins that ORG_ADMIN-role callers are
stopped 401 at the management-route gate on the two non-info routes.
* test(proxy): close PR1/PR2 key-side deferred coverage gaps
Closes the four key-side gaps deferred from PR1/PR2:
- 404 on missing key for /key/update and /key/delete (not 401/403)
- denied /key/update leaves max_budget/tpm_limit/rpm_limit untouched
- /key/regenerate enforces litellm.upperbound_key_generate_params (#26340)
- /key/list key_alias substring vs exact (admin-only) + team_id filter,
and a non-admin filtering a foreign team is 403
* test(proxy): pin /team block, unblock, available, filter/ui, members/me
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/block + /team/unblock
(management-route gate fronts _verify_team_access; reachable only by
PROXY_ADMIN and an org admin of the team's own org), GET /team/available
(default empty path), GET /team/filter/ui (route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only
despite the handler having no gate), and GET /team/{team_id}/members/me
(caller resolves its own membership; non-member 404, no-user_id key 400).
* test(proxy): pin /team model add/delete + permissions endpoints
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/model/add + /team/model/delete
(route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only; missing team 404), GET /team/permissions_list +
POST /team/permissions_update (self-managed; proxy/team/org admin pass), and
POST /team/permissions_bulk_update (PROXY_ADMIN-only). Pins the deliberate
divergence that the available-team self-join grants read access via
permissions_list but never write access via permissions_update.
* test(proxy): pin /team delete, bulk_member_add, v2/list, daily/activity
Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/delete (per-team
_verify_team_access; batch aborts whole on a missing id), POST
/team/bulk_member_add (route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only; empty/over-cap 400),
GET /v2/team/list (_enforce_list_team_v2_access — bare query 401s regular
users, org-scoped for org admins) and GET /team/daily/activity (non-member
team_ids filter 404, the VERIA-43 fix).
* test(proxy): add route-coverage gate + close team org-relocation gap
Adds test_route_coverage.py (PR3.M1): parses every @router route literal
from the two management-endpoint source files and asserts each is exercised
by >=1 behavior-suite scenario — a permanent regression guard for future
routes. Closes the last PR1/PR2 deferred gap: the /team/update org-relocation
allowed branch, exercised by a dual-org-admin minted via create_scratch_actor.
test_team_model uses literal route URLs so the coverage parser resolves them.
* test(proxy): bound plain route params to one path segment in coverage gate
Plain path params ({team_id}) now compile to [^/?]+ instead of [^?]+, so a
parameter cannot span '/'. Starlette ':path' params still match across '/'.
Keeps the route-coverage guard from falsely reporting a future multi-segment
route as covered. All 37 routes remain covered.
171 lines
6.2 KiB
Python
171 lines
6.2 KiB
Python
import litellm
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import pytest
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from litellm.proxy._types import KeyManagementRoutes
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from .actors import Actor
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from .conftest import create_scratch_team
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio(loop_scope="session")
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_PERM = KeyManagementRoutes.KEY_INFO.value
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# GET /team/permissions_list and POST /team/permissions_update are self-managed
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# routes, so every actor reaches the handler. Both grant access to PROXY_ADMIN,
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# the team admin, or an org admin of the team's org. The scratch team is in
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# ORG_A with TEAM_ADMIN as its team admin.
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_MATRIX = [
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("proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, 200),
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("org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, 200),
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("team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, 200),
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("internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, 403),
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("owner", Actor.OWNER, 403),
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("unrelated_same_org", Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, 403),
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("cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, 403),
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("service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, 403),
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("org_b_admin", Actor.ORG_B_ADMIN, 403),
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]
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async def _seed_team(prisma, scratch_prefix, world) -> None:
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await create_scratch_team(
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prisma,
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scratch_prefix,
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organization_id=world.org_a_id,
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admin_user_ids=[world.keys[Actor.TEAM_ADMIN].user_id],
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member_user_ids=[
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world.keys[Actor.INTERNAL_USER].user_id,
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world.keys[Actor.OWNER].user_id,
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world.keys[Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG].user_id,
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world.keys[Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT].user_id,
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],
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)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"actor,expected_status",
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[(a, s) for (_id, a, s) in _MATRIX],
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ids=[s[0] for s in _MATRIX],
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)
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async def test_team_permissions_list_authz_matrix(
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actor: Actor, expected_status: int, proxy_client, prisma, scratch, world
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):
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await _seed_team(prisma, scratch.prefix, world)
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resp = await proxy_client.get(
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f"/team/permissions_list?team_id={scratch.prefix}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {world.keys[actor].cleartext}"},
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)
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assert (
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resp.status_code == expected_status
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), f"{actor.value}: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}"
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if expected_status == 200:
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assert resp.json()["team_id"] == scratch.prefix
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"actor,expected_status",
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[(a, s) for (_id, a, s) in _MATRIX],
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ids=[s[0] for s in _MATRIX],
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)
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async def test_team_permissions_update_authz_matrix(
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actor: Actor, expected_status: int, proxy_client, prisma, scratch, world
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):
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await _seed_team(prisma, scratch.prefix, world)
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resp = await proxy_client.post(
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"/team/permissions_update",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {world.keys[actor].cleartext}"},
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json={"team_id": scratch.prefix, "team_member_permissions": [_PERM]},
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)
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assert (
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resp.status_code == expected_status
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), f"{actor.value}: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}"
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row = await prisma.db.litellm_teamtable.find_unique(
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where={"team_id": scratch.prefix}
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)
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assert row is not None
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if expected_status == 200:
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assert _PERM in (row.team_member_permissions or [])
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else:
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assert _PERM not in (row.team_member_permissions or []), "denied but mutated"
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async def test_team_permissions_available_team_self_join_divergence(
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proxy_client, prisma, scratch, world, monkeypatch
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):
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"""permissions_list honours the available-team self-join — a non-admin can
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READ an available team's permissions — but permissions_update deliberately
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does not: the same caller is 403 on update. default_internal_user_params is
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module-level litellm.* state, so monkeypatch save/restores it."""
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await create_scratch_team(prisma, scratch.prefix, organization_id=world.org_a_id)
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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litellm, "default_internal_user_params", {"available_teams": [scratch.prefix]}
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)
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caller = world.keys[Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER] # non-admin, unrelated to the team
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listed = await proxy_client.get(
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f"/team/permissions_list?team_id={scratch.prefix}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {caller.cleartext}"},
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)
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assert listed.status_code == 200, listed.text
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updated = await proxy_client.post(
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"/team/permissions_update",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {caller.cleartext}"},
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json={"team_id": scratch.prefix, "team_member_permissions": [_PERM]},
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)
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assert updated.status_code == 403, updated.text
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# POST /team/permissions_bulk_update is PROXY_ADMIN-only. ORG_ADMIN-role
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# callers are stopped 401 by the management-route gate; INTERNAL_USER-role
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# callers, on a route that is neither internal_user nor self-managed, are 401
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# there too — only PROXY_ADMIN reaches the handler's own admin gate.
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_BULK_MATRIX = [
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("proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, 200),
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("org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, 401),
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("team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, 401),
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("internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, 401),
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("cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, 401),
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("org_b_admin", Actor.ORG_B_ADMIN, 401),
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]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"actor,expected_status",
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[(a, s) for (_id, a, s) in _BULK_MATRIX],
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ids=[s[0] for s in _BULK_MATRIX],
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)
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async def test_team_permissions_bulk_update_authz_matrix(
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actor: Actor, expected_status: int, proxy_client, prisma, scratch, world
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):
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await create_scratch_team(prisma, scratch.prefix, organization_id=world.org_a_id)
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resp = await proxy_client.post(
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"/team/permissions_bulk_update",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {world.keys[actor].cleartext}"},
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json={"team_ids": [scratch.prefix], "permissions": [_PERM]},
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)
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assert (
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resp.status_code == expected_status
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), f"{actor.value}: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}"
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row = await prisma.db.litellm_teamtable.find_unique(
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where={"team_id": scratch.prefix}
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)
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assert row is not None
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if expected_status == 200:
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assert _PERM in (row.team_member_permissions or [])
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else:
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assert _PERM not in (row.team_member_permissions or []), "denied but mutated"
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async def test_team_permissions_bulk_update_no_selector_is_400(proxy_client, world):
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"""Neither team_ids nor apply_to_all_teams is a 400."""
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resp = await proxy_client.post(
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"/team/permissions_bulk_update",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {world.keys[Actor.PROXY_ADMIN].cleartext}"},
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json={"permissions": [_PERM]},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 400, resp.text
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