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32
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 viettranx
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1ac08155b0 |
feat(trace): reliable stop/abort with ctx-aware streams and 2-phase router
Makes the Stop button on the traces page actually stop running traces. Seven-phase implementation across provider HTTP, agent router, trace persistence, WS events, tool exec, i18n, and integration tests. - Provider HTTP+SSE ctx-aware: close socket on cancel via CtxBody wrapper - Router 2-phase abort: CAS state machine, 3s grace, force-mark fallback - Trace retry: 3 inline retries + 10-max retry queue, stale recovery 10min - trace.status WS event: real-time UI updates (invalidates query on receive) - Tool exec: process-group kill (SIGTERM→3s→SIGKILL), Rod page ctx watch - i18n: 6 abort toast variants in en/vi/zh - Integration: 9 scenarios, -race clean Fixes tenant-ctx loss in forceMarkTraceAborted and retry worker broadcast (caught by code-reviewer: C1/C2). Stale threshold intentionally 10min because start_time-based; last_span_at migration is a follow-up. |
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viettranx
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968599feeb |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into dev
Resolve conflicts in shell.go and shell_deny_test.go — keep dev's refactored path exemption logic (matchesAnyPathExemption helper). |
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viettranx
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c1f8966de0 |
refactor(exec): extract path exemption logic to separate file
Move shell-aware parsing, dynamic workspace exemptions, path alias variants, and canonicalization functions from shell.go (688 LOC) to shell_path_exemption.go (284 LOC) for maintainability. |
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Kai (Tam Nhu) TranandGitHub
|
8730a90acb |
fix(exec): allow uploaded files in active workspaces (#748)
Shell-aware command parsing, dynamic workspace exemptions, and symlink canonicalization for exec path denial. Fixes #739. |
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0e2282be8f |
fix: use errors.Is() for sentinel comparisons + remove unused @xyflow/react (#727)
Replace direct sentinel error comparisons (==, !=) with errors.Is()
across the codebase. Direct comparison breaks when errors are wrapped
with fmt.Errorf("...: %w", err), which can cause missed matches for
sql.ErrNoRows, io.EOF, context.DeadlineExceeded, and context.Canceled.
Affected packages:
- store/pg: sql.ErrNoRows in secure_cli, agents_export_team_*, mcp_export_queries
- store/sqlitestore: sql.ErrNoRows in schema migration
- tools: context.DeadlineExceeded in shell, credentialed_exec
- mcp: context.DeadlineExceeded in bridge_tool
- providers: context.Canceled in acp_provider, anthropic_stream_test
- updater: io.EOF in tar extraction
Also removes unused @xyflow/react dependency from web UI — it was
replaced by react-force-graph-2d but never cleaned up from package.json.
Co-authored-by: Luvu182 <208665161+Luvu182@users.noreply.github.com>
|
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Viet TranandGitHub
|
76385f2fc3 |
fix(security): harden exec path exemption matching (#721)
- Add absolute path exemption for dataDir/skills-store/ (fixes skill
scripts using absolute paths like /app/data/skills-store/ being denied)
- Strip surrounding quotes before prefix matching (LLMs often quote paths)
- Reject path traversal ("..") in exempt fields to prevent escape
- Switch from "any field exempt → skip" to per-field matching: only exempt
if ALL fields that match the deny pattern are individually exempt
- Closes pipe/comment bypass vectors where an exempt path in one argument
would exempt the entire command including non-exempt paths
Includes 27 test cases covering: legitimate access, quoted paths,
path traversal, unicode bypass, pipe/comment bypass, mixed args.
|
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viettranx
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20c4478fe1 |
fix(security): harden exec path exemption matching
- Add absolute path exemption for dataDir/skills-store/ (fixes skill
scripts using absolute paths like /app/data/skills-store/ being denied)
- Strip surrounding quotes before prefix matching (LLMs often quote paths)
- Reject path traversal ("..") in exempt fields to prevent escape
- Switch from "any field exempt → skip" to per-field matching: only exempt
if ALL fields that match the deny pattern are individually exempt
- Closes pipe/comment bypass vectors where an exempt path in one argument
would exempt the entire command including non-exempt paths
Includes 27 test cases covering: legitimate access, quoted paths,
path traversal, unicode bypass, pipe/comment bypass, mixed args.
|
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7d7b716074 |
fix(tools): quote-aware shell operator detection in credentialed exec (#700) (#702)
* fix(tools): quote-aware shell operator detection in credentialed exec (#700) - Replace detectShellOperators with detectUnquotedShellOperators in credentialed exec path — respects single/double quoting so that characters like | inside argument values (e.g. --jq '.[0] | .name') are not falsely flagged as shell operators - Pass raw command string (preserving quotes) to executeCredentialed instead of reconstructing from parsed args - Downgrade "no credential found" log from Warn to Debug (fires for every non-credentialed command, too noisy at Warn) - Add extractUnquotedSegments() helper with comprehensive tests * fix(tools): handle backslash escape outside quotes in shell operator detection extractUnquotedSegments did not handle \ as an escape character outside of quotes, causing \" to incorrectly enter double-quote mode. This hid subsequent shell operators from detection (e.g. gh \"arg\" | env would not detect the unquoted pipe). Add backslash escape handling in the unquoted state to match go-shellwords parsing behavior. Both \ and the escaped character are emitted as unquoted content so operator detection still catches them. --------- Co-authored-by: viettranx <viettranx@gmail.com> |
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viettranx
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7ba3a5115a |
fix(tools): hint model when shell commands target DB-backed memory files
Memory files (MEMORY.md, memory/*.md) are stored in PostgreSQL, not on disk. When the model uses exec to run cat/ls/grep/find on memory paths, short-circuit with a hint to use memory_search or memory_get instead. Also append [Source: database, not filesystem] to read_file and list_files results served from the memory interceptor. |
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viettranx
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484d434f6c |
fix(security): harden sandbox, auth, and shell deny patterns
Sandbox: add noexec/nosuid/nodev to tmpfs mounts, remove SETUID/SETGID/CHOWN caps, add PidsLimit 256 default, keep no-new-privileges from base. Auth: reject X-GoClaw-User-Id header spoofing in dev mode (no gateway token), use full 32-byte HMAC for file tokens instead of truncated 16-byte. Shell: add NFKC Unicode normalization + zero-width character stripping before deny pattern matching, add 5 export-prefixed env var deny patterns, fix exemption logic to check per-argument prefix instead of whole-command substring (prevents bypass via comments while preserving skill store access). |
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viettranx
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ab5bad11ff |
feat: cap tool output at source + improve context pruning pipeline
Problem: Agent sessions accumulated 71K+ input tokens (83% history) because read_file and exec had no output limits. SOUL personality drowned by massive context. Changes: - read_file: add offset/limit params + 50K char output cap with pagination hints (model can re-read with offset) - exec/shell: cap output at 30K chars with smart head+tail truncation (preserves errors/summaries at tail) - pruning: add per-result 30% context guard, tune softTrimRatio 0.3→0.25 and softTrimMaxChars 4K→3K, add tail-aware soft trim - mid-loop: allow pruning to re-trigger each iteration (was one-shot) Design: cap at source, preserve full data in session, prune at consumption time. read_file offset/limit enables recovery of truncated content. |
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viettranx
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011f5f1a3d |
fix(security): harden env file permissions and block NUL byte injection (#306, #44)
- prepare-env.sh: chmod 600 after .env creation to prevent world-readable secrets - shell.go: reject commands containing NUL bytes before execution - credentialed_exec.go: defense-in-depth NUL check in credentialed path - shell_deny_test.go: add TestExecute_RejectsNULByte with 6 test cases |
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Viet TranandGitHub
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cd022699f6 |
feat: multi-tenant isolation — complete implementation (#359)
* feat(security): multi-tenant user data isolation (Plan 1)
Comprehensive user data isolation for non-owner system users:
- API key identity binding: owner_id column forces user_id on auth,
prevents spoofing via X-GoClaw-User-Id header
- Sessions: ownership checks on list/preview/patch/delete/reset,
non-admin users see only their own sessions
- Cron: user_id filtering on list, ownership checks on mutations
- Server-side WS event filtering: agent/chat/session/cron/team events
scoped per-user instead of broadcast to all clients
- Web UI role guards: RequireAdmin on 15 admin-only pages, role
propagated from WS connect response to auth store
- Tracing/activity: user_id enforcement for non-admin HTTP callers
- Teams: HasTeamAccess membership checks on get/delete/list
- Skills: fail-closed ownership check (deny non-admin if store
doesn't support owner lookup)
- HTTP auth: requireAuthBearer now enforces owner_id + user context
for file/media downloads (was missing)
- Dead code: removed delegation_history, handoff_routes tables and
all related handlers/store code
- New: team_user_grants table for user-to-team access control
Migration 000026: api_keys.owner_id + team_user_grants + DROP legacy tables
* feat(security): multi-tenant foundation — tenants table, tenant_id propagation, permission cache (Plan 2)
Add tenant isolation infrastructure across the entire gateway:
Schema (migration 000027):
- Create tenants + tenant_users tables with master tenant seed
- Add tenant_id column to 30 user-scoped tables (NOT NULL DEFAULT master)
- api_keys.tenant_id nullable (NULL = system-level cross-tenant key)
- Create builtin_tool_tenant_configs + skill_tenant_configs for per-tenant overrides
- Drop custom_tools table (agent loop integration never wired)
Store layer:
- TenantStore interface + PGTenantStore (CRUD tenants + tenant_users)
- TenantID field on AgentData + APIKeyData
- tenant_id in agents/api_keys/skills SQL (Create, Get, List)
Context propagation:
- WithTenantID/TenantIDFromContext (uuid.Nil = fail-closed)
- WithCrossTenant/IsCrossTenant (owner/system admin flag)
Auth tenant resolution:
- HTTP: resolveAuthBearer sets TenantID/CrossTenant on all 5 auth paths
- WS: handleConnect sets tenantID/crossTenant on Client
- API key 2-tier: NULL = cross-tenant (system), set = tenant-scoped
Runtime isolation:
- Event bus: TenantID field on Event, fail-closed filter in event_filter.go
- Cron: tenant context injected in RunJob handler
- Subagent: tenant validation prevents cross-tenant spawn
- Security logging: tenant_id in auth resolution logs
Tenant management:
- WS RPC: 7 methods (tenants.list/get/create/update, tenants.users.*)
- HTTP: 7 endpoints (/v1/tenants/*)
- Slug validation + path traversal prevention
- Role validation (owner/admin/operator/member/viewer)
Infrastructure:
- PermissionCache: 4 sub-caches (tenant resolve, role, agent access, team access)
- tenant_paths.go: filesystem path helpers with master-tenant backward compat
- i18n: MsgInvalidRole key + translations (en/vi/zh)
Dead code removed: custom_tools store, HTTP handler, DynamicToolLoader (-828 lines)
* feat(security): tenant query filtering + workspace isolation (Plan 3)
Add WHERE tenant_id filtering to all 30+ tenant-scoped store queries,
wire workspace filesystem isolation, and harden restrict_to_workspace.
Store query filtering:
- Add tenantClauseN/tenantIDForInsert/requireTenantID helpers
- Filter all SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE by tenant_id for non-cross-tenant
- Refactor SessionStore.GetOrCreate and CronStore.AddJob/ListJobs to
accept context.Context for tenant propagation
- System skills (is_system=true) bypass tenant filter for all tenants
- Special cases: GetByKey (channels), GetByHash (auth) skip filter
Workspace isolation:
- Resolver computes tenant-scoped workspace + dataDir for non-master tenants
- Add WithTenantSlug/TenantSlugFromContext to context propagation
- Add TenantStore + Workspace to ResolverDeps
- Force effectiveRestrict() to always return true (multi-tenant security)
- Remove restrict_to_workspace from agentAllowedFields
UI cleanup:
- Remove custom-tools pages, types, routes, constants (backend removed in Plan 2)
- Clean tool-name-select component of custom tools references
* feat(security): session ctx propagation + execMapUpdate tenant guard (Plan 4)
Session store:
- Add ctx to AddMessage, SetSessionMetadata, SetAgentInfo, List, Save
- List now filters by tenant_id for non-cross-tenant callers
- Save uses ExecContext for cancellation support
- All ~15 callers updated to pass ctx
execMapUpdate tenant guard:
- Remove deleted_at IS NULL from execMapUpdateWhereTenant (only agents has soft-delete)
- Migrate 8 callers to execMapUpdateWhereTenant: agent_links, channel_instances,
mcp_servers, secure_cli, tracing, teams, skills_crud, cron_update
- Add ctx to UpdateSkill, UpdateJob interfaces + all callers
Deferred: cron scheduler global cache (correct by design — system process),
browser per-tenant isolation (separate plan).
* refactor(store): add context.Context to all SessionStore interface methods
Complete ctx propagation across all 24 SessionStore methods for:
- Future tenant-aware DB operations
- Request cancellation/timeout support
- Distributed tracing capability
Updated ~15 files including all callers in agent loop, gateway methods,
heartbeat ticker, tools, and CLI commands.
* fix(security): remove context.Background() shadowing in gateway handlers
Critical fix from code review: gateway agent handlers (create, update,
delete, identity, files, links, teams) were creating ctx := context.Background()
which shadowed the handler's ctx that carries tenant_id. This breaks
tenant-scoped agent queries for non-master tenants.
- Remove ctx shadowing in 7 agent handler files
- Add ctx param to resolveAgentUUID/resolveAgentInfo helpers
- Use store.WithCrossTenant in resolver (system-level operation)
* feat(security): tenant-scoped UNIQUE constraints for multi-tenant isolation
Update UNIQUE indexes to include tenant_id, allowing same names across tenants:
- agents: (agent_key) → (tenant_id, agent_key) WHERE deleted_at IS NULL
- sessions: (session_key) → (tenant_id, session_key)
- skills: (slug) → (tenant_id, slug)
- mcp_servers: (name) → (tenant_id, name)
- channel_contacts: (channel_type, sender_id) → (tenant_id, channel_type, sender_id)
Code changes:
- GetByKey now filters by tenant_id (same pattern as GetByID)
- ON CONFLICT clauses updated for sessions and skills
- Channel consumer uses WithCrossTenant for agent resolution
- Down migration restores original constraints
* fix(security): close remaining tenant isolation gaps from final audit
Critical fixes:
- gateway_setup: WithCrossTenant for default agent lookup at startup (C6)
- channel_contacts: ON CONFLICT updated to (tenant_id, channel_type, sender_id) (Q15)
- agents.Delete: tenant filter on DELETE (Q1)
High priority fixes:
- agents: List, GetDefault, ShareAgent, RevokeShare, ListShares, CanAccess,
ListAccessible, Update unset-default — all now tenant-scoped
- skills_crud: DeleteSkill now takes ctx, verifies tenant ownership
- mcp_servers, channel_instances, secure_cli: Delete methods tenant-scoped
- WithCrossTenant added to: gateway team notifications, team_tool_cache,
pending_messages GetDefault
* fix(migration): add tenant_id to usage_snapshots unique index
Update idx_usage_snapshots_unique to include tenant_id, preventing
cross-tenant upsert collisions when different tenants have agents
with same provider/model/channel combination.
* feat(security): cron tenant guard + browser per-tenant isolation
Phase 3 — Cron API tenant guard:
- Add ctx to 5 CronStore methods (GetJob, RemoveJob, EnableJob, RunJob, GetRunLog)
- All API-facing cron ops now filter by tenant_id (prevents cross-tenant CRUD)
- RemoveJob/EnableJob return "not found" on tenant mismatch (no enumeration)
- GetRunLog JOINs cron_jobs for tenant filtering
- UpdateJob internal reads scoped by tenant (defense-in-depth)
- Scheduler-internal methods (GetDueJobs, refreshJobCache) unchanged (system-level)
Phase 4 — Browser per-tenant isolation:
- Per-tenant incognito browser contexts via rod Incognito() (separate cookie jars)
- All page access (Snapshot, Screenshot, Navigate, Click, Type, etc.) validated
via getPageForTenant — blocks cross-tenant access by targetID
- OpenTab creates pages in tenant's incognito context
- ListTabs scoped to tenant's incognito context
- ConsoleMessages validates page ownership
- Stop/reconnect properly cleans up incognito contexts
* feat(security): isolation gaps + per-tenant config (Plan 5)
Part A — Isolation Gap Fixes:
- Merge migration 028 into 027: add tenant_id to llm_providers +
config_secrets, fix UNIQUE constraints for paired_devices +
channel_instances
- providers.go: tenant filtering on all CRUD queries
- config_secrets.go: ON CONFLICT (key, tenant_id)
- pairing_store: add ctx to all 7 interface methods, remove hardcoded
MasterTenantID, update ~15 channel caller files
- Session cache: prefix keys with tenantID to prevent cross-tenant
collision. DB queries (loadFromDB, Save, Delete, LastUsedChannel)
add tenant filter
- config_permissions cache: prefix keys with tenantID
- Cron ListJobs: fail-closed when tenant context missing
Part B — Per-Tenant Configuration:
- Provider Registry: compound key tenantID/name with fallback to
master tenant. GetForTenant/ListForTenant/RegisterForTenant
- Resolver: uses tenant-aware provider lookup + disabled tools query
- Agent loop: filter disabled tools from LLM tool definitions
- Builtin tool tenant configs: store interface + PG implementation +
PUT/DELETE HTTP endpoints
- Skill tenant configs: store interface + PG + ListAccessible LEFT
JOIN to exclude disabled skills per tenant
- OAuth: DBTokenSource with tenantID field for tenant-scoped token
refresh
- All HTTP provider handlers use RegisterForTenant/UnregisterForTenant
* feat(security): channel tenant propagation + MCP per-user credentials (Plan 6)
- Propagate tenant_id from channel_instances through BaseChannel →
InboundMessage → agent loop context (fixes 5-point break in tenant flow)
- Inject tenant context in WS router dispatch for all gateway methods
- Add MCP per-user credential overrides (api_key, headers, env) with
AES-256-GCM encryption and HTTP API endpoints
- Rewrite MCP pool with tenant-scoped keys, slot semaphore, idle eviction,
and credential rotation support (Evict per tenant+server)
- Bypass pool for users with custom credentials (separate connections)
- Fix MCP APIKey never passed to connections (inject as Authorization header)
* fix(security): close remaining tenant isolation gaps from Plan 1-6 audit
- Add tenant_id to 6 missing tables: agent_context_files,
skill_agent_grants, mcp_agent_grants, team_tasks, spans,
embedding_cache (migration 027)
- Fix tid==uuid.Nil fallback to fail-closed (return error) in 8 update
methods: agent_links, teams, skills, channel_instances, secure_cli,
cron, mcp_servers, tracing
- Add tenant filter to bare DELETEs: DeleteLink, DeleteTeam
- Add tenant filter to queries: ListChildTraces, GetMonthlyAgentCost,
CountAgentGrantsByServer, ListAccessible (MCP), ReviewRequest,
ResolveGroupTitles, buildTraceWhere
- Fix missing tenant_id in INSERTs: CreateSkill, GrantToUser,
ReviewRequest grant INSERTs
- Add tenant filter to api_keys: List, Revoke, Delete
- Fix cron scanJob/RemoveJob/EnableJob fallthrough patterns
* fix(security): inject tenant context into channel handler entry points
Channel handlers used context.Background() which lost tenant context,
causing store operations to either fail-closed or default to master
tenant. Now all 10 handler entry points inject tenant from BaseChannel.
* fix(security): tenant filters for teams, tasks, skills (Plan 6b audit)
- Teams: add tenant filter to GetTeamForAgent, ListMembers,
ListIdleMembers, KnownUserIDs (JOIN agent_teams for tenant check)
- Teams: add tenant_id to GrantTeamAccess INSERT, tenant filter to
RevokeTeamAccess, ListTeamGrants, HasTeamAccess
- Team tasks: add tenant_id to CreateTask INSERT, fail-closed
UpdateTask, tenant filter on all 7 query/delete methods
- Skills: add tenant filter to RevokeFromAgent, ListAgentGrants
- Skills: add ctx param + tenant filter to ToggleSkill
- History: annotate context.Background() locations with TODOs for
future tenant injection (requires PendingHistory struct refactor)
* fix(security): add tenant_id to 4 missing team tables + fix INSERTs
Add tenant_id column to: agent_team_members, team_task_comments,
team_task_events, team_task_attachments (migration 027).
Fix INSERT statements to include tenant_id: AddMember,
AddTaskComment, RecordTaskEvent, AttachFileToTask.
* fix(migration): cast UUID literals in tenant_users seed + usage_snapshots index
PostgreSQL doesn't auto-cast string to UUID in SELECT and expression
index contexts. Add explicit ::uuid casts to prevent migration failure.
* docs: add multi-tenant architecture guide for integrators
Comprehensive solution doc covering auth model, WS protocol, event
system, data isolation, API reference, and integration patterns.
Target audience: developers building custom frontends or SaaS on GoClaw.
* feat(ui): multi-tenant awareness + tenant admin page (Plan 7)
Backend:
- Enrich WS connect response with tenant_name, tenant_slug, cross_tenant
- Add tenants.mine WS method (any user, returns own memberships)
- Parse tenant_hint in connect params for browser pairing multi-tenant
- Wire tenantStore to MethodRouter for connect-time tenant lookup
Frontend:
- Auth store: tenantId, tenantName, tenantSlug, isCrossTenant, availableTenants
- WS client: capture tenant fields from connect, send tenant_hint
- WS provider: auto-fetch tenants.mine on connect
- useTenants() shared hook for all tenant-aware components
- Tenant indicator in sidebar connection status
- Tenant admin page (/admin/tenants) with list + create dialog
- Tenants nav in sidebar (cross-tenant admin only)
- i18n: tenants namespace (en/vi/zh)
- Type updates: tenant_id on AgentData, ApiKeyData
* refactor(ui): move tenant selector into user menu dropdown in topbar
Replace simple logout button with a Radix Popover user menu showing:
- User ID display
- Tenant selector (when multi-tenant: list all tenants with check mark)
- Logout button
Remove tenant indicator from connection-status.tsx (now in topbar).
Tenant switch saves slug to localStorage and reloads for reconnect.
* feat(ui): add logout confirmation dialog
Show destructive confirm dialog before logout via ConfirmDialog
component. Added logoutConfirm i18n key for en/vi/zh.
* fix(ui): security hardening — hide admin nav, fix route guard, fix refresh
- Hide System nav group for non-admin roles in sidebar (was visible to all)
- Replace RequireAdmin with RequireCrossTenant guard on /admin/tenants route
- Add RequireCrossTenant component to require-role.tsx
- Fix refresh button animation: use isFetching instead of isLoading
- Clean up connection-status.tsx (remove tenant indicator, now in topbar)
* feat: cross-tenant admin tenant scope selector
Backend: add tenant_scope connect param. Cross-tenant clients can
narrow their scope to a specific tenant (slug). applyTenantScope()
sets client.tenantID and clears crossTenant flag.
UI: user menu shows "All Tenants" option for cross-tenant admins.
Selecting a tenant saves slug to localStorage as tenant_scope,
reload reconnects with narrowed scope. "All Tenants" clears scope.
* feat: provisioning API key scope + tenant detail page (Plan 8)
Backend:
- Add operator.provision scope for limited tenant management
- Add HasScope() method to gateway Client
- Allow provision-scoped keys to create tenants + add users
- Allow provision-scoped keys to create tenant-bound API keys
Frontend:
- Tenant detail page with user management (list, add, remove)
- Clickable tenant list rows navigate to detail
- i18n: tenant detail keys (en/vi/zh)
- Route /admin/tenants/:id with RequireCrossTenant guard
* fix: tenant scope keeps admin privileges + UI pattern fixes
Backend:
- applyTenantScope keeps crossTenant=true (retains admin features)
- Router: scoped cross-tenant injects WithTenantID (filters data)
while keeping admin role for method access
UI:
- Fix "All Tenants" check mark (compare against nil UUID string)
- Fix tenant label when scope active (show selected tenant name)
- Use ConfirmDialog for user removal (was hand-rolled)
- Add DialogDescription to add-user dialog (Radix a11y)
- Fix table min-w-[600px] consistency
- Fix column header mismatch (was "role", should be "created")
* fix(ui): clean up tenant detail header — remove redundant info panel
Remove duplicate slug/status/created panel. Info now shown in
PageHeader description (slug + date). Status badge removed (redundant
with description). Cleaner, consistent with other admin pages.
* fix(ui): redesign tenant detail with info cards + user cards
* feat(ui): tenant selection gate — require tenant before app access
- Add tenantSelected flag to auth store (persisted via localStorage)
- WS provider auto-selects: single-tenant user auto, cross-tenant
admin defaults to "All Tenants", zero-tenant user blocked
- RequireAuth gate: redirect to /select-tenant when connected but
no tenant selected
- New TenantSelectorPage: centered card layout matching login page,
"All Tenants" amber card for cross-tenant admin, per-tenant cards
with role badges, no-access state with logout button
- i18n: selectTenant, noAccess keys (en/vi/zh)
* fix(security): scope events for cross-tenant admin with tenant_scope
Event filter was checking !crossTenant before filtering — scoped
cross-tenant admins (crossTenant=true + tenantID set) bypassed
tenant event filtering. Now checks tenantID != Nil regardless of
crossTenant flag, ensuring scoped admins only see their chosen
tenant's events.
* fix(security): HTTP API now respects tenant_scope for gateway token
Root cause: UI uses HTTP API (/v1/agents, /v1/mcp/servers, etc.)
for data fetching. HTTP auth middleware with gateway token always
set CrossTenant=true with no tenant filtering. tenant_scope only
worked for WS connection, not HTTP requests.
Fix:
- HTTP client sends X-GoClaw-Tenant-Scope header from localStorage
- HTTP auth resolves header slug → tenant UUID via tenantStore
- requireAuth: CrossTenant + TenantID → WithTenantID (scoped)
- Wire InitTenantStore(pgStores.Tenants) in gateway startup
* feat(security): tenant-aware provider registry, event filter, and membership validation
- Refactor providers.Registry: Get(ctx, name) / List(ctx) extract tenant
from context via injected TenantFromCtx func (avoids circular import)
- Event filter: fail-closed 3-mode tenant filtering
Mode 1: unscoped admin sees all
Mode 2: scoped admin sees tenant events + system events
Mode 3: regular user sees only own tenant (fail-closed)
- WS connect: resolveTenantHint validates membership via GetUserRole
with PermissionCache (30s TTL, bus invalidation)
- BroadcastForTenant helper for tenant-scoped event emission
- Session list: add TenantID to SessionListOpts from context
- Cron handleRun: preserve tenant in background goroutine context
- GOCLAW_LOG_LEVEL env var (debug|info|warn|error) for Docker/K8s
- Cache debug logging: tenant_cache, permission_cache, api_key_cache
- Friendly verify error: timeout → user-readable message
- Verify timeout: 15s → 30s
* feat(ui): setup wizard improvements + agent preset enrichment
- Setup: skip link with confirm dialog, language selector (en/vi/zh)
- Setup: card padding fix (py-0 gap-0 on Card, py-5 on CardContent)
- Setup: remove duplicate skip link from layout
- Step Model: verify countdown timer (30s), stops on result
- Step Agent: default Fox Spirit preset, selected state styling,
hide agent key/name inputs, auto-derive from preset, emoji in config
- Summoning modal: elapsed timer (m:ss format)
- Agent presets: enriched prompts with human-like quirks
Fox Spirit: playful personality, care reminders
Artisan: portrait/banner/ads/logo expertise
Astrologer: reference sites (astro.com, cafeastrology, labyrinthos)
- i18n: "triệu hồi linh hồn" fix, all 3 locales updated
* feat(ui): API Key tenant support + card layout + provider chain fix
- API Key create: tenant selector for cross-tenant admin, provision scope
- API Key create: redesigned dialog with scope cards, Radix Select, icons
- API Key list: card layout with badges (status, tenant, scopes)
- API Key: shortcut in user menu (topbar)
- API Key: keep "API Key" untranslated across all locales
- Provider chain: empty state fix — skip legacy entry when provider
not found in current tenant
- i18n: form.cancel key added to all 3 locales
* fix(ui): add bottom padding to all page layouts + misc improvements
- Add pb-10 to all 24 page containers to prevent content touching
bottom edge of viewport
- Various UI polish from user modifications (summoning colors,
layout icon, agent cards, sidebar adjustments)
* feat(ui): MCP user credentials dialog + builtin tool tenant toggle
- MCP: per-user credentials dialog (api_key, headers, env KV editor)
with status badges, delete all, save
- MCP: "My Credentials" button on each server row
- Builtin Tools: per-tenant enable/disable override toggle
with "Using default" / "Enabled/Disabled for tenant" badges
and reset-to-default button
- Setup: larger logo (h-16) and bolder title (text-4xl font-bold)
- i18n: all keys added to en/vi/zh for both features
* fix(ui): API key card spacing + remove pagination border
- Card padding: px-4 py-3.5 (was px-3 py-2), rows spaced with gap-2
- Scopes on separate row from dates for readability
- Card gap: space-y-2.5 between cards
- Pagination: add className prop, remove border-t on API keys page
- Badge/icon sizes bumped to text-xs / h-3.5 (was text-[10px] / h-3)
* fix(security): comprehensive tenant isolation audit — SQL, events, cache, skills, files
Defense-in-depth hardening across 12 audit phases:
- SQL: add tenant_id WHERE to teams_tasks lifecycle/activity/followup/progress/embedding (~30 functions)
- Events: broadcastTeamEvent + task_ticker + subagent announce now carry TenantID
- Cache: agentKeyCache scoped by tenant (agent keys per-tenant, not globally unique)
- Skills: SkillStore interface accepts ctx, SQL filter (is_system OR tenant_id=$N), per-tenant list cache, GrantToAgent includes tenant_id, tenant-scoped file storage
- Files: StorageHandler/FilesHandler/TeamAttachments/teamWorkspaceDir use config.TenantDataDir/TenantTeamDir
- Security: HMAC signed file tokens (file_token.go) replace gateway token in URLs
- Audit: AuditEventPayload carries TenantID for async subscriber tenant scoping
- InboundMessage: subagent/dispatch/validation/session_send propagate TenantID
- Pending messages: DeleteStale scoped by tenant
* fix(security): skip gateway token in URLs with signed file tokens
toFileUrl() now skips appending ?token=GATEWAY_TOKEN when the URL
already contains ?ft= (HMAC signed file token). Prevents gateway
token exposure via browser history, logs, and referrer headers.
* fix(security): stop persisting auth tokens in session media URLs
mediaToMarkdown() now stores clean paths (/v1/files/path) without
any auth tokens. Previously embedded ?token=GATEWAY_TOKEN (or ?ft=)
into markdown which gets persisted in session messages DB.
Frontend toFileUrl() adds auth at render time — tokens never stored.
* fix(security): migration 027 strips leaked gateway tokens from session URLs
Adds cleanup step to tenant foundation migration: removes ?token=xxx
from persisted media URLs in session messages. Old code embedded the
gateway token; new code stores clean paths only.
* fix(security): sign file URLs at delivery time, not persist time
Add SignFileURLs() utility that finds /v1/files/ and /v1/media/ URLs
in content and appends HMAC signed ?ft= tokens before delivery.
Applied at 4 delivery points:
- WS agent events (OnEvent callback in gateway_managed.go)
- WS chat.history response
- WS sessions.preview response
- HTTP /v1/chat/completions response
Sessions store clean paths only. Tokens are generated per-delivery
with 1h TTL — never persisted in DB. Frontend toFileUrl() skips
appending gateway token when ?ft= is already present.
* fix: file token verify path must match signed path (/v1/files/ prefix)
SignFileURLs() signs the full URL path "/v1/files/{path}" but the
verify in files.go auth() was using "/{path}" (without prefix).
HMAC mismatch caused all signed file tokens to return 401.
* fix(security): scope storage size cache per-tenant
sizeCache was a single global entry — all tenants shared one cached
size. Changed to sync.Map keyed by tenantBaseDir so each tenant gets
its own cached size calculation.
* feat(ui): redesign API keys page — table layout + code snippet dialog
Replace card-based API keys list with table layout matching MCP Servers
pattern. Add "API Key Usage" dialog with tabbed code snippets (cURL,
TypeScript, Go) showing gateway connection examples with syntax
highlighting and copy-to-clipboard.
* fix(builtin-tools): seed media tools disabled, fix tenant toggle, add unconfigured warning
- Seed media tools with Enabled=false and no default provider settings
(user must configure provider chain before enabling)
- Fix provider chain form ghost entries: validate provider exists in
tenant before showing (parseInitialEntries new-format path)
- Fix double toggle: show only tenant override OR global toggle, not both
- Fix list API: merge tenant_enabled from builtin_tool_tenant_configs
into response when tenant-scoped (was always null)
- Add ListAll() to BuiltinToolTenantConfigStore for full override map
- Add amber warning banner for enabled media tools missing provider config
* feat(mcp): require_user_credentials setting + KeyValueEditor for user creds
- Add require_user_credentials setting in mcp_servers.settings JSONB
- Backend: skip MCP server in LoadForAgent when user lacks credentials
- Frontend: toggle in MCP form dialog, persisted in settings field
- Redesign MCP user credentials dialog: replace raw Textarea with
KeyValueEditor (sensitive key masking for auth/token/secret fields)
- Add settings to mcpServerAllowedFields for HTTP update
* fix(security): restrict cross-tenant to owner IDs, config to owners only
- Gateway token + non-owner user ID: admin role but tenant-scoped
(no cross-tenant access). Fallback: only "system" is owner when
GOCLAW_OWNER_IDS not configured (fail-closed).
- Config page (WS config.* methods): wrapped with requireCrossTenant
middleware — non-owner admins get permission denied
- Config sidebar link: hidden for non-cross-tenant users
- Logout: clear tenant_id and tenant_hint from localStorage
(prevents tenant scope leak to next user session)
- Refactor: LOCAL_STORAGE_KEYS.TENANT_ID/TENANT_HINT constants
* fix(ui): chat bubble contrast, login logo, tenant no-access UX
- Chat bubble: use --chat-bubble-user CSS var (darker orange, L=0.50/0.52)
with text-white for WCAG AA contrast (~5.5:1)
- Login page: logo h-20 w-20, title text-3xl font-bold
- Tenant selector no-access: shield icon + hint text explaining
user needs admin to add them to a tenant
- Sidebar: GoClaw text uses text-sidebar-primary (brand color)
* feat(contacts): merge/unmerge contacts to tenant users
Add API and UI for linking channel contacts to tenant_users identity,
enabling cross-channel user identification within a tenant.
Backend:
- POST /v1/contacts/merge — link contacts to existing or new tenant_user
- POST /v1/contacts/unmerge — remove merged_id from contacts
- GET /v1/contacts/merged/{id} — list contacts by tenant_user
- GET /v1/tenant-users — list users for current tenant
- Add display_name + metadata columns to tenant_users (migration 27)
- All endpoints enforce tenant isolation via context tenant_id
Frontend:
- Checkbox multi-select on contacts table
- Selection toolbar with Merge/Unmerge buttons
- Merge dialog: link to existing user or create new
- Link2 icon indicator for merged contacts
- i18n: en/vi/zh translations for merge section
* fix(security): add tenant_id to span and embedding_cache inserts
SpanData struct was missing TenantID field — all span inserts failed
with NOT NULL constraint violation after migration 027 dropped defaults.
Fix captures tenant_id from context at emit time (6 call sites in
loop_tracing.go + subagent_tracing.go), then includes it in both
CreateSpan() and BatchCreateSpans() SQL (25→26 columns).
Also fixes embedding_cache writeEmbeddingCache() which was missing
tenant_id in its batch INSERT — same class of bug.
Both use MasterTenantID fallback for backward compatibility.
* feat: Introduce tenant switcher UI and enhance multi-tenant architecture documentation.
* fix(security): enforce tenant scoping, fix session isolation and UI cleanup
- Force cross-tenant admins to always have a concrete tenant_id (default
MasterTenantID) instead of unscoped WithCrossTenant — prevents mismatch
between session listing (no filter) and writes (MasterTenantID fallback)
- Make agent router tenant-aware: Get(ctx, agentID) resolves agent for
the caller's tenant, preventing cross-tenant agent cache collisions
- Fix context.Background() in title goroutine and summarization — now
uses tenant-aware context (WithoutCancel) so titles and compaction
persist to the correct tenant
- Add read-only SessionStore.Get() method; replace GetOrCreate in auth
checks (preview/patch/delete/reset) to prevent phantom session creation
- Inject tenant from channel instance into inbound message processing
- Remove "All Tenants" option from tenant selector, topbar switcher,
and ws-provider auto-select — admin must always operate within a tenant
- Fix contacts page selection toolbar layout shift (always rendered)
- Widen MCP credentials sensitive header regex to catch API_KEY etc.
* fix(security): propagate tenant_id in consumer handlers and background ops
- InjectTeamDispatch: use context.WithoutCancel instead of context.Background
to preserve tenant_id while avoiding cancel propagation from HTTP/WS handlers
- handleTeammateMessage/handleSubagentAnnounce: inject tenant_id from msg
- Add nil guard for outcome.Result to prevent panic on agent-not-found
- Use BroadcastForTenant for EventTeamTaskFailed/Completed/LeaderProcessing
- Remove unnecessary WithCrossTenant in autoSetFollowup (ctx already scoped)
- resolveAgentByKey: accept ctx param for tenant-scoped agent lookup
- pending_messages: use request ctx instead of cross-tenant for GetDefault
* fix(security): tenant-scope EnsureContact and PendingHistory DB operations
- All channel EnsureContact calls now use tenant-scoped ctx instead of
context.Background (whatsapp, slack, discord, telegram, feishu, zalo)
- PendingHistory: add tenantID field, thread through constructors
- All PendingHistory DB ops (load, flush, compact, delete) use tenantCtx()
- Normalize timeouts: 10s for simple queries, 15s for batch writes
* feat(teams): auto-attach media, retry completed tasks, improve tool messages
- Auto-attach workspace media from any tool (create_image/audio/video) to
team tasks via loop-level hook, not just write_file interceptor
- Store absolute paths in team_task_attachments instead of relative
- Extend retry action to support completed tasks (reopen for follow-up)
- Context-aware comment result messages with next-action guidance for
leader vs member roles and task status
- All tool results include task_id for agent follow-up actions
- Use #N "subject" format instead of raw UUIDs in tool messages
* feat(multi-tenant): tenant isolation for media, events, providers and UI
- Tenant-scoped media store, event filter, provider registry
- Tenant header propagation in WS/HTTP clients
- UI: tenant-aware chat messages, markdown renderer improvements
- Protocol: tenant error codes and event definitions
* docs: add multi-tenant architecture documentation
* fix(teams): store absolute paths in team_task_attachments
- AutoAttachWorkspaceFile: use cleanPath consistently instead of raw absPath
- executeAttach: resolve relative paths to absolute via team workspace
- AfterWrite interceptor already uses filepath.Clean (verified)
* fix(teams): attachment download handles both absolute and relative paths
filepath.Join with an absolute att.Path discards the teamBase prefix,
causing path traversal check to fail and download to serve wrong file.
Now checks IsAbs first — uses path directly for new absolute entries,
falls back to legacy join for old relative entries.
* fix(teams): attachment download validates against workspace root not tenant dir
Absolute paths stored in DB don't match TenantTeamDir structure
(master tenant has no tenants/ prefix). Now validates absolute paths
against dataDir (workspace root) instead. Legacy relative paths still
resolve via TenantTeamDir as before. IDOR check on att.TeamID ensures
cross-team isolation.
* fix(teams): attachment download uses workspace root, not data dir
Files are stored under GOCLAW_WORKSPACE/teams/ but handler was passed
dataDir (GOCLAW_DATA_DIR) — completely different directory. Now passes
workspace. Legacy relative paths resolve via {workspace}/teams/{teamID}/{chatID}/{path}.
* fix(security): use HMAC-signed file tokens for attachment downloads
Replace gateway token exposure (?token=) with HMAC-signed short-lived
file tokens (?ft=) for team task attachment downloads — same mechanism
used by chat file URLs.
Backend:
- team_attachments auth: accept ?ft= signed token (priority 1), Bearer (priority 2)
- teams_tasks RPC: sign download_url with HMAC at delivery time
- Add fileTokenSecret to TeamsMethods, thread through wireChannelRPCMethods
Frontend:
- Use server-signed download_url from attachment data instead of ?token=
- Remove useAuthStore dependency from task-detail-dialog
* fix(security): decouple file token signing from gateway token
- Generate random 256-bit HMAC key at startup (crypto/rand, memory-only)
- All file signing/verification uses FileSigningKey() instead of gateway token
- Remove ?token= query param fallback from /v1/files/, /v1/media/, attachments
- Only ?ft= signed tokens and Bearer header accepted for file access
- Reduce file token TTL from 1h to 5min
- Frontend: remove gateway token from all file URLs and imports
- Note: tokens invalidate on restart (acceptable for 5min TTL + WS reconnect)
* fix(ui): use signed download_url for task attachments
- Add download_url to TeamTaskAttachment type
- Use a.download_url (server-signed ?ft=) instead of bare URL
* fix(security): tenant-scope team workspace paths + show user/tenant in topbar
- WorkspaceDir callers now use config.TenantWorkspace() to resolve
tenant-scoped base dir (non-master tenants get workspace/tenants/{slug}/)
- Fixes: all tenants previously wrote to global /app/workspace/teams/
without filesystem-level isolation
- Affected: loop.go (agent run), team_tasks_mutations.go (task creation)
- teams_workspace.go already correct (uses TenantTeamDir)
- UI topbar: show "userId (tenantName)" in user menu
* feat(ui): redesign task detail dialog with improved UX
- Split monolithic 343-line component into 5 focused files
- New header: subject as title, identifier + status badges above
- Metadata grid with soft bg-muted/30 background, priority icons
- Attachments: card-style with mime-type icons + proper download Button
- Description/Result: markdown rendering via MarkdownRenderer
- Comments: avatar circles + markdown rendering for content
- All sections collapsible with chevron + count badge
- Timeline: vertical dot-line pattern, collapsed by default
- Fix kanban card hover layout shift (opacity instead of display toggle)
* fix(security): tenant-scoped workspace paths and tool cache isolation
- Scope team workspace paths to tenant directory
- Add tenant isolation to tool cache and task reads
- Shell deny pattern improvements
- Agent resolver and context file tenant scoping
- Sidebar tenant/user display fix
- Add tests for workspace, boundary, and context file interceptor
* fix(ui): tenant visibility fallback, merge coming-soon, task detail tweaks
- Tenants page: try tenants.list (owner), fall back to tenants.mine
for regular users; hide create button for non-owners
- Merge contacts dialog: add coming-soon banner (i18n en/vi/zh),
disable form and submit button
- Task detail: collapse attachments/comments by default,
guard download_url before rendering
|
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|
viettranx
|
a4a7a59b6a |
fix(sandbox): path isolation, DooD volume mounting, hints, and nginx DNS (#129, #136)
Address issues identified in PR #137 with a cleaner approach: - Sandbox isolation: add SandboxCwd/ResolveSandboxPath helpers to map filesystem tool paths to agent-scoped container subdirectories, preventing cross-agent file access via read/write/edit/list tools - DooD volume mounting: add resolveHostWorkspacePath with multi-strategy container ID detection (/proc/self/mountinfo, HOSTNAME, os.Hostname) and 5s timeout on docker inspect - Sandbox hints: expand from 1 pattern (binary not found) to 6 patterns (permission denied, network disabled, read-only FS, missing file, resource limits) with MaybeFsBridgeHint for filesystem tools - Nginx DNS: add Docker resolver (127.0.0.11) with dynamic upstream variable to handle backend container IP changes - MCP args: switch from comma-separated to space-separated parsing with quote support for --flag="value with spaces" patterns - Refactor: rename ExecTool.workingDir to workspace for consistency, extract sandbox.DefaultContainerWorkdir constant |
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|
viettranx
|
b80ee0ae43 |
feat(sandbox): hint LLM when tool/binary missing in sandbox container
Detect exit code 127 and "command not found" patterns in sandbox execution paths and append a [SANDBOX] hint to the error output, so the model can inform the user about sandbox environment limitations. Only applies to sandbox execution — host paths are untouched. |
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|
a7f5acc1e3 |
fix(security): harden SQL injection, MCP prompt injection, sandbox fallback, and file serving (#246)
- execMapUpdate: validate column names with strict regex to prevent SQL injection - HTTP update handlers: add field allowlists (agents, providers, custom_tools, mcp, channel_instances) - pqStringArray: properly escape array elements to prevent PostgreSQL array literal injection - scanStringArray: handle quoted elements in PostgreSQL array format - MCP bridge: wrap tool results as external/untrusted content to prevent prompt injection - File serving: block access to sensitive system directories (/etc, /proc, /sys, etc.) - Sandbox: fail closed when Docker unavailable instead of silent fallback to host - Shell deny: fix base64 --decode bypass, add host exec 1MB output limit - ILIKE queries: escape % and _ wildcards in knowledge_graph, custom_tools, channel_instances Co-authored-by: Luvu182 <208665161+Luvu182@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
viettranx
|
843b550651 |
feat: runtime packages UI, pkg-helper, configurable shell deny groups (#244)
Runtime package management with security hardening: - pkg-helper: root-privileged daemon for apk install/uninstall via Unix socket - HTTP API: /v1/packages (list/install/uninstall/runtimes), admin role required for writes - Shell deny groups: 15 configurable groups (per-agent overrides via context) - Packages UI: Web page for managing system/pip/npm packages with confirmation dialogs - Docker: privilege separation (root entrypoint → su-exec drop), init for zombie reaping - Security: umask socket creation, persist file validation, deny pattern hardening (Node.js fetch/http, Python from/import, curl localhost, sensitive env vars) - Auth: empty gateway token → admin role (dev/single-user mode) |
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|
GoonandGitHub
|
75c570e951 |
feat(security): credentialed exec + HTTP RBAC + API key cache (#197)
- Secure CLI credential injection via AES-256-GCM encrypted env vars - API key management with fine-grained RBAC scopes - resolveAuth/requireAuth middleware across all 25+ HTTP handlers - In-memory API key cache with TTL, negative caching, pubsub invalidation - Sandbox-first execution (fails if unavailable, no silent fallback) - Credential scrubbing, constant-time token comparison, Admin-only CLI creds - SQL migration 000020: secure_cli_binaries + api_keys tables - 14 unit tests for cache and RBAC with race detector Closes #197 |
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|
5e2fa395c7 |
feat(providers): add ACP provider for external coding agents (#190)
* feat(providers): add ACP provider for orchestrating external coding agents (#189) Implement native Go ACP (Agent Client Protocol) client as a new Provider. Enables GoClaw to orchestrate any ACP-compatible agent (Claude Code, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI) as a subprocess via JSON-RPC 2.0 over stdio. - Add bidirectional JSON-RPC 2.0 transport over stdio pipes - Add subprocess process pool with idle TTL reaping and crash recovery - Add ACP session lifecycle (initialize, session/new, session/prompt) - Add tool bridge for agent-initiated fs/terminal/permission requests - Add workspace sandboxing, shell deny patterns, and env var filtering - Wire config-based and DB-based provider registration paths - Export DefaultDenyPatterns from tools package for reuse * feat(providers): add changelog entry for ACP provider integration * fix(tools): prevent workspace traversal bypass via /tmp/ fallback in resolveMediaPath Reject paths containing ".." in the isInTempDir fallback to prevent workspace escape where traversal path still resolves inside /tmp/. * fix(tools): block workspace-sibling paths in resolveMediaPath /tmp/ fallback When workspace is inside /tmp/, traversal paths like workspace/../X resolve to /tmp/ siblings that pass isInTempDir. Reject paths inside the workspace parent directory to prevent this escape. * feat(providers): add ACP provider web UI and live reload via pubsub Web UI for creating/editing ACP providers with dedicated form fields (binary, args, idle TTL, permission mode, work directory). ACP providers now update immediately without gateway restart via cache invalidation pubsub pattern. Frontend: - New ACPSection form component with i18n (en/vi/zh) - Provider form dialog integration with ACP state management - ACP type badge on providers list page - Settings field added to provider TypeScript types Backend: - ACP models handler (claude/codex/gemini) without API key requirement - Binary path validation + LookPath verification in verify handler - Provider CRUD emits cache.invalidate events via msgBus - Subscriber in gateway_managed.go re-registers ACP providers from DB - ACP core improvements from code review (helpers, jsonrpc, process, terminal, tool_bridge) --------- Co-authored-by: viettranx <viettranx@gmail.com> |
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|
viettranx
|
52c56978c5 |
fix(tools): improve workspace path guidance to reduce LLM path guessing
Agents were guessing absolute paths for file/exec tools, causing failed tool calls and wasteful retries. Strengthen LLM guidance at three levels: - System prompt: instruct to use relative paths, not guess absolute paths - Tool param descriptions: mention workspace-relative resolution - Subagent prompt: add missing workspace section with path guidance |
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|
2fdb791802 |
fix: honor per-agent DB settings for restrict, subagents, memory, sandbox (#145)
Four per-agent settings stored in the database (and configurable via UI) were silently ignored at runtime because the tool/system layer always used the global config defaults instead. **restrict_to_workspace**: Tools used the global config default baked at startup. Fix: pass per-agent value through context; tools check context override before falling back to constructor default. **subagents_config**: ParseSubagentsConfig() existed but was never called. All agents shared one SubagentManager with global limits. Fix: resolve per-agent config in the agent resolver, store it on each spawned task, and use it for limit checks, deny lists, and system prompt generation. **memory_config**: Only the enabled toggle was read per-agent; search weights (vector_weight, text_weight, max_results, min_score) were hardcoded from PGMemoryStore defaults. Fix: extend MemorySearchOptions with weight overrides, read per-agent config from context in the memory_search tool. **sandbox_config**: Only workspace_access was extracted per-agent; mode, image, memory, CPU, timeout, network settings were discarded. Fix: pass full sandbox.Config through context; Manager.Get() accepts an optional config override for new containers. Co-authored-by: Luvu182 <208665161+Luvu182@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
viettranx
|
bdb60de7ae |
chore: upgrade Go 1.25 → 1.26 and apply go fix modernizations
- Update go.mod and Dockerfile to Go 1.26 - Apply `go fix ./...` stdlib modernizations across 170+ files - Add `go fix` to post-implementation checklist in CLAUDE.md - Fix go fix misapplied rewrite in loop_history.go |
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|
viettranx
|
d839e034af |
feat(tools): add exec path exemptions and tool arguments in events
- Add AllowPathExemptions to ExecTool for fine-grained deny bypass (skills-store) - Include tool call arguments in tool.result event payloads |
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|
viettranx
|
b62d46e50e |
refactor(lint): apply Go best practices across codebase
- Use errors.Is() instead of direct sentinel comparison (13 instances) - Convert if/else-if chains to switch/case for same-variable comparisons - Remove redundant bitwise OR with zero - Add post-implementation checklist to CLAUDE.md |
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|
Viet TranandGitHub
|
6895e369f6 |
refactor: remove standalone mode, consolidate to managed-only (PostgreSQL) (#70)
- Remove standalone mode code: file-based stores, standalone gateway, heartbeat service, SQLite memory, standalone docker-compose - Rename docker-compose.managed.yml → docker-compose.postgres.yml - Clean up ~130 Go comments referencing "managed mode" qualifier - Simplify docker-compose.yml env vars (providers/channels via web UI) - Update .env.example to essential vars only (token + encryption key) - Add setup wizard UI (provider → agent → channel bootstrap flow) - Add logs.tail WebSocket handler for live log streaming - Add cursor-pointer to interactive UI components - Clean up config page (remove standalone-only sections) - Update README and docs for managed-only architecture |
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|
viettranxandClaude Opus 4.6
|
74d85c8dd5 |
feat(security): enforce group file writer restrictions + harden exec against env/config leaks
Group writer enforcement (managed mode): - GroupWriterCache with 5min TTL wrapping AgentStore.ListGroupFileWriters - Tool-level blocking: write_file, edit, read_file (SOUL.md/AGENTS.md), cron mutations - System prompt injection: non-writers get refusal instructions + filtered context files - Cache invalidation via bus events on add/remove writer - Wired through resolver, loop, gateway_managed, gateway_callbacks Exec security hardening: - Block /proc/PID/environ and /proc/self/environ reads (env var exfiltration) - Block strings on /proc files (binary env dump) - DenyPaths() on ExecTool: block data dir, .goclaw/, config file from exec commands - Scrub VIRTUAL_* env vars from tool output Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
viettranxandClaude Opus 4.6
|
73b46c3634 |
feat(security): apply upstream TS OpenClaw security and core engine fixes
Port 8 fixes from upstream TypeScript OpenClaw (4 CRITICAL + 4 HIGH): CRITICAL: 1. Tool call name trimming — add strings.TrimSpace() to all provider response parsers (Anthropic 2 locations, OpenAI 3 locations) to prevent registry lookup failures from LLM whitespace-padded names 2. Shell env injection deny patterns — block GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF, GIT_DIFF_OPTS, BASH_ENV, and ENV=.*sh to prevent code execution via environment variable injection during git/shell operations 3. Broken symlink escape — recursive target resolution via resolveThroughExistingAncestors() to catch chained symlinks that escape workspace (e.g. link1→link2→/etc/passwd) 4. Mutable parent-symlink TOCTOU check — hasMutableSymlinkParent() detects symlinks in writable parent dirs that could be rebound between path validation and file operation HIGH: 5. Model fallback thinking preservation — add ThinkingCapable interface to providers/types.go, implement on Anthropic/OpenAI/DashScope, check before injecting thinking_level in agent loop, warn on fallback when thinking is configured 6. Cron session-key double-prefix guard — prevent agent:X:cron:agent:X duplication in BuildCronSessionKey() 7. Webhook rate limiter — bounded WebhookRateLimiter (4096 keys max, 60s window, 30 hits/window) to prevent memory exhaustion DoS 8. DM policy allowlist validation — warn at startup when dmPolicy=allowlist with empty allowFrom (silent message drop) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
viettranx
|
08ced252b2 | feat: Introduce agent summoning flow with a dedicated modal and updated bootstrap process for predefined agents. | ||
|
Viet Tran
|
2991283901 |
Add environment variable dumping protections and expand credential scrubbing patterns
Remove env/printenv from safe bins list and add deny patterns for bare env/printenv/set/export commands that dump all environment variables including secrets. Expand credential scrubbing to detect connection strings (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MongoDB, Redis, AMQP), generic KEY=/SECRET=/CREDENTIAL= environment variables, DSN/DATABASE_URL patterns, and long hex strings (64+ chars) that may be encryption keys or hashes. |
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|
Viet Tran
|
765bec2287 |
Add Docker-based sandbox support with comprehensive security hardening and graceful fallback
Introduce optional Docker sandbox for agent code execution with defense-in-depth security patterns. Add ENABLE_SANDBOX build arg to conditionally install docker-cli in runtime image. Create docker-compose.sandbox.yml overlay with sandbox configuration (512MB memory, 1 CPU, no network, session-scoped containers). Expand shell command deny patterns to cover data exfiltration (DNS tunneling, curl POST), reverse |
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|
Viet Tran
|
172216e73d |
Add edit tool, cron tool, session tools, and message tool with full wiring and exec approval hardening
Register edit tool (sandboxed + non-sandboxed variants) with context file and memory interceptors in managed mode. Add cron tool for agent-facing job management. Register session tools (list, status, history, send) and message tool with proper SessionStoreAware, BusAware, and ChannelSenderAware wiring. Harden exec approval system to always be active with deny patterns + safe bins, defaulting to full |
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|
Viet TranandClaude Opus 4.6
|
f3f4c67b36 |
Initial commit: GoClaw AI agent gateway
Multi-agent AI gateway with WebSocket RPC, HTTP API, and messaging channel integrations. Go port of OpenClaw with multi-tenant PostgreSQL, per-user isolation, security hardening, and production observability. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |