docs: add security update blog post for March 2026 supply chain incident

docs/my-website/blog/security_update_march_2026/index.md

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+---
+slug: security-update-march-2026
+title: "Security Update: Suspected Supply Chain Incident"
+date: 2026-03-24T14:00:00
+authors:
+  - krrish
+  - ishaan-alt
+description: "As of 2:00 PM ET on March 24, 2026"
+tags: [security, incident-report]
+hide_table_of_contents: false
+---
+
+import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
+import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';
+
+> **Status:** Active investigation
+> **Last updated:** March 24, 2026, 2:00 PM ET
+
+LiteLLM is investigating a suspected supply chain attack involving unauthorized PyPI package publishes. Current evidence suggests a maintainer's PyPI account may have been compromised and used to distribute malicious code.
+
+At this time, we believe this incident may be linked to the broader [Trivy security compromise](https://www.aquasec.com/blog/trivy-supply-chain-attack-what-you-need-to-know/), in which stolen credentials were reportedly used to gain unauthorized access to the LiteLLM publishing pipeline.
+
+This investigation is ongoing. Details below may change as we confirm additional findings.
+
+## Confirmed affected versions
+
+The following LiteLLM versions published to PyPI were impacted:
+
+- **v1.82.7**: contained a malicious payload in `proxy_server.py`
+- **v1.82.8**: contained `litellm_init.pth` and a malicious payload in `proxy_server.py`
+
+If you installed or ran either of these versions, review the recommendations below immediately.
+
+Note: These versions have already been removed from PyPI.
+
+## What happened
+
+Initial evidence suggests the attacker bypassed official CI/CD workflows and uploaded malicious packages directly to PyPI.
+
+These compromised versions appear to have included a credential stealer designed to:
+
+- Harvest secrets by scanning for:
+  - environment variables
+  - SSH keys
+  - cloud provider credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure)
+  - Kubernetes tokens
+  - database passwords
+- Encrypt and exfiltrate data via a `POST` request to `models.litellm.cloud`, which is **not** an official BerriAI / LiteLLM domain
+
+## Who is affected
+
+You may be affected if **any** of the following are true:
+
+- You installed or upgraded LiteLLM via `pip` on **March 24, 2026**, between **10:39 UTC and 16:00 UTC**
+- You ran `pip install litellm` without pinning a version and received **v1.82.7** or **v1.82.8**
+- You built a Docker image during this window that included `pip install litellm` without a pinned version
+- A dependency in your project pulled in LiteLLM as a transitive, unpinned dependency
+  (for example through AI agent frameworks, MCP servers, or LLM orchestration tools)
+
+You are **not** affected if any of the following are true:
+
+- You are using **LiteLLM Cloud**
+- You are using the official Docker image: `ghcr.io/berriai/litellm`
+- You are on **v1.82.6 or earlier** and did not upgrade during the affected window
+- You installed LiteLLM from source via the GitHub repository, which was **not** compromised
+
+
+### How to check if you are affected
+
+<Tabs>
+<TabItem value="sdk" label="SDK">
+
+```bash
+pip show litellm
+```
+</TabItem>
+<TabItem value="proxy" label="PROXY">
+
+Go to the proxy base url, and check the version of the installed LiteLLM.
+
+![Proxy version check](../../img/security_update_march_2026/proxy_version.png)
+</TabItem>
+</Tabs>
+
+
+## Indicators of compromise (IoCs)
+
+Review affected systems for the following indicators:
+
+- `litellm_init.pth` present in your `site-packages`
+- Outbound traffic or requests to `models.litellm[.]cloud`
+  This domain is **not** affiliated with LiteLLM
+
+
+## Immediate actions for affected users
+
+If you installed or ran **v1.82.7** or **v1.82.8**, take the following actions immediately.
+
+### 1. Rotate all secrets
+
+Treat any credentials present on the affected systems as compromised, including:
+
+- API keys
+- Cloud access keys
+- Database passwords
+- SSH keys
+- Kubernetes tokens
+- Any secrets stored in environment variables or configuration files
+
+### 2. Inspect your filesystem
+
+Check your `site-packages` directory for a file named `litellm_init.pth`:
+
+```bash
+find /usr/lib/python3.13/site-packages/ -name "litellm_init.pth"
+```
+
+If present:
+
+- remove it immediately
+- investigate the host for further compromise
+- preserve relevant artifacts if your security team is performing forensics
+
+### 3. Audit version history
+
+Review your:
+
+- local environments
+- CI/CD pipelines
+- Docker builds
+- deployment logs
+
+Confirm whether **v1.82.7** or **v1.82.8** was installed anywhere.
+
+Pin LiteLLM to a known safe version such as **v1.82.6 or earlier**, or to a later verified release once announced.
+
+
+## Response and remediation
+
+The LiteLLM team has already taken the following steps:
+
+- Removed compromised packages from PyPI
+- Rotated maintainer credentials and established new authorized maintainers
+- Engaged Google's Mandiant security team to assist with forensic analysis of the build and publishing chain
+
+
+## Questions and support
+
+If you believe your systems may be affected, contact us immediately:
+
+- **Security:** `security@berri.ai`
+- **Support:** `support@berri.ai`
+- **Slack:** Reach out to the LiteLLM team directly
+
+For real-time updates, follow [LiteLLM (YC W23) on X](https://x.com/LiteLLM).
+