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Commits
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c8bcfbb20c |
feat(a2a): watsonx Orchestrate agent provider (#29410)
* feat(a2a): add watsonx Orchestrate agent provider Bridge A2A message/send to WXO runs API (CP4D and IBM Cloud IAM auth), with dashboard agent type metadata and unit tests for transformations. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(a2a): use shared httpx client and cache WXO auth tokens Route WXO streaming through get_async_httpx_client (TLS verification enabled). Cache bearer tokens with TTL buffer. Extract A2A reply text via a dedicated helper instead of hard-coded JSON paths. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(a2a): treat CP4D token expiration as absolute Unix time CP4D /authorize returns expiration as epoch seconds, not TTL. Compute remaining lifetime against wall clock so cached tokens refresh before expiry. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * style(a2a): black-format watsonx orchestrate handler for CI py312 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix watsonx orchestrate edge cases * Fix WXO streaming fallback error handling * Fix watsonx orchestrate run completion handling * fix(a2a): make WXO username optional in agent create UI Username is only required for cp4d auth; ibm_cloud uses api_key alone. Backend still validates username when auth_mode is cp4d. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * test(a2a): align WXO dashboard field test with optional username Username is not required in agent_create_fields.json; backend validates for cp4d auth_mode only. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(a2a): send Accept header on WXO streaming run request * fix(a2a/wxo): scope streaming transport fallback to initial POST only Narrow the httpx.TransportError fallback in handle_streaming so it only covers the initial POST /runs/stream. Errors during polling or SSE consumption now propagate instead of triggering handle_non_streaming, which would have submitted a duplicate WXO run for the same request. * refactor(a2a/wxo): type run-param extraction and use text response_type Return a typed WXORequestParams NamedTuple from _extract_litellm_params instead of a positional tuple so call sites read params by name, and send the user message with response_type 'text' so the run body is valid across all WXO agent configurations rather than the search-specific type. * fix(a2a/wxo): evict expired token cache entries and raise asyncio.TimeoutError on poll timeout --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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f48a87ef12 | fix(ci): normalize whitespace before classname-to-path awk on test rerun (#29475) | ||
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5fd27141cf | Litellm OSS Staging 010626 (#29422) | ||
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b7bbddbd4d |
fix(mcp): clear allowed_tools and tool overrides on MCP server edit (#29411)
* fix(mcp): clear allowed_tools and tool overrides on MCP server edit Send empty arrays/objects from the dashboard instead of null, coerce legacy null payloads before Prisma, and stop auto-selecting all tools when the stored allowlist is empty. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * style(mcp): simplify CRUD panel value ternary per review Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): enforce empty tool allowlist when cleared in dashboard Set mcp_info.tool_allowlist_enforced on UI save so [] blocks all tools while legacy servers with default [] remain unrestricted. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix legacy MCP tool allowlist edit state * test(mcp): pin allowlist fields on mock server in tools test MagicMock auto-attributes are truthy and trigger server_applies_tool_allowlist after the empty-allowlist enforcement change. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): avoid locking legacy servers on quick edit save Only set tool_allowlist_enforced when already enforced or the user selected tools; skip allowlist fields on save for unrestricted servers; do not auto-select all tools when editing legacy servers before load. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): type mcp_info base for allowlist flag read Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): use MCPInfo type for tool_allowlist_enforced in edit save Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Update ui/litellm-dashboard/src/components/mcp_tools/mcp_server_edit.tsx Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Remove unused MCP allowlist variable * Fix MCP legacy tool state display * Fix legacy MCP tool allowlist saves * fix(mcp): enforce allowlist when create flow deselects all tools Track explicit allowlist interaction in the create form so deselecting every tool persists tool_allowlist_enforced=true. Previously an empty selection sent the flag as false with allowed_tools=[], which the proxy treats as allow-all, contradicting the UI's 0 tools enabled state. This mirrors the existing edit-flow handling. * fix(mcp): enforce disallowed_tools on REST listing and keep restored tool selection on legacy edit --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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e8fcb01215 |
Litellm OSS Staging (#29161)
* Cato Networks guardrail, based on Aim (#26597) * Aim was acquired by Cato Networks, creating Cato Networks guardrail based on Aim * Add more tests * Move test so they are reached by codecov coverage * base URL trailing slashes * Support Lemonade runtime context metadata (#28135) * Support Lemonade runtime context metadata * Add provider hook for runtime model metadata * Address provider model info review feedback Keep the runtime model info hook duck-typed instead of extending the base model-info class, and avoid importing ModelInfoBase from Ollama common utilities to reduce CodeQL cyclic-import noise. Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev> * Fix CI after staging rebase Relax the Ollama runtime metadata return annotation to match the provider-hook dict response and update the Google Interactions OpenAPI status expectation for the current live spec. Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev> * Normalize Lemonade runtime model metadata * Avoid leaking Ollama metadata auth * Avoid leaking Lemonade metadata auth --------- Co-authored-by: Graham Neubig <398875+neubig@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev> * fix(cato): address guardrail review feedback Use proxy-authenticated user identity, forward moderation hook return values, and ensure streaming sender tasks are cancelled and awaited on exit. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(vertex_ai): route google/gemma-*-maas through partner-models OpenAI path - clone of #28010 (#28846) * fix(vertex_ai): route google/gemma-*-maas through partner-models OpenAI path Fixes #26083 vertex_ai/google/gemma-4-26b-a4b-it-maas previously fell through to the NON_GEMINI route. Per owtaylor's plan on #26083: add the google/gemma- prefix to PartnerModelPrefixes so is_vertex_partner_model picks it up and should_use_openai_handler routes it to the OpenAI-compatible /endpoints/openapi/chat/completions URL. No gemma-detection exclusion needed (the "gemma/" check uses a slash, which google/gemma-... doesn't match). No OpenAIGPTConfig subclass needed — works with the base handler. * fix(vertex_ai): mark gemma-4-26b-a4b-it-maas as vision-capable (empirically verified) * fix(vertex_ai): address greptile feedback — provider category, canonical URL, sync backup * test(vertex_ai): add function-calling and vision pass-through tests for Gemma MaaS Addresses oss-pr-review-agent-shin feedback on PR #28010: supports_function_calling, supports_tool_choice, and supports_vision were marked true but had no tests proving the payloads actually reached the OpenAI-compatible endpoint. Added: - test_gemma_maas_supports_function_calling — verifies the utility returns True when the model_cost entry carries supports_function_calling=true - test_gemma_maas_supports_vision — same for supports_vision - test_vertex_ai_gemma_function_calling_passthrough — verifies tools + tool_choice appear in the JSON body POSTed to /endpoints/openapi/chat/completions - test_vertex_ai_gemma_vision_passthrough — verifies image_url content parts survive transformation and reach the global endpoint URL * fix: Delete uv.lock * test(vertex_ai): add function-calling and vision pass-through tests for Gemma MaaS Addresses oss-pr-review-agent-shin feedback on PR #28010: P1 (patch target): Added a comment explaining why patching litellm.llms.custom_httpx.http_handler.AsyncHTTPHandler is correct — get_async_httpx_client() (defined in http_handler.py) instantiates AsyncHTTPHandler within that module's scope, so the definition-site patch intercepts it. Without the mock the test raises AuthenticationError, confirming it never silently passes. P2 (partner-provider regression guard): Added test_gemma_routes_through_openai_handler() which calls VertexAIPartnerModels.should_use_openai_handler() directly, so if Gemma's routing to VertexPartnerProvider.llama ever changes the URL-shape tests below it become a real regression guard rather than an unanchored unit test. Also added: - test_gemma_maas_supports_function_calling / supports_vision — capability flag checks via patch.dict(litellm.model_cost) - test_vertex_ai_gemma_function_calling_passthrough — tools + tool_choice forwarded in the request body - test_vertex_ai_gemma_vision_passthrough — image_url part survives transformation to the global endpoint Added: - test_gemma_maas_supports_function_calling — verifies the utility returns True when the model_cost entry carries supports_function_calling=true - test_gemma_maas_supports_vision — same for supports_vision - test_vertex_ai_gemma_function_calling_passthrough — verifies tools + tool_choice appear in the JSON body POSTed to /endpoints/openapi/chat/completions - test_vertex_ai_gemma_vision_passthrough — verifies image_url content parts survive transformation and reach the global endpoint URL * fix: proper patch for unit tests --------- Co-authored-by: Iana <iana@Shivakumars-MacBook-Pro.local> * fix(cato): guardrail all completion choices on output When n > 1, only choices[0] was analyzed and redacted. Iterate every Choices entry so block and anonymize actions apply to all completions. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix review * fix(cato_networks): harden output anonymize handling and restructure nested UI routes Guard against empty redacted_output and empty all_redacted_messages from Cato. Restructure nested admin UI HTML exports to index.html so extensionless routes work. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix mypy * fix(cato): guard missing policy_drill_down and all_redacted_messages keys * fix(cato): avoid KeyError bypassing block action on missing analysis_result * fix(cato): preserve non-text message fields during anonymize Rebuild redacted messages from the original messages, overwriting only content, so tool_calls, tool_call_id, name and multimodal fields survive the anonymize action. * fix(cato): preserve trailing messages when fewer redacted messages returned Avoid silently truncating the conversation in _anonymize_request when Cato returns fewer redacted messages than were sent, and isolate the no-api-key config test from a pre-existing CATO_API_KEY environment variable. * fix(cato,model-info): preserve stream block signal on sender teardown; forward api_key in dynamic model-info lookup Suppress ConnectionClosed (alongside CancelledError) when tearing down the Cato streaming sender task so a backend ConnectionClosed cannot mask the original StreamingCallbackError (e.g. a guardrail block) raised by the receive loop. Thread api_key through get_model_info -> _get_model_info_helper so an explicit key reaches a provider's dynamic get_model_info for a caller-supplied api_base. Previously only api_base was forwarded, so authenticated Ollama and Lemonade servers at a custom base could only be queried unauthenticated. * fix(cato): surface mid-stream forwarding errors instead of blocking on recv If the upstream LLM stream errors mid-flight, the sender task dies before sending the terminal done frame, so the consumer would block on websocket.recv() until Cato closes the connection. Race recv against the sender task and raise the stored sender exception promptly as a StreamingCallbackError. * fix(cato): drop spoofable end_user_id from guardrail user identity Only the key/JWT-bound user_email is a trusted identity. end_user_id is resolved from caller-supplied request fields (OpenAI user param, headers, metadata), so an authenticated caller with no bound user_email could set it to another user's email and have LiteLLM forward x-cato-user-email for that victim, poisoning Cato audit and policy attribution. Forward only user_email and omit the header otherwise. * fix(cato): harden output anonymize path against missing content key * fix(cato): fall back to original message when redacted content key is missing * refactor(model-info): drop unused api_key from cached model-info helper _cached_get_model_info_helper is only called by the cost-tracking hot path, which never authenticates, so the api_key parameter was never populated. Keeping it in the lru_cache key offered no benefit and risked fragmenting the high-RPS cache and retaining credential strings per entry. * fix(cato): preserve None content on tool-call-only choices in output hook * fix(ollama): respect static-model guard in OllamaConfig.get_model_info Delegate to OllamaModelInfo.get_model_info so statically-priced Ollama models short-circuit before the /api/show network call instead of hitting the server unconditionally. * fix(lemonade,ollama): treat empty api_key as unset to avoid leaking server creds An empty-string api_key was treated as an explicit key, so it passed the guard meant to keep server-side credentials off caller-supplied bases and then fell back through the env/global key chain. A caller could point api_base at a server they control and send api_key="" to receive the configured provider key in the Authorization header. Gate the credential fallback on the api_key being truthy instead of merely not-None. * fix(cato): inspect and redact Responses-API input, not just messages The guardrail only read data["messages"], so /v1/responses requests, which carry their text in data["input"], reached Cato as an empty message list and bypassed inspection entirely. Send build_inspection_messages(data) so both shapes are analyzed, and write anonymized results back with apply_redacted_messages_back when the request used input. * perf(utils): keep api_key out of get_model_info lru_cache key * fix(cato): propagate ssl_verify to streaming WebSocket connection The streaming hook applied ssl_verify only to the HTTP handler; the websockets.connect() call used default verification, so a custom Cato instance behind TLS with a self-signed cert worked for non-streaming calls but failed every streaming request. Resolve the ssl_verify setting into the connect() ssl argument, mirroring the HTTP handler. * refactor(utils): rename shadowing local in _get_model_info_helper * fix(cato): flatten multimodal chat content before inspection Chat Completions requests whose message content is a multimodal parts array were posted to Cato as the raw OpenAI parts, so text inside content: [{"type":"text", ...}] reached the model without Cato ever inspecting the string. Flatten each message's list content to plain text while keeping the list 1:1 with the request so the index-based redaction write-back stays valid; Responses-API input requests still go through build_inspection_messages. * test(lemonade): clear get_model_info cache around api_base test * fix(cato): inspect and redact Responses-API input even when messages present _inspection_messages returned early once messages was non-empty, so a /v1/responses caller could place benign text in messages and disallowed text in input and have only messages reach Cato while the model used input. Inspect both fields and write anonymize redactions back to input as well as the index-aligned messages. * test(log_db_metrics): assert table_name event_metadata contract log_db_metrics now emits minimal event_metadata via _safe_db_event_metadata (table_name only, function_name/function_kwargs/function_args dropped as redundant with call_type and unsafe to stamp on a span). The success-path test still asserted function_name membership and crashed with TypeError on the None metadata returned when no table_name is passed. Pass a table_name and assert the surfaced contract instead. * fix(cato): inspect and redact completion prompt and Responses-API instructions The Cato guardrail only inspected chat messages and the Responses-API input field, so blocked text placed in the legacy /v1/completions prompt or the /v1/responses instructions field reached the model without ever being sent to Cato. Both fields are now appended as synthetic inspection messages, and the anonymize path slices Cato's redactions back to the field they came from. * fix(cato): serialize non-str/bytes websocket chunks before forwarding * fix(cato): inspect tool descriptions and tool-call arguments * fix(cato): map redacted output by assistant index; restore get_model_info.cache_info * fix(cato): block output even when detection_message is null/empty A block_action returned by Cato on the output hook whose detection_message was null or empty was let through to the caller: the truthiness guard on detection_message skipped the HTTPException and the unblocked response was returned. Raise the HTTPException directly in _handle_block_action_on_output so the output path blocks unconditionally, mirroring the input path. * fix(cato): inspect and redact nested tool param and legacy function descriptions Tool/function parameter descriptions and the legacy functions[] array are forwarded to the model but were not seen by Cato, so blocked text hidden there bypassed inspection and anonymization. Recursively walk every description string in tools[].function and functions[] schemas for both the analyze payload and the anonymize write-back. * fix(cato): traverse schema descriptions iteratively to satisfy recursive detector The nested walk() generator recursed over tool/function JSON schemas with no depth bound, which the recursive_detector code-quality gate rejects. Replace it with an explicit-stack DFS that yields the same (container, key) refs in the same pre-order, so schema description redaction is unchanged. * fix(cato): inspect and redact response_format JSON schema descriptions response_format json_schema descriptions are forwarded to the model, so blocked text hidden in nested schema descriptions could bypass Cato inspection and redaction. Extend the schema-description walk to cover response_format alongside tools and legacy functions. * fix(cato): skip output rewrite when Cato returns no redaction Return None from call_cato_guardrail_on_output on monitor/no-action so the post-call hook only mutates the message when there is an actual redaction, instead of redundantly re-writing the original content. * refactor(utils): resolve explicit api_key model info without the cache Move the model-info build into a non-cached _build_model_info helper and drop api_key from the lru-cached _cached_get_model_info signature. Both cached helpers now take the same (model, provider, api_base) key and never forward api_key, while explicit per-caller keys are resolved through the builder directly instead of reaching into the cache wrapper's __wrapped__. * fix(cato): inspect and redact non-description schema string values Tool, function and response_format JSON schemas forward more than just description text to the model. enum, const, default, examples and title values are sent verbatim, so blocked content hidden in any of them bypassed Cato inspection and redaction. Walk those schema string values alongside descriptions on both the inspection and anonymize paths. * fix(model-info): surface swallowed dynamic model-info errors The provider-specific get_model_info dispatch falls back to the static cost map when a provider's dynamic lookup raises, which is intentional graceful degradation. Previously the exception was discarded with a bare debug line, so a real failure (e.g. a provider whose get_model_info signature does not accept api_key) was invisible. Log the exception at warning level with the model and provider context so the fallback is diagnosable. * fix(cato): inspect and redact Responses API output in post-call hook The post-call success hook only handled ModelResponse, so /v1/responses (which returns a ResponsesAPIResponse) bypassed the Cato output guardrail. Extract and inspect/redact every output_text content block and function-call arguments string, blocking on a block action, so generated text cannot escape inspection by using the Responses API. * chore: reset _experimental/out folder * chore(ui): remove orphaned prebuilt dashboard chunk files The _experimental/out manifests are byte-identical to the base branch, so the served dashboard already matches base. 436 unreferenced Next.js chunk files had accumulated in the directory and are not loaded by any manifest; removing them restores the committed UI artifacts to the base build and drops the artifact churn from this PR's diff. * fix(guardrails,ollama): forward ssl_verify to Cato init and raise_for_status on /api/show --------- Co-authored-by: Alex Yaroslavsky <trexinc@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Graham Neubig <neubig@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Graham Neubig <398875+neubig@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: openhands <openhands@all-hands.dev> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Piotr Placzko <piotr@icep-design.com> Co-authored-by: Iana <iana@Shivakumars-MacBook-Pro.local> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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68952a55d7 |
docs(agents): clarify when to create new test files (#29472)
* docs(agents): clarify when to create new test files in CLAUDE.md Document that bug fixes should extend existing mapped test files while new features may add files under the mirrored tests/test_litellm/ layout. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * docs(agents): clarify test file naming conventions in CLAUDE.md Address Greptile feedback: document test_<filename>.py vs descriptive test_*_transformation.py patterns and when to match existing names. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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c233cbbc2a |
fix(batches): skip unnecessary batch input file reads (#29114)
* fix(batches): skip unnecessary batch input file reads Skip expensive pre-read of batch input files when no batch limits apply and model allowlist checks are not required, and decode model-embedded file IDs before file-content fetches to prevent upstream 404s. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(batch-rate-limiter): prevent user metadata flag from bypassing model allowlist The skip_batch_input_file_rate_limiting flag in litellm_metadata is user-controllable for batch requests (request-body metadata lands in litellm_metadata via LITELLM_METADATA_ROUTES). Honoring it unconditionally also skipped _enforce_batch_file_model_access, letting a restricted key submit a JSONL referencing models outside its allowlist. Only honor the metadata-based skip when the key has no model allowlist to enforce. Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(batch_rate_limiter): enforce model access check before honoring skip paths Admin-configured skips (disable_batch_input_file_rate_limiting, skip_batch_input_file_rate_limiting_for_models/_for_providers) and the no-applicable-rate-limits short-circuit previously bypassed _enforce_batch_file_model_access. A key with a restricted model allowlist could therefore submit a batch JSONL referencing models outside its allowlist whenever any of these skip paths fired, and the provider-skip path was attacker-controllable via the request body's custom_llm_provider field. Hoist the model-access guard to the top so restricted keys always have their JSONL validated regardless of which skip would otherwise apply. Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(batch_rate_limiter): wildcard model bypass + fail-open embedded model creds - _key_requires_batch_model_access_check: check '*' / all-proxy-models before access_group_ids so wildcard keys skip the JSONL download. - _resolve_batch_input_file_fetch_params: wrap embedded-model get_credentials_for_model in try/except HTTPException, mirroring the request-model fallback path, and always decode the file id. Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * perf(batch_rate_limiter): reuse rate-limit descriptors across skip check and counter increment * test(batch_rate_limiter): cover skip-path and file-fetch helpers Add unit tests for the batch rate limiter's new skip/routing helpers so the diff's patch coverage no longer depends on the CircleCI batches job, whose coverage upload is blocked when an unrelated Bedrock integration test aborts the run. Covers _get_batch_routing_model, _matches_skip_list, _key_requires_batch_model_access_check, _has_applicable_batch_rate_limits, _should_skip_batch_input_file_processing, _resolve_batch_input_file_fetch_params, the descriptor-reuse path of _check_and_increment_batch_counters, and the non-bytes file content guard in count_input_file_usage. * fix(batch_rate_limiter): resolve provider skip from trusted deployment creds Resolve the batch provider from router deployment credentials instead of the user-supplied custom_llm_provider request field, so an unrestricted key cannot spoof a skip-listed provider to bypass batch rate limiting. Strengthen the provider-skip test to assert the file download and descriptor work were short-circuited, and add a test that a spoofed provider still falls through to rate-limit evaluation. * fix(batch_rate_limiter): guard model-embedded credential lookup on llm_router presence * test(batch_rate_limiter): drive real no-skip fetch path and pin wildcard+access-group predicate The spoofed-provider test configured empty descriptors, so the no-limits shortcut skipped the file fetch and the assertion only proved the provider allow-list did not short-circuit before descriptor evaluation. Give the key an applicable rate limit so the only thing that can prevent the fetch is the provider skip, then assert afile_content is awaited and the counters are incremented; the spoofed custom_llm_provider must not skip processing. Also cover the wildcard / all-proxy-models plus access_group_ids combination in the model-access predicate so the wildcard-wins behavior is locked down. * fix(batch_rate_limiter): drop client-controlled skip flag to close quota bypass The litellm_metadata.skip_batch_input_file_rate_limiting flag was read straight from the request body, so any caller whose key had unrestricted model access could send it and skip the input-file download, token count, and RPM/TPM reservation, bypassing their batch rate limits. Skip decisions now derive only from server-controlled general_settings. * fix(batch_rate_limiter): match per-model skip on file-bound model only The per-model skip resolved its model from _get_batch_routing_model, which prefers the client-supplied top-level model field. That field only selects routing credentials; the models a batch actually runs are the body.model entries in the input JSONL. An unrestricted key could therefore name a skip-listed deployment at the top level while routing a different, same-provider model through the file, skipping the download, token count and rate-limit reservation to bypass batch RPM/TPM limits. Match the per-model skip against the file-bound model only (model-embedded file id or unified managed file target), which is fixed when the file is created and reflects the model the batch runs. The provider skip keeps using the routing model since an admin opting out of a whole provider already accepts any of that provider's models. * fix(batch_rate_limiter): drop forgeable per-model skip to close quota bypass The per-model skip matched skip_batch_input_file_rate_limiting_for_models against the model bound to the input file id. That model comes from decode_model_from_file_id / the unified file id, both unsigned base64 the caller fully controls, so a caller could re-encode an accessible provider file id with a skip-listed model while the JSONL still routes rate-limited body.model entries and bypass the batch RPM/TPM counters. The models a batch actually runs are its JSONL body.model entries, which cannot be known without reading the file, so no caller-influenced model identifier can safely gate a skip. Remove the per-model skip entirely. The provider skip stays because the provider is resolved from trusted deployment credentials and the batch is constrained to run on that provider; the global disable and no-applicable-limits skips stay because they do not depend on caller input. * fix(batch_rate_limiter): warn when no-op per-model skip key is configured * test(batch_rate_limiter): patch llm_router so model-embedded credential-error test hits fallback * fix(batch_rate_limiter): resolve provider skip from file-bound model create_batch routes a model-embedded or unified file id on the model bound to that file and ignores the top-level model, so deriving the provider skip from the top-level model first let a caller point model at a skip-listed provider while the file routed a rate-limited one, skipping counter enforcement. Resolve the routing model from the file binding first, matching the batch endpoint. --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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609e1e9763 |
fix(ui): render caller-supplied filter options in caller order (LIT-3151) (#29462)
FilterComponent iterated a hardcoded orderedFilters whitelist instead of the options prop, so any consumer whose filter names were not on that list rendered nothing. The Tool Policies page passes "Input Policy", "Output Policy", "Team Name" and "Key Name", none of which were whitelisted, so its Filters panel opened to an empty area. Drop the whitelist and render the options the caller passes, in the order they pass them, so each page owns its own filter set and ordering. The Logs page array is reordered to match its prior on-screen order; VirtualKeys and TeamVirtualKeys already matched the old whitelist order and are unaffected. |
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1cce49b9d0 |
fix(vector-stores): support engines URL for Vertex AI Search (#27885)
Adds optional vertex_engine_id field to vertex_ai/search_api so users can route through a Discovery Engine search app instead of the data store directly. Required for website, healthcare, and connector-based data stores that return FAILED_PRECONDITION on the existing dataStores URL. Existing data-store-direct callers are unaffected. Resolves LIT-3036 |
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45d41f4104 |
ci(release): create stable/X.Y.x line branch on X.Y.0 tags (#29457)
Each patch release currently spawns an ad-hoc patch/v1.84.N branch that exists only to base the next patch's cherry-picks on, leaving stale per-patch branches behind and making "what is queued for the next 1.84.x" hard to answer. Switch to one long-lived line branch per minor, stable/X.Y.x, created automatically the first time we tag X.Y.0 on that minor, and tagged on for each subsequent patch. The gate is ^v?(\d+)\.(\d+)\.0$, so rc / dev / nightly / .post / patch tags all skip cleanly; the line branch is created exactly once per minor. Existing release/<tag> behavior is untouched (additive step), and RC patches keep their current patch/v1.87.0rcN flow until that gets its own follow-up. |
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c908505e6a |
fix(proxy): omit OpenAI [DONE] on google-genai streamGenerateContent (#29426)
* fix(proxy): omit OpenAI [DONE] on google-genai streamGenerateContent google-genai SDK uses ?alt=sse and cannot parse the proxy's trailing data: [DONE] chunk. Skip that terminator for agenerate_content_stream. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(proxy): address Greptile review on google-genai stream fix Always yield stream error_message; only gate data: [DONE] on the skip flag. Set _litellm_skip_openai_stream_done in google_endpoints instead of common_request_processing. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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29270a36a5 |
fix(anthropic, fireworks): inline legacy $ref defs in tool schemas (#28646)
Tools sourced from MCP servers and OpenAPI-derived gateways (AWS
AgentCore + Google Workspace, DevRev MCP, etc.) frequently carry
JSON Schemas backed by legacy ``definitions`` (draft-04) or OpenAPI
``components.schemas`` instead of ``$defs`` (JSON Schema 2020-12).
Anthropic and Fireworks only resolve ``$defs``. Their tool-schema
filters silently drop the unrecognised def blocks while keeping the
``$ref`` pointers, so the upstream rejects the request:
- Anthropic: ``tools.0.input_schema: Invalid tool schema, $ref is
not supported``
- Fireworks: ``Error resolving schema reference '#/definitions/...'``
(PointerToNowhere)
Add ``unpack_legacy_defs(schema, *, copy=False)`` next to the existing
``unpack_defs`` -- a single helper that pops draft-04 ``definitions``
and OpenAPI ``components.schemas`` and feeds them through
``unpack_defs`` in place. ``$defs`` is left untouched (resolved
natively). ``copy=True`` deep-copies first when there is actually work
to do, used by Anthropic so the caller's tool dict is preserved.
Anthropic ``_map_tool_helper`` calls ``unpack_legacy_defs(_, copy=True)``;
Fireworks ``_transform_tools`` calls ``unpack_legacy_defs(params)``
in place.
Refs: https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/26692
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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65b6e04da6 |
fix: stop use_chat_completions_api flag from leaking into provider request body (#29447)
* fix: stop use_chat_completions_api flag from leaking into provider request body
use_chat_completions_api is a LiteLLM control flag that forces the
/responses -> /chat/completions bridge. It was missing from
all_litellm_params, so get_non_default_completion_params treated it as a
model-specific param and forwarded it to the upstream provider. A
model-level "use_chat_completions_api: true" in the proxy config therefore
reached the chat-completions path and was rejected by strict providers
(OpenAI/Anthropic) with HTTP 400 for an unknown body field.
Register it as a known internal param so it is stripped on every path
(completion, the responses bridge that calls litellm.completion, and
filter_out_litellm_params).
Adds a regression test driving litellm.completion() with a mocked OpenAI
client that asserts the flag never reaches the request body.
* test: clarify extra_body assertion in use_chat_completions_api leak test
Replace the misleading 'not in ... or {}' precedence idiom with an explicit
parenthesized guard that also handles extra_body being None.
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8190ff4d86 | feat(otel): allowlist team_metadata sub-keys promoted to baggage (#29442) | ||
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fe108580d7 | fix(datadog): split oversized batches on 413 instead of re-queueing forever (#29444) | ||
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f7c029d4a0 | fix: add mistral/ministral-8b-latest to model price map (#29453) | ||
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76bf280d0a |
test(responses): bump deprecated gemini-3-pro-preview to gemini-3.1-pro-preview (#29433)
Google sunset gemini-3-pro-preview on the Gemini API, so the AI Studio
responses-API thought-signature tests started failing with a 404
("This model models/gemini-3-pro-preview is no longer available").
Point both tests at the current gemini-3.1-pro-preview model, which
litellm already has registered and which supports the function calling,
reasoning, and native streaming these tests exercise.
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28c0d8579b |
chore(deps): bump deps (#29373)
* bump: version 0.1.41 → 0.1.42 * uv lock |
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54ed5a4eb5 |
fix(e2e): tolerate trailing slash in SERVER_ROOT_PATH login redirect (#29369)
The Next.js admin UI is exported with trailingSlash: true, so the proxy
serves /ui/login at /ui/login/index.html and 308s /ui/login → /ui/login/.
The waitForURL predicate used endsWith("/ui/login"), which never matched
the canonicalized URL and timed out after 15s.
This was masked until the build artifacts were regenerated against the
AuthContext fix: the prior bundles still hit the racy redirect path that
fired before proxyBaseUrl was populated, producing /ui/login (no prefix,
no proxy round-trip, no trailing slash) which fortuitously satisfied the
predicate. The first PR to ship the corrected bundle exposed the
assertion bug.
Switch the predicate to includes("/ui/login"); the prefix assertion below
still validates the SERVER_ROOT_PATH preservation that is the actual
contract under test.
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80cf50dedb | fix(v3 limiter): cap no-max_tokens TPM floor at smallest configured limit (#28805) | ||
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8b16b61114 | chore: update Next.js build artifacts (2026-05-31 02:04 UTC, node v20.20.2) (#29366) | ||
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117136cccc | fix(openai-moderation): wire streaming flags through to unified dispatcher (#27324) | ||
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f0ebfb2a1b |
fix(ui): break logout redirect loop across origins (#29360)
When the user has visited both the dev UI (e.g. localhost:3000) and the
proxy UI (e.g. localhost:4000) in the same tab, logging out from the dev
origin produced an infinite logout/login redirect.
The proxy-side LoginPage's "is the user still authenticated?" check
was reading getCookie("token"), which falls back to sessionStorage when
document.cookie has no token. The cross-origin clearTokenCookies() call
from the dev origin can clear cookies on the shared hostname, but cannot
reach sessionStorage on the proxy origin (sessionStorage is per-origin),
so the fallback returned a stale token and LoginPage interpreted the
user as logged in, redirecting back to the dev origin. Dev origin then
saw no cookie and redirected to LoginPage, repeating ~20x per second.
This change introduces getCookieFromDocument(), a cookie-only read with
no sessionStorage fallback, and uses it in LoginPage's already-logged-in
check. The HttpOnly-reverse-proxy defense from PR #23532 is unaffected:
storeLoginToken still writes both the JS cookie at /ui and the
sessionStorage backup, and getCookie still falls back for callers that
want the full read path.
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a9cc6ed68c |
test(e2e): cover PROXY_LOGOUT_URL redirect on Logout (#29080)
* test(e2e): cover PROXY_LOGOUT_URL redirect on Logout Env-gated spec mirroring the existing serverRootPathRedirect pattern: when the proxy is booted with PROXY_LOGOUT_URL set, clicking Logout in the navbar must navigate to that external URL. The standard run_e2e.sh exports an empty value so the rest of the suite is unaffected; this spec self-skips unless the env var is populated. * test(e2e): run PROXY_LOGOUT_URL spec in the suite + harden logout assertions Boot the e2e proxy with PROXY_LOGOUT_URL set (job-level env in CircleCI and run_e2e.sh) so proxyLogoutUrl.spec.ts actually runs instead of self-skipping. Nothing else in the suite performs a logout, so this only affects the behavior under test. Harden the spec to verify the logout flow rather than a URL substring: - wait for /sso/get/ui_settings before clicking so logoutUrl is populated (otherwise window.location.href = "" silently reloads same-origin) - assert a token cookie exists first, and is cleared after logout - locate the dropdown via getByRole instead of internal antd CSS classes - stub the external destination and assert on URL origin + path prefix * test(e2e): assert exact PROXY_LOGOUT_URL on logout redirect Replace the origin + startsWith(pathname) checks with a single normalized href comparison. With PROXY_LOGOUT_URL=https://www.example.com the path was "/", so startsWith("/") matched any path and left path/query/hash unchecked. Comparing normalized hrefs pins scheme, host, port, path, query and hash while still tolerating the browser's trailing-slash/default-port normalization. |
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7d1bd9d9f4 |
fix(reset_budget): write only {spend, budget_reset_at} and stop pre-zeroing counter (#29358)
* fix(reset_budget): write only {spend, budget_reset_at} and stop pre-zeroing counter
ResetBudgetJob's batched update_data path shipped the full key/user/team
model on each reset. Prisma rejects object_permission_id and budget_limits
on the update input type, so any row carrying those fields detonated the
entire batch -- spend never reset, budget_reset_at never advanced. After
v1.84.0 started populating object_permission_id on UI-created keys, this
fires routinely.
_reset_budget_common also zeroed the cross-pod spend counter before the
DB write, so failed resets left enforcement reading 0 from the counter
while the DB still held the over-budget spend, admitting requests past
the cap until the counter naturally re-saturated from new reservations.
Switch the write to per-row narrow updates ({spend, budget_reset_at})
via db.batch_, and move the counter invalidation out of
_reset_budget_common so it only fires after the DB write commits. On
DB-write failure the counter is left untouched, enforcement continues
to block, and the next scheduler tick can retry without leaving a
bypass window.
Fixes #27730.
* fix(reset_budget): address Greptile review on #29358
- Strengthen the bypass-half regression test: replace the for-loop over
call_args_list (vacuously true when empty) with assert_not_called(),
so the test would actually flag a re-introduction of counter-zeroing
via any code path.
- Add the same explanatory docstring on _write_user_reset_updates and
_write_team_reset_updates that _write_key_reset_updates already has,
so all three helpers point future maintainers at #27730.
* test(reset_budget): update test_proxy_budget_reset for new batch-write path
Same shape as the previous test_reset_budget_job.py update: keys/users/teams
now write through prisma.db.batch_().<table>.update, not update_data, so the
tests need a batcher mock and updated assertions. Adds:
- _wire_batcher_for_test helper that returns a list which accumulates per-row
batch updates captured from prisma_client.db.batch_().
- _attrify helper that wraps dict fixtures so getattr(item, "token") works
alongside the dict item-access the fake_reset_* mocks rely on. The new
narrow-write helpers use getattr to pull out the row's id, and would
silently skip plain dicts otherwise.
- Updates 3 partial_failure tests to assert against the batch-call list
(rows by id, payload contains only {spend, budget_reset_at}) instead of
update_data.assert_awaited_once + data_list inspection.
- Updates test_reset_budget_continues_other_categories_on_failure: only
budget + enduser still flow through update_data; key/user/team go through
the batch path now.
- Wires the batcher mock into 3 service_logger_*_success tests so commit()
is actually awaitable and the success hook fires.
These tests were silently passing locally only because the editable install
in .venv pointed at the main repo, not the worktree — running pytest with
PYTHONPATH overridden to the worktree (matching CI) reproduces the failures.
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90b5104475 |
feat(mcp/auth): additive key access-group grants + opt-in member assignment (#29313)
* fix(mcp): make key.access_group_ids grants additive over team ceiling A key whose unified access_group_ids grant a private MCP server was having that grant intersected against its team's MCP ceiling, so a key in a team scoped to other servers (or with no own scope) lost the granted server entirely. Resolve access_group_ids once as ungated additive grants and union them on top of the key/team ceiling instead of folding them into the key scope that gets intersected. * test(mcp): align key access-group tests with additive-grant model The previous commit moved key.access_group_ids resolution out of the intersected key ceiling (_get_allowed_mcp_servers_for_key) and into the ungated additive grant path (_get_key_access_group_mcp_server_extras), unioned on top of the team ceiling. Five tests from #28890/#29195 still asserted the old gated / in-key-scope contract and failed: - _get_allowed_mcp_servers_for_key now returns the object_permission ceiling only and never resolves access_group_ids; two tests now assert the group resolver is not called from that path (with and without an object_permission present). - The extras path is ungated, so a group whose assigned_team_ids / assigned_key_ids exclude the caller still contributes its servers. - The end-to-end test asserts the grant surfaces via the extras path rather than the base key path. - Dropped test_key_access_group_ids_empty_returns_no_extras; the empty case is already covered by the extras family's no-groups test. * feat(auth): gate member access-group assignment on keys behind opt-in Non-admin team members could attach access_group_ids to keys they create or update, letting them self-grant resources (MCP servers/models) the team admin never intended. Add an opt-in KEY_ACCESS_GROUP_ASSIGNMENT team-member permission (default-deny) enforced at /key/generate and /key/update; proxy and team admins bypass. Surfaces automatically as a checkbox in the team Member Permissions UI. * fix(auth): gate access-group assignment on /key/regenerate too RegenerateKeyRequest inherits access_group_ids and prepare_key_update_data persists it, so a non-admin key owner could self-grant access groups by regenerating. Apply the same opt-in member gate using the existing key's team. * test(auth): cover member access-group gate and additive MCP grants Add unit tests for enforce_member_can_assign_access_groups (deny without opt-in, allow with opt-in, and proxy-admin / team-admin / non-team-key bypasses) and for _get_key_access_group_mcp_server_extras (no-auth and no-resolved-servers return empty, resolved ids are expanded, errors degrade to no grants). |
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dc4f5b12ef |
fix(proxy): enforce allowed_passthrough_routes for auth=true pass-thr… (#29256)
* fix(proxy): enforce allowed_passthrough_routes for auth=true pass-through
Pass-through endpoints with auth=true were injected into openai_routes,
so teams with openai_routes access bypassed per-team allowed_passthrough_routes.
Gate auth-enforced pass-through at JWT, virtual-key, and non-admin route checks.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(proxy): clarify JWT passthrough denial
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(proxy): make pass-through auth checks method-aware
Prevent allowlist bypass when the same path is registered with different auth settings per HTTP method.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Fix passthrough route auth checks
* fix(proxy): reject unregistered pass-through HTTP methods
Enforce method-aware JWT checks and return 405 when stale FastAPI routes accept requests outside the current pass-through registry.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(proxy): remove duplicate request_method in JWT team lookup
Fixes SyntaxError on proxy startup caused by passing request_method twice to find_team_with_model_access.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Fix passthrough route auth enforcement
* fix(proxy): raise passthrough-specific 403 directly in virtual-key path
* fix(proxy): load team for RBAC role-claim JWT passthrough gating
* Revert "chore(tests): migrate Bedrock CI to AWS account 941277531214 (#28728)" (#29326)
This reverts the Bedrock CI account migration (#28728). The original account
(888602223428) was put under an AWS security restriction after a leaked key
and has since been reactivated, while the replacement account (941277531214)
lacks access to several models the suites exercise (legacy Bedrock Claude 3
models, Cohere, Nova Canvas image gen, Bedrock batch inference, and flagship
Opus). Pointing CI back at the reactivated account restores that coverage.
This is the exact inverse of #28728: all hardcoded 941277531214 references go
back to 888602223428 (provisioned/imported-model ARNs, AgentCore runtime ARNs
and their suffixes, batch execution role ARN, and the example proxy config),
the S3 buckets revert to litellm-proxy and load-testing-oct, the guardrail IDs
revert to wf0hkdb5x07f and ff6ujrregl1q, the SageMaker endpoint and Knowledge
Base revert to their original ids, and the live-call tests go back to the
legacy model strings. The grid_spec fail_reason workaround for the unentitled
Opus cells is dropped while keeping the unrelated bedrock_effort_ceiling field
added after the migration.
The CircleCI AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY env vars still point at
941277531214 and must be set to the reactivated account's fresh credentials
separately via the CircleCI API; AWS_REGION_NAME stays us-west-2.
(cherry picked from commit
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ba2699740c |
feat(pass_through): extend passthrough_managed_object_ids to Azure (#29160)
* feat(pass_through): extend passthrough_managed_object_ids to Azure
Adds managed ID minting/resolution for Azure passthrough endpoints
(/azure/...) alongside the existing OpenAI passthrough support.
Key changes:
- pass_through_endpoints.py: detect azure/azure_ai custom_llm_provider
(string or enum) to set _is_managed_id_provider and _managed_id_provider;
both INPUT and OUTPUT rewrite blocks now fire for Azure.
- llm_passthrough_endpoints.py: forward custom_llm_provider into
create_pass_through_route so it reaches pass_through_request (was None).
- managed_id_rewriter.py: extend _PASSTHROUGH_PREFIX_RE and _canonical_path
to strip /azure/openai prefix and add /v1/ for Azure paths that omit it;
add ("azure", method, path) entries to BUILTIN_OUTPUT_ID_FIELD_MAP for
files and batches endpoints.
- managed_id_codec.py / types/utils.py: supporting codec and enum constant.
- proxy_server.py: register llm_passthrough_router before batches_router to
prevent route collision for /openai_passthrough/* paths.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(pass_through): remove unused imports for ruff F401
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(pass_through): satisfy mypy for optional parsed_body
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(pass_through): compute query params string after managed-ID rewrite
Move requested_query_params_str computation to after the managed-ID
input rewrite block so logging_url reflects the rewritten raw-provider
query params actually sent upstream, instead of the original
managed IDs.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* Add support for managed ids for passthrough responses api
* Add support for list batches and list files
* style: run Black on passthrough managed ID files
Fix CI formatting for managed_id_rewriter.py and pass_through_endpoints.py.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(passthrough): parse json file_object and implement before-cursor pagination
- Parse row.file_object via json.loads when Prisma returns it as a string;
mirrors openai_files_endpoints/common_utils.py so list responses keep all
stored detail fields (status, timestamps, etc.).
- Implement the previously-parsed-but-unused 'before' cursor for list
pagination by flipping fetch order to ascending with a 'gt' bound on
created_at, then reversing rows so the response stays newest-first.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* Remove logger
* refactor: split list_passthrough_ids_from_db to fix PLR0915
Extract pagination, fetch, and serialization helpers so the main list
function stays under the statement limit without changing behavior.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: scope passthrough managed ID dedup and list by provider
Validate embedded provider before reusing deduped file/object rows so
OpenAI and Azure cannot share the same managed ID for an identical raw ID.
Filter list responses to rows whose managed IDs decode to the current
provider, with over-fetch scanning when needed.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): cap pagination trim at effective limit
When raw_limit > 100, fetch_limit is capped at 101 (one extra row to
detect has_more), but trimming with rows[:raw_limit] failed to drop
the sentinel row. Use the capped effective limit instead.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix: cross-provider object collision and fail-closed list error handling
Greptile P1: move provider check before access check in _mint_or_reuse_object
so a cross-provider raw ID collision (OpenAI and Azure share the same batch_
ID) falls through to mint a new provider-scoped row instead of raising 404.
Veria-ai medium: _fetch_provider_scoped_list_rows now always returns
(page, has_more) — DB errors break out of the scan loop and return matched
rows so far. list_passthrough_ids_from_db never returns None for a recognised
list route, so the caller can never fall through to the upstream provider.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: namespace passthrough model_object_id by provider to prevent unique violation
Store model_object_id as 'passthrough:{provider}:{raw_id}' instead of the
bare raw ID so OpenAI and Azure can each own a row for the same raw batch ID
without hitting the @unique constraint. Dedup lookup uses the same namespaced
key so it is implicitly provider-scoped and the _managed_id_matches_provider
check is no longer needed on the object path.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: gate list interception on managed_files hook like input/output rewrites
Without the hook no managed IDs are minted so the DB is empty. Intercepting
GET /v1/files without the hook returned an empty list and hid the caller's
real upstream files/batches. Matches the guard used by the input and output
rewrite blocks.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: set has_more=True when scan cap is hit with a full final DB batch
When max_scans (20) is exhausted and the last DB page was full-sized,
there are almost certainly more rows beyond the scan window. Track
last_batch_full across iterations so the scan_cap_hit condition sets
has_more=True in that case, preventing silent pagination truncation in
high-mixed-provider pools.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): scope pagination cursor lookup to caller-owned rows
Prevent a cross-tenant timing oracle by constraining the after/before
cursor row lookup to the caller's owner_filter, and cover the real Azure
responses path form (no /v1/) in tests.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): align passthrough list metadata with direct GET
Persist upstream file metadata when minting a managed file ID and rewrite
nested batch file IDs before snapshotting the object, so DB-served file/batch
list responses return the same fields and managed IDs as a direct endpoint
GET.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): degrade to raw id on cross-owner object collision
The OUTPUT (mint) path of _mint_or_reuse_object raised HTTPException(404)
when a dedup hit on the namespaced model_object_id belonged to a different
owner, converting a successful upstream batch/response creation into a 404
for the caller. Two upstream accounts under one provider name can issue the
same raw id, so this is reachable in multi-tenant deployments.
Return the caller's raw id unmanaged instead: the upstream create already
succeeded, a new managed row can't be minted (model_object_id is @unique),
and reusing the other owner's managed id would later fail the access check.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): scope list cursor by provider and cap body-rewrite recursion depth
* perf(managed_id_rewriter): push batch list provider scope to DB and anchor canonical-path prefix
Object (batch) list rows store model_object_id as passthrough:{provider}:{raw},
so the provider filter is now applied at the indexed DB column, collapsing the
application-layer multi-scan to a single query for that table. File rows keep
the decode-based scan since they have no provider column.
Anchor the canonical-path prefix regex at a path boundary so routes such as
/openai_realtime/... are no longer mis-stripped.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): refresh stored batch snapshot on reuse
The dedup-reuse path in _mint_or_reuse_object returned the existing managed id
without updating the stored file_object, so DB-served list responses kept the
creation-time snapshot and showed null output_file_id/error_file_id even after
the batch completed. Refresh the snapshot when an owned row is reused so the
list reflects the batch's latest state.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): deny cross-owner object access on retrieve/cancel/delete
Returning the raw id when can_access_resource fails only made sense for create
responses, where the caller's own upstream create succeeded under a raw id that a
different owner already holds. On retrieve/cancel/delete the caller reaches that
branch only by supplying another tenant's raw id (which bypasses the managed-id
input gate), so echoing the upstream object back leaked it cross-tenant. Restrict
the raw fallback to create routes and return 404 otherwise.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): deny cross-owner file access on retrieve/delete
_mint_or_reuse_file scoped the raw file dedup lookup to the current caller, so a
raw file-... id belonging to another tenant was never found and the OUTPUT path
minted a fresh managed id for that same upstream file under the caller. A raw id
only reaches this path by skipping the managed-id input gate (raw provider ids
are opt-out), so a different-owner row means the caller is touching someone
else's file. Look up flat_model_file_ids globally and run can_access_resource;
deny with 404 on retrieve/delete and leave the raw id unmanaged on create, which
mirrors the cross-owner handling already in _mint_or_reuse_object.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): deterministic provider-scoped file dedup
Replace the unscoped find_first in _mint_or_reuse_file with a find_many
ordered by created_at and an application-layer provider filter. The file
table has no provider column, so a raw file id shared across OpenAI and
Azure could map to one row per provider; find_first then picked a row
non-deterministically and, on a provider mismatch, minted a fresh managed
row on every call, accumulating duplicates. Selecting the oldest matching
same-provider row the caller can access keeps reuse stable and prevents
duplicate rows while preserving the cross-tenant deny/leave-raw behaviour.
* refactor(pass_through): scope passthrough managed IDs on the explicit provider
Move the openai/azure detection out of pass_through_request into
resolve_passthrough_managed_id_provider in llms/base_llm/managed_resources,
and key managed-ID rewriting on the forwarded custom_llm_provider rather than
the upstream URL's EndpointType. The helper documents why azure and azure_ai
collapse to one "azure" scope (they share the same Azure OpenAI files/batches
surface, so an ID minted on one must resolve on the other) and returns None for
any other provider so a third-party OpenAI-compatible endpoint never triggers
managed-ID minting.
Add TestManagedIdProviderScope covering the azure_ai -> azure collapse and the
non-openai/azure exclusion.
* test(log_db_metrics): assert sanitized event_metadata contract
test_log_db_metrics_success still asserted the legacy event_metadata
shape (function_name/function_kwargs/function_args), which #28909
intentionally removed so that live Prisma clients, OTel spans, and
secrets never land on a service-log span. The decorator now emits only
a sanitized payload: None when no table_name is present, and
{"table_name": ...} when it is. Update the test to verify both branches
of that contract.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): page provider-scoped file list by offset
The file list scan advanced its cursor with a strict created_at boundary.
When several rows shared a created_at timestamp and a non-matching provider
row sat on the page boundary, the next query skipped the remaining rows at
that timestamp, dropping matching files from the response. Page by a stable
offset over a total order (created_at plus the unique id column) so tied
rows are never skipped or repeated.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): push file-list provider scope to the DB
The file-list helper had no provider column to query, so it scanned the
table and filtered by decoding each managed ID in the application layer,
capped at 20 pages. For an admin with a large mixed-provider file pool
that cap could truncate a page.
Mint now writes a _passthrough_provider:{provider} marker into
flat_model_file_ids, giving the file table the same DB-queryable provider
scope object rows already get from the namespaced model_object_id. The
list helper pushes the scope into the query so a single round-trip serves
the page. The scan loop, the offset paging, and the cap are gone, so pages
can no longer truncate, leak the other provider, or skip rows that share a
created_at timestamp.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): deny raw provider IDs that map to another tenant's managed resource
Clients only ever receive managed IDs on passthrough, so a raw file/batch/response ID for another tenant's managed object can only be recovered by decoding that tenant's managed ID. Raw IDs were forwarded upstream untouched (deliberate opt-out), which on a retrieve/cancel/delete executed upstream before the response-side ownership check ran, leaking a cross-tenant action.
Guard raw provider IDs on the input path: when a raw file-/batch_/resp_ ID resolves to a managed row the caller cannot access, return 404 before forwarding. Genuinely unmanaged raw IDs (no DB row) and IDs the caller owns are left untouched, preserving the opt-out.
* test(managed_id_rewriter): cover azure_ai and pre-versioned azure passthrough paths
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): fall back to raw id when persistence fails
A DB persistence failure after a successful upstream create left the
client holding a minted managed ID with no backing row, so every later
resolve returned 404 and the resource was permanently unreachable. Mint
the managed ID only when the row is stored; on persistence failure return
the raw provider id, matching the no-persistence-available fallback, so
the freshly-created resource stays reachable.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): log only rewritten query param keys
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): use compound (created_at, id) list cursor boundary
A timestamp-only lt/gt cursor boundary skips list rows that share the
cursor row's created_at across a page boundary, silently dropping them.
Compare the unique id (the secondary sort key) alongside created_at so
the page walk stays complete when timestamps tie.
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): converge concurrent object creates on one managed id
* fix(managed_id_rewriter): bound raw-id guard DB lookups per request
The INPUT guard fired one DB lookup for every file-/batch_/resp_ prefixed
string in the path, query, and body. The file-id guard is an unindexed
array-containment scan over LiteLLM_ManagedFileTable, so an authenticated
caller could amplify a single passthrough request into thousands of
full-table scans by packing a body with id-shaped strings.
De-dupe raw ids within a request and cap the distinct guard lookups,
failing closed with 400 instead of skipping the guard. Legitimate callers
hold managed ids (resolved via an indexed unified_*_id lookup, not the
guard), so the cap only trips under abuse.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
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7ca796beb1 |
fix(proxy): restrict vector store index create/delete to proxy admins (#29202)
* fix(proxy): restrict vector store index create/delete to proxy admins Prevent non-admin API keys from registering indexes via POST /v1/indexes or deleting Azure AI Search indexes through managed pass-through routes. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(proxy): tighten vector store index lifecycle checks Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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4c3efe9c7c |
fix(guardrails): return HTTP 400 for litellm content filter blocks (#28418)
* fix(guardrails): return HTTP 400 for litellm content filter blocks Align litellm_content_filter hard rejects with the standard guardrail block status code so clients receive 400 instead of 403. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(guardrails): return HTTP 400 for custom code guardrail blocks Pre-call custom code guardrail blocks now raise HTTPException(400) instead of using the passthrough ModifyResponseException path that returned a synthetic 200 response. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(guardrails): preserve custom code passthrough blocks Keep standalone custom code guardrail blocks on the passthrough contract while covering policy pipeline block handling for passthrough-style guardrail interventions. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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152b1177e5 |
test(reasoning-effort-grid): cover Claude Opus 4.8 across provider routes (#29327)
* test(logging): align DB metrics event_metadata assertions with safe redaction PR #28909 hardened log_db_metrics to emit a minimal, non-sensitive event_metadata (only table_name when present, otherwise None) instead of dumping function_name, function_kwargs, and function_args onto the span. The test in test_log_db_redis_services was not updated and still asserted "function_name" in event_metadata, which raised TypeError (argument of type 'NoneType' is not iterable) and turned the logging_testing CI job red on litellm_internal_staging. Update test_log_db_metrics_success to assert event_metadata is None when no table_name is passed, and add test_log_db_metrics_event_metadata_is_safe as a regression guard verifying that only the table name surfaces and that sensitive kwargs (tokens, prisma client) are never dumped. * test(bedrock): self-heal opus-4-7 grid cells when unentitled on CI The bedrock-claude-opus-4-7 converse cells are unentitled on the Bedrock CI account, so they were marked xfail. xfail keeps reporting them as expected failures even after access is granted, so the wire translation never gets verified again. Now the cell makes the call and skips only when Bedrock replies "is not available for this account"; the moment the model is entitled the same cells run their full assertions with no edit. A focused unit test pins the tolerance predicate so any other failure still surfaces loudly and the available path still runs the assertions. * test(reasoning-effort-grid): add claude-opus-4-8 across provider routes Adds claude-opus-4-8 to the anthropic, azure, vertex and bedrock-converse routes (275 cells total) so the reasoning-effort wire translation is covered for the new model. The bedrock opus-4-8 and opus-4-7 cells reuse the self-heal path: they run the call and skip only on Bedrock's "is not available for this account" reply, then assert in full once the model is entitled. The azure and vertex opus-4-8 cells stay xfail until a Foundry deployment exists and Vertex availability is confirmed. The shared xhigh+max capability set is renamed to _CAPS_XHIGH_MAX now that more than one model uses it. |
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94a043efb2 |
refactor(proxy/auth): normalize Bearer prefix in safe-hash helper (#29343)
* refactor(proxy/auth): normalize Bearer prefix in safe-hash helper
UserAPIKeyAuth._safe_hash_litellm_api_key now strips a leading
"Bearer "/"bearer " prefix before its existing sk-/JWT classification, so
the helper produces the same hashed output regardless of whether the
caller stripped the Authorization header prefix or passed the header
value through unchanged.
* refactor(proxy/auth): make Bearer-prefix strip case-insensitive
Per RFC 7235 the HTTP authorization scheme token is case-insensitive.
Replace the two-prefix loop with a single case-insensitive check so the
helper normalizes "Bearer ", "bearer ", "BEARER ", and any mixed-case
variant before classifying the remainder as sk- or JWT. The contract
test gains coverage of "BEARER " and "BeArEr ".
* test(mcp): align auth-handler test expectations with safe-hash helper
The two MCP auth tests asserted that UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="Bearer ...")
retained the raw header bytes on the api_key field. _safe_hash_litellm_api_key
now normalizes that input — stripping the Bearer prefix and hashing the
resulting sk- key — so the expectations move to the normalized form:
the bare token in the parametrize case, and hash_token("sk-...") in the
backward-compat assertion. This matches what the real auth flow produces
(the builder strips Bearer and the DB stores the hashed token), so the
mocks now line up with production rather than with the un-normalized
validator output.
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bfbb5d2375 |
fix(ci): make litellm_internal_staging green (logging test + Bedrock Opus 4.7 self-heal) (#29344)
* test(logging): align DB metrics event_metadata assertions with safe redaction PR #28909 hardened log_db_metrics to emit a minimal, non-sensitive event_metadata (only table_name when present, otherwise None) instead of dumping function_name, function_kwargs, and function_args onto the span. The test in test_log_db_redis_services was not updated and still asserted "function_name" in event_metadata, which raised TypeError (argument of type 'NoneType' is not iterable) and turned the logging_testing CI job red on litellm_internal_staging. Update test_log_db_metrics_success to assert event_metadata is None when no table_name is passed, and add test_log_db_metrics_event_metadata_is_safe as a regression guard verifying that only the table name surfaces and that sensitive kwargs (tokens, prisma client) are never dumped. * test(bedrock): self-heal opus-4-7 grid cells when unentitled on CI The bedrock-claude-opus-4-7 converse cells are unentitled on the Bedrock CI account, so they were marked xfail. xfail keeps reporting them as expected failures even after access is granted, so the wire translation never gets verified again. Now the cell makes the call and skips only when Bedrock replies "is not available for this account"; the moment the model is entitled the same cells run their full assertions with no edit. A focused unit test pins the tolerance predicate so any other failure still surfaces loudly and the available path still runs the assertions. |
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2d4c13c00f |
fix(mcp): preserve omitted fields on PUT /v1/mcp/server partial updates (#29253)
* fix(mcp): preserve omitted fields on PUT /v1/mcp/server partial updates Use model_dump(exclude_unset=True) for updates so schema defaults (transport=sse, allow_all_keys=false, etc.) are not written when callers omit them. Serialize JSON fields from the filtered dict and only force is_byok on create. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): allow explicit alias=None on MCP server partial updates Snapshot caller-provided fields before normalization so omitted alias is not written while an intentional alias=None still clears the stored value. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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ace3c65ab3 |
fix(mcp): preserve source_url in GET /v1/mcp/server list responses (#29249)
* fix(mcp): preserve source_url in GET /v1/mcp/server list responses
The list endpoint builds responses from the in-memory registry, but
source_url was dropped during the DB-to-registry roundtrip even though
GET /v1/mcp/server/{id} returned it correctly from the database.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(tests/mcp): set source_url on MagicMock table records
MagicMock auto-creates source_url as a mock object, which fails MCPServer
Pydantic validation after source_url was wired through build_mcp_server_from_table.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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f11c12d157 |
Revert "chore(tests): migrate Bedrock CI to AWS account 941277531214 (#28728)" (#29326)
This reverts the Bedrock CI account migration (#28728). The original account (888602223428) was put under an AWS security restriction after a leaked key and has since been reactivated, while the replacement account (941277531214) lacks access to several models the suites exercise (legacy Bedrock Claude 3 models, Cohere, Nova Canvas image gen, Bedrock batch inference, and flagship Opus). Pointing CI back at the reactivated account restores that coverage. This is the exact inverse of #28728: all hardcoded 941277531214 references go back to 888602223428 (provisioned/imported-model ARNs, AgentCore runtime ARNs and their suffixes, batch execution role ARN, and the example proxy config), the S3 buckets revert to litellm-proxy and load-testing-oct, the guardrail IDs revert to wf0hkdb5x07f and ff6ujrregl1q, the SageMaker endpoint and Knowledge Base revert to their original ids, and the live-call tests go back to the legacy model strings. The grid_spec fail_reason workaround for the unentitled Opus cells is dropped while keeping the unrelated bedrock_effort_ceiling field added after the migration. The CircleCI AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY env vars still point at 941277531214 and must be set to the reactivated account's fresh credentials separately via the CircleCI API; AWS_REGION_NAME stays us-west-2. |
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967fed1fa1 |
feat(enterprise): add RESEND_FROM_EMAIL for self-hosted Resend sends (#28830)
Allow self-hosted installs to override the default LiteLLM sender address via RESEND_FROM_EMAIL, matching SendGrid's SENDGRID_SENDER_EMAIL pattern. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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4cc3dd7aad |
feat(context_management): compact_20260112 polyfill for non-Anthropic providers (#28868)
* feat(anthropic/messages): in-gateway context_management polyfill for non-Anthropic providers
- Add `context_management/` module with `clear_tool_uses_20250919` editor
dispatched before chat-completions translation on `/v1/messages`
- Hard-protect most-recently completed tool_result from being cleared
- Attach `context_management.applied_edits` to both non-streaming and
streaming (final `message_delta`) responses
- Bedrock Converse: forward `context_management`; filter to
`compact_20260112`-only edits with `compact-2026-01-12` beta header
- token_counter: guard Anthropic-format tools (no `function` key) to
prevent AttributeError during polyfill token counting
- Streaming: handle empty-choices usage-only trailing chunks
- Skip polyfill when `litellm.drop_params = True`
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(bedrock): pop None context_management before sending to Bedrock Converse
If context_management is forwarded as None (e.g. when mapping returns
None for an invalid format), _filter_context_management_for_bedrock_converse
previously returned early without removing the key, leaving
"context_management": null in the request and causing a validation
error. Pop the key when the value is not a dict.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(bedrock/converse): pop None context_management; extract helpers to fix PLR0915
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(anthropic/messages): check per-request drop_params alongside global
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(anthropic/messages): preserve drop_params for downstream and respect explicit False
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix: lazy debug logging in clear_tool_uses; remove unused context_management constants
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(anthropic/messages): guard context_management polyfill with try/except
Wrap apply_context_management() in a try/except so any failure (e.g.
litellm.token_counter raising on an unknown tokenizer or unexpected
message format) is logged but does not crash the underlying LLM
request. The polyfill is a best-effort additive feature; on failure we
forward the original messages without applied edits.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(token_counter): guard None input_schema in Anthropic tool fallback
Use `or {}` instead of `.get(..., {})` so explicit null parameters do not
raise AttributeError when formatting function definitions for token counting.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: minimize context_management polyfill threading
- Use None (not empty list) for polyfill_applied_edits when context
management isn't requested, so semantics of 'feature not requested'
vs 'feature requested but no edits applied' are distinct.
- In the streaming iterator, only pass applied_edits to the per-chunk
translator on the final (finish_reason) chunk; intermediate chunks
ignore it anyway, and this makes intent explicit on both sync and
async paths.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(context_management): align tool_use counts and normalize list spec
- _count_tool_uses now requires a string id, matching _collect_tool_use_ids_in_order so the tool_uses trigger can't fire on blocks that aren't clearable.
- apply_context_management dispatcher now accepts the OpenAI list form and normalizes it via AnthropicConfig.map_openai_context_management_to_anthropic, so the polyfill path no longer silently no-ops on list input.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* feat(context_management): add compact_20260112 polyfill for non-Anthropic providers
Implements an in-gateway compaction polyfill that summarizes long conversations
using a configurable model when `compact_20260112` is requested for non-Anthropic
targets (e.g. OpenAI, Gemini), matching Anthropic's context management beta
behaviour for those providers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(compact): skip tool_result-only user turns; bedrock: elif for context_management
- compact_20260112 Phase D: when keeping the last user turn after a full
summary, skip role=user turns whose content is exclusively tool_result
blocks. Such turns translate to OpenAI tool-role messages with no
preceding assistant tool_calls (those got summarized away), which
non-Anthropic providers reject. Fall back to a synthetic continuation
prompt if no eligible user question exists, so the downstream call
always has a non-empty user message.
- bedrock converse: chain the context_management param as elif so it
follows the same if/elif pattern as the surrounding thinking/
reasoning_effort checks.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(anthropic): post-compaction question selection, system type, sync stream merge
- compact.py: select last user question from effective_messages (post-compaction slice) instead of raw messages, so prior summarized turns aren't reintroduced
- handler.py: widen _prepare_completion_kwargs system parameter type to Union[str, List[Dict]] matching PolyfillResult.system
- streaming_iterator.py: mirror async hold-and-merge logic in sync __next__ so context_management is attached to the final merged message_delta when stop_reason and usage arrive in separate chunks
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(anthropic/messages): apply context_management on sync path; clear held stop_reason chunk in async iterator
- Sync `anthropic_messages_handler` was silently dropping the
`context_management` kwarg via `ANTHROPIC_ONLY_REQUEST_KEYS` after the
polyfill was moved into the async handler. Bridge to the async
dispatcher with `run_async_function` so `litellm.messages.create()`
callers keep working (regressed e.g. `clear_tool_uses_20250919`).
- In the streaming iterator's `__anext__` `StopIteration` handler, clear
`self.holding_stop_reason_chunk` after capturing it (matches `__next__`)
so a subsequent call doesn't re-emit the same chunk.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(bugfixes): bedrock None context_mgmt; stream per-instance queue; sync polyfill; trailing-chunk passthrough
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(anthropic): silently drop trailing chunks after usage; remove dead _polyfill_result key
- streaming_iterator: in sync __next__, after the usage chunk has been
merged and emitted, silently consume any trailing provider events
via 'continue' instead of forwarding them through the queue. Trailing
chunks would translate to content_block_delta or message_delta and
violate Anthropic SSE ordering after the final message_delta. The
async __anext__ already drops these via 'if not self.queued_usage_chunk:'
gating, so this aligns sync and async behavior.
- handler: drop unused '_polyfill_result' from ANTHROPIC_ONLY_REQUEST_KEYS.
PolyfillResult is passed as an explicit arg to the adapter methods, never
through extra_kwargs, so the entry was dead code.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* refactor(anthropic): extract usage-merge helper; guard empty slice-only compaction result
- Extract the duplicated hold-and-merge usage logic from the sync __next__ and
async __anext__ paths into a shared _merge_usage_into_held_stop_reason_chunk
helper so the subtle cache-token / context_management attachment lives in
exactly one place.
- In the compact_20260112 slice-only path, fall back to _select_last_user_question
when _strip_compaction_blocks produces an empty list (e.g. messages ending on
an assistant turn whose only content was the compaction block) so the
downstream API never receives an empty messages array.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* refactor(anthropic/context_management): streaming iterator compaction fixes and compact polyfill improvements
- Extract usage-merge helper; guard empty slice-only compaction result
- Silently drop trailing chunks after usage; remove dead _polyfill_result key
- Fix bedrock None context_mgmt; stream per-instance queue; sync polyfill; trailing-chunk passthrough
- Apply context_management on sync path; clear held stop_reason chunk in async iterator
- Fix post-compaction question selection, system type, sync stream merge
- Skip tool_result-only user turns; bedrock: elif for context_management
- Add streaming iterator compaction test suite
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* revert(html): restore flat *.html naming in _experimental/out
Reverses the accidental rename from *.html → */index.html introduced in
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3be3c1dea1 | feat(otel): add team_metadata, http.route, and model names to inference spans (#29319) | ||
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37e6e2da1c |
test(e2e): assert internal-user navbar identity is scoped to that user (#29077)
* test(e2e): assert internal-user navbar identity is scoped to that user The existing login.spec.ts only checks the admin's navbar identity. This adds the symmetric check for the internal user — verifying the account button + dropdown surface the internal user's email, id, and role, and that no admin-scoped values leak through. * test(e2e): harden navbar identity test per review feedback Locate the user dropdown panel by a data-testid on the popupRender div instead of Ant Design internal + Tailwind class names, so styling refactors no longer risk breaking the identity-scoping assertions. Source the seeded user emails/ids from shared constants (match seed.sql) instead of hardcoding them inline. |
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892838963c |
test(e2e): cover Internal User create-key flow when in no teams (#29083)
* test(e2e): cover Internal User create-key flow when in no teams The seeded e2e-internal-user is in two teams, so the "no team" branch of the Create Key modal — where the team dropdown must render empty — was unreachable. Seeds a noteam@test.local user and adds a spec that logs in fresh, opens the modal, and asserts the dropdown has zero options. * test(e2e): harden no-team dropdown assertion + add with-teams counterpart Replace the one-shot count() check with a settled-empty assertion: wait for the dropdown's loaded "No teams found" state before asserting zero options, so the test can't pass on a transient empty frame while the team-options request is still in flight. Add internalUserWithTeams.spec.ts as the differential partner; it logs in as the seeded e2e-internal-user (two team memberships) and asserts the dropdown lists exactly those teams. Without it, the no-team spec's zero-options assertion would still pass against a regression that empties the dropdown for every user. |
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12d29a38a7 |
tests(proxy_server): surface current behavior in tests (#29309)
* test(proxy/proxy_server): pin forwarding routes (PR2) (#28887) * test(proxy): pin proxy_server.py forwarding-route behavior PR2 of the proxy_server.py behavior-pinning project: fills the 12 forwarding-route test files added by the harness PR with happy + error pins for all 52 LLM-facing routes (models, chat/completions, completions, embeddings, moderations, audio, assistants, threads, utils, model-info, model-metrics, queue). Every happy-path test asserts the full response dict via normalize() so the gate enforces real shape pinning rather than status codes. * test(proxy): drop task-plumbing comments from PR2 test files * test(proxy): tighten PR2 error-path status-code pins Apply the same review feedback Greptile gave on PR1 (#28856) and PR3 (#28850) to PR2's forwarding-route tests: - Replace permissive `>= 400` / `in (X, Y)` status assertions with the exact 500/405 the handler actually returns, so a regression that silently shifts the code now fails the pin. - Add a body-presence check alongside each tightened status assertion to satisfy _pin_check.py's no-status-only rule. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(proxy): pin proxy_server.py non-route surface behavior (PR1) (#28856) * test(proxy): pin proxy_server.py non-route surface behavior (PR1) Fills the 7 PR1 placeholder files under tests/test_litellm/proxy/proxy_server/ with behavior pins for the non-route surface of proxy_server.py: lifecycle/init/shutdown, ProxyConfig class methods, DB-overlay config scrubbers, spend counters, background-health helpers, OpenAPI customization, exception handlers, and streaming-generator helpers. 233 tests cover 101 pin-list symbols (1+ happy + 1+ error each). New-tests-only coverage on litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py: 32.80% line / 20.91% branch (PR1 gate: 25% line / 18% branch). Full directory runs in ~22s with -n 4. Plan: https://www.notion.so/Plan-Pin-proxy_server-py-behavior-2026-05-25-36c43b8acdab81ee845fd5365128a2fc * test(proxy): address Greptile review comments on test_lifecycle.py - test_initialize_signature_is_async_with_expected_params: hard-code expected_param_count so a signature change actually trips the gate (previously both sides of the comparison were len(sig.parameters)). - test_check_request_disconnection_invalid_when_connected_times_out: patch asyncio.sleep so the test no longer spins for ~1.2 s of real wall-clock; timeout lowered to 0.05 s. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(proxy/proxy_server): pin control-plane routes (PR3) (#28850) * test(proxy/proxy_server): pin misc routes (PR3, partial) Adds happy + error tests for the misc control-plane routes: GET /, /routes, /adaptive_router/state, /get_logo_url, /get_image, /get_favicon. Also gitignores .pin_list.txt (used by the pin gate). * test(proxy/proxy_server): pin login/SSO routes (PR3, partial) Adds happy + error tests for the 5 login/SSO control-plane routes: GET /fallback/login, POST /login, POST /v2/login, POST /v3/login, POST /v3/login/exchange. Mocks authenticate_user and create_ui_token_object at their imported location. * test(proxy/proxy_server): pin onboarding routes (PR3, partial) Adds happy + error tests for the 2 onboarding control-plane routes: GET /onboarding/get_token, POST /onboarding/claim_token. Wires a MagicMock async context manager for prisma_client.db.tx() and signs the onboarding JWT with the patched master_key. * test(proxy/proxy_server): pin model_cost_map reload routes (PR3, partial) Adds happy + error tests for the 5 model-cost-map control-plane routes: POST /reload/model_cost_map, POST|DELETE|GET /schedule/model_cost_map_reload(/status), GET /model/cost_map/source. Attaches litellm_config to mock_prisma per-test (the table is not in the default _PRISMA_TABLES fixture). * test(proxy/proxy_server): pin anthropic_beta_headers reload routes (PR3, partial) Adds happy + error tests for the 4 anthropic-beta-headers control-plane routes: POST /reload/anthropic_beta_headers, POST|DELETE|GET /schedule/anthropic_beta_headers_reload(/status). Stubs db.litellm_config (not in default _PRISMA_TABLES) and monkeypatches reload_beta_headers_config so no network calls fire. * test(proxy/proxy_server): pin invitation routes (PR3, partial) Adds happy + error tests for the 4 invitation control-plane routes: POST /invitation/new, GET /invitation/info, POST /invitation/update, POST /invitation/delete. Patches _user_has_admin_privileges / _user_has_admin_view to avoid extensive get_user_object mocking. * test(proxy/proxy_server): pin config CRUD routes (PR3, partial) Adds happy + error tests for the 8 config-CRUD control-plane routes: POST /config/update, POST|GET /config/field/update|info, GET /config/list, POST /config/field/delete, POST /config/callback/delete, GET /get/config/callbacks, GET /config/yaml. Attaches litellm_config to mock_prisma per-test. * test(proxy/proxy_server): tighten pin assertions per review - test_routes_misc.py: `b"" in response.content` is trivially true; replace with `len(response.content) > 0` so an empty 405 body trips the gate. - test_routes_login_sso.py: `len(response.content) >= 0` is trivially true; tighten to `> 0`. - test_routes_anthropic_beta.py: replace brittle string-literal checks on the serialized JSON (`'"interval_hours": 12' in payload`) with `json.loads` + dict access so the assertion survives any serializer spacing. - test_routes_config.py: `assert status_code in (404, 500)` was too permissive; the handler re-raises HTTPException(404) verbatim, so pin 404 strictly. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d82eb33a60 | feat(otel): typed semconv-aligned OpenTelemetry instrumentation (#28909) | ||
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581c30f1e8 | [internal copy of #29089] fix: duplicate claude code traces (#29311) | ||
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c754c560dd |
fix(proxy): link passthrough success spans to the SERVER root OTEL span (#29315)
* fix(proxy): link passthrough success spans to the SERVER root OTEL span Passthrough requests never wired user_api_key_dict.parent_otel_span into the logging metadata, so on success the litellm_request span orphaned into its own trace and the "Received Proxy Server Request" root span was never ended. Setting it once in _init_kwargs_for_pass_through_endpoint fixes both the non-streaming and streaming paths, since update_environment_variables copies that metadata onto the logging object's model_call_details, which is what the OTEL handler reads. Resolves LIT-3443 * fix(proxy): set passthrough parent span after client metadata merge Greptile flagged that litellm_parent_otel_span was assigned before the _metadata.update() calls that merge request-body metadata, so a client body mirroring the internal key could overwrite the real span with a JSON scalar and null the fix for that request. Move the assignment after the merge and add a regression test that fails on the old ordering. * fix(proxy): also set user_api_key after client metadata merge Per Greptile, user_api_key had the same clobber window as the parent span: a passthrough request body mirroring the key could overwrite the authenticated value in the logged metadata. Move it into the same post-merge block and add a deterministic contract test asserting both internal keys resist client-supplied metadata. |
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af17400c38 |
feat(a2a): well-known agent-card discovery + LangGraph Platform mode (#28860)
* feat(a2a): well-known agent-card discovery + LangGraph Platform mode Adds a registration-time discovery flow so admins can paste an upstream agent URL, see its skills/capabilities, pick what to expose, and have the proxy front it with a LiteLLM-shaped agent card. Backend (new litellm/proxy/a2a/ module): - fetch_well_known_card walks /.well-known/agent-card.json, /.well-known/agent.json, /agent.json by default. langgraph_platform mode hits the canonical path with ?assistant_id=<id> (LangGraph serves one shared endpoint per deployment). - merge_agent_card overlays LiteLLM overrides on the upstream card: drops upstream url, forces protocolVersion=1.0, replaces securitySchemes with LiteLLMKey bearer, emits supportedInterfaces pointing at the proxy, filters capabilities to a small allowlist, strips non-v1.0 fields. - POST /v1/a2a/discover returns the raw upstream card (admin-only) so the UI can render skills/capabilities for selection. - create/update/patch agent endpoints pre-generate the agent_id and run merge_agent_card before storing, so DB.agent_card_params already embeds the proxy-fronted URL. UI (ui/litellm-dashboard): - New AgentCardDiscovery component with a parent-driven plan: discovery_mode + params + display URL. For LangGraph the parent composes (api_base, assistant_id); for pure A2A it uses the url field. Component hides the manual URL input when the parent drives. - add_agent_form wires discovery for every non-custom agent type and overlays the user's selections onto agent_card_params at submit, fixing the bug where dynamic agent forms ignored discovery picks. Completion-bridge fixes (paired): - Add kind: "message" to A2A response messages and unwrap result so it's a Message directly per spec (matches a2a SDK SendMessageResponse validation). - Forward A2A metadata to LangGraph runs via extra_body.metadata. * fix(a2a): preserve agent url, fix streaming chunk envelope, and protect forwarded metadata - Streaming chunk: move final out of the message object into the result envelope per the A2A spec. - Agent card merge: keep upstream url on the stored card so the runtime invocation path can locate the upstream backend; the public well-known endpoint already rewrites this field to the proxy URL before exposing it to clients. - Completion bridge: apply A2A forward metadata after merging litellm_params so an agent-configured extra_body cannot overwrite the forwarded metadata. Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(a2a): fix legacy streaming chunk, agent card test, and metadata merge - providers/litellm_completion: move 'final' out of the message object into the result envelope per the A2A spec (matches the bridge fix). - agent endpoints test: the runtime invocation path now preserves the top-level 'url' on the stored card, so update the assertion to match. - completion bridge metadata: when forwarding A2A metadata via extra_body.metadata, merge into any existing extra_body.metadata instead of replacing it, so an agent-configured metadata block is preserved (forward metadata still wins on key conflicts). Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(a2a): remove dead duplicate transformation dir; drop SSRF-prone headers field from /v1/a2a/discover Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(a2a): revert accidental html→index.html rename from |
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83fcacad08 |
fix(mcp): ignore stale ids on key save (#29128)
* fix(mcp): ignore stale server ids during key permission validation Prevent virtual key save failures when object_permission still includes MCP server IDs that were deleted from the registry. The validator now drops stale IDs before team scope checks and adds coverage for stale-ID and active unauthorized-ID behavior. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): use DB find_many to detect stale server IDs, add tool-permission test Addresses greptile feedback on PR #29128: P1 – Race-condition / authoritative-signal concern: Extract _get_stale_mcp_server_ids() helper that performs a single DB find_many (LiteLLM_MCPServerTable) when prisma_client is available, making server-existence checks authoritative even during in-memory registry warm-up. Falls back to the in-memory registry only when no DB client is present (config-only deployments / unit tests). Pass prisma_client through both call sites in key_management_endpoints. P2 – Missing test coverage for mcp_tool_permissions: Add test_validate_stale_ids_in_mcp_tool_permissions_silently_dropped to confirm stale server IDs that appear only as keys in mcp_tool_permissions are also stripped without raising 403. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): also check in-memory registry when DB is present to avoid misclassifying config-file servers as stale Config-file MCP servers are never written to LiteLLM_MCPServerTable, so a DB-only query would classify them as stale and silently drop their IDs from the authorization check, allowing unauthorized key access. Fix: treat a server ID as stale only when it is absent from BOTH the DB and the in-memory registry (which holds config-file servers). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): normalize server aliases on key save Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: remove unused stale MCP helper and capture normalized object_permission on key generation Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * test(mcp): keep validate_key_mcp_servers_against_team stub in sync with return contract validate_key_mcp_servers_against_team now returns the (normalized) object_permission, and the key-generation helper assigns that return value back into the request data. The two key-generation tests stubbed the function with a bare AsyncMock, whose default MagicMock return value clobbered object_permission and skipped permission-record creation. Make the stubs pass object_permission through unchanged. * fix(mcp): preserve provided object_permission fields on key update The key-update path reconstructs data.object_permission from a full model_dump(), which marks every field as set. Downstream model_dump(exclude_unset=True) then emits models/blocked_tools/ search_tools as None, and those are non-nullable array columns, so the Prisma write fails whenever the UI submits object_permission with only a subset of fields populated (e.g. a TPM/RPM-only edit). Build the dict with exclude_unset=True so the normalized object_permission keeps the caller's original field set. --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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1d9095f914 |
fix(bedrock): support tool search results + chat annotations (#29120)
* Fix overiding of fastapi_response headers * fix(bedrock): support tool search results and surface citations as annotations Add an optional tool-message search_results path that maps directly to Bedrock toolResult.searchResult blocks, and convert Converse citationsContent into chat completion annotations for user-facing citation metadata. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(format): align bedrock prompt factory with black Reformat the updated bedrock prompt template conversion file so CI black --check passes. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(bedrock): harden citations, search_results mapping, and token counting Resolve mypy issues in citation parsing, only attach url_citation annotations when citation text is stitched into content, fall back to tool content when search_results is empty, and count search_results text in token/TPM preflight paths. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(bedrock): extract tool result helpers to satisfy PLR0915 Refactor _convert_to_bedrock_tool_call_result into smaller helpers so lint passes without changing Bedrock tool result behavior. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(bedrock): count all forwarded search_results fields in token estimates Include source, title, content text, and citations when estimating tokens so large metadata cannot bypass TPM preflight checks. Reformat factory.py with black. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(managed-files): skip content blocks without a type key in get_file_ids_from_messages * fix(bedrock): stitch citations for any punctuation-only text block * fix(bedrock): map null citation source/title to empty annotation strings * fix(bedrock): advance citation offset for text-only citationsContent blocks * fix(bedrock): complete citation TypedDicts for grounding annotations --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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c792df64d2 |
feat(mcp): support stateless and stateful clients via session-id routing (#26857)
* feat(mcp): support stateless and stateful clients via session-id routing - Add session_manager_stateful (stateless=False) alongside stateless - Route by mcp-session-id: has ID → stateful, initialize (no ID) → stateful, else → stateless - Peek POST body to detect initialize for routing; replay via wrapped receive - Handle stale session IDs for both managers - Add test_mcp_routing_initialize_to_stateful_no_session_to_stateless - Update test_valid_mcp_session_id_is_preserved, test_concurrent_initialize_session_managers Made-with: Cursor * fix(mcp): respect stateful routing and harden initialize detection Ensure streamable MCP requests are dispatched via the computed target session manager, and guard initialize detection against non-object JSON bodies. Update stale-session test patches to target the stateful manager so routing assertions remain correct. Made-with: Cursor * test(mcp): patch stateless/stateful managers in concurrency init test Update concurrent session-manager initialization test to patch session_manager_stateless and session_manager_stateful directly, matching initialize_session_managers() behavior and preventing NameError from undefined mocks. Made-with: Cursor * Fix tests * Fix tests * Fix MCP stateful routing edge cases * Fix stateful MCP auth context refresh * Fix MCP stateful session cleanup * fix(mcp): bind stateful sessions to creator and reject hijacks Stateful mcp-session-id was usable by any authenticated proxy caller. Track the session creator's hashed API key (or user_id) when a new session is issued and reject mismatched callers with 403 before _set_or_update_auth_context overwrites the stored MCPAuthenticatedUser. Also formats nested with-statements in test_mcp_stale_session.py and fixes a pre-existing AsyncMock mismatch in test_stale_mcp_session_id_is_stripped. * fix(mcp): serialize concurrent requests on same stateful session Bugbot's 'Concurrent requests share context' finding: _update_auth_context mutates the single MCPAuthenticatedUser stored per session in place on every request, so two requests sharing one mcp-session-id can overwrite each other's mcp_servers / auth headers / oauth state / client_ip while in-flight callbacks are still reading the same object. Owner-binding alone narrows this to same-principal racing, but the in-place mutation race remains. Add a per-session asyncio.Lock around handle_request so concurrent same-session requests run sequentially. The lock is allocated on demand and torn down with the rest of the session state on DELETE / idle expiry. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): include OAuth2 bearer in stateful session owner fingerprint UserAPIKeyAuth() for OAuth2 passthrough has no api_key/user_id, so every OAuth caller fingerprinted to "anonymous" and could hijack another OAuth caller's mcp-session-id. Hash the upstream Authorization header into the fingerprint as oauth:<sha256>. * fix(mcp): don't hold stateful session lock for streaming GETs The per-session lock wraps handle_request, so a long-lived GET (SSE stream held open for the life of the session) would block every subsequent POST on the same mcp-session-id. Only POST/DELETE mutate the shared MCPAuthenticatedUser, so it's sufficient to serialize those — GETs run lock-free and stream concurrently. * fix(mcp): allow None user_api_key_auth in MCPAuthenticatedUser The set_auth_context / _set_or_update_auth_context / _update_auth_context helpers in server.py all accept Optional[UserAPIKeyAuth] and pass it straight into MCPAuthenticatedUser, but the dataclass-style constructor typed user_api_key_auth as required UserAPIKeyAuth. Mypy flagged this on the stateful-routing branch: server.py:3227: error: Incompatible types in assignment (expression has type "UserAPIKeyAuth | None", variable has type "UserAPIKeyAuth") server.py:3255: error: Argument "user_api_key_auth" to "MCPAuthenticatedUser" has incompatible type "UserAPIKeyAuth | None"; expected "UserAPIKeyAuth" Widen the parameter type to Optional[UserAPIKeyAuth] to match the call sites. Runtime behavior is unchanged. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * style: replace with new alias * fix(mcp): fall back to client_ip in stateful session owner fingerprint Addresses Greptile review on PR #26857: when no API key, user_id, or OAuth bearer is available (e.g. unauthenticated/passthrough callers), the owner fingerprint collapsed to a single 'anonymous' value, allowing two unrelated callers to drive each other's stateful MCP sessions. Fold client IP into the fingerprint as a fallback identity signal so distinct anonymous sources do not share an owner identity. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix active stateful MCP session cleanup * test(mcp): cancel leaked stateful auth-context cleanup task initialize_session_managers() spawns a real asyncio.create_task running _cleanup_expired_stateful_session_auth_contexts(). The test_concurrent_initialize_session_managers test was saving and restoring the session-manager context-manager globals but did not save, cancel, or restore _stateful_auth_context_cleanup_task. Because pyproject.toml sets asyncio_default_fixture_loop_scope=session, the event loop is shared across tests in the same session, so the leaked task kept running against module-level dicts for the rest of the test run. Save and cancel the task in the finally block so the test fully cleans up after itself. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix stateful MCP session fingerprinting * Hash MCP session user owner fingerprints * Fix stale MCP session DELETE cleanup * fix(mcp): harden owner fingerprint hashing for non-str api keys _owner_fingerprint_for assumed api_key/user_id supported .encode(); MagicMock-based tests (and any non-str truthy values) crashed with TypeError before routing. Only hash str/bytes secrets; fall through otherwise so MCP routing and session tests behave correctly. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix MCP stateful cleanup loop resilience * Fix stateful MCP initialize auth capture * fix(mcp): drop orphan per-session lock when auth context absent Defensive cleanup for _stateful_session_locks entries created on sessions that never enter _stateful_session_auth_contexts. The periodic cleanup loop only iterates auth_context_last_seen, so such locks would otherwise live forever. Add a test that reproduces the leak and verifies the request finalizer pops the lock. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(mcp): trim verbose comment on lock cleanup Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix stateful MCP delete failure tracking * fix test * fix(mcp): cap routing-peek body size to bound pre-dispatch memory Authenticated clients that POST without an mcp-session-id forced the proxy to buffer the entire request body before routing, since the peek loop drained every body chunk to decide whether the JSON-RPC method was 'initialize'. Cap the peek at 4 KB (more than enough for an initialize envelope) and let the remainder stream through wrapped_receive into the downstream handler. * test: replace dall-e-3 with gpt-image-1 in health check and router tests (#27813) OpenAI returns 'The model dall-e-3 does not exist' for the test account, breaking test_openai_img_gen_health_check and test_image_generation. Switch to gpt-image-1, matching the existing TestOpenAIGPTImage1 pattern. * fix(tests): drop dall-e-only test classes; route live image tests via gpt-image-1 Second wave of failures from the 2026-05-12 DALL-E shutdown: - tests/image_gen_tests/test_image_edits.py::TestOpenAIImageEditDallE2 and tests/image_gen_tests/test_image_generation.py::TestOpenAIDalle3 are explicitly named for the deprecated models and can't pass; remove. gpt-image-1 coverage already exists in sibling classes. - tests/local_testing/test_router.py image gen tests use dall-e-3 only as a routing example; swap to gpt-image-1. - tests/local_testing/test_custom_callback_input.py image_generation success/failure paths swapped to gpt-image-1. * Fix MCP initialize session active tracking Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * Fix MCP reinitialize session tracking Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * Fix MCP reinitialize auth context aliasing Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * Apply black formatting after merge Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Run owner-binding 403 before consuming POST body Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Harden MCP routing peek bound and stateful purge race Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Remove inadvertently committed Next.js build artifacts Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Run owner check before stale MCP session cleanup Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): reverse cleanup ordering to terminate transport before clearing owner Reverses _purge_expired_stateful_session_auth_contexts so the transport is popped from server_instances and terminated BEFORE owner/auth tracking is cleared. The previous order left a window where _stateful_session_owners was already empty but server_instances still served the session, so a concurrent request would observe expected_owner is None and bypass the owner-binding check. Addresses Greptile review on PR #26857. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * test(mcp): fully reset stateful session tracking in auth-context refresh test Use _remove_stateful_session_tracking in teardown so the test no longer leaks _stateful_session_auth_context_last_seen and _stateful_session_locks between tests, matching the cleanup used by the sibling stateful tests. * fix(mcp): cap concurrent stateful sessions per caller to bound memory --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Sameerlite <sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Babysitter <claude@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <mateo@berri.ai> |
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70d2748d80 |
fix(proxy): map stripped batch body.model to proxy alias for auth (#29264)
* fix(proxy): map stripped batch body.model to proxy alias for auth replace_model_in_jsonl rewrites JSONL body.model to the provider id before upload; batch file access checks must resolve that id back to model_name so keys granted the proxy alias are not rejected with 403. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(proxy): surface resolved proxy alias in batch file 403 detail --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |