* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as `http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/" is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable without authentication. Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line, not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"], mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic. Affected variants confirmed fixed: Host: localhost/?x=1 Host: localhost:4000/?x=1 Host: localhost/#test Host: localhost:4000/#test Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: reduce comments in route fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.) in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side. Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. — without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation. Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF. Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and the existing credential fields. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config (aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint. - Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles) - Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins - Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to /utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK credential resolution. Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints. Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host. Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing. ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.) nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe. _NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring) so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic, azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check. Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential). Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a passthrough prefix are allowed through. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures - key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields. can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin check on a team key means the caller was authorized. - test: set created_by on mock key in test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id). - auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope (e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation. - ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly. Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"] to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"), breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes. Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/". migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column. Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including /team/new) to 500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id == caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access. Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements (PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper to bring statement count under the limit. test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local "cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
🚅 LiteLLM
LiteLLM AI Gateway
Open Source AI Gateway for 100+ LLMs. Self-hosted. Enterprise-ready. Call any LLM in OpenAI format.
LiteLLM Proxy Server (AI Gateway) | Hosted Proxy | Enterprise Tier | Website
What is LiteLLM
LiteLLM is an open source AI Gateway that gives you a single, unified interface to call 100+ LLM providers — OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Bedrock, Azure, and more — using the OpenAI format.
Use it as a Python SDK for direct library integration, or deploy the AI Gateway (Proxy Server) as a centralized service for your team or organization.
Jump to LiteLLM Proxy (LLM Gateway) Docs
Jump to Supported LLM Providers
Why LiteLLM
Managing LLM calls across providers gets complicated fast — different SDKs, auth patterns, request formats, and error types for every model. LiteLLM removes that friction:
- Unified API — one interface for 100+ LLMs, no provider-specific SDK juggling
- Drop-in OpenAI compatibility — swap providers without rewriting your code
- Production-ready gateway — virtual keys, spend tracking, guardrails, load balancing, and an admin dashboard out of the box
- 8ms P95 latency at 1k RPS (benchmarks)
OSS Adopters
Netflix |
Features
LLMs - Call 100+ LLMs (Python SDK + AI Gateway)
All Supported Endpoints - /chat/completions, /responses, /embeddings, /images, /audio, /batches, /rerank, /a2a, /messages and more.
Python SDK
uv add litellm
from litellm import completion
import os
os.environ["OPENAI_API_KEY"] = "your-openai-key"
os.environ["ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"] = "your-anthropic-key"
# OpenAI
response = completion(model="openai/gpt-4o", messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Hello!"}])
# Anthropic
response = completion(model="anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-20250514", messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Hello!"}])
AI Gateway (Proxy Server)
Getting Started - E2E Tutorial - Setup virtual keys, make your first request
uv tool install 'litellm[proxy]'
litellm --model gpt-4o
import openai
client = openai.OpenAI(api_key="anything", base_url="http://0.0.0.0:4000")
response = client.chat.completions.create(
model="gpt-4o",
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Hello!"}]
)
Agents - Invoke A2A Agents (Python SDK + AI Gateway)
Supported Providers - LangGraph, Vertex AI Agent Engine, Azure AI Foundry, Bedrock AgentCore, Pydantic AI
Python SDK - A2A Protocol
from litellm.a2a_protocol import A2AClient
from a2a.types import SendMessageRequest, MessageSendParams
from uuid import uuid4
client = A2AClient(base_url="http://localhost:10001")
request = SendMessageRequest(
id=str(uuid4()),
params=MessageSendParams(
message={
"role": "user",
"parts": [{"kind": "text", "text": "Hello!"}],
"messageId": uuid4().hex,
}
)
)
response = await client.send_message(request)
AI Gateway (Proxy Server)
Step 1. Add your Agent to the AI Gateway
Step 2. Call Agent via A2A SDK
from a2a.client import A2ACardResolver, A2AClient
from a2a.types import MessageSendParams, SendMessageRequest
from uuid import uuid4
import httpx
base_url = "http://localhost:4000/a2a/my-agent" # LiteLLM proxy + agent name
headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer sk-1234"} # LiteLLM Virtual Key
async with httpx.AsyncClient(headers=headers) as httpx_client:
resolver = A2ACardResolver(httpx_client=httpx_client, base_url=base_url)
agent_card = await resolver.get_agent_card()
client = A2AClient(httpx_client=httpx_client, agent_card=agent_card)
request = SendMessageRequest(
id=str(uuid4()),
params=MessageSendParams(
message={
"role": "user",
"parts": [{"kind": "text", "text": "Hello!"}],
"messageId": uuid4().hex,
}
)
)
response = await client.send_message(request)
MCP Tools - Connect MCP servers to any LLM (Python SDK + AI Gateway)
Python SDK - MCP Bridge
from mcp import ClientSession, StdioServerParameters
from mcp.client.stdio import stdio_client
from litellm import experimental_mcp_client
import litellm
server_params = StdioServerParameters(command="python", args=["mcp_server.py"])
async with stdio_client(server_params) as (read, write):
async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
await session.initialize()
# Load MCP tools in OpenAI format
tools = await experimental_mcp_client.load_mcp_tools(session=session, format="openai")
# Use with any LiteLLM model
response = await litellm.acompletion(
model="gpt-4o",
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "What's 3 + 5?"}],
tools=tools
)
AI Gateway - MCP Gateway
Step 1. Add your MCP Server to the AI Gateway
Step 2. Call MCP tools via /chat/completions
curl -X POST 'http://0.0.0.0:4000/v1/chat/completions' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer sk-1234' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"model": "gpt-4o",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "Summarize the latest open PR"}],
"tools": [{
"type": "mcp",
"server_url": "litellm_proxy/mcp/github",
"server_label": "github_mcp",
"require_approval": "never"
}]
}'
Use with Cursor IDE
{
"mcpServers": {
"LiteLLM": {
"url": "http://localhost:4000/mcp/",
"headers": {
"x-litellm-api-key": "Bearer sk-1234"
}
}
}
}
Supported Providers (Website Supported Models | Docs)
Get Started
You can use LiteLLM through either the Proxy Server or Python SDK. Both give you a unified interface to access multiple LLMs (100+ LLMs). Choose the option that best fits your needs:
| LiteLLM AI Gateway | LiteLLM Python SDK | |
|---|---|---|
| Use Case | Central service (LLM Gateway) to access multiple LLMs | Use LiteLLM directly in your Python code |
| Who Uses It? | Gen AI Enablement / ML Platform Teams | Developers building LLM projects |
| Key Features | Centralized API gateway with authentication and authorization, multi-tenant cost tracking and spend management per project/user, per-project customization (logging, guardrails, caching), virtual keys for secure access control, admin dashboard UI for monitoring and management | Direct Python library integration in your codebase, Router with retry/fallback logic across multiple deployments (e.g. Azure/OpenAI) - Router, application-level load balancing and cost tracking, exception handling with OpenAI-compatible errors, observability callbacks (Lunary, MLflow, Langfuse, etc.) |
Stable Release: Use docker images with the -stable tag. These have undergone 12 hour load tests, before being published. More information about the release cycle here
Support for more providers. Missing a provider or LLM Platform, raise a feature request.
Run in Developer Mode
Services
- Setup .env file in root
- Run dependant services
docker-compose up db prometheus
Backend
- (In root) create virtual environment
python -m venv .venv - Activate virtual environment
source .venv/bin/activate - Install dependencies
uv sync --all-extras --group proxy-dev uv run prisma generateprisma generate- Start proxy backend
python litellm/proxy/proxy_cli.py
Frontend
- Navigate to
ui/litellm-dashboard - Install dependencies
npm install - Run
npm run devto start the dashboard
Verify Docker Image Signatures
All LiteLLM Docker images published to GHCR are signed with cosign. Every release is signed with the same key introduced in commit 0112e53.
Verify using the pinned commit hash (recommended):
A commit hash is cryptographically immutable, so this is the strongest way to ensure you are using the original signing key:
cosign verify \
--key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/0112e53046018d726492c814b3644b7d376029d0/cosign.pub \
ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:<release-tag>
Verify using a release tag (convenience):
Tags are protected in this repository and resolve to the same key. This option is easier to read but relies on tag protection rules:
cosign verify \
--key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/<release-tag>/cosign.pub \
ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:<release-tag>
Replace <release-tag> with the version you are deploying (e.g. v1.83.0-stable).
Enterprise
For companies that need better security, user management and professional support
Get an Enterprise License Talk to founders
This covers:
- ✅ Features under the LiteLLM Commercial License:
- ✅ Feature Prioritization
- ✅ Custom Integrations
- ✅ Professional Support - Dedicated discord + slack
- ✅ Custom SLAs
- ✅ Secure access with Single Sign-On
Contributing
We welcome contributions to LiteLLM! Whether you're fixing bugs, adding features, or improving documentation, we appreciate your help.
Quick Start for Contributors
This requires uv to be installed.
git clone https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm.git
cd litellm
make install-dev # Install development dependencies
make format # Format your code
make lint # Run all linting checks
make test-unit # Run unit tests
make format-check # Check formatting only
For detailed contributing guidelines, see CONTRIBUTING.md.
📖 Contributing to documentation? The LiteLLM docs have moved to a separate repository: BerriAI/litellm-docs. Please open doc PRs there. Docs are served at docs.litellm.ai.
Code Quality / Linting
LiteLLM follows the Google Python Style Guide.
Our automated checks include:
- Black for code formatting
- Ruff for linting and code quality
- MyPy for type checking
- Circular import detection
- Import safety checks
All these checks must pass before your PR can be merged.
Support / talk with founders
- Schedule Demo 👋
- Community Discord 💭
- Community Slack 💭
- Our emails ✉️ ishaan@berri.ai / krrish@berri.ai