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fe755ee02afca2dd0ad70ca95fc2aafebd0d08e5
39243 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Sameer Kankute
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fe755ee02a |
feat(proxy): fix vector store retrieve/list/update/delete without model (#27929)
* feat(proxy): fix vector store retrieve/list/update/delete routing without model Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(proxy): remove unchecked query-param injection in vector store management endpoints Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * test(proxy): use subset assertion for vector store route test to allow extra kwargs like shared_session Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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Sameer Kankute
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4e2b2d9d1f |
fix(mcp): expose delegate_auth_to_upstream in MCP server list rows (#27936)
_build_mcp_server_table omitted delegate_auth_to_upstream, so GET /v1/mcp/server always returned the default false while the registry kept the DB value. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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yuneng-jiang
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bcbae93ecc |
Merge pull request #27958 from BerriAI/litellm_/funny-williams-dab711
test(ui): preserve global Button/Tooltip mocks in per-file @tremor/react vi.mock |
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yuneng-jiang
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27de6547dc |
Merge pull request #27957 from BerriAI/litellm_/blissful-hawking-dfd43c
chore(ci): remove unused GitHub Actions workflows and orphan files |
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Yuneng Jiang
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d4be90cdad | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_/funny-williams-dab711 | ||
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Yuneng Jiang
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c82acbc0de |
test(ui): preserve global Button/Tooltip mocks in per-file @tremor/react vi.mock
Per-file `vi.mock("@tremor/react", ...)` factories fully replace the
setup-level mock from `tests/setupTests.ts`, so the global Button/Tooltip
overrides are lost in any file that re-mocks `@tremor/react`. Without
them, the real Tremor `<Button>` leaks through and its internal
`useTooltip(300)` schedules a native 300ms `setTimeout` on pointer
events. When the test environment is torn down before the timer fires,
the trailing `setState` calls `getCurrentEventPriority`, which reads
`window.event` against a destroyed jsdom -> "window is not defined"
flake observed on CI.
Patches the 7 leaky test files to re-supply `Button` (bare `<button>`)
and `Tooltip` (Fragment) overrides matching `setupTests.ts`. Also drops
a dead `afterEach` workaround in `user_edit_view.test.tsx` (the
fake-timer dance it ran could not drain a real timer scheduled before
the swap) and corrects a misleading comment in `MakeMCPPublicForm.test.tsx`.
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yuneng-jiang
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16bd81985d |
Merge pull request #27795 from BerriAI/litellm_vcr-cache-observability-and-fixes-c5bc
test(vcr): classify cache verdicts, surface cost leaks, and fix the two biggest leakers |
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Yuneng Jiang
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3f6c0090c0 |
chore(ci): remove unused GitHub Actions workflows and orphan files
Audit of .github/workflows/ via gh run history shows the following have either never run or have been dormant for 10+ weeks. CI coverage that still matters is preserved on CircleCI (e.g. llm_translation_testing). Removed workflows: - test-litellm.yml — workflow_dispatch only, last run 2026-02-12 (cancelled); CCI local_testing_part1/2 covers the same tests - llm-translation-testing.yml — last run 2025-07-10; replaced by CCI llm_translation_testing job (run_llm_translation_tests.py kept for the make test-llm-translation target) - run_observatory_tests.yml — last run 2026-03-03 (cancelled) - scan_duplicate_issues.yml — last run 2026-03-02 (failure) - publish_to_pypi.yml — never run - read_pyproject_version.yml — fires on every push to main but its echoed version output is not consumed by any downstream step Removed orphan files (no callers in workflows, CCI, or Makefile): - .github/workflows/README.md — documented only publish_to_pypi.yml - .github/workflows/update_release.py + results_stats.csv - .github/actions/helm-oci-chart-releaser/ |
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ishaan-berri
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39e1831e84 |
Emit native web_search_tool_result blocks for Anthropic clients (Claude Desktop / Cowork citations) (#27886)
* feat(custom_logger): add async_post_agentic_loop_response_hook Lets a CustomLogger shape the response returned by the agentic-loop follow-up call without bypassing the loop's safety / observability machinery (depth tracking, fingerprinting, etc.). Default returns the response unchanged. Used by websearch_interception to inject Anthropic-native web_search_tool_result blocks when the originating client requested a native web_search_* tool. * feat(llm_http_handler): call post-agentic-loop hook on the originating callback In _execute_anthropic_agentic_plan, after anthropic_messages.acreate returns, call the originating callback's async_post_agentic_loop_response_hook so it can mutate the final response (e.g. inject native tool_result blocks). Pass the callback through from _call_agentic_completion_hooks. Exceptions in the post-hook are caught and logged so a buggy callback can't kill the request. * feat(websearch_interception): add is_anthropic_native_web_search_tool Identifies tools the Anthropic-native clients (Claude Desktop, the Anthropic SDK, the Anthropic Console) use to request native search: type starts with "web_search_" (e.g. web_search_20250305). Rejects the LiteLLM standard tool, the OpenAI-function variant, the bare "WebSearch" legacy name, and the bare "web_search" Claude Code shape. This lets us decide per-request whether the client expects web_search_tool_result content blocks in the response, without renaming any existing constants or touching native-provider skip logic. * feat(websearch_interception): add build_web_search_tool_result_block Produces the Anthropic-native web_search_tool_result content block from a structured SearchResponse. Anthropic-native clients use this block to populate citations / source links — the existing text-blob flatten path only feeds readable evidence to the model and discards the structure, so this builder gives us the missing piece. Shape matches https://docs.anthropic.com/en/api/web-search-tool — web_search_result items carry url, title, page_age, encrypted_content (empty string when the search provider doesn't supply one). * feat(websearch_interception): emit native web_search_tool_result blocks When the originating client request carried a native Anthropic web_search_* tool, the final response now also carries web_search_tool_result content blocks alongside the model's text answer — so Claude Desktop / Anthropic SDK clients can populate the citations panel and replay conversation history with structured search evidence. Wiring: - Pre-request hooks (both deployment + Anthropic path) set a flag on kwargs when they see a native web_search_* tool, so the signal survives the conversion-to-litellm_web_search step regardless of which hook fires first. - _execute_search now returns (text, SearchResponse) so the structured results aren't lost when the text is flattened for the follow-up model call. - _build_anthropic_request_patch returns the parallel list of SearchResponse objects. - async_build_agentic_loop_plan pre-builds the web_search_tool_result blocks (one per tool_use_id) and stashes them on plan.metadata when the flag is set. - async_post_agentic_loop_response_hook reads the metadata and prepends the blocks to response.content. - _execute_agentic_loop mirrors the injection for the legacy path so both paths behave identically. Clients that send the LiteLLM standard tool keep the existing text-only behavior — no regression. * test(websearch_interception): cover native web_search_tool_result emission 18 tests across: - detector branches (native vs litellm-standard, OpenAI-function shape, Claude Desktop builtin WebSearch, bare web_search, missing type) - block-builder shape (results, none, empty) - pre-request hook flag-setting (native sets, standard does not) - async_build_agentic_loop_plan attaches blocks to plan.metadata when the flag is present, leaves metadata untouched when absent - post-hook injection into dict and object responses - legacy _execute_agentic_loop mirrors the injection so both paths return the same shape * test(websearch_short_circuit): keep _execute_search mocks in sync with new tuple return * test(websearch_thinking_constraint): keep _execute_search mocks in sync with new tuple return * feat(websearch_interception): emit native blocks from try_short_circuit_search The agentic-loop post-hook only fires when the model returns a tool_use block. Cowork / Claude Desktop on Bedrock actually make TWO requests per user turn: the main /v1/messages with their builtin tool, and a separate standalone /v1/messages whose only tool is web_search_20250305. That second request hits try_short_circuit_search — no agentic loop, no post-hook — and was returning text-only, leaving the citations panel empty. When the short-circuit input carries a native web_search_* tool, build a synthetic server_tool_use + web_search_tool_result pair (using the structured SearchResponse already returned by _execute_search) so the client gets the native shape it expects. The legacy text block is preserved so non-native short-circuit callers (Claude Code, github_copilot, etc.) see the same payload as before. Failure path still emits the native block pair (with empty results) plus the text-error block, so the client gets a well-formed response rather than a malformed half-shape. * test(websearch_native_blocks): cover short-circuit native-block emission Three new cases on top of the existing 18: - native web_search_20250305 short-circuit → [server_tool_use, web_search_tool_result, text], ids paired, urls/titles carried. - litellm_web_search short-circuit → text-only (no regression). - native short-circuit on search failure → still emits the native block pair (empty results) plus the text-error block, so the client never sees a malformed half-shape. * test(websearch_short_circuit): index assertions by block type, not by position Native short-circuit responses now have [server_tool_use, web_search_tool_result, text] when the input carries web_search_20250305 — find the text block by type rather than relying on content[0]. * fix(websearch_interception): gate legacy WebSearch name on schema absence Clients like Cowork / Claude Desktop ship a client-side tool named "WebSearch" with a full input_schema — they handle it themselves and expect to make a separate native web_search_20250305 sub-request for the actual search. Today is_web_search_tool matches the bare name regardless of other fields, which hijacks the client's tool server-side. The agentic loop fires on the main request, the model never gets to emit the client-side tool_use, and the separate native sub-request (where citation data flows) is never made. Net: citations panel empty. Real Anthropic client tools always carry input_schema (the API rejects them otherwise), so a bare {name: "WebSearch"} with no schema is the only thing that could be a legacy interception marker. Gate the match on schema absence: legacy callers (if any) keep working, real client-side WebSearch tools pass through untouched. * fix(websearch_interception): drop "WebSearch" from response-detection lists Post-conversion the model always sees ``litellm_web_search``, so the "WebSearch" entry in the response-side tool_use detection lists was dead at best. If a model ever did return ``tool_use(name="WebSearch")`` it would now (incorrectly) hijack the client's own ``WebSearch`` tool again — same Cowork problem we just fixed on the input side. Drop it. * test(websearch_native_blocks): cover the WebSearch legacy-name schema gate Three new cases: - {name: "WebSearch"} (bare interception marker) → still matched - {name: "WebSearch", input_schema: {...}} (Cowork client tool) → passes through untouched - {name: "WebSearch", description: "..."} (no schema) → still matched on the assumption it's a legacy marker rather than a malformed real client tool. --------- Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaffer <ishaanjaffer0324@gmail.com> |
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Dennis Henry
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9b6ab55c5f |
fix: allow for allowlisted redirect URIs (#27761)
* fix: allow for allowlisted redirect URIs * github comment addressing * Update litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/oauth_utils.py Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * harden oauth wildcard further * test: cover wildcard entry with dot-leading suffix rejection --------- Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Mateo Wang
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7a462a4220 |
fix(rate-limit): stop v3 limiter from leaking internal stash to provider body (#27913)
* fix(rate-limit): stop v3 limiter from leaking internal stash to provider body
PR #27001 (atomic TPM rate limit) introduced a reservation flow that
writes four LiteLLM-internal keys onto the request data dict:
_litellm_rate_limit_descriptors
_litellm_tpm_reserved_tokens
_litellm_tpm_reserved_model
_litellm_tpm_reserved_scopes
_litellm_tpm_reservation_released
These keys are forwarded as request body params to the upstream provider,
which rejects them as unknown fields:
OpenAI -> 400 'Unknown parameter: _litellm_rate_limit_descriptors'
(mapped by litellm to RateLimitError / 429, hiding the bug
behind a misleading 'throttling_error' code)
Anthropic -> 400 '_litellm_rate_limit_descriptors: Extra inputs are
not permitted'
Net effect: every chat completion against any real provider fails the
moment a virtual key has any tpm_limit / rpm_limit set — i.e. v3-enforced
key-level TPM/RPM limits are broken end-to-end. The v3 RPM/TPM check
itself still runs (raises 429 on over-limit), but the success path
poisons the upstream body.
Reproduced on litellm_internal_staging HEAD (
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ryan-crabbe-berri
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867470fd68 |
ci(mutmut): enable mutate_only_covered_lines to fit in CI budget (#27910)
The mutation-test workflow timed out at the 350-minute job cap when running whole-folder mutation against litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/ (~30 files, ~1.5 MB of source). Every mutant was running the full test suite, and mutants were generated for lines no test covers — which would survive regardless, just wasting compute. mutmut 3.x's mutate_only_covered_lines setting runs the suite once up front to compute coverage, then skips mutating uncovered lines. This cuts the mutant count dramatically and is the right semantic for the score (no test → no kill possible → uncountable). Per-mutant test filtering by function name is already automatic in mutmut 3.x; no external coverage step is needed. |
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Yassin Kortam
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a6494e6fe3 |
perf: eliminate per-request callback scanning on proxy hot path (#27858)
- Introduce `_CallbackCapabilities` dataclass and `ProxyLogging._callback_capabilities()` static method that inspects `litellm.callbacks` once and caches capability flags keyed on (list length, member ids); invalidates automatically when the callback list mutates without per-request iteration overhead - Replace O(n) `litellm.callbacks` walks in `async_pre_call_hook`, `during_call_hook`, `async_post_call_streaming_iterator_hook`, `async_post_call_streaming_hook`, and `post_call_response_headers_hook` with fast-path exits when no relevant callbacks are registered - Add `needs_iterator_wrap()` and `needs_per_chunk_streaming_hook()` instance methods to decouple iterator-level wrapping from per-chunk hook execution; avoids `get_response_string` materialization per chunk when no guardrail or chunk-hook callback is active - Introduce `_fast_serialize_simple_model_response_stream()` using `orjson` for common single-choice text streaming chunks, bypassing the full Pydantic serializer; falls back to `model_dump_json` for tool calls, logprobs, usage, and provider-specific fields - Add early-return in `_restamp_streaming_chunk_model` when downstream model already matches the requested model, avoiding unnecessary string comparisons on every chunk - Fix stale zero-cost cache bug in `_is_model_cost_zero`: move the per-router `_zero_cost_cache` dict onto the `Router` instance and clear it in `_invalidate_model_group_info_cache` so in-place pricing updates via `upsert_deployment` immediately resume budget enforcement - Add `scripts/benchmark_chat_completions_perf.py`: standalone async benchmarking tool with a mock OpenAI provider, LiteLLM proxy process management, non-streaming RPS, streaming TTFT, and full-stream latency measurements with repeat/median run support - Add comprehensive unit tests covering capability detection, cache invalidation, fast-path correctness, zero-cost cache regression, and the no-callback streaming fast path Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassinkortam@g.ucla.edu> |
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vladpolevoi
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65d6ad82ef |
feat(lasso): add tool-calling support to LassoGuardrail (#27648)
* feat(lasso): extend LassoGuardrail to support tool calling (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): PR review followups for tool-calling guardrail (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): handle object-style tool_calls in _update_tool_calls_from_masked (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): use model role for tool_use blocks (RND-5748)
* test(lasso): add round-trip tests for message transformation (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): remove unused imports, handle Responses-API input masking, flatten multimodal content (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): inspect Responses-API input field (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): guard text-cursor remap against Lasso count mismatch (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): flatten list content in tool_result.content (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): remap multimodal list content during masking (RND-5748)
Bug: _map_masked_messages_back counted list-content messages in
original_text_count but the remap loop only handled isinstance(str).
The positional text_cursor never advanced for list messages, causing
all subsequent masked texts to be written onto the wrong messages.
Fix: added elif isinstance(content, list) branch that replaces the
list with the masked text string and advances the cursor — mirrors
the existing string-content branch. Also handles the assistant +
tool_calls combo for list-content messages.
Test: test_map_masked_messages_back_list_content verifies a user
message with [text + image_url] followed by an assistant message
gets correct masked content on both (cursor stays aligned).
* refactor(lasso): extract _get_field and _extract_tool_call_fields helpers (RND-5748)
The dict-vs-object access pattern (x.get('y') if isinstance(x, dict)
else getattr(x, 'y', None)) was duplicated 14 times across 5 methods.
_get_field(obj, field) — single-point dict/Pydantic field access.
_extract_tool_call_fields(call) — returns (call_id, name, parsed_input)
with JSON argument parsing, replacing ~30 duplicate lines in both
async_post_call_success_hook and _expand_messages_for_classification.
Also simplified _update_tool_calls_from_masked, _prepare_payload tool
mapping, and _apply_masking_to_model_response call_id extraction.
Net ~60 lines removed. No behavior change — all 32 tests pass.
* fix(lasso): add count guard to _apply_masking_to_model_response (RND-5748)
_apply_masking_to_model_response used a bare text_cursor without
verifying 1:1 correspondence between text-bearing choices and masked
text entries. If Lasso returned a different number of text messages
than choices with content, masked text would be applied to the wrong
choice or silently skip choices.
Added the same count-mismatch guard pattern already used in
_map_masked_messages_back: count original text-bearing choices,
compare to masked_text length, skip text remap on mismatch with a
warning log. Tool_call masking via id-based lookup is unaffected.
Tests:
- test_apply_masking_to_model_response_multiple_choices: verifies
correct per-choice masked text with 2 choices
- test_apply_masking_to_model_response_count_mismatch: verifies
content is left unchanged when counts disagree
* fix(lasso): close two guardrail-bypass paths flagged in review (RND-5748)
* tool-call args: when function.arguments is malformed JSON or parses
to a non-object, preserve the raw string as {"arguments": <raw>} so
Lasso still inspects it instead of receiving input=None. Covers both
pre-call and post-call extraction (shared helper). Also resolves the
CodeQL empty-except warning since the except body now assigns parsed=None.
* Responses-API input: when a request carries both "messages" and
"input", inspect both. Previously a benign messages array let the
guardrail skip data["input"] entirely. The masking write-back is
split via a count boundary so masked messages flow back to
data["messages"] and masked input flows back to data["input"]
without cross-contamination.
Tests: malformed/non-object args round-trip, dual-field classification,
dual-field masking write-back split.
* chore(lasso): black formatting + comment on expand skip branch (RND-5748)
* black: wrap two long expressions in lasso.py and reformat dict
literals in test_lasso.py to satisfy CI lint.
* add a short comment in _expand_messages_for_classification
explaining why empty string and None content are intentionally
skipped (None is the OpenAI shape for a pure tool-call turn).
* fix(lasso): satisfy mypy in _handle_masking, _update_tool_calls_from_masked, _apply_masking_to_model_response (RND-5748)
* Narrow `response.get("messages")` into a local before slicing so
mypy doesn't see `Optional[List[Dict[str, str]]]` as non-indexable.
* Rename the two write-side `func` bindings in
`_update_tool_calls_from_masked` to `func_dict` / `func_obj` so
mypy doesn't unify the dict and Any|None branches.
* Rename the inner loop variable in `_apply_masking_to_model_response`
from `msg` to `masked_msg` to avoid clashing with the
`msg = choice.message` rebinding below.
No behavior change; resolves the 7 mypy errors from the CI lint job.
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Kenan Yildirim
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649eb2d176 | fix(guardrails): improve CrowdStrike AIDR input handling (#26658) | ||
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Krrish Dholakia
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410ce761dc |
fix: tighten budget field validation and authorization checks (#27897)
* fix: block NaN/Inf budget bypass and add missing non-admin guards
Addresses three security issues:
GHSA-wvg4-6222-3q4r: /user/update exposes max_budget, soft_budget, spend
to self-editing non-admin users with no server-side guard. Non-admin callers
now receive HTTP 403 if any of those fields appear in the update payload.
GHSA-q775-qw9r-2r4g: _enforce_upperbound_key_params returned early (no-op)
when upperbound_key_generate_params was absent from config, letting any
authenticated user generate a key with unlimited max_budget. Fix adds a
delegated-authority ceiling in _common_key_generation_helper: non-admins
cannot grant a key more budget than their own key carries.
GHSA-2rv4-xv66-fpjg: float('nan') passes every `value < 0` guard because
nan < 0 is False in Python, and spend >= nan is always False, permanently
disabling budget enforcement for any entity carrying a NaN max_budget.
All write-time budget guards now use `not math.isfinite(v) or v < 0`.
_enforce_upperbound_key_params validates finiteness unconditionally (before
the early-return). All spend-enforcement comparisons in auth_checks.py are
now guarded with math.isfinite(max_budget) as defense-in-depth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: close budget ceiling bypass for callers with no max_budget (GHSA-q775)
Non-admin callers whose API key has no explicit max_budget (None) could
bypass the delegated-authority ceiling and create keys with arbitrary
budgets. Now blocks budget assignment when caller has no budget configured.
Also removes redundant inline import of LitellmUserRoles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: only apply budget ceiling to explicitly requested max_budget
Capture the caller-supplied max_budget before _enforce_upperbound_key_params
can fill it with a default, so auto-filled defaults don't trigger the
ceiling guard for non-admin users with no budget on their own key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: capture requested max_budget before any defaults are applied
Move _requested_max_budget capture before both default_key_generate_params
and upperbound_key_generate_params mutations, so auto-filled values don't
trigger the ceiling check for non-admin users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: allow unlimited-budget callers to delegate any budget
Callers with max_budget=None (unlimited) can legitimately create
budget-capped keys. Only block when caller has an explicit budget
and the requested budget exceeds it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Yassin Kortam
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de1747dca8 |
fix(spend-logs): redact echoed prompts in error_information (LIT-2992) (#27689)
Provider validation errors (e.g. OpenAI RateLimitError carrying 178
pydantic errors each with their own 'input': [...]) were stored verbatim
in LiteLLM_SpendLogs.metadata.error_information.error_message via
str(original_exception), producing rows >12 MB.
Sanitize before metadata is serialized:
- redact 'input'/'messages' values in both error_message and traceback
when store_prompts_in_spend_logs is False (back-door leak paths)
- always apply the MAX_STRING_LENGTH_PROMPT_IN_DB size cap to
error_message and traceback (DB-storage safeguard)
Value scanning uses a parser-based balanced-bracket walk that respects
string quoting, so multi-modal payloads ('messages': [{'content': [...]}])
and user text containing literal brackets ("secret[123") are handled
correctly instead of leaking past a depth-1 regex.
Scoped to the spend-log path so OTEL/Datadog/etc. callbacks still
receive the untruncated error per LITELLM_TRUNCATION_DB_SAFEGUARD_NOTE.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassinkortam@g.ucla.edu>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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yuneng-jiang
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117b036ed6 |
Merge pull request #27907 from BerriAI/yj_build_2_may13
[Infra] Build UI |
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yuneng-jiang
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a2bb7aaf7e |
Merge pull request #27908 from BerriAI/yj_bump_may13
[Infra] Bump Extras Version |
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Yuneng Jiang
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e838a40049 | uv lock | ||
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Yuneng Jiang
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0aa439d919 | bump: version 0.4.71 → 0.4.72 | ||
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Yuneng Jiang
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2d578a7165 | chore: update Next.js build artifacts (2026-05-14 04:47 UTC, node v20.20.2) | ||
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Krrish Dholakia
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8bbc61e03c |
fix: harden /key/update authorization checks (#27878)
* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as `http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/" is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable without authentication. Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line, not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"], mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic. Affected variants confirmed fixed: Host: localhost/?x=1 Host: localhost:4000/?x=1 Host: localhost/#test Host: localhost:4000/#test Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: reduce comments in route fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.) in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side. Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. — without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation. Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF. Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and the existing credential fields. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config (aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint. - Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles) - Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins - Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to /utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK credential resolution. Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints. Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host. Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing. ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.) nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe. _NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring) so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic, azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check. Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential). Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a passthrough prefix are allowed through. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures - key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields. can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin check on a team key means the caller was authorized. - test: set created_by on mock key in test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id). - auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope (e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation. - ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly. Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"] to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"), breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes. Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/". migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column. Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including /team/new) to 500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id == caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access. Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements (PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper to bring statement count under the limit. test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local "cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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yuneng-jiang
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0c4982042a |
Merge pull request #27892 from BerriAI/worktree-fix-mcp-byok-oauth
Worktree fix mcp byok oauth |
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yuneng-jiang
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e3e5209f51 |
Merge pull request #27801 from stuxf/chore/get-instance-fn-runtime-s3-gate
chore(proxy): refuse remote-URL instance-fn loads outside config-file path |
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yuneng-jiang
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a6a9d8edf0 |
Merge pull request #27898 from stuxf/chore/banned-params-extra-body-cover
chore(proxy): cover extra_body + azure_ad_token in banned-params check |
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user
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626b768d25 |
chore(tests): drop redundant membership check; trim test comment
``test_azure_ad_token_is_in_banned_list`` only asserted tuple membership of a name the parametrized test already exercises end-to-end through ``is_request_body_safe``. Removed. Tightened the admin-opt-in test comment. |
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user
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5e56022553 |
chore(proxy): coerce stringified nested-config containers before descent
``_NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS`` descent used ``isinstance(nested, dict)``, so a caller sending ``extra_body`` as a JSON-encoded string instead of an object (the same shape multipart/form-data clients use for ``litellm_metadata``) skipped the banned-key check entirely. Switched to ``_coerce_metadata_to_dict`` so the JSON-string path is parsed before descent — mirrors the existing handling on ``_NESTED_METADATA_KEYS``. |
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yuneng-jiang
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1bea77e564 |
fix(ui): fetch version + debug flag from /health/readiness/details (#27896)
* fix(ui): fetch version + debug flag from /health/readiness/details The proxy moved `litellm_version`, `is_detailed_debug`, and other diagnostic fields off the public `/health/readiness` payload behind an auth-gated `/health/readiness/details` endpoint. The navbar version tag and the detailed-debug-mode banner stopped working because they were still reading those fields from the unauthed response, which no longer contains them. Replace `useHealthReadiness` with a `useHealthReadinessDetails` hook that takes an `accessToken` argument and sends a Bearer header to the auth-gated endpoint. The hook stays disabled while `accessToken` is falsy, so the navbar can keep rendering on the public model hub (where the token is null) without triggering an auth redirect or a 401-loop. * fix(ui): disable retries on readiness/details + cover token forwarding Two small follow-ups on the readiness/details migration: - Set `retry: false` on the query. The payload feeds a passive navbar tag and a debug banner; a 401 from an expired token shouldn't fan out into three retries against the proxy. - Add navbar specs that assert the `accessToken` prop is forwarded into the hook (matches the DebugWarningBanner spec). Without this, the navbar could silently regress to passing `undefined` and the existing tests wouldn't catch it. |
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user
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2519ac161e |
chore(proxy): cover extra_body + azure_ad_token in banned-params check
``extra_body`` is the OpenAI-SDK passthrough container. Provider modules read provider-auth fields out of it directly (Azure's ``extra_body.azure_ad_token``, Bedrock's ``extra_body.aws_web_identity_token``, etc.) without re-validating, so the boundary check has to walk it the same way it walks ``litellm_embedding_config``. Adding it to ``_NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS`` extends single-level banned-key descent into the container — top-level admin opt-ins (``allow_client_side_credentials`` / ``configurable_clientside_auth_params``) still apply. ``azure_ad_token`` was not in ``_BANNED_REQUEST_BODY_PARAMS`` despite being the bearer-token field the Azure transformer resolves through ``get_secret`` (same shape as ``aws_web_identity_token`` on the Bedrock STS path). Added so it can't be supplied per-request without an admin opt-in. |
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Sameer Kankute
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1294165768 |
feat(mcp): support MCP access group names in URL-based namespacing (#27726)
* feat(mcp): support MCP access group names in URL-based namespacing
Extends dynamic_mcp_route to resolve /{name}/mcp requests where {name}
is an MCP access group tag or a comma-separated list of servers/groups,
matching what the documentation promised but the handler did not implement.
Resolution order: registered server alias → toolset → comma-separated
list → single access group tag (404 if none match).
Adds unit tests covering all four resolution paths plus 404 cases.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(mcp): address Greptile review comments on dynamic_mcp_route
- Move comma-separated check before toolset DB lookup so comma names
short-circuit without hitting the database
- Cache access-group DB lookups via user_api_key_cache to avoid a raw
find_many on every request (matches toolset caching pattern)
- Remove unused response_started variable from _forward_as_mcp_path
- Update tests to assert comma list skips toolset call and to mock cache
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* refactor(mcp): extract helpers to fix PLR0915 too-many-statements in dynamic_mcp_route
Extract _mcp_forward_as_path and _is_mcp_access_group_cached as
module-level helpers so dynamic_mcp_route stays under the 50-statement
limit. Update tests to patch the new module-level symbols directly.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Avoid caching missing MCP access groups
* fix(mcp): stream MCP responses via _stream_mcp_asgi_response instead of buffering
_mcp_forward_as_path previously accumulated the full response body in
memory before sending it. Replace the buffering custom_send pattern with
_stream_mcp_asgi_response, which uses an asyncio.Queue bridge so chunks
are yielded to the client as they arrive, preventing unbounded memory
growth on large or long-lived MCP responses.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(mcp): short-TTL negative cache for access-group existence lookup
An unauthenticated caller could repeatedly request /<unknown>/mcp and
force a fresh DB lookup for the access-group existence check on every
request (only positive results were cached). Cache negative results
for a short DEFAULT_MCP_ACCESS_GROUP_NEGATIVE_CACHE_TTL window (10s by
default) so the DB is shielded from flooding while a transient DB error
(which surfaces as an empty list) cannot hide a real group for long.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9
* fix(mcp): use plain int for access-group negative cache TTL
Drop the os.getenv wrapper around DEFAULT_MCP_ACCESS_GROUP_NEGATIVE_CACHE_TTL
to avoid the documentation_test_env_keys check failing on the new variable.
The negative-cache window is a small internal tuning constant, not a
user-facing knob, so a plain integer is clearer than an env override.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9
* fix(mcp): validate, dedupe, and cap CSV tokens in dynamic MCP route
For /{name1,name2,...}/mcp, validate every token resolves to a known
server alias or access group, dedupe case-insensitively, and cap at
DEFAULT_MCP_NAMESPACE_CSV_MAX_TOKENS=16 before forwarding.
- Bounds the per-request DB / cache fan-out an authenticated caller can
trigger by stuffing the path with tokens (raised by veria-ai).
- Returns 404 instead of forwarding when no token resolves, so the
downstream server filter cannot silently fall back to the full
allowed_mcp_servers list (raised by Cursor agentic security review).
- Forwards only the resolved subset, so unknown tokens cannot ride along
into the downstream filter.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): exact-match CSV token dedupe to preserve case-sensitive distinct tokens
Bugbot flagged that case-insensitive dedup on `MyGroup,mygroup` could
collapse to whichever case appeared first and silently drop the matching
casing if the downstream resolver is case-sensitive. Switch to exact-match
dedup so distinct casings survive; whitespace-only differences still
collapse via the .strip() before comparison.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <mateo@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
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user
|
aced4295bb |
chore(proxy): also scrub guardrail callbacks / module paths from DB overlay
A guardrail entry's ``callbacks`` list (v1: ``{name: {callbacks:[...]}}``,
v2: ``{guardrail_name, litellm_params: {callbacks: [...], guardrail:
"module.path"}}``) is iterated during config load and threaded through
``get_instance_fn``. A PROXY_ADMIN persisting
``litellm_settings.guardrails[*].callbacks: ["s3://..."]`` or
``litellm_settings.guardrails[*].litellm_params.guardrail: "s3://..."``
via ``/config/update`` was not covered by the previous scrub matrix.
Walk both v1 and v2 entry shapes and null out remote-URL callbacks /
module-path values before the merge. Adds four regression tests.
|
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Krrish Dholakia
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f1d07c13e5 |
fix: block SSRF fields in RAG ingest vector_store config
aws_sts_endpoint, aws_web_identity_token, and aws_bedrock_runtime_endpoint in ingest_options.vector_store were passed directly to the Bedrock ingestion class, which reads them into boto3 STS client construction. Any authenticated caller could redirect AssumeRole calls to an attacker-controlled server, leaking the proxy's instance profile credentials. Calls is_request_body_safe() on ingest_options["vector_store"] before forwarding to litellm.aingest(). Same banned-params list and admin opt-in escape hatch (allow_client_side_credentials) as the /chat/completions path. ValueError from the safety check is caught and re-raised as HTTP 400. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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lmcdonald-godaddy
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baa68ebb12 |
fix(pricing): GPT-4o-Transcribe Pricing (#27875)
* Update gpt-4o-transcribe price * Update test for gpt-4o-transcribe pricing fix * Update gpt-4o-mini-transcribe price |
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Mateo Wang
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f028a622e2 |
fix(prometheus): emit litellm_remaining_tokens_metric for Bedrock and Vertex (#27705)
* fix(prometheus): emit remaining_tokens/requests gauges for bedrock + vertex (LIT-2719) Bedrock and Vertex AI never return x-ratelimit-remaining-* response headers, so litellm_remaining_tokens_metric / litellm_remaining_requests_metric only fired for OpenAI / Azure / Anthropic deployments even when tpm/rpm was configured on the router. Add a provider-agnostic fallback in PrometheusLogger.async_log_success_event that asks Router.get_remaining_model_group_usage() for the same model_group and emits the gauges with configured_limit - current_usage when the upstream provider didn't populate the headers itself. Existing OpenAI / Azure / Anthropic flows are unchanged because the fallback short-circuits when both header values are already present. Tests: 8 new tests covering bedrock + vertex emission, header short-circuit, partial-header fill, llm_router=None, missing model_group, empty router result, and router exception swallowing. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(prometheus): narrow except to ImportError, log router lookup failures via verbose_logger.exception Address greptile review: - The optional 'from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import llm_router' should guard against ImportError specifically, not all exceptions, so that unexpected errors (e.g. AttributeError from partially-initialized state) stay visible. - get_remaining_model_group_usage failures are now logged via verbose_logger.exception (with traceback) instead of debug, matching the PR description's intent and avoiding silent loss of router-cache errors in production. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(prometheus): subtract in-flight delta in router-remaining fallback The router's TPM/RPM counter is incremented by Router.deployment_callback_on_success, which fires alongside this prometheus callback in the success-log fan-out. Prometheus wins the race, so get_remaining_model_group_usage returns the pre-decrement counter for the current request — while vendor headers (OpenAI/Anthropic/Azure) are already post-decrement. That broke parity between providers on the same gauge: dashboards plotting litellm_remaining_requests_metric showed Bedrock/Vertex perpetually one request behind Anthropic for the same throughput. Replay the in-flight increment before emit: subtract total_tokens from remaining_tokens and 1 from remaining_requests. * Revert "fix(prometheus): subtract in-flight delta in router-remaining fallback" This reverts commit 001ce95ecdd952b4b5a23dd2b1e62c4562c932bc. * fix(router): post-decrement router-derived ratelimit headers Router.set_response_headers injects x-ratelimit-remaining-{tokens, requests} for providers that don't return them natively (Bedrock, Vertex). The values come from get_remaining_model_group_usage, which reads the router's TPM/RPM counter — incremented post-response by deployment_callback_on_success. So the headers reflected the counter state before the current request was counted: pre-decrement. Vendor headers from OpenAI/Anthropic/Azure are post-decrement (the vendor counted the request before responding). Same metric name, two semantics — dashboards plotting litellm_remaining_requests_metric showed Bedrock/Vertex perpetually one request behind for the same throughput, and the HTTP response headers exposed the same skew to clients. Subtract the in-flight delta before writing: 1 from remaining-requests, response.usage.total_tokens from remaining-tokens. Fixes both the response headers and (transitively) the prometheus gauges that read from standard_logging_payload.additional_headers. --------- Co-authored-by: cursor <cursor@example.com> Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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user
|
3aef0642a8 |
chore(proxy): also scrub pass_through_endpoints[].target from DB overlay
A pass-through endpoint's ``target`` field is passed through ``create_pass_through_route`` into ``get_instance_fn`` during config load. A PROXY_ADMIN persisting ``target: "s3://attacker/m.i"`` via the DB-overlay ``pass_through_endpoints`` write path was not covered by the previous scrub matrix, so the remote module load would still reach the loader because the YAML-load chain has ``config_file_path`` set. Walk each entry in ``general_settings.pass_through_endpoints`` and null out any ``target`` that starts with ``s3://`` or ``gcs://``. The entry itself is preserved so the path-registration helper can choose how to handle a missing target (the existing code skips the route when ``target is None``). Adds two regression tests. |
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user
|
7575df2549 |
chore(proxy): scrub remote-URL module loads from DB-overlay config
When ``ProxyConfig`` merges DB-persisted ``litellm_settings`` / ``general_settings`` on top of the YAML config, the merged dict is later iterated by ``load_config`` which threads ``config_file_path`` (the YAML path) into ``get_instance_fn``. The runtime gate that refuses ``s3://`` / ``gcs://`` modules when ``config_file_path`` is ``None`` therefore can't distinguish a YAML-sourced value from a DB-sourced one: both look the same to ``get_instance_fn``. Strip ``s3://`` / ``gcs://`` entries from the DB-overlay value for every field whose contents reach ``get_instance_fn`` during config load: - litellm_settings: ``callbacks``, ``success_callback``, ``failure_callback``, ``audit_log_callbacks``, ``post_call_rules``, ``custom_provider_map[].custom_handler`` - general_settings: ``custom_auth``, ``custom_key_generate``, ``custom_key_update``, ``custom_sso``, ``custom_ui_sso_sign_in_handler``, ``litellm_jwtauth.custom_validate`` The YAML config-file load path is unchanged — the documented operator flow (``callbacks: ["s3://bucket/module.instance"]`` in ``config.yaml``) still works. Only DB-overlay writes (e.g. via ``/config/update``) are stripped. Adds 16 regression tests covering the scrub matrix. |
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Krrish Dholakia
|
b95130eb32 |
fix: block client-side pricing injection via request body
Authenticated clients could supply CustomPricingLiteLLMParams fields (input_cost_per_token, output_cost_per_token, etc.) in the request body. These were forwarded to register_model() in main.py, permanently mutating the shared global litellm.model_cost dict for all users on the instance. Adds all CustomPricingLiteLLMParams fields to _BANNED_REQUEST_BODY_PARAMS so is_request_body_safe() rejects them before they reach completion(). New pricing fields added to CustomPricingLiteLLMParams are auto-covered. Admin opt-in via allow_client_side_credentials or configurable_clientside_auth_params still works as before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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milan-berri
|
6274b4c217 |
fix(fireworks_ai): strip thinking_blocks from chat messages before Fireworks API call (#27881)
* fix(fireworks_ai): strip thinking_blocks from chat messages before API call Fireworks OpenAI-compatible ChatMessage schema uses additionalProperties:false and rejects Anthropic-style messages[].thinking_blocks (e.g. Claude Code replays), returning invalid_request_error. Remove the field in _transform_messages_helper alongside provider_specific_fields. Adds unit test test_transform_messages_helper_strips_thinking_blocks. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * chore(fireworks_ai): drop inline comments from message sanitization Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * docs(fireworks_ai): explain why provider_specific_fields and thinking_blocks are stripped Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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ishaan-berri
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b593b88ec6 |
Ishaan - May 13th Staging LiteLLM (#27877)
* fix: strip Gemini thought-signature from tool_use.id in non-streaming path; example websearch config (#27873) - adapters/transformation.py: mirror the streaming path and strip the `__thought__<b64>` suffix off `tool_call.id` before building the AnthropicResponseContentBlockToolUse. Base64's `+ / =` characters violate Anthropic's `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$` tool_use.id pattern, so when a conversation that flowed through Gemini is later replayed to an Anthropic-native provider (Bedrock or Anthropic API) the request 400s. - example_config_yaml/websearch_interception_config.yaml: register the interceptor under `callbacks:` not `success_callback:`. `success_callback` does not run pre-request hooks, so the tool-conversion step never fires on `/v1/messages` and the raw `web_search_20250305` tool is forwarded to Bedrock, which 400s. - adds a unit test pinning the non-streaming strip behavior and the surviving `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$` shape of the resulting id. Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <279349115+oss-agent-shin@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix/azure image edit auth header (#27863) * fix(azure/image_edit): use api-key header instead of Authorization Bearer Delegate `AzureImageEditConfig.validate_environment` to `BaseAzureLLM._base_validate_azure_environment` so the image-edit route follows the same auth resolution as every other Azure provider: - prefer the Azure-native `api-key` header when an API key is available - fall back to `Authorization: Bearer <azure_ad_token>` only for AAD auth The previous implementation unconditionally set `Authorization: Bearer <api_key>`, which is the OpenAI-direct convention and is rejected by Azure OpenAI / APIM-fronted deployments with `401 Access denied due to missing subscription key`. Adds regression tests covering api_key kwarg, litellm_params.api_key, and the AAD-token fallback path. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * docs(azure/image_edit): pin api-key precedence semantics + add regression test Address review feedback that the move to ``BaseAzureLLM._base_validate_azure_environment`` changed the relative priority of the positional ``api_key`` kwarg vs. ``litellm_params["api_key"]``. The new behavior — ``litellm_params["api_key"]`` wins, positional only fills in when ``litellm_params["api_key"]`` is empty — is intentional and matches every other Azure ``validate_environment``: ``AzureVideosConfig`` uses the exact same merge logic, while ``AzureVectorStoresConfig`` and ``AzureResponsesAPIConfig`` don't accept a positional ``api_key`` at all. The old ``or`` chain (positional wins) was the outlier and was part of the same OpenAI-vs-Azure convention drift that produced the original ``Authorization: Bearer`` bug. The only production caller (``llm_http_handler.image_edit``) sources both values from the same ``litellm_params.api_key``, so this change is behaviorally a no-op there. Document the precedence in the docstring and lock it in with an explicit test so future refactors can't quietly re-invert it. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Adam Kirstein <adam.kirstein@disney.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * test(azure/image_edit): expect api-key header instead of Authorization Bearer PR #27863 fixed Azure image edit to use the Azure-native api-key header instead of OpenAI's Authorization: Bearer convention, but did not update test_azure_image_edit_litellm_sdk to match. The test still asserted 'Authorization' in headers, which now fails since the new code routes through BaseAzureLLM._base_validate_azure_environment and emits api-key when an api_key is provided. Update the assertion to pin the correct Azure behavior: api-key header present with the resolved key, and no Authorization header. --------- Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <ext-agent-shin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <279349115+oss-agent-shin@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Adam Kirstein <107421694+justalittleadam@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Adam Kirstein <adam.kirstein@disney.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Ishaan Jaffer <ishaanjaffer0324@gmail.com> |
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Sameer Kankute
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bbeb094d00 |
Litellm agent oss staging 05 11 2026 (#27733)
* fix(ollama): Include provider in model list for ollama (#26135) * Include provider in model names for ollama * Fix unit tests * fix(ollama): process both thinking and content in same streaming chunk (#26098) * fix(health_check): skip max_tokens for image_generation mode (#26417) * fix(health_check): skip max_tokens for image_generation mode `_update_litellm_params_for_health_check` injected `max_tokens` for every deployment. OpenAI `/v1/images/generations` strictly rejects unknown fields, so health checks for dall-e-* and gpt-image-1 always failed with `400 "Unknown parameter: 'max_tokens'"` even though the actual image endpoint calls succeed. Skip the `max_tokens` injection when `model_info.mode == "image_generation"`. `messages` still gets injected (downstream `_filter_model_params` already strips it for non-chat handlers). * Switch to allow-list with per-deployment override Per @krrishdholakia review: deny-listing image_generation only re-introduces the same bug for every other non-chat mode (embedding, audio_*, rerank, video_generation, ocr, search, moderation, ...). Replace the single image_generation skip with `_MAX_TOKEN_SUPPORT_MODES = {chat, completion, responses}`. Missing `mode` is treated as chat for backward compatibility. New modes are safe by default. Add `model_info.health_check_supports_max_tokens` as an operator escape hatch — True forces injection on a non-listed deployment (operator wants to bound probe tokens), False suppresses it on a chat-style deployment behind a strict-schema provider. Tests: parametrize over 3 chat-style + 10 non-chat modes, plus override on/off and the no-mode legacy path. * fix(http_handler): handle RequestNotRead in MaskedHTTPStatusError for multipart uploads (#26718) Squash-merged by litellm-agent from dawidkulpa's PR. * fix(ollama): guard against double 'ollama/' prefix in live model listing Greptile flagged that Ollama servers can return names that already start with 'ollama/'. Check the prefix before prepending so we don't produce 'ollama/ollama/...'. Adds a regression test. * Fix Ollama empty reasoning stream chunks Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: James Myatt <james@jamesmyatt.co.uk> Co-authored-by: VHash <225398745+vhash0@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: hayden <sewhan.kim+@a-bly.com> Co-authored-by: dawidkulpa <84176950+dawidkulpa@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> |
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Krrish Dholakia
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06c1c3497f |
fix: Fix Redis Sentinel client handling to solve authentication error… (#26302)
* fix: Fix Redis Sentinel client handling to solve authentication error with password protected sentinel (#25625) * fix Redis Sentinel authentication handling * test: cover Redis Sentinel auth routing * refactor: align Redis Sentinel kwargs threading * fix: avoid duplicate Redis Sentinel socket timeouts * Address review comments * refactor(_redis): return set from _get_redis_kwargs for O(1) lookup Align _get_redis_kwargs() with the cluster helper by returning a set instead of a list, so the sentinel connection-kwargs filter uses O(1) membership tests. Addresses Greptile review feedback on PR #26302. * fix(_redis): restore Azure-specific kwargs in cluster kwargs set The set-literal refactor of _get_redis_cluster_kwargs dropped four LiteLLM-custom Azure keys (azure_redis_ad_token, azure_client_id, azure_tenant_id, azure_client_secret) that the prior list form had explicitly appended. Because they are not in RedisCluster's argspec, they were silently stripped, breaking Azure IAM auth on cluster clients. Re-add them to the explicit include set. --------- Co-authored-by: Kristin Cowalcijk <kristincowalcijk@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <sameer@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: krrish-berri-2 <krrish-berri-2@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: claude <claude@anthropic.com> |
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oss-agent-shin
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714664fe21 |
docs: add class docstring to _LoopWrapper (#27870)
Document the purpose of the daemon thread that backs the sync branch of the timeout decorator. Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <279349115+oss-agent-shin@users.noreply.github.com> |
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oss-agent-shin
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ca82761e48 |
docs(budget_manager): add docstring to BudgetManager.reset_cost (#27867)
Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <279349115+oss-agent-shin@users.noreply.github.com> |
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yuneng-jiang
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5e706f8c87 |
Merge pull request #27866 from BerriAI/litellm_/bold-kare-aebc4b
fix(proxy): expose db status on public /health/readiness |
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Yuneng Jiang
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d6fa08307b |
fix(proxy): expose db status on public /health/readiness
External readiness probes consumed the legacy detailed payload's `db`
field to drive alerting and pod-rotation decisions. Stripping the body
to `{"status": "healthy"}` broke those probes silently — the HTTP code
still flipped to 503, but probes checking `body.db == "connected"`
treated the response as healthy.
Add `db` back to the unauthenticated payload. Keep the rest of the
diagnostic fields (litellm_version, callbacks, cache, log_level) gated
behind /health/readiness/details so the recon-leak gate from #26912
holds. Values match the legacy contract: "connected", "disconnected",
"Not connected".
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Sameer Kankute
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7e61dbb1df |
fix(responses): preserve cache_control in Responses API -> Chat Completion transformation (#27727)
* fix(responses): preserve cache_control in Responses API -> Chat Completion transformation
cache_control injected by AnthropicCacheControlHook was silently dropped when
_transform_responses_api_content_to_chat_completion_content rebuilt content blocks
with only {type, text}. Now copies cache_control through so Anthropic prompt caching
works correctly when using client.responses.create with cache_control_injection_points.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(responses): preserve cache_control for input_image and input_file blocks
Extends the cache_control fix to image and file content blocks, which were
also silently dropping cache_control during the Responses API -> Chat Completion
transformation. Adds tests for all three content block types.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Babysitter <claude@anthropic.com>
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Sameer Kankute
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18f77ff7bc |
feat(mcp): add delegate_auth_to_upstream flag for PKCE passthrough (#27834)
* feat(mcp): add delegate_auth_to_upstream flag for PKCE passthrough Adds an opt-in per-server flag that lets clients (e.g. VS Code) complete PKCE directly with an upstream OAuth2 MCP server, instead of LiteLLM double-gating with its own API-key/SSO check. Only honored when auth_type=oauth2 and the operator explicitly sets the flag; mixed-target or non-oauth2 requests fail closed. - Adds the field to Pydantic models, Prisma schema, and a migration - New MCPRequestHandler._target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream gate that runs only when no x-litellm-api-key is present, so authenticated users still get user_id resolution + stored-credential lookup - Anonymous callers now see delegate servers in get_allowed_mcp_servers (scoped to delegate servers only; the upstream still enforces auth) - mcp_management_endpoints: allow anonymous /authorize and /token for delegate servers so VS Code can complete PKCE without a LiteLLM session - UI toggle (shown only for oauth2) + payload/view wiring - Tests covering: oauth2 on/off, non-oauth2 with flag, mixed targets, no resolvable target, explicit key precedence, and 401 emission Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Enforce oauth2 for delegated MCP auth bypass Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): close secondary Authorization bypass for delegate servers The delegate-auth bypass gated only on the primary `x-litellm-api-key` header, so a LiteLLM key sent via `Authorization: Bearer sk-...` (the secondary header) was silently dropped — skipping spend tracking and rate limiting. Gate on the resolved litellm_api_key (which considers both headers) so the bypass fires only when neither is present. Also update the existing "Authorization header present" test to reflect that an upstream OAuth token now flows through the existing oauth2 fallback (LiteLLM auth attempt → fail → anonymous), not via the delegate branch. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Avoid duplicate MCP OAuth credential lookup Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): block delegate bypass for M2M and internal-only servers Two security issues flagged in code review: 1. High – client_credentials (M2M) servers must not be delegatable: LiteLLM auto-fetches the upstream token using stored credentials, so allowing anonymous bypass would let any external caller invoke tools authenticated as LiteLLM's service account. Fix: check `server.has_client_credentials` in `_target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream`, the anonymous allow-list in `get_allowed_mcp_servers`, and `_mcp_oauth_user_api_key_auth`. 2. Medium – internal-only servers exposed to public internet: The anonymous delegate allow-list was not filtering by `available_on_public_internet`, so external callers with an upstream OAuth token could invoke tools on servers marked internal-only. Fix: add `available_on_public_internet` guard to the anonymous delegate server list in `get_allowed_mcp_servers`. Tests added for both cases. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Require public MCP delegate auth servers Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): align delegate auth path parsing with downstream routing `_extract_target_server_names_from_path` used a naive segments-based split while `server.py::_get_mcp_servers_in_path` uses a regex that allows server names with one embedded slash and comma-separated lists. With the old parser, a request to `/mcp/<delegated>/<garbage>` was parsed as targeting `<delegated>` by the auth gate (bypassing LiteLLM auth) while the routing layer parsed it as `<delegated>/<garbage>` — when that name did not resolve, the request fell back to the anonymous allow-list, which can include `allow_all_keys` servers that normally require a LiteLLM key. Replace the parser with the same regex logic as `_get_mcp_servers_in_path` so auth gating sees the exact target name(s) downstream routing sees. Add regression tests covering parser parity and the specific extra-path-segment bypass attempt. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * fix(mcp): close header/path TOCTOU in MCP delegate auth gate `_target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream` and `_target_servers_use_oauth2` trusted the `x-mcp-servers` header when present, but `server.py::extract_mcp_auth_context` overrides that header with the path-derived list for `/mcp/...` routes. An attacker could set `x-mcp-servers: <delegated>` while pointing the URL path at a non-delegate server, flipping the auth gate without changing the target downstream routing actually uses. Extract a shared `_resolve_target_server_names` helper that mirrors the downstream override (path-derived names for `/mcp/...` routes, header value otherwise). Add regression tests covering the TOCTOU attempt and the helper's path-vs-header precedence. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * Fix delegated MCP OAuth test mock Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): drop unreachable /{server}/mcp branch in auth path parser `_extract_target_server_names_from_path` also matched the ``/{server_name}/mcp`` form, but the downstream parser ``_get_mcp_servers_in_path`` only handles ``/mcp/...`` — and ``dynamic_mcp_route`` in ``proxy_server`` rewrites ``/{name}/mcp`` to ``/mcp/{name}`` on the scope before the MCP handler runs. Parsing the un-rewritten form on the auth side was therefore unreachable in production, and contradicted the docstring's claim of mirroring the downstream parser — exactly the kind of mismatch that risks a future header/path TOCTOU if any new entry point skips the rewrite. Drop the branch; the canonical ``/mcp/...`` path matches both parsers. Update the regression test to assert the new behavior. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * Fix MCP path auth target resolution Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): require auth for refresh_token grants on delegate-auth servers `_mcp_oauth_user_api_key_auth` gates the unauthenticated PKCE flow for ``delegate_auth_to_upstream`` servers, but the bypass applied to BOTH ``/authorize`` and ``/token`` regardless of grant type. ``mcp_token`` accepts ``grant_type=refresh_token`` as well as ``authorization_code``, and ``exchange_token_with_server`` attaches the server's stored ``client_secret`` to whatever is forwarded upstream. An unauthenticated caller holding a refresh token issued to that OAuth client could mint fresh upstream access tokens through LiteLLM. Limit the anonymous bypass on ``/token`` to ``grant_type=authorization_code`` (the only grant PKCE actually protects via ``code_verifier``); fall through to normal LiteLLM auth for ``refresh_token`` and any other grant. ``/authorize`` continues to allow anonymous PKCE redirects. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * fix(ui): clear delegate_auth_to_upstream when switching off oauth2 The ``delegate_auth_to_upstream`` form field is rendered inside an ``isOAuth2 && (...)`` conditional, so the Form.Item unmounts when the user changes ``auth_type`` away from ``oauth2``. The follow-up ``form.setFieldValue("delegate_auth_to_upstream", false)`` runs after the field has already deregistered, so ``onFinish`` receives ``undefined`` and the fallback ``?? mcpServer.delegate_auth_to_upstream`` preserved the old ``true``. The flag then persisted in the database for a non-oauth2 server and silently re-activated if ``auth_type`` was later switched back to ``oauth2``. In the edit payload, force the flag to ``false`` whenever ``auth_type !== oauth2``; only trust the form value (and the existing DB fallback) when the server is actually oauth2. Backend defense-in-depth already ignores the flag for non-oauth2 servers, but the DB state should stay clean too. https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9 * Fix MCP delegate auth reset on edit Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com> |
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Sameer Kankute
|
a74e269f7d |
fix(cost): align vertex_ai/gemini-embedding-2-preview with Vertex multimodal pricing (#27848)
* fix(cost): align vertex_ai/gemini-embedding-2-preview with Vertex multimodal pricing Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(cost): align vertex_ai/gemini-embedding-2 GA source URL with preview Per Greptile review on #27848: GA entry referenced ai.google.dev while the preview entry was updated to the canonical Vertex AI pricing page. Both share identical pricing values; sync the source URL for consistency. https://claude.ai/code/session_01W8jRwstnmduadGw8Z8egxe --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Sameer Kankute
|
466f06df6d |
fix(mcp): surface upstream 401 for token-forwarding MCP servers (#27847)
* fix(mcp): surface upstream 401 for token-forwarding MCP servers For MCP servers configured with extra_headers: [Authorization], the gateway forwards the client token directly to the upstream. When that token is rejected (expired or invalid) the upstream returns 401, but the MCP SDK starts the SSE stream with 200 OK before calling handlers, so the 401 can't be returned mid-stream. Fix: add a pre-flight httpx probe in handle_streamable_http_mcp — before the SDK opens the session — so the gateway can still return HTTP 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer authorization_uri=<gateway-discovery-url> when the upstream rejects the token. The probe fails-open (returns 200) on network errors so a transient hiccup does not block valid requests. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): parallelize pre-flight auth probes and use HEAD to avoid side effects - Extract forwarded_auth outside the pass-through server loop (was called N times for the same scope value) - Gather all upstream auth probes concurrently with asyncio.gather instead of sequentially; eliminates N×5 s worst-case latency - Switch probe from POST+initialize JSON-RPC body to HEAD request; HEAD carries the Authorization header so the upstream rejects invalid tokens with 401 but never allocates a session or writes an audit entry Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): use get_async_httpx_client in _probe_upstream_auth Replaces bare httpx.AsyncClient with the project-standard get_async_httpx_client(httpxSpecialProvider.MCP) to satisfy the ensure_async_clients_test code coverage check and avoid the +500 ms per-request overhead of creating a new client on every probe call. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * refactor(mcp): extract pre-flight probe into _check_passthrough_upstream_auth Moves the parallel upstream auth probe logic out of handle_streamable_http_mcp into a dedicated helper to satisfy Ruff PLR0915 (Too many statements > 50). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): gate pre-flight probes on authorized server set to prevent bypass _check_passthrough_upstream_auth was resolving user-supplied server names directly before authorization ran, letting any permitted LiteLLM key trigger an upstream HEAD probe to a server it was not allowed to use. Changes: - Call _get_allowed_mcp_servers inside the helper so only servers the caller's key is authorized for are probed. - Move the call site to after toolset scoping so the auth context is fully resolved before the probe list is built. - Thread user_api_key_auth into the helper signature (replaces the raw mcp_servers name list). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Add async HTTP HEAD support Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): use Scope type annotation in _get_forwarded_auth_from_scope Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix MCP upstream auth probe method Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * Remove unused AsyncHTTPHandler head method Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): exclude has_client_credentials servers from pre-flight auth probe _prepare_mcp_server_headers skips caller Authorization when the server uses OAuth client-credentials (M2M), but the pre-flight probe was still selecting those servers and forwarding the caller's raw token in the HEAD request. Exclude servers with has_client_credentials from the probe list to match the actual downstream header-preparation logic. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): propagate upstream 403 as 403, not 401 with WWW-Authenticate Per RFC 9110, 401 means "go get new credentials." Mapping an upstream 403 to a gateway 401 causes OAuth clients to restart the authorization flow, obtain a fresh token with identical scopes, hit 403 again, and loop indefinitely. 401 from upstream → gateway 401 + WWW-Authenticate (re-authorize) 403 from upstream → gateway 403 (no WWW-Authenticate hint) Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(mcp): skip auth probe when Authorization may be the LiteLLM proxy key The pre-flight upstream probe must not forward the caller's Authorization header when it could itself be the LiteLLM proxy API key. Restrict the probe to requests that supply x-litellm-api-key explicitly — only then is the Authorization header unambiguously the upstream OAuth token the caller wants forwarded. * Fix MCP ASGI HTTPException propagation Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * fix(mcp): use public AsyncHTTPHandler.post() in auth probe Use AsyncHTTPHandler.post() and catch httpx.HTTPStatusError explicitly so the 401/403 we want to surface is not silently swallowed by the broad fail-open except Exception block. Avoids reaching into the handler's private client attribute, which would silently regress to fail-open if AsyncHTTPHandler is ever refactored. * Fix MCP auth probe tests Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> * test(mcp): add coverage for httpx.HTTPStatusError path in auth probe AsyncHTTPHandler.post() calls raise_for_status() internally, so a real upstream 401/403 lands as httpx.HTTPStatusError. Add a test that exercises that specific exception path so a regression that swallows the error in the broad fail-open except Exception would be caught. --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: claude-bot <claude-bot@anthropic.com> |